Subject: FYI
From: MODERATOR
To: All
Date Posted: 14:42:33 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: ppp-70-249-138-254.dsl.rcsntx.swbell.net at 70.249.138.254

Message:
Culled from the disclaimer:

12. Username - You are free to choose what ever username that you wish but take note that those usernames that are demeaning to your own self or to others, vulgar or that contains other negative connotations are disallowed. Using handles with racial tones is also strictly prohibited on this forum.

P.s. You know yourself. Cheers!

/Mod

Subject: CONCUBINES, KIDS AND AIRPORTS
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 14:24:25 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
With regards to the recent spate of political protagonists diving into the gutter to dig up dirt about opposing presidential candidates, I think it is a distracting and gratuitous exercise. In fact my reaction can be summed up by Clark Gable in the movie, Gone With The Wind: "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn" I am less interested in Solo B's purported harem of concubines than in his plans to reduce unemployment (currently running about 80%) or giving us reliable electricity beyond the campaign period. I don't really care whether Charles Margai has out-of-wedlock kids. I am however all ears if he would commit as president to expand the runways at Hastings Airport and make it an international airport and save us all from the shuttle nightmare between Lungi and Freetown. Party activists, please give us for debate your candidates' positions for educated debate and dot innuendoes about their extra marital exploits and libidos. That is so boring. Remember these guys are not running for Pope.

Subject: festoes
From: mani
To: All
Date Posted: 13:04:16 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
The Patriotic Vanguard, Sierra Leone News Portal|

Politics in Sierra Leone: A Tale of Three Manifestoes

By Christopher Warburton, Ph.D Econ

In 1776 the Americans crafted one of the most enduring political documents in human history, the Declaration of Independence. By so doing they cleaned up and popularized fundamental tenets of British political philosophy which affirmed the inalienable rights of man. The document is a testament to the relentless desire of mankind to be free from the yoke of oppression by despotic or tyrannical government so that human beings can prosper.

The British had the Magna Carta (Great Charter) of 1215 to guarantee liberty, fair trial and representative government to all Englishmen. In France, the fall of the Bastille eventually resulted in the Declaration of the Rights of Man which defined the goal of every political association as the “preservation of the natural and imprescr1ptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property security, and resistance against oppression.” Of course the French were inspired by the Americans, and this concept of freedom defined the free market economy of laissez-faire that was so passionately supported by the physiocrats.

The mechanisms for achieving liberty, prosperity, and responsible government have generally lacked consensus, but modern politics in Sierra Leone ought to remind us of the writings of French philosophers and European political thinkers who were clearly appalled by the Old Regime and all it represented. Montesquieu was concerned about unwise, irrational, and outdated laws when he wrote L’Espirit des Lois (The Spirit of Laws) in 1748. Rousseau, who was born in Switzerland in 1712, published his Social Contract in 1762 because he was clearly worried about the irony that man is usually born free but everywhere he seems to be in chains. His diagnosis was that government must derive its authority from the consent of the governed-sovereignty of the people.

Voltaire did not quite fit the profile of a modern philosopher, but as a popularizer of ideas his writings made no less of an impact on his society. He was highly suspicious of the role of religion in politics and he became the self-appointed champion of all victims of bigotry and injustice. According to Voltaire religion had originated long before religious leaders, but it had been exploited ever since “the first knave met the first fool.” Intolerance symbolized all that was stupid, irrational and degrading in the Old Regime. Real contemporary democracies take action to safeguard religious tolerance and equal protection of religious faiths.

The idea of direct democracy in the Greek polis has been revolutionized and made more appealing by American’s representative democracy, which despite its short comings, has become an evaluative paradigm for countries in search of a just society. What has made America a political envy of the world is in fact the reverberating power of actionable and inspirational words which have transcended the immediate needs of American independence to define the ideal political challenges of America and other societies in the world (including Sierra Leone) in search of responsible government: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”

There are two significant component parts of the Declaration: (i) The removal of destructive government; and (ii) The replacement of such a government by one which can be trusted to guarantee the safety and happiness of a nation. Aspiration to the realization of the dreams of the American Declaration poses incredible challenges for Sierra Leoneans as they decide who their next leaders are going to be. This is so because: (i) The general level of [civic] literacy required to understand and appreciate representative government is suboptimal; (ii) Serious political parties are no longer oblivious of those fundamental rights which may be deceptively incorporated into their manifestoes; (iii) In the absence of optimal literacy and the presence of rhetoric and irrational behavior, it is not uncommon for some voters to resort to violence or retreat to their parochial cleavages in the Dark Ages of the twenty-first century. In much more advanced societies such cleavages are politely referred to as “bases.” However, when these bases are sufficiently aggrieved, they may not espouse unflinching loyalty if they have a strong sense of political and economic alienation or resentment towards their political parties.

The Political Parties on Fundamental Liberties

Political parties can no longer exclude fundamental rights and liberties from their manifestoes. In this regard, the All People’s Congress (APC) cannot claim to be superior to the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), nor can the SLPP claim to be superior to the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) or the APC. Political elites are now familiar with the eighteenth century literature on fundamental liberties. Voters are therefore left with the daunting task of looking for nuances and impeaching suspicious assertions by asking the stubborn questions of: What? Why? How? For whom?

Apart from its commitment to representative government, the PMDC guarantees the constitutional and democratic rights of all citizens ( freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of association, freedom of information, right to free access to information, right to free, fair and expeditious trial, and freedom of the press).

The APC alludes to fundamental liberties as part of its core principles: “Freedom, human rights; human dignity; justice; equality; and the rule of law.” The APC writes: “Human rights have become an issue of great importance in contemporary times. This explains why it has come to occupy such an important and prominent place in State governance, the world over. Much of the misery and injustice of our time is the result of the reckless use of power. The abuse of power is a human problem and nobody seems to have a built-in-immunity from its corrosive effect. An APC Government is committed to limiting this tendency by ensuring the sanctity of life and the dignity of man.”

The SLPP states that: “No Government other than the SLPP Government can claim the accolade of heightening public awareness about human and citizens’ rights under the rule of law. And at no time have people become more conscious about their rights than now. This is a great achievement by any standard. But our work in this regard is not yet complete. In the post-election years ahead, we will set in motion a new public enlightenment campaign in order to ensure that every citizen of this country is fully aware of their civic rights as they are of their correlative civic obligations and responsibilities.”

Just what are the logical extensions of these fundamental liberties? Beyond what might seem to be their cursory restatement, they include the right to have food; health; education; and shelter. The political parties have done just fine in reminding the voters about how committed they are to guaranteeing these fundamental liberties.

The SLPP would like to increase access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation for all in both urban and rural areas. “The strategy in the five years is to continue to expand and strengthen the decentralised network of facilities for the delivery of safe drinking water and the improvement of general sanitation in both urban and rural areas. The provision of basic healthcare is considered a major priority for the SLPP Government. We will continue to demonstrate commitment to the improvement of the health status of the population, especially the rural and urban poor, in the next five years. The overall goal is to improve accessibility and affordability of health services to the population.”

As far as education is concerned, “the overall objectives of the education sector are to (a) promote basic education for all Sierra Leoneans; and (b) support manpower development in key sectors that has (sic) the greatest impact on economic growth, poverty reduction and prosperity. The main objectives of the SLPP government, during its next five years of office are to ensure the planned growth and development of the towns and villages of Sierra Leone and at the same time promote access by all citizens including the underprivileged to safe sanitary and descent housing.”

The APC contends that “Sierra Leone, once a pioneer in education and the envy of the sub region formerly known as the Athens of Africa, now finds itself in a deepening crisis that has undermined the very foundation of its educational system. Teaching and learning in many schools in Sierra Leone are at a minimal level principally because of poor classroom conditions, insufficient learning materials, lack of adequately qualified, well compensated and committed teachers. The APC considers education as the most important vehicle through which Sierra Leone will develop its human resources. An APC government will therefore facilitate, encourage and provide adequate and appropriate education.”

The APC argues that the “health system in Sierra Leone is in acute crisis. The whole country is serviced by less than six physician doctors, less than four surgeon specialists and less than three hundred nurses in the employ of government. The APC established the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences and the National School of Nursing while in governance. Disappointingly the SLPP government rendered these institutions unproductive and unable to meet our nation’s health needs. This lack of vision on the part of the SLPP government has had a devastating effect in the country to the extent that life expectancy has reached an all time low of 35 years for females and 33 for males. The party also recognizes that housing a basic necessity of life is in short supply in the country for all categories of the population.”

The PMDC reports that “life expectancy in Sierra Leone averages 37 years, one of the lowest in the world. Maternity and infant mortality rate in Sierra Leone are among the highest in the world. There is a high prevalence of preventable diseases due to inadequate and ill-equipped health infrastructure, inadequate access to health and other social services in both urban and rural areas. Doctors, nurses and supporting staff are relatively few in number. The party believes that prevention is better than cure and that it will create the enabling environment for citizens to live healthier lives, as good health is an important catalyst to economic and social development necessary for national prosperity and political stability.”

The PMDC recognizes that “human resource development is crucial to turning the economy around. Notwithstanding the billions poured into the education sector over the years, the best we could get are poorly constructed schools with few trained teachers, resulting in disappointing results in public examinations. Sierra Leone, once heralded as the Athens of Africa, now lags behind less endowed nations in the provision of education. As a political Movement, PMDC recognizes education as a key investment in human resources, which is grossly lacking at the moment. The thrust of the PMDC’s education policy shall be geared towards addressing the following: a) Quality education at all levels. b) Affordable education for all; and c) Accessibility to education nationwide.”

The PMDC notes that “public buildings and offices, quarters, barracks, their furnishings and trappings nationwide are in dire state of disrepair and grossly inadequate. Meanwhile a significant number of our compatriots have no place to lay their heads. The institutional and legislative framework for a housing scheme in this country is weak and inadequate. The PMDC in government will: a) Commit to developing policies, plans and programmes that will satisfy the housing requirements of the nation; b) Develop a national policy and objective on housing that will be geared towards meeting the national housing demand by increasing the national housing stock and satisfying the hopes and aspirations of the low-income sector of the workers of our country; and c) Create an enabling environment that will facilitate local and foreign investor-participation in housing schemes through appropriate incentives.”

Voters must now sift through the competing claims on fundamental liberties to make wise and reasonable choices. History is not generally kind to incumbents who seek a fresh mandate when the electorate is doleful and enraged because of their adverse policies. On the other hand, incumbents and a ruling political party with the ability to demonstrate and persuade voters that they have accomplished or met reasonable guarantees or standards of fundamental liberties tend to have a reasonably good shot at re-employment. A government which is up for reelection must then be prepared to defend its record, the immediate evaluative criterion for its reappointment.

Challengers face voter skepticism and their chances of capturing political power are highly dependent on trust and the degree of destruction caused by an old regime. Their past records on issues and voting patterns become highly critical for a convincing bid.

Beyond the seemingly solemn promises, those who aspire to the position of political leadership must then satisfactorily explain what they have done in and out of office to: reduce the level of poverty; increase the level of education; foster constitutional reform of bad laws (e.g. land tenure); create equal opportunities; foster economic prosperity; and uphold property right rather than promote its arbitrary repudiation.

The electorate is entitled to know: What proportion of the government’s budget was set aside to attain or guarantee fundamental liberties? What fraction of it was squandered? What was the agenda of the opposing political parties on these social issues? Was the opposition complicit or did it acquiesce? Corruption and poverty are evident threats to the realization of fundamental liberties. Voters must therefore decide which public officials have inflicted undue hardship on them as a result of corrupt behavior or abuse of authority, keeping in mind that all contestants, regardless of party affiliation, must be held to a rigorous standard of scrutiny.

Representative democracy implodes when salient political questions are answered by blood and iron or the irrational conduct of an unenlightened electorate. Bad governance and underdevelopment thrive on the cycle of gun-toting politics, mediocre political participation, and adverse [s]election, which are so characteristic of political episodes in the history of the nation.

Representative Government

The theory of separation of powers has become a well respected principle and system of government. It is a system that is intended to guarantee the now familiar fundamental liberties, but more so to check or forestall the excesses of government. The concept of checks and balances is integral to the essence of representative government. What this means from the American perspective is that there must be: separation of control; separation of personnel; but not necessarily separation of functions. Government is broken up into three branches: (i) the executive; (ii) the legislative; and (iii) the judicial. A member of one branch of government cannot be a member of another, nor can one branch of government control the other.

Notwithstanding the separation of personnel and control, the executive branch which is responsible for enforcing laws, could also grant pardons (a judicial function), give executive orders, or veto legislation (a legislative function). The legislature is responsible for making laws but it also determines the budget of the executive branch (executive function) and it can impeach a president and remove him/her from office (judicial function). The judiciary is responsible for interpreting laws or adjudicating laws but it can examine the actions of the executive branch (executive function) and laws of the legislature (a legislative function). The system has built-in safeguards to prevent one arm of government from becoming too powerful or tyrannical without oversight. It is based on trust and the use of good judgment.

The manifestoes promise Sierra Leoneans good representative government, but they are unclear about how much oversight and remedy to bad governance are desirable. The SLPP states: “Rights, whatever their descr1ption, are hollow until they are stoutly protected by the judicial system. That system, given the degree of independence and impartiality and effectiveness it enjoys, can itself contribute greatly to increasing or decreasing public confidence in the Government and the State.” The party also supports decentralization and devolution by empowering local institutions just as the other political parties.

The APC complains that “executive interference, coupled with the pursuit of political party interests have clearly undercut the constitutional role of the legislature. In addition to this, general conditions of service for members of Parliament remain unattractive. This situation will be thoroughly examined by an APC government, and proper and adequate policies will be put in place to make Parliamentary work attractive and productive. There has been an unwillingness on the part of the central government to devolve power, functions and resources to the local units.” To obtain “the true mark of democracy,” the APC cites the supremacy of the rule of law and the separation of the offices of the Minister of Justice and that of the Attorney-General.

The PMDC stipulates that “the rule of law is a sine qua non for any democratic society. It is the cornerstone for good governance leading to a stable society. PMDC is committed to upholding the rule of law and guarantees a free, open and just society. A PMDC government will: a) Ensue (sic) the independence of the judiciary as opposed to what obtains now and had long been. b) Reform the judicial and justice system to make them more efficient, effective and attractive.”

What seems to be apparent in the manifestoes of the political parties, and rightly so, is the vigorous promotion of the idea that an independent judiciary and devolution are crucial indicators of representative government. It seems to me that voters should be prepared to request more information about the checks to arbitrary authority and the removal of political leaders from office during their tenure when they abuse their authority or commit “high crimes.” Punitive measures for the abuse of power and/or “high crimes” while leaders are in office must not be perceived of as an ancillary component of representative government if the almighty fundamental liberties are to be guaranteed. It should be interesting to know what the political parties intend to do (in real terms) about such crimes and abuse of authority. It just might not be enough to talk about zero tolerance for corruption or referral to under-utilized political institutions.

Economic Growth and Development

The political parties have frantically raced to out-compete one another in their promises for economic growth in five years. Virtually every sector of the national economy has been targeted for improvement. It is curious to know why modest promises are insufficient to capture political power. Why over-commit or over-invest? Intuitively, the thinking seems to be that a political party which promises the most would have a realistic chance of being elected if the electorate fails to see the hidden challenges of meeting ambitious goals.

Voters must consider the practical limits or the merits of the commitment to economic growth in five years. By promising too much, three salient questions cannot be overlooked: (i) How can these plans be attained in five years? (ii) If fiscal restraint or discipline should be given high priority, what is the source of funding for the essential programs to get the country back on track? (iii) What is the plan for foreign exchange stability, if foreign investors are to be enticed to Sierra Leone (i.e. without having pecuniary rewards in alternative forms, how can the currency be made more attractive to foreign investors)? What might not have anything to do with over-commitment is a plan for the labor force to be internationally competitive for integration into the global economy. What are the plans to prepare Sierra Leoneans to capture a substantial share of the outsourcing market of the global economy if the domestic agricultural, financial, and business sectors cannot readily and favorably respond to the state of unemployment?

The Commitments to Economic Growth and Development

In addition to the social spending that might be required, there is hardly any sector of the Sierra Leonean economy for which targeted spending is clear. It is incomprehensible how the leakages of smuggling, tax evasion, and public capital flight will make-up for the short-fall of government outlay. It is somewhat consoling to note that privatization, which is strongly supported by the political parties could minimize government spending, but it will require more than privatization to satisfy the required deficit financing. The manifestoes do not make clear just how much spending is required to resuscitate the ailing economy, although it is clear that the mining, agricultural, and financial sectors, in addition to the physical infrastructure of the country, will require mammoth financing or remain in a steady state or state of disrepair.

The National Revenue Authority (NRA), which is now part of the bureaucracy for the purposes of revenue collection, may very well be instrumental in improving the revenue collecting capabilities of any government in the country, but it does not indicate the extent to which it is capable of financing the agenda of any of the political parties. How much money is required to overhaul the educational system, health, housing, forestry, mining, communication and electricity? What assurances are there that electricity will be available for private consumption, businesses, or foreign investors?

The inflationary situation in the country has to be addressed much more deeply. The SLPP promises to reduce inflation in the next five years by instituting major monetary instruments that will include open market operations and statutory reserve requirements. The PMDC and APC are equally aware of the fiscal and monetary challenges, but with less precise strategies, voters might want to understand the positions of all the political parties on precise issues like seigniorage and what can be done about it to reduce the level of inflation. How can the central Bank’s independence be restored? What role will seigniorage play in financing government deficit? How can seigniorage be avoided?

As far as sovereign debt is concerned, the incumbent party seems to have an advantage and its manifesto gives exhaustive analysis of debt negotiations culminating in decision point. Unlike its challengers, it has been in the favorable position to negotiate debt reduction with international organizations. Challengers must therefore show debt-reduction competence or serious commitment to sovereign debt negotiations and reduction.

Should voters be vigilant and responsible? The country is in a situation for which due diligence and civic responsibility cannot be trivialized or sacrificed to irrational sentiments. Voters must be willing and eager to ask the decisive questions that will put the country on the path of sustainable economic development. Convincing and rational responses with the highest likelihood of implementation must inform probative rather than belligerent voters if the country should have any realistic prospect of hope.

Meaningful political and economic transitions are no longer dependent on rhetoric or sentiments, but substantive programs in an age when most nations of the world are beginning to realize that it is important to make progress and uplift the lot of their citizenry. Fortunately, unlike the 1960s and 1970s when military regimes were well disposed to seize political power with virtual impunity, the international community is now less disposed to countenance rogue regimes and war crimes. Sierra Leoneans must now seize the opportunity to elect the government they deserve to give them a better shot at life and prosperity. May the best political party win and may God save the country from undesirable leadership.

Subject: Concubines, Bastards and Airports
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 12:45:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
I have witnessed the recent spate of political protagonists diving into the gutter to scoop dirt about the presidential candidates. My response to all this is best expressed forme by Clark Gable in the movie, Gone With The Wind: "Frankly my dear, I don't give a damn". My stance is not because of high principle. I just believe that if we start taking the political discourse on that slippery slope of a man's extramarital activities, vis-a-vis girlfriends, concubines or out-of-wedlock kids, most people on this forum will turn out to be hypocrites. Besides we are not voting for the Pope. We are trying to elect someone who in spite of his human failings will aspire to noble ideals and altruism for the greater good. Berewa's concubines? Margai's bastards? Who cares? My vote for any of the big three will depend on their record and plans for the future. For example, which candidate will consider extending Hastings runways so that it can become an international airport and save every body the shuttle nightmare between Lungi and Freetown?

Subject: Re: Concubines, Bastards and Airports
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:54:32 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
I like that. Brilliant! I posed the question as to the validity of margai's statement on his website and other outlets about the number of his children. It was not intended to attack his personality but his credibility as a leader. The act itself can be understood but the omission of disclosure made me wonder - why is this man behaving like this - we are not fools - we know and telling us about will make us hold you in high esteem.

Subject: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:41:19 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
THE NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT OH; WE NA DE LANDLORD!
By Awareness Time
Jul 19, 2007, 18:39 Email this article
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You May Click Here To Read or Discuss Views About This Article

Track & Lyrics by Oba of Fourah Bay

INTRO

Go Lidom if you heart done warm

For 24 years back, oodat bin

take Salone lek Farm???

Two Ship Res; You want know ‘bout that

Ask Ernest Koroma ‘bout that

Na im na bin NASSIT Chairman

NASSIT Chairman na Parliament

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

The Notice Nor Go Right Oh

We Na De Landlord

The Notice Nor Go Right Oh

We Na De Landlord

From 2001, Gadhaffi send res for Salone

From 2001, Gadhaffi send res for Salone

Ernest Koroma know that

Na im na bin the Chairman

For the NASSIT Committee

Na dem bin sell the res

Ee dey make innocent

Because ee want power

Power wey noto you yone

24 Years, We don toe-line

You done kill we! Ee do so!

FIRST STANZA

If you don craise, Go leh den men you

You nor go gi notice to landlord

Oodat den dey use you

Get for abuse you oh

Rebel den pwell yah

De Pa don cam, ee make yah

Schoolpikin nor dey pay school

Woman sabi den yone right

NASSIT support old pa dem

Support Solo B leh we get betteh Salone

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

SECOND STANZA

2002 Elections, den nor talk

2004 Elections, den nor talk

You wey don sell res

Dey make lek you nor know

Na Politics!

Why 2007 from 2001?

Na now den wan talk

Because election don cam

Den frade Solo-B

Den begin talk... Boku Lie!

Talk Na Free!

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

Subject: Re: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: Continue for Suffer
To: All
Date Posted: 14:08:29 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
Support Solo B leh KABBAH ALAKI continue FOR PWELL BETTEH NAR Salone

CHORUS:

Berewa en Kabbah
We nor fool
Nar Oonu fool
We nor craise
We don gainse
Kabbah don don
Berewa go don
Nar di notice dis
We don tire wit dis
Salone Pipul Problem
We go kick dem

Subject: Re: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: PROPAGANDA
To: All
Date Posted: 14:37:58 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
E luk leke say kabba in bortu don sweet nar sylvia worworliwor in mot. Ejus dey pull sing way.

Subject: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Saidu Daphay Turay
To: All
Date Posted: 10:51:01 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-70-108-186-218.washdc.east.verizon.net at 70.108.186.218

Message:
Maada Bio's quest for power made him to betray Valentine Strasser by hurriedly handing power through quasi elections to kabbah. He journeyed to the United States to enjoy his goodies and booties looted from the coffers of Sierra Leone but the United States could'nt accomodate him just as Tom Nyumah got himself exposed that rendered his deportation. Now these two ill-fated cronies are now joining forces with the SLPP to terrorize the opposition parties just as Maada announced in 2006 that "If the APC wins, he will overthrow that government." Let Maada Bio be reminded that inasmuch he has right to allign with any political party of his choice, his threat of distabilizing Sierra Leone is closely monitored and will be held accountable for any problems facing the opposition parties. Violent is not bought but a will for the savage to exercise and a counter defence for the civilized to reciprocate. So Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah can exploit the the dying SLPP party by becoming body guards to Berewah but the peoples power will prevail against any planned subversive activities.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 11:37:40 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Saidu Turay, I am in sync with you in your distrust of Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah, those political mercenaries. Yes they are mercenaries in the sense that they offer their services to the highest bidder. This time the SLPP is offering the biggest renumeration, so Bio and Nyumah are SLPP thugs today. These guys are completely devoid of principles or scrupples and would have eagerly jumped at the opportunity to tot a gun or ride shot gun for APC or PMDC had the price been right. There is no conspiracy theory here at all. It's all about the unprincipled dash for the buck. Oh, about Captain (General? PLEASE!!) Bio's threat to stage a coup; he has a snowball's chance in hell. The present day military in Sierra Leone is more professional than the rag-tag outfit Bio and Nyumah led. The only time this military will lead a coup is if the Solo gang decides to mug our democracy by stealing the elections. And even then, they are going to hold Bio and Nyumah at arm's lenght.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:58:13 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
We would rather have BIO, than have Gbassay Kanu( RUFP) leader.
Bet you are planning another Rebel War...
This time, it will take few days not YRS.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 13:15:54 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Alieu, you said you would rather have Bio than Gbessay Kanu of the RUFP. I have never heard of an RUFP Gbessay Kanu and wouldn't care anyway. My position is that we would be better off without any of these despicable clowns. Anyway just as Solo B deserves to be booed for hiring that bumbling Napoleon Maada Bio as his chief thug, so too does Boy Ernest deserve to be smacked for even entertaining the thought of entering into an unholy alliance with those murderous acolytes of the RUF. Win, but please not by all means necessary. Solomon, Ernest and Charles, take note.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Joker Oker
To: All
Date Posted: 13:57:56 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
Manny, why do you take this Joker seriously?

Don't you know his lies are the product of his dull imagination? The clown is a tribalistic SLPP supporter that is used to mammy cuss and calling other people names.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 13:26:14 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Bo mi man change da you cyber-name dae. How ba?

As for Gbassay Kanu, he is the current leader of the RUF and son of former APC kingpin.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 11:35:51 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Saidu Turay, I am in sync with you in your distrust of Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah, those political mercenaries. Yes they are mercenaries in the sense that they offer their services to the highest bidder. This time the SLPP is offering the biggest renumeration, so Bio and Nyumah are SLPP thugs today. These guys are completely devoid of principles or scrupples and would have eagerly jumped at the opportunity to tot a gun or ride shot gun for APC or PMDC had the price been right. There is no conspiracy theory here at all. It's all about the unprincipled dash for the buck. Oh, about Captain (General? PLEASE!!) Bio's threat to stage a coup; he has a snowball's chance in hell. The present day military in Sierra Leone is more professional than the rag-tag outfit Bio and Nyumah led. The only time this military will lead a coup is if the Solo gang decides to mug our democracy by stealing the elections. And even then, they are going to hold Bio and Nyumah at arm's lenght.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: NOISE
To: All
Date Posted: 11:13:20 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 207.108.136.242

Message:
It's a shame for those who were singing praises of heroism for Tom Nyuma when he was in the US fighting deportation. Do you remember what happened to SAJ Musa? Trust me it is going to happen to these murderers if they want to reignite another problem for that country. This time is the people's turn. So they have to watch out their actions.

Subject: ‘Ten years of forcing young girls into prostitution'
From: Med
To: All
Date Posted: 10:29:46 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 82.114.74.96

Message:

Yaya thanks, I am moved by such a statement, I urge that our leaders and their loyalists double efforts in addressing such disgraceful issue. This problem is primarily influenced by the war we have all suffered in our nation; yes even extraterrestrials know now that recovering from war is a gradual and often painstaking process which gyrates around good or bad governance, for example, you don’t need an outstanding degree to run your home, it takes a two fold process i. the process of decision-making and ii. the process by which decisions are implemented, in short defines governance. It’s either as a government, CEO, husband or wife fails in reaching a realistic decision or the implementation process goes amiss, the results actually determines or questions ones ability.
Africa has the nastiest history in the human race, our people have suffered much brutality and we continue to suffer the more in the hands of very few narrow mindedness people called politicians, which includes the reunion of slpp and former nprc teenage soldiers, soldiers that ravaged our nation with impunity [despite Berewa’s allegation of corruption claims on13 Sept 1996] are now taking the back seat whilst those that advised them rule us [Kabba and Berewa-National Policy Advisory Council] it’s a pity, this has actually helped my conclusion that we have no clue of governance, what a leader is or should be, even how our people accept the effects of bad governance as against its proper functioning, determines our level of understanding. Sierra Leoneans venerates our leaders, sad to say, it’s a colonial legacy, it ought not to be so in this 21 century, our people need to know the concept of leadership, pathetically even those deemed enlightened prove ignorance on this subject when ever they express themselves in this forum. I have often said that leaders should fear the people, not the opposite; if a nation suffers, it’s a nation’s choice, because history has taught us that ordinary sober minded people [nations] have crumbled kingdoms, governments that did not serve their national interests.
The Arabs we beg for money today, helping us install electricity or street lights mostly were mere hunters or nomads at the time most African nations gained what you call independence today, despite the fact that they are engulfed in crises they are ahead of us.
Now, our women [sisters] and children were reported by TRC to have suffered the most during the barbaric senseless decade war and have continued to suffer, we need to put aside politics and address these simple issues like food security……to our leaders, think and implement, please

Subject: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Toegondoe Sagbah
To: All
Date Posted: 01:33:52 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mendemoi@yahoo.com
Entered From: pool-72-82-207-36.cmdnnj.east.verizon.net at 72.82.207.36

Message:
Wanakabs, you want to go personal on Charles with your previous question and not on the issues? Then here is a question for you to answer. HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE AND HOW DID HE RELLY TREAT THE OLD LADY WHEN SHE WAS ALIVE?(May God Bless Her soul)? I think that you would rather deal with the issues instead of private lives...PLENTY OF SKELETONS IN THE CLOSET, MAY BE YOU DON'T KNOW

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Salia Koroma
To: All
Date Posted: 09:12:56 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: salia@hotmail.com
Entered From: c-24-127-53-17.hsd1.va.comcast.net at 24.127.53.17

Message:
Just rumour mongering: that is what you are known for here and on other forums.That Margai is unfaithful is common knowledge, not a skeleton. Only you know the skeleton about Mr. Berewa.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: WAA
To: All
Date Posted: 09:50:30 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
You are the person fooling himself.

Berewa is NOTORIOUS for having concubines, many of them half his age! They usually called him "uncle" around his late wife, to try and fool the poor woman. One of the notorious "money-nar han back nar gron" ladies of ill repute in Atlanta is in fact one of Berewa's many concubines

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:14:19 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Atleast he is not known for having an affair with his neice like Toe's leader.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: PMDC
To: All
Date Posted: 11:37:23 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
YOU DON'T KNOW THE REAL DIRTY OLD MAN CALLED BEREWA.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:39:30 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
what/who i know is the DIRTY Bastard called Margai.
Laydom with you neice...

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:09:22 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Alie, do not go down their road - we should avoid using such words. The bulk who left the SLPP and joined the PMDC are known for such tactics - profane obscenities is part of their vocabulary. Hooliganism and notoriety is all the orders of their day. Thank God they are no longer a part of us; their tribalistic character is known throughout - they are the characters that gave the SLPP a Southerner/Easterner look. Thank God they have gone!

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: XCheck Your Facts
To: All
Date Posted: 13:54:47 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
"The bulk who left the SLPP and joined the PMDC are known for such tactics - profane obscenities is part of their vocabulary. Hooliganism and notoriety is all the orders of their day."

Not true, lying SLPP bato man.Is SLPP Alieu Sesay, man of many fake names, who has just now used obcenities not SLPP? Why is it that you SLPPers always like to push your dirty laundry under the foot mat (no pun intended, SLPPers).

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: PMDC
To: All
Date Posted: 11:43:06 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
berewa laydom wit his niece while his wife was in the same house, is what i hear. SO, WHAT DOESC HE WANT TO TALK?

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: men pekin
To: All
Date Posted: 13:42:09 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Wae me aunty say for go men me, every night wae e comot Pa dae tell me for pull wait year nar im aede.
Den we move to " touch am". E kin tell me for touch am, en den e gee me 10000 leone.
Nar dat we lef pan tae ar get belleh for am.

De peikin dae with me mama nar BO #2.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: FINDA ATL
To: All
Date Posted: 12:07:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: adsl-074-228-219-218.sip.asm.bellsouth.net at 74.228.219.218

Message:
Leave me out of this,because as far as I know,Uncle Berewa helped me with my SCHOOL FEES in America,so if he decided to have me as one of his CONCUBINES that's find with me,eventhough I knew what he was doing to AUNTY NEE was wrong,but yeah I needed to finish school in Georgia.I was at the HILTON AIRPORT HOTEL with him last year when he came to Atlanta,and his children were mad at US,but I do not give a damm about them,and they know it,and especially that spoiled rotten daughter of his ANNIE LANSANA.I have been to Sierra Leone several times since the death of Aunty NEE,and now I am free to stay at his house.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: news
To: All
Date Posted: 04:59:43 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: 125-64-ftth.onsneteindhoven.nl at 88.159.64.125

Message:
Chez is drifting into a sea of lies and darkness. Himself has more than nine children. He said it not me.
Tell me, your action to have such a large number of children shows that you are promiscuous and you lack a sense of self control.
Go back and look at yourself before you talk about others.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:08:27 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Are you refuting my observations? Am i the candidate here? Am I the one being tested here for credibility and not promiscuity? Answer my questions! I am not ashamed of my children. I have five biological and I support a lot through my etrepreneurial vetures.

I am not the one being tested here. i have not given a false statement to conceal a vital prerequisite on the question of my credibility.

I tell no lies - those who know me, will tell you that I do not engage in gossip or namecalling. it is an observation that i want to confirm. It emanated from a debate on charles' honesty and credibility. If you have anything berewa said that is not true - tell us and some of us will question him.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: ANSWER
To: All
Date Posted: 09:55:34 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
"Are you refuting my observations? Am i the candidate here? Am I the one being tested here for credibility and not promiscuity? Answer my questions!"

The answer to your first and last question is yes! The answer to your remaining question is no. That is not so relevant as the answer to the first and last questions.

Your major problem is that you lack credibility. It is a fault you share with your candidate, Berewa. Both of you are doomed to failure in your unpatriotic quest to fool the poor suffering people of Salone.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:18:35 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
I can see we are not understanding each other. is the statement made by margai in his profile about the number of his children an omission or the truth? that is my question. My credibility is not been tested here - it is that of margai. he made a statement to the world and i am merely trying to bring out his error or lack of truth.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: UNCLE FINDA
To: All
Date Posted: 13:51:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
You may not understand yuourzelf, but me, I undersand you very very well. You want to use dirty politics. Too bad you don't know that your candidate Dirty Old Man Solomon FINDA of ATlanta Uncle BEREWA s a very dirty old man.

I repeat, Berewa is a very dirty OLD man.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 05:49:46 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
There are many forms of marraige you know. There are even traditional forms.....

The passing unto the hereafter of Rabbi Josef Dunner was followed by this obituary in the Guardian
“He is survived by his wife, nine of his 10 children, and 250 grand and great-grandchildren, all following the traditions in which he lived his life.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,,2117048,00.html
Count your own blessings and without envy, avarice, covetousness, jealousy or spite, you may count his blessings too.
“The Vicar of Wakefield” begins “I was ever of opinion that the honest man who married and brought up a large family, did more service than he who continued single and only talked of population.”

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 06:09:12 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
True mon patron! My bone of contention: ommission/oversight or misplaced info if become known should be courageously disclosed. I am asking the PMDC is the info or your website for the public to consume true?

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:53:17 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
You are missing my point. my question may have been directed in a personal phase but it is the credibility of your candidate's statement on your website that puzzles me. he says "Marital Status: Married (Mrs. Vivat Margai with two daughters)". This statement makes me question a credibillity issue here. Why is he withholding information that would have dismiss the notion that Charles lacks credibility; that charles is covertly dishonest - disclosure to the full is what I am asking. About Berewa's concubines! that is irrelevant as everyman who lacks a bit of discipline can indulge in such, it is also a matter of the degree to which the individual is ready to go. have concubines and spread your powerful genes? Or you just fulfill likes animalistic needs man can hardly let go? I do not think i am personal here? If you have anything on Berewa, please say it the people need to know. I am supporting Berewa but the interest of my country comes first. i think, for now, he is the only suitable choice we have. I would not be personal - I love facts - noone will kill or send me to gaol for that. Tell us the truth and we will understand you guys.

yes the closets are full of dirty linen. now is the time that the character can have a bearing on the policies you can make in the future. A womaniser may be an immoral character and lacks self-discipline but to deny that which you've sown is an abomination of the higest order.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 02:38:59 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Of course you guys have never heard of "Grandpa's style!" - Muslims are limited to four, and Christians to one. You'll have to check the song " School Days" from Demba Conta's Album " The United States of Africa " for Grandpa's style.....

Whilst you Chez Winakabs may be beating your chest with self -Righteousness when talking about our local heroes, what do you have to say, not only about Kabbah and Albert's annointed, but about

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:59:15 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Mon patron, i am not criticising the act here but the denial of an act that one has done and everybody knows it. It dents one's credibility. Few men can raise their hands up and call themselves saint. But when in the public domain or wanting to be in the public domain, one should have the bold courage to disclose what others may view as a necessary thing. Do not conceal that which is so important in making assessment of your standing in life - your integrity.

Solomon lived it and enjoyed it. he did not deny his offspring. Ethiopia is proud today to have solomon as their descendant. Speak out and people will respect and understand your past. The urge can do a lot of wonders.

Subject: Cocorioko! Why so late with the debate?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:19:03 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:

The reporting of the debate will take a day and then this will be discussed during the four days before the elections on Cocorioko and a few other forums with mostly Diaspora participants, some card toting, but mostly non-voters.........

And then do these Diaspora discussions in cyberspace ever impact on the discussions and home grown opinions?

To what extent will the debate impact on voter behaviour, especially on the floating (if there are any such people in Sierra Leone.......

The Royal African Society
http://www.royalafricansociety.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=141

Tackling the issues that caused the war:
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/493/

That Libyan Rice business:
http://www.peepsierraleone.com/news/templates/article.asp?articleid=38&zoneid=8

To help prevent the hijacking of the elections:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/africa/story/2007/03/070220_sierraleone_elections.shtml

Since the debate has been postponed to the day before Mr. Berewa’s birthday party, it’s possible that we can still send in questions for the SLPP’s Berewa (known to some of his detractors as a somnambulist) the Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma (the youngest and most youthful of the three) and the Hon. Charles St. Francis Margai (who would also like to be given a chance to perform some miracles) and to debate…….

Subject: Re: Cocorioko! Why so late with the debate? (2)
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 21:30:58 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
V-P Berewa is probably now undergoing intensive debate coaching , going over the issues , again and again and knowing that some of these APC debaters can be rough, able trifoot you ehn den bazz you pan tap di bargain, and one sure good thing about Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma, is that he is a very calm human being....

A vice-presidential debate could also take place before the big boys’ battle it out.

Subject: A REFLECTION - SEE WHERE OUR DETERIORATION BEGAN
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 20:17:31 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
COUNTRY REPORT ON TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE - BY MARIAMA JALLOH

Sierra Leone is one of the oldest Countries in the West Coast of Africa. It has a population of about 4 million people and it shares common boarders with Liberia on the Eastern side and with Guinea on both the Eastern and Northern sides of the country. Sierra Leone has 14 indigenous ethnic tribes and it is divided in to four provinces – the Eastern Province, Southern Province, Northern Province and the Western Area.

Sierra Leone has natural resources like Diamonds, Gold, Iron Ore and Bauxite which were the main source of export before the war. About half of the population are engaged in small scale farming like rearing livestock (this is common in the Northern Province), planting of rice, ground nut, cocoa, coffee and kola nuts. Most of these crops planted are for domestic use. But crops like Cocoa and Coffee, before the war, were exported to other countries.

At this moment Sierra Leone does not export any crops and is highly dependent on importation of goods from other countries.

Sierra Leone, among other countries, was colonized by the British and finally got independence on the 27th April,1961 and later became a republican state under the then Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai. Sierra Leone at present has a democratically elected government headed by President Ahmed Tejan Kabba. We have the three main organs of Government which are independent i.e. The Legislature, The Executive and The Judiciary.

TRADE UNION HISTORY IN SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is among the countries on the continent with the oldest trade unions. It is also among the countries, which recorded the earliest strikes on the continent. In 1874, a strike occurred in Freetown harbor and in the years that followed before the formation of trade unions as of today, were years of bitter and violent protest by the workers against the poor working conditions and inhuman treatment in the hands of the employers who enjoyed the full backing of the colonial government.

THE PERIOD 1928 – 1938
Many of the strikes and protests took place during this period. These days any strike action and protests were considered illegal and subversive. But, as a result of these unrest’s which were not only prevalent in Sierra Leone but also in other countries, led to the issuing of a directive by the colonial secretary of the home government to the colonial administrators in 1930 requiring them to enact labor legislation on minimum conditions of employment and trade union organization.

Attempts to form trade unions in Sierra Leone started with workers grouping themselves into departmental and shop organizations. The first such organizations formed at work places were in the Railways Department, Marampa Mines, Pepel and the Sierra Leone Coaling Company (MABELLA).

The organizations were formed purposely to enable the workers to put across their demands to the employers, but due to the fact that the organizations were not recognized by the employers andin the absence of labor laws providing a machinery for negotiations, the organizations were more often used to organize strikes than engaging in negotiations with employers. This situation of unrest lingered on until 1938, when the late I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson returned home from abroad with a wealth of experience he gained during his travels around the world. He preached to people the following ideas:

- how the workers could request for their rights from the employers and
- How the citizens could request for their civil rights.

At a general meeting convened at the King George Farm at Savage Street in Freetown immediately after the MABELLA Strike, he educated thousands of workers who attended the meeting on how to organize themselves into strong trade unions which fight for their rights and be recognized by the government. He in fact introduced the method of organizing trade unions and political parties in Sierra Leone.

THE RAILWAYS’ AND THE “MABELLA” STRIKES
The two strikes occurred before the enactment of the Sierra Leone Labor Laws in 1939. The Railways strike took place in 1926. The strike was as a result of workers’ demands for better wages and better working conditions from the Railways authority, which seemed to have fallen on “Deaf Ears”.

The strike, which began on February 1926, lasted for two months, during which period the workers suffered humiliation, and harassment in the hands of troops who shot at them as they demonstrated and arrested the strike leaders. The Governor of Sierra Leone described the strike as a revolt against the government by its own servants.

The 1938 strike by the workers of Sierra Leone Coaling Company, MABELLA as it was best known, lasted for two weeks. The strike was caused by the same reasons as the Railways strike. But this time, the government intervened by working out a compromise between the raging workers and the management, resulting in the work being resumed after slight changes were made in the working conditions.

Although the work resumed within two weeks, the stranded foreign ships waiting to be loaded with coal incurred huge losses.

The enactment of the Sierra Leone Labor Laws embodying trade union ordinance in 1939, marked a new era of industrial relation in Sierra Leone. The trade unions were registered in large numbers following the enactment of the laws. The first trade union to be registered was the Artisans & Allied Workers’ Union led by the late Brother Marcus Grant as its General Secretary. Brother Grant later figured prominently not only in trade unions, but also in politics. Together with late President Dr. Siaka Stevens, who started his trade union career, as General Secretary of Marampa Mines Union later became the General Secretary-General of the United Mine Workers Union and first Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Council of Labor (SLCL) at its inception?

Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act Sierra Leone Government

Dr. Siaka Stevens never lost touch with Trade Union Movement even after his resignation from trade union leadership to become a full-time politician. Both Brother Siaka Stevens and Marcus C. Grant were pioneers and heroes of the Sierra Leone Labor Movement. Other trade unions formed that time included the Railways Union, Carpenters’ Union. Some of the unions were very small and weak. The government on the other hand was busy with the establishment of the labor department. But due to lack of qualified personnel, it took a long time before the government could properly start the department.

THE FIRST TRADE UNION LABOUR CENTRE
Efforts by Dupinee a Sierra Leonean and Edgar Parry, a British Trade Unionist who later became the first labor commissioner culminated in the establishment by 1946 of streamlined trade union organization on industrial basis. The Sierra Leone Council of Labor, a trade union co-ordinating body was formed in the same year with Brother Siaka Stevens as its first General Secretary.

The Creoles of Freetown provided almost the entire labor force for the government owned enterprises with which the early trade unions were connected such as the railways, the mines and docks. Not until much later were trade unions formed in most private sectors.

Because of this homogeneity of labor force without marked tribal difference trade union organization accelerated much faster. Of all the British colonies, Sierra Leone enjoyed the enviable position of having the highest reputation in the field of industrial relations and boasted of negotiating machinery, which conformed to that of the United Kingdom.

In 1949 Sierra Leone Labor Congress participated in the formation of the ICFTU the first representatives being the late Siaka Stevens and the late Marcus Grant.

Prior to the 1955 strike, industrial relations in Sierra Leone were presented as something of a model with close cooperation between unions, the labor departments and employers, the existence of wages councils, joint industrial councils and National joint Consultative Committee which acted as a central advisory body on labor legislation and labor policy.

The 1955 Strike
The strike of 1955 by the members of the two unions, the Artisans and Allied Workers’ Union and the Transport and General Workers’ Union was caused by a deadlock at the joint industrial Council over pay demand and a subsequent disagreement at a special investigation committee appointed by the government to look into the dispute and make recommendations.

The strike was described as historical and unique because of the following reasons:
- It was the first to be organized by a registered trade union
- It was the first to occur after exhausting the parties negotiating machinery
- It was the first to affect the essential services in the whole of Freetown as the workers staged sympathy strikes at places like Railway, Electricity, Health, Public works and Water Works.

The situation became so tense with the government threatening to arrest trade union leaders if they did not call off the strike. The threat sent the leaders into hiding for fear of arrest.

As the strike continued to make life difficult for the Freetown residents the Governor was compelled to summon trade union leaders to a meeting at his Fort Thornton residence Now State House to discuss the strike issue. Since the trade union leaders had feared arrest, none of them turned up except Brother Marcus Grant who availed himself for the meeting which ended with a promise by the government to look into the workers grievances should they resume work. Brother Grant was left with no choice but to communicate the government’s decision to the workers. He called a meeting at the Victoria Park. After his address to the workers on the government’s decision, the workers decided to resume work.

After a month, the governor who was also Commander-in-Chief and Vice Admiral of Sierra Leone announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry headed by the late Justice R.B. Marke. Surprisingly enough the terms of reference did not include the workers’ grievances. The aim of the government was to find someone to blame for the strike.

MERGERS AND SPLITS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
The Sierra Leone Council of Labor formed in 1946 remained the only central trade body until 1962 when as a result of a rift; a rival organization was formed known as the Sierra Leone Labor Congress. The two organizations merged in 1964 under the name Sierra Leone Federation of Labor. But the merger was short-lived. A group broke away from the Federation in the same year to form yet again the Sierra Leone Council of Labor. In 1966, unity was restored again and the tow organizations formed yet another Sierra Leone Labor Congress. In 1971, there was another split. Differences in opinion and policy arose between those who broke away to form Sierra Leone Labor Congress. This division caused many harms to the workers during the period 1971-1976.

On the 22nd July 1976, the Sierra Leone Labor Congress and the Sierra Leone Council of Labor merged again to form the present Sierra Leone Labor Congress.

The late President, Siaka Stevens, whose association with labour movement in Sierra Leone never ceased, was a guest of honor at the inaugural ceremony of the Congress held at the Parliament Building on 16th September, 1976 to which he delivered an inaugural speech.

In his speech, among other things, he congratulated all those who were involved in negotiations for the long hoped for but long deferred unity. He noted with appreciation that one of the aims of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress was to reduce the number of trade unions in the country to a meaningful proportion, since the country was small and would be better off with fewer but strong and viable trade unions than with many weak ones. He re-assured the trade unions of the Government’s continued assistance to the movement to improve the lot for the workers. He noted that the government and trade unions have a common goal of putting all their energies together for the development of the country. He concluded by wishing the trade unions every success in their endeavors and hoped that they would not fail the workers.

The 1981 National Strike

The economic difficulties of the 1980’s which resulted in serious inflation and deteriorating economy prompted the Sierra Leone Labor Congress in 1981 under the leadership of late J.B. Kabbia, as Secretary-General, to make strong appeals to the Sierra Leone Government to take drastic measures in order to arrest the situation which the trade unions saw a running out of control.

The Sierra Leone Labor Congress in its two letters addressed to the Head of State, the last one dated 14th August, 1981, contained far reaching suggestions by the Congress on measures the government should take which ranged from the reduction of the price of rice, the Sierra Leone staple food, to the overall reorganization and institution of action on prices, unemployment, housing, hospitals and drug provisions, roads, delay in paying salaries and gratuities, transportation costs, reduction and control of government expenditures, income tax, foreign exchange control, farm produce prices, import licenses, investment loan system and the land tenure system.

The government did not respond to the first letter but took action on the second letter by appointing an eighteen-man committee, nine from government and nine from trade unions under the chairmanship of the late Vice President Hon. C.A. Kamara-Taylor.

The Committee held two successful meetings but the third meeting broke down as representatives of the trade unions led by Brother I. Langley walked out protesting against the failure by the government to implement issues agreed upon during the first meeting which included the reduction of the price of rice. The trade union representatives reported back to the Congress Executive Council, which decided to issue a strike notice effective from 1st September 1981. The government on the other hand suggested the appointment of a Commission of inquiry comprising representatives of government, Employers Federation and the trade unions.

The Congress Executive Council did not respond to the offer as was expected by the government. As a result of this, the President went on the air on 31st August 1981 on a broadcast to the nation. In the broadcast, after recounting the events, which had taken place up to that time, he declared a State of Emergency throughout the country with effect from 1st September1 1981 in the interest of public order and safety. In spite of this, the strike took place as planned and in some cases lasted up to 11 days. During the strike, over two hundred trade unionists including leaders of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress were arrested and detained at the Pademba Road Prison, but were later released after the strike had been called off.

The following events occurred after the strike

1. The government appointed a Commission of inquiry headed by Mr Justice M.O. Taju-Den on 15th October 1981.

The Commission’s terms of reference were as follows:

i. to enquire into the status, administration and activities of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress from 1976
ii. To Enquirer into all aspects of industrial relations in Sierra Leone and to make recommendations for any improvements which it may consider necessary.

2. The Commission of inquiry dissolved the entire Congress Executive Council on 10th March, 1982, replaced it with a caretaker committee, ordered the suspension of late J.B. Kabia from the office of the Secretary General of the Congress and further recommended that he be banned from participating in trade union activities for the next three years form 10th March, 1982
3. The Commission of inquiry ended its sitting on the 11th February 1982 and adjourned ‘sine die’ to compile its report.
4. The report, which made far-reaching recommendations on the labor laws on the structure of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress was later published, and most of its recommendations accepted by the government.
5. The Delegates’ Conference of the Congress took place on 2nd October 1982, bringing an end of the Caretaker Committee.
6. The Delegates’ Conference under the new constitution elected the Congress Executive Council Members with Bro. I. Langley as President. The new Executive subsequently appointed Bro. K. Yilla as the Secretary-General.
7. Immediately after the Congress elections, the late President Dr. Siaka Stevens offered to the Congress one parliamentary seat to which he appointed Bro. I. Langley on the recommendation of the Congress Executive Council.

SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME

Sierra Leone has at present no policy on this scheme. The Sierra Leone Labour Congress has since 1993 requested government to give this matter urgent attention as most workers are not benefiting from whatever paid to them on retiring from their employment. Similarly, there are no provisions in any of the trade group collective agreement for old age coverage with respect to medical and regular monthly income as pension as against those employed in the public service.

In 1996, the government delegation to the ILO Annual Meeting made a representation to the Director General of ILO for Technical Service. This took a little bit of time and in 1999, another arm of the Ministry of Labour was created to the present name – Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations.

Presently, the ILO has given its consent to provide all the technical service required in establishing this social security scheme. Parliament has also endorsed the decision. A parliamentary committee has been set up with the participation of the Labour Congress (representing the workers), Employers Federation (representing the Employers) and the Government. A tripartite committee is been headed by Hon. Alex Koroma.

Subject: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: shamsu Deen-Cole
To: All
Date Posted: 17:34:44 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: shamsu2000@hotmail.com
Entered From: ool-4355b29b.dyn.optonline.net at 67.85.178.155

Message:
Disaster inside the APC CAMP

It seems as if the Prayers of Governor Clarkson is alive and well. The All People Congress (APC) who was riding high a few weeks ago, with lots of false information about rice, lies and propaganda regarding who our running mate will be, are so desperate that they have gone back to their old ways of abuse, intimidation and hooliganism.

Let’s see what has turned the tide against them.

Item One: When we the SLPP, made the announcement that Hon. Alhaji Momodu Koroma, has been chosen by Vice President Solomon Berewa as his running mate, APC came out lambasting our selection. They had a lot to say about Momodu Koroma, but all their comments was nothing but indignation and bitterness against us for nominating a qualify respectable Northerner. They are angry because they cannot find a running mate of similar attribute and certification as Momodu Koroma. No respectable Southerner or Easterner wanted to be associated with the APC. So who so ever they got from the East is inconsequential. In another words, he is Mr. Nobody.

We the members of the SLPP, and our able, gallant leader examined our long list of qualify dynamic candidates from all over Sierra Leone. They are all long time members of our Party, people with political Correctness, Educational Qualities, and above all Social CLASS. Our Leader saw in Hon. Momodu Koroma a vision of a future leader. Not because of his Financial Contribution to the Campaign, but someone who will be ready to take over the duties as a leader of our Nation, in case of any eventuality. Momodu Koroma has been in Government for over ten years, as Minister of Presidential Affairs, to Minister of External Affairs.

In any Government, the External Affairs Ministry or Foreign Secretary or Secretary of State (as it is called in the USA), is not only one of the leading Cabinet officer, but the spokesperson for the Nation to the World. It is him who solicits support from the International Community...

Remember when President Kabba appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary, our Nation was in shambles due to the senseless barbaric acts of thugs. The international Community looked at us in disbelief. Asking how can any one belonging to the human race be so barbaric, as to mutilate the limp of innocent Women and Children including a 2 years old baby. It was Hon. Momodu Koroma that came to the rescue of our Nation. He made our case to the world at every International forum and today we as a people are proud to show our Faces to the world as Sierra Leoneans. That is what Hon. Momodu Koroma has accomplished for our Nation. He has done more than any other person in that Office with the exception of Dr. John Karifa Smart (who took us to independence).

Now let see who the APC vice Presidential Candidate is. Mr. Sam SUMANA.(As they say in the USA “SAM WHO”.) Who is he and what is he to you?. With all due respect to my opposition leader, Sierra Leone deserve better.. The people of Sierra Leone want to know who in the hell is this man. What contribution has he made to our Nations, Where was he during the Rebel War, when we Sierra Leoneans in the USA, organized several demonstrations against the War. We demonstrated, in Washington DC at the White House, and in New York City at the United Nations. Where was Mr. Sam Sumana?. What is his credential as far as political governance, knowledge of how Government should function, political readiness and so on.? He may have a University Degree, I respect that, but that is not enough. What is his employment back ground that may tell us of his experience in life?

A member of the APC chapter in New Jersey told me that he was chosen because they wanted a person with Geography equilibrium and Mr. Sumana is from the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. I do accept that premise, but is he the best man from the East? This man is not known in the East. He is a loner. Even when he was in Minnesota in the USA, he was not known by many Sierra Leoneans. He is not a good mixer.

I am not Bragging, but I am confident that I SHAMSU DEEN-COLE, I am well known in the Sierra Leone community in the USA and in Sierra Leone than Mr. Sumana., Looking for a running mate from another Region is always a good Idea, but you can’t just settle for anyone, just because he came from the region of your needs.. If APC cannot come up with any well known citizen from the east or the South, then APC is dying a slow death.

Item Two: The next Problem for APC disintegration is that they sold their Symbols to the highest bidder during the primary.. What a shame. This is a slap in the Face for the people who had been pushing the Banner of APC all those years.

My fellow Sierra Leoneans, APC is telling our people, that if any member of their party is poor regardless of what your contribution has been with the APC, if you can’t pay for the Symbol, you are OUT. This is not democracy, this is not Justice. Now people in Sierra Leone are saying that APC gave symbol only to people from England and America. As one APC member in Freetown told me” We go show dem say nar we day nar Salone”. The people are MAD.

We the SLPP, gave the people power to chose who they want as their Candidate. Our leaders did not get involve. It is the people that decide who they want, and that democracy..

Item Three: APC for what ever reason, decided to unite with RUF (THE REBEL PARTY OF FODAY SACCOR). What a disaster. This is Political Suicide. Are they so desperate, that they will sleep in the same bed with the devil?

People in Sierra Leone are saying that “Now we know who the Rebels were” I know we have peace, and that we forgave them, but we must not forget. Remember as we say in Salone “ Leppet nor day change in spot”. See what happen last week during the so-called APC Rally. Their behavior did not go well with the people of Freetown the ruffians in their midst, show their true color. They attacked people in their Cars, Stole Watches Hand Bags from Women, Mobile Phones, Using Abusive and Threaten Language against our party and our Leaders.( As they say, “ if you lay down with Dogs, you will get up with Fleas”….

A week before last, the SLPP supporters came out in good Numbers to Rally in Support of our DREAM TEAM. “SOLO-B & MOMODU –K”

The crowd was unbelievable. They were peaceful, joyful, respectful and nice to look at. They sang respectable Songs peaceful Banner, drummer and it was a carnival atmosphere. People dance till midnight with no problem. This is what Politics is all about. We are all Sierra Leoneans, and we all hoping for a better future for our mother land. We can belong to and support different political Party, but we must have respect for each other.

Item Four: To my greatest surprise, Hon. Ernest Koroma, Leader of the APC, said some days ago that if his party is victorious on the Coming August 11 Election, “he will bring Sierra Leone back to the Days of Sheka Stevens”.. The days of Sheika Stevens and THUGS. Please God Help us. Mr Koroma during one visit to the USA some time ago SAID THAT this APC is a new APC PARTY. Well My People, please think very well about what Sheka Stevens brought to Sierra Leone. INTA ALIA, ONE PARTY.STATE, VIOLENCE, ELECTION KIDNAPPINGS, UNOPPOSE, BEATINGS, BLACK OUT, REBELS, AND THE LIST GOES ON AND ON. .

As I said some time ago, and I must say it again, If Sierra Leone is to become a better Nation, a Nation with brighter future, a Nation of hope, we the people must change our attitude. I am calling on the Leadership of all political Parties, to please educate your supporters. Let us act as civilize people. Stop threaten people, Stop the Abuse, let’s live together, love each other, and at the end May the best man win.

. WE WANT A PEACEFUL FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. I HAVE NO DOUBT, THAT UNDER THE SLPP, YOU WILL HAVE FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. REMEMBER THAT IT IS ONLY UNDER SLPP, THAT SIERRA LEONEANS HAD EVER GIVEN THE CHOICE OF ELECTING. ALL THE YEARS OF APC RULE, WE NEVER HAD ELECTION, WE ALWAYS HAD SELECTION. “UNOPPOSE, DEM PICK AM”... SO IF EVEN YOU ARE NOT A SUPPORTER OF THE SLPP, THINK OF YOUR NATIONS FUTURE, AND VOTE SLPP.

GOD BLESS SIERRA LEONE

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 01:37:40 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You may perform the miracle of making a mountain out of a molehill but don’t cry disaster, where there is none. Distorting and exaggerating wild claims against members of the APC, does not strengthen your case for the SLPP when such exaggerations rob you of credibility.

Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma has shown resilience in that long tussle and tug of war, over the APC leadership – and so you know, he is a strong man; he has tenacity and is focused on his purpose.

Is there a tribal department in your brain, in which Sierra Leone is so neatly divided between North and South, East and West compartments?

“No respectable Southerner or Easterner wanted to be associated with the APC”

What about respectable Western Area and respectable Northern roots people?

I don’t think that you have to dis-qualify the APC choice of running mate – in order to sanctify Mr. Momodou Koroma – who admittedly has a different background and valuable experience to recommend him as potential leader of Sierra Leone.

Sometimes you want us to believe that which is glaringly untrue. It is not true that the APC is an incarnation of Pa Shaki or Josef Stalin or the gentle Joseph Momoh - as if you would define the Democratic and Republican parties by Carter and Reagan…..

When you post-Albert Margai SLPP guys start yapping it sounds like you think that the Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma, has it in the APC Manifesto that if he wins so overwhelmingly – to the extent that the SLPP does not win even a single parliamentary seat Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma has declared an emergency plan that since that would be a de facto one party state he would appoint some APC back benchers to form and opposition ( for the sake of multi-partyism) or that it is Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma’s avowed aim to usher in a new era of a one-party state whatever the circumstances - when he has never stated – and even the most anti-APC tribalist knows that would never state or dream of doing such a think.

The only question that I have about Mr. Sam Sumana is this: Since the office of the Vice-president (at least under the present government is responsible for “Control of the movement of people in Diamond protected areas” – If Mr. Sumana is in that competitive business branch of Diamonds, will his becoming Vice-president not lead to a conflict of interest between State business and his own Diamond business. Would it not give him undue advantage – and even encourage patronage, to have him responsible about that his area of interest?

The Office of Vice-President (where Mr. Solomon Berewa acquire some considerable experience these past few years.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 01:55:17 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
I forgot to add the areas that have been the reponsibility of

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 02:00:58 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Very sorry - please forgive - again

I forgot to add the areas that have been the reponsibility of V-P Berewa.

Subject: interesting reading!
From: Dr C. CURTIS-THOMAS
To: All
Date Posted: 18:57:24 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 198.24.31.125

Message:
INTERESTING READING!

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 18:39:19 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
SLPP Deen-Cole:
The voters of Sierra Leone are going to decide on August 11, 2007. Their decision will be based on how they feel about the Kabbah-SLPP Regime performance during the last 10 years. If you and your peers of the SLPP do not understand that you will continue to beat a dead horse. the Shaki-Momoh APC REGIME. The voters are not being asked to evaluate "deadmen" daedeabudi". You and the rest of SLPP are stupid but the average Sierra Leoaneans are not stupid. They are not going to bring deadmen back
to evaluate and cast vote on their performance. They are going to judge based oh how the SLPP DEBUL has performed over the lasst 10 years.
It is not the APC Stewardship under review and verdict/judgement on August 11, 2007. It is the SLPP PERFORMANCE FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS UP FOR EVALUATION. Do you understand?
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:29:53 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
No swearing on cyber streets when???

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:24:01 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
No swearing on cyber streets when you ought to know better.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: SHAMSU DEEN-COLE
To: All
Date Posted: 19:56:00 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: shamsu2000@hotmail.com
Entered From: ool-4355b29b.dyn.optonline.net at 67.85.178.155

Message:
Mr Yaya, with all due respect, I do not think that if someone is loyal to a party, it is because they are stupid. you see this is exactly what I am talking about. In all my statements about the APC, I did not use any insaulting or abusive words. Now you are calling me Stupid. But you know what they say?, "Abuse is the weapon of the VULGAR". Thank you Sir, but I rather be a stupid supporter with love, respect and dignity, than a Chicken with no head. If the Americans,voted for Bush, Clinton,TWICE Because they believe in them,the British voted Toni Blair three times, I think I have the right to support and vote for my choice.

I am intelligent enough to look at the history of the APC party, to know what they did to my motherland IN THEIR 24 YEARS OF POWER. Invoking the Names of your past Leaders, is not beating a dead Horse. It is your Party leader who said that he will "take us back to the days of Shiaka Stevens". I have the right and intellect to use that statement as my premise to make my case. And for you to have the audacity to call me stupid, is pathetic. I will keep my cool. I pray not to ever become abusive to any one . I love my homeland and only cool head and common sense will take us to the promise land....LONG LIVE SIERRA LEONE

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 20:49:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
SLPP Deen-Cole,
If you argue like a slow learner I have no choice but to use a descr1ptive term appropriate to your conduct. You and the other SLPP Mules and donkeys are not getting the point. Now is the focus of the people. now is the pain of the people. Not history!!! Now!!!!!
Ten years of degradation; ten years of mismanagement. Ten years of forcing young girls into prostitution. So that they can feed their parents1 Ten years of filth in our streets! Ten years deeper begging the world for crumps! Ten years of just coasting in an ocean of stupidity. You are not giong to buy bonga when you sea een haede don rot. Berewa and Kabbah dey stink so why pipul go vote for slpp? bu nafulman dem nomoh go do dat.
Go ahead and get angry: You are stupid!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: wow
To: All
Date Posted: 13:11:59 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
na di fors tem dis ar see yayah vex, but yu tork tru bra. yayah na man. now guys, let's talk about the PRESENT, you hear, mista Winkwink of europe? where is my popcorn?

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: babybob
To: All
Date Posted: 21:18:32 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-71-172-31-34.nwrknj.fios.verizon.net at 71.172.31.34

Message:
Where were you when we had thirty years of corruption, destruction of the moral fabric of sierra leone ,kleptocracy and perpetration of violence against our people.

You may be surprise because more people are going to buy the rotten bonga than you think, When they think of the pain and misery from the previous rotten APC bonga that was thrust upon them.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: M. Alieu Iscandari Esq
To: All
Date Posted: 04:41:22 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
Where were you when we had thirty years of corruption, destruction of the moral fabric of sierra leone ,kleptocracy and perpetration of violence against our people.

chill out brother the past ten years under the slpp has been nothing but that which you so vehemently oppose, if ONLY you could be honest about it.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 23:24:31 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
Brah,
I know what I did and I did not hide. I am now dealing with the future and a new vision.
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:05:30 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Yayah, the past creates the present. Our stupidity today was because of the 24 years of neglect. To give us a turnaround in ten years that which suffered 24 years of neglect is incomprehensible. Aside these difficulties faced, our government continues to try. Contnuity of our programmes is all we ask! Things will change under the abled leadership of Berewa. I will come back to you on this after 15 August 2007 - a time I will have access to the internet.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Kanforie Sorie Koroma
To: All
Date Posted: 19:00:57 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
Very brilliant response to this trash posted by somebody with the IQ of a roach. Who in his right senses will vote thieves back to power so that they will continue to steal our shiploads of rice and sell them to Ghana ? The Aramu Alhaji Tejan Kabbah will stand trial for that rice when APC comes to power.

Subject: AND GUESS HOW OLD IS YAYA FAMUSIE?{60yrs}
From: okdok
To: All
Date Posted: 20:46:14 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: okdok@yahoo.com
Entered From: wnpgmb11dc1-38-247.dynamic.mts.net at 209.202.38.247

Message:
Yaya is always tough at using bad,abusive languages in political matters of our country.Does he really think he is any better or educated?He is a book mumu

Subject: Re: AND GUESS HOW OLD IS YAYA FAMUSIE?{60yrs}
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 23:29:39 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
Thannk You very much.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Pa Sorie
To: All
Date Posted: 20:36:55 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: dejabz2@yahoo.co.uk
Entered From: cpe-24-168-3-117.si.res.rr.com at 24.168.3.117

Message:
Do you guys ever write or participate in a discussion without using vulgar language? Is this the new APC? For God sake present to rebutal to a well-written piece. It seems as if each time your party's record is examined,you resort to statements buffeted with allegations, that cannot be corroborated. This "rice selling issue" have you guys investigated it? if my knowledged serves me right your leader is best placed to know what to it, the govt is saying that it was sold for NASSIT, and your leader was Chairman on the parliamentary committe responsible for NASSIT. Let hear from him, not one of set-piece speeches. But policy -oriented ones.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Bambay Lans Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 02:18:11 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-71-197-104-25.hsd1.ca.comcast.net at 71.197.104.25

Message:
It seems as if the Prayers of Governor Clarkson is alive and well. The All People Congress (APC) who was riding high a few weeks ago, with lots of false information about rice, lies and propaganda regarding who our running mate will be, are so desperate that they have gone back to their old ways of abuse, intimidation and hooliganism.
Greetings my brothers and sisters. Mr. shamsu Deen-Cole, let me take this opportunity to thank you for your observation. I hope your intentions are in the best interest of Sierra Leone.
Sir, permit me to respond to your thoughts to probably give you one of the last opportunities to change your mind for supporting the current S.L.P.P. leadership, if you actually bore the interest of Sierra Leone at heart.
Let me further remind you that popularity in the Sierra Leone community does not matter much nor does it seem to matter even when it involves the globe, space and beyond. Probably, it could have mattered had we a proper representation by people who dearly love Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, Sir, we are at a threshold where, our nation, in a not too distant future, our people, who have endured a lot, who have underwent a brutal civil war due to the selfishness of a few people, amidst all forms of cruelty such as selling their basic sustenance, might be given the opportunity to decide who will rule them and bring the long desired peace, progress and stability as we enjoyed during the Siaka Stevens era.
When I read your caption, I was aroused with the hope that a revealing message about many dubious issues such as that of the rice, the fraud at the party presidential candidate election, the filth in the country, the lack of electricity in the country though parts were donated by South African companies and other countries, the oil deal with Iran that we are hearing less of, the beating and killing of Journalists, the imprisonment of Journalist in a bid to intimidate and other issues that are more important to Sierra Leonean lives at home and abroad; issues you mentioned in your opening statement we thought have been revealed to shame all of us who have been awaiting truthful words or acknowledgement of the sale or locat1on of the missing item because our people really need it. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Instead, you came to shower praises on a member of the cabinet that has yet to tell us about the rice issue and the above mentioned issues. You heaped praises on one who, it is apparent, has operated in the inner circles of the very people who boldly wrote about these donations on their web site and have now categorically denied the statement. Do we see ethical deficiency here. Well it is a leadership of deficiencies.
Remember, that even after President Kabba had appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary, our Nation was in shambles due to the senseless barbaric acts of thugs and still is. Remember, that even after President Kabba had appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary the international Community looked at us in disbelief and they still look at us in gross disbelief. Remember, that the International Community do have assessment capabilities and would consider the whole and not parts and parcel of a situation in analyzing it. Did you read the Canadian report on our war? Did you read the U.S. Congress’ report on our war? I hope you did. Did you read the Truth and Reconciliation reports or testimonies of the war? Well all these documents are in the hands of the International Community. Apparently, you would not know and would think that most of the things your government says about them will never reach them. When was it when President Kabba came crying that the pledges made by countries are not enough but then went to Sierra Leone, him and Berewa knocking because they were not beating their chest that everything in Sierra Leone was there doing. What happened to appreciation? That is ingratitude.
Yes they have been ungrateful. Hon. Hinga Norman, woops, may bad! Is dead. Did the government have a say in the decision making of Sierra Leone? How come they did not advocate for the man to be sent abroad to seek medical attention. Did they try but were denied? There was the intention to kill him. Ingratitude.
All the years you have spent abroad, I am opined that when you mention the International Community that you were not only referring to governments not the populace. If your statistics is inclusive of the populace as well, I can categorically tell you that the disappointment of the populace still stands because Mr. Momodu Koroma’s efforts might have reached governments and Heads of states but there is no way his efforts have reached the homes of three million people in America alone. This is one of the reasons we need people at State House and in Parliament who can sell Sierra Leone to the populace of the International Community not only heads of States and governments but the people of the various countries as well. Representatives who come abroad to beg and attend to dinners and dace and return to Sierra Leone claiming he has reached the International Community have been the very people that have prolonged the sufferings of Sierra Leone. They are the very people who have not been able to encourage meaningful trade to Sierra Leone because they cannot reach entrepreneurs due to their lack of knowledge of these systems and have been hoodwinked by diplomatic courtesies of Heads of States and government some of whom are not even impressed by their services to the people in diplomatic terms. Nonetheless, it is only protocol that they attend to them. This is why they have met with these people. I guarantee you that any person sent by the Sierra Leone Mission will be greeted with the same courtesy. So I personally would not buy whatever you claim he did for Sierra Leone because it is toying with protocol.
Sir, your diplomats and Foreign Ministers have done very little in unifying the Sierra Leonean Community by building the confidence of Sierra Leoneans in these communities let alone the born citizens of these countries. Sir, you do not know the population of Sierra Leoneans that reside in America alone do you? Your diplomat does not know either does he? Does representing Sierra Leone mean a portion or the whole? That is how different you are from democracies. Indicative of the fact that you throw your compatriots like sheep in the field to fend for themselves without knowing about them. But you are popular.
You have made a serious misinformation Sir, which I would like to correct. Please allow me to give you a brief lecture on the History of Sierra Leone. “Sir Milton's Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) led the country to independence and the first general election under universal adult franchise in May 1962. Upon Sir Milton Margai's death in 1964, his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, succeeded him as Prime Minister. Sir Albert attempted to establish a one-party political system but met fierce resistance from the opposition All People's Congress (APC). He ultimately abandoned the idea.”
Please pay special attention to the following because the S.L.P.P. has been famous of taking credibility for everything and giving no credibility to ardent Sierra Leoneans who make contributions no matter how small. The attainment of independence was a collective effort and not done by a single person as you have claimed.
“Dr. John Karefa-Smart entered politics in 1957. He was a foundation member of the Sierra Leone Organisation Society, which later became the S.L.P.P. He was active in the constitutional committees that eventually led to Sierra Leone's independence in 1961.” (Sierra Leone Web.)
Contested elections and military rule In closely contested elections in March 1967, the APC won a plurality of the parliamentary seats. Accordingly, the Governor General (representing the British Monarch) Henry Josiah Lightfoot Boston declared Siaka Stevens -- APC leader and Mayor of Freetown -- as the new Prime Minister. Within a few hours, Stevens and Margai were placed under house arrest by Brigadier David Lansana, the Commander of the Sierra Leone Military Forces (SLMF), on grounds that the determination of office should await the election of the tribal representatives to the house. A group of senior military officers overrode this action by seizing control of the government on March 23, arresting Brigadier Lansana, and suspending the constitution. The group constituted itself as the National Reformation Council (NRC) with Brigadier Andrew Juxon-Smith as its chairman. The NRC in turn was overthrown in April 1968 by a "sergeants' revolt," the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement. NRC members were imprisoned, and other army and police officers deposed. Stevens at last assumed the office of Prime Minister under the restored constitution.”
As you can see above, the S.L.P.P. in fact, innitiated the idea of a one party after the death of one of our great leaders, Sir Milton Margai. After the death of Sir Milton Margai, S.L.P.P. started going downhill. In fact there was an in-finght within the party even during the Albert Margai era, for the sake of power, the same way Hon. Berewa disrespected ethics by buldozing his way fraudulently into being appointed as the leader of the party. If he could fraud his own party, which in fact, almost broke the party into five parts, how much more if he is given power?
I have discussed with educated people. Onething I would hope is that such education can be utilized to benefit Sierra Leone. So far, the S.L.P.P has not produced.
In that light therefore, I admonish you to put concept into perspective and know that the readers here are ashamed for our S.L.P.P. government than any government on this palnet.
Look for an alternative so that your image, if not already tarnished, will not be tarnished alongside your Honorable. I have nothing against him personally, I know for fact that he is not the suitable representative for Sierra Leone though “he is popular in the Sierra Leone community.” We need one that is sincere with his people not one who is popular and unethical.
We need some one that can take integrity to a higher level that the International Community, both governments and the governed can feel comfortable to listen to out of trust.
I hope this has helped you to change your mind.

Subject: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:42:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
I have been having a debate about honesty and integrity. How many children has margai got? A question for our PMDC brothers and sisters.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: muscuda
To: All
Date Posted: 17:56:25 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
why is that important

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:05:42 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Credibility - we have to come clean and tell the people we want to lead who we are and what we are capable of doing. If the PMDC is not prepared to answer my question, Iwill be left with no option but to find the answer elsewhere. As humans, we can never be 100% perfect. What is important is owning up.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 00:27:42 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Mr. Somebod ( Johnny Leigh may not agree entirely, about

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:02:08 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
"Marital Status: Married (Mrs. Vivat Margai with two daughters)"

Is the above true? it was on his prolife on the link your directed me to.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 19:13:08 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
As the Rev & Pastor Kanu will be the first to admit, "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God"
( Romans 3:23 )

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:30:56 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Confess and thy immoral deeds will be pardoned! man is fallible and therefore can be pardoned. My boss, we all the prospective candidates are facing a credibility test and therefore have to come clean. As leaders we cannot continue to hide our dirty linen. An opportunity was given for all the constestants to tell the people who they are? If sane people detect false claims or omissions, one has to be gravely concern as to the standing of the individual.

I have five children, three with my estranged wife and two other form estwhile relationships. I have made it my life and cannot shy away from such truth. it is now part of me to the day I depart from this world. Itis not something I imagined as a child but fate decided otherwise and I am so proud of them. I have the boldness to tell the world about them - denying them this claim of fatherhood tantamounts to crass injustice and gross irresponsibility.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:46:21 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You are so utterly boring

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs
To: All
Date Posted: 21:09:55 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
True, to you eyes and ears. At least I have the exciting YOU!

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:43:02 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Can our leaders ever emulate these people in whose system we attempt to model our systems.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:50:45 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Chez winakabs most self-righteous paragon of virtue, it's you again?

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:26:29 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Off to bed - bon nuit mon patron

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 22:50:54 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Chez, send me your e-mail address. There's a long letter, alreadyy wrtitten ( when you lost your mum) that I'd like to post to you.

I would not like to post it on the net.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:13:03 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Mon patron - i am human and if i do the wrong things, I'll have to suffer the consequencies. Anyway thanks. This is my email ad:

winakabs@rock.com

if it is something worth sharing I will be happy to do so. i did not loose my mother - it was my grandmother. may her soul continue to blossom in peace.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:11:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
I think we all need some sleep.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 22:52:14 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You decide

Subject: So you see, Cocorioko has no business with APC
From: COCORIOKO FANATIC
To: All
Date Posted: 14:52:19 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
In the APC website , related links are posted.

Related Link
Sierraleonelive

Awarenes Times

Allafrica.com

who's who

Cocorioko is not included.

There are only two explanations :
1. Either the people who made the website do not know or are ungrateful about cocorioko's services to the party or

2. Cocorioko really has no business with APC.

Shame how APC can begin to be ungrateful to those helping them.

But I am glad. I want cocorioko to remain independent.

Subject: LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE
From: RES NOR RES
To: All
Date Posted: 14:51:37 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: jaybez@hotmail.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE

S.L.P.P. DUMP SIERRA LEONE

TOPIC: HIGHLIGHTS ON LIBYA’S PRESIDENT SPEECH ABOUT
DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE DURING HIS VISIT.

ü 125 Million US Dollars and Cars to be distributed among Imams in Sierra Leone.

ü 100 Million US Dollars Cheque to Sierra Leone

ü Two ships loaded with Rice for Sierra Leone

ü Forty Tractors for Sierra Leone

ü Two Air Taxi Planes

ü Fifty-two Buses

ü Two 20ft Containers of meat for Sierra Leone

ü Twelve mini-hydro machines for the 12 Districts

ü Two Generators for the City

ü Two ferries for Sierra Leone

Subject: Re: LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 04:32:41 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
How come after two Libyan shipments of our staple food rice, and after all the honours and recognition accorded Dr. Monty Jones, we still have

Subject: Sign: Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma
From: Bambay Lans Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 14:18:18 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: sccinstr194109.scc.losrios.edu at 165.196.194.109

Message:
"I believe in a fair global partnership and in sharing good practices with friends."

Sign: Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma

Subject: Barmoi Junction-
From: Amara Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 13:25:05 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: amara@yahoo.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
The Barmoi Junction Luma commonly referred to as the “Beckley Luma” is to benefit from a UNDP program aimed at stimulating economic growth in Sierra Leone.

I are thankful for the vision of Mr. Olu Beckley who established this trading market in 1996. Today Barmoi Junction, a small village near Rokupr, can boast of the largest international market in Sierra Leone. What Mr. Beckley started 10 years ago is now paying dividends to thousands of people in our part of the country. It is a great source of revenue for our local government and I am proud to have worked with him.

Subject: ALPHA KANU ON THE APC RULE
From: POLITICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:17:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
"In those good years of the APC rule, Sierra Leone’s economic and social infrastructure were so far ahead of our sub-regional neighbours that a popular way of bidding farewell to family by our brothers leaving Guinea to come to Sierra Leone was “Mi yehi England” and the Senegalese used to say “Man gi dem Angleterre” meaning ‘I am going to England.’"

ALPHA KANU APC SPOKESMAN DURING THE LAUNCHING OF THE PARTY'S MANIFESTO

Subject: Judiciary to ensure free and fair elections
From: UNDP
To: All
Date Posted: 13:16:11 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Judiciary to ensure free and fair elections
- Thursday 19 July 2007.

Friday, 13 July 2007 saw the creation of two courts of law in Freetown, both dedicated to resolving electoral issues. The Electoral Courts have been established to safeguard the democratic structure of the judiciary and will fulfill an essential role in the achievement of accountable, transparent, free and fair elections. This is contained in a release sent to us today by the UNDP in Sierra Leone.

The envisaged court structure has two elements; the Electoral Offences Court and the Election Petition Rules Court. Both are divisions of the High Court and will address issues relating to the upcoming Parliamentary Elections.

The Electoral Offences Court will hear criminal matters with reference to offences listed in the Electoral Laws Act. All acts carried out in relation to the Parliamentary Elections, from the registration process through to the final announcement of results, will be subject to scrutiny by the courts. Those convicted of an electoral offence will face a fine or imprisonment.

The Election Petitions Courts will handle civil matters linked to the results of the election. Often referred to as ‘courts of disputed results’, these courts will provide redress to those who believe that the outcome of a given poll resulted from wrong doing. In such a case the court will investigate the poll and can remove elected candidates, if it is found that the seat was achieved through improper means.

The courts will operate side by side, with judges hearing both criminal and civil submissions. They will sit in total for six months and will be based in Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Freetown.

The creation of the Electoral Courts by the Chief Justice has taken place with collaboration from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Electoral Assistance Team and with the financial support from the international community through the Elections Basket Fund. The UN Executive Representative of Secretary General, Victor Angelo welcomes the creation of the Electoral Courts, stating that they are ‘a first in the history of the state, and a significant development in the rule of law and contribution towards the creation of a stable democracy in Sierra Leone.’

Photo: Chief Justice Ade Renner-Thomas of Sierra Leone.

Subject: Update on Kailahun Incident
From: POLITICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:15:26 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Update on Kailahun Incident
PATRIOTIC VANGUARD

- Thursday 19 July 2007.
By Jonathan Leigh.

President Tejan Kabbah made a brief stopover in Kailahun, east of Sierra Leone on Monday, which was the scene of political violence twenty four hours earlier, on his way to the border town of Guekedou in Guinea to attend a meeting of the Mano River Union states involving Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Ivory Coast.

Kabbah visited the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker and the SLPP office respectively which were allegedly vandalised by PMDC supporters and called on the police to prosecute those culpable for the incident despite the fact that no arrest were made by the police.

Rivalry between two brothers supporting opposing camps in the upcoming elections, sparked off ugly scenes of violence. Chiefdom Speaker Bongay Ngobeh is a staunch SLPP supporter while his brother is a parliamentary aspirant for the PMDC.

Talking to us on his mobile phone from Kailahun, Superintendent Kerefa Keita, the Police Local Unit Commander in Kailahun stated categorically that he was not aware of any shooting during the incident as alleged by the PMDC Publicity Secretary Mohamed Bangura neither from the police or any other person or group of persons.

According to Keita, Kailahun was peaceful and quiet before the arrival of Charles Margai. The same atmosphere prevailed on the first day of his visit last Saturday where he addressed his supporters, went to Buedu on a similar assignment, returned to Kailahun the same day and spent some time at his party’s office before retiring to the GTZ Guest House which was booked for him.

Keita says his information was that the midnight incident of last Sunday was sparked off when supporters of the PMDC started chanting provocative songs against the SLPP.

The situation became tense and stones were thrown at the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker Bongay Ngobeh by PMDC supporters. In retaliation, the PMDC office nearby was also attacked during the exchange of missiles. Two vehicles; one packed in the compound of the Speaker and the other parked infront of the PMDC office were damaged.

According to Keita, he was out of Kailahum at the time on patrol at a village called Borbu but had to cut short his trip and return to put the situation under control. He immediately cordoned off the area of the incident.

Later, he received a phone call from the SLPP District Chairman Prof. Sahr Ngevao informing him that thugs allegedly hired by the PMDC were advancing to the SLPP office on Mano Sawalu Road. Ngevao himself told us by telephone on Monday that the office was pelted with stones and vandalized.

Supt. Keita also narrated certain remarks made by Charles Margai himself against the police in particular, which he did not respond to. He said he also prevented SLPP supporters from blocking the route while Charles Margai and his entourage were leaving the town.

Subject: Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa
From: POLIYICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:13:33 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
I’m the hope & future of Salone – Solo B

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa

The leader of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) yesterday told thousands of supporters at the Regent Village Community Centre that he was the hope and future of Sierra Leone. Vice President Berewa, who went on a short campaign tour in that constituency, said he would be the best choice to lead Sierra Leone for the next five years as he had enough experience to lead the people to the right direction.
The SLPP noted that 15 years ago if he was the Vice President he would not be campaigning because he would have won the election very easily under the APC one party rule.

Mr Berewa said he was moved by the crowd that welcomed him and promised to fight poverty unto its end.
He said President Kabbah promised to bring peace and that he succeeded, so he too was now telling the entire country that poverty would be his main concern.
He went on to state that last week Tuesday his party launched its manifesto and that during its launch the atmosphere was so peaceful that shops were opened and mobile phones not stolen.

“But when the All People’s Congress (APC) came out the following day, the city became a no-go area as peaceful citizens lost so many valuables,” the Vice President claimed.

Vice President Berewa appealed to all not to let the APC take power again “if we want to sustain the God given peace”.

Mr Berewa than received an ex-APC supporter, Solomon Coker, who said he left the APC because “SLPP is the only way forward”.
The SLPP leader then promised the constituency that when he would have become President, he would do more for them as the Mountain District had always supported the SLPP.

Rev. Jenner Buck, the SLPP chairman of Mountain District, thanked Vice President Berewa and all those who made the programme successful.
Mr Berewa was accompanied by HE Ali Bangura, Alhaji Cole, Kanja Sesay, Alieu Badara Mansaray, Sam Pratt, et al.

Councillor Edward Caesar, who chaired the occasion, praised the SLPP for all what it had done.
He also appealed to all to continue to support the SLPP by voting for Solomon Berewa and the parliamentary candidate Patrick Cole.

Subject: Re: Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:04:12 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
"...He [Mr. Berewa] went on to state that last week Tuesday his party launched its manifesto and that during its launch the atmosphere was so peaceful that shops were opened and mobile phones not stolen.

“But when the All People’s Congress (APC) came out the following day, the city became a no-go area as peaceful citizens lost so many valuables,” the Vice President claimed..."

Do you all now understand why I refer to them as the AKARTA PEOPLES' CONGRESS?

I rest my case.

Subject: World Bank Releases Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996 - 2
From: WORLD BANK
To: All
Date Posted: 13:11:28 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Thursday, July 19, 2007 :: infoZine Staff

World Bank Releases Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996 - 2006

The report, Governance Matters, 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2006, launched by the World Bank Institute and the World Bank Development Economics Vice-presidency, shows that a number of countries - including in Africa - are making progress in improving governance and fighting corruption. This is encouraging given that good governance and corruption control are fundamental for long-term growth and reducing poverty.

Washington, D.C. - infoZine - "The hopeful news is that a considerable number of countries, including in Africa, are showing that it is possible to make significant governance progress in a relatively short period of time. Such improvements in governance are critical for aid effectiveness and for sustained long-run growth." says Daniel Kaufmann, co-author of the report and Director of Global Programs at the World Bank Institute "Bribery around the world is estimated at about US $1 trillion dollars, and the burden of corruption falls disproportionately on the bottom billion people living in extreme poverty,"

The report, authored by the World Bank's Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, builds on research on the importance of governance and its impact on development over the past decade. Good governance matters for other human development outcomes such as infant mortality, illiteracy, and inequality, as well. Good governance has also been found to significantly enhance the effectiveness of development assistance in general, and of World Bank funded projects in particular.

Measuring countries' governance performance, and their improvements over time, is thus a key item on the governance agenda. But it is also a complex challenge, as governance has many dimensions, each with inherent measurement challenges. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project shows how this challenge can be met.

"The Governance Indicators put to rest the tired assertion that these issues cannot be robustly measured and the lessons drawn cannot be put to subsequent positive use by governments, the development community, civil society and the media," says John Githongo, former Permanent Secretary for Governance & Ethics in Kenya's Office of the President.

This year's report represents a decade-long effort by the researchers to build and update the most comprehensive cross-country set of governance indicators currently available to the public. The aggregate indicators as well as data from the underlying sources are available at a newly-redesigned website at www.govindicators.org. The indicators cover 212 countries and territories, drawing on 33 different data sources to capture the views of tens of thousands of survey respondents worldwide, as well as thousands of experts in the private, NGO, and public sectors.

"Until the mid-nineties, I did not think that governance could be measured. The Worldwide Governance Indicators have shown me otherwise" says Shlomo Yitzhaki, Director of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Professor of Economics at the Hebrew University. "It constitutes the state of the art on how to build periodic governance indicators which can be a crucial tool for policy analysts and decision-makers benchmarking their countries. Uniquely, it publicly discloses the aggregated and disaggregated data, as well as the estimated margins of error for each country. It definitely sets a standard for transparency in data."

The report shows that:

Some African countries are making significant strides on the path to good governance. Over the period from 1998 to 2006, Kenya, Niger, Sierra Leone have shown marked recent improvements in Voice and Accountability, while Algeria and Liberia have strengthened their Rule of Law. Countries like Algeria, Angola Libya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have made improvements in Political Stability and Tanzania has recorded gains on Control of Corruption. The report also shows however that other African countries still face enormous governance and development challenges.

Emerging economies are matching rich countries on key dimensions of governance. Over a dozen developing countries such as Slovenia, Chile, Botswana, Estonia, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Costa Rica score higher on key dimensions of governance than industrialized countries such as Greece or Italy.

Improving governance helps fight poverty and improves standards of living. 10 years of research show that improved standards of living are largely the result of improved governance, and not the other way around. When governance is improved by one standard deviation, infant mortality declines by two-thirds and incomes rise about three-fold in the long run. Such an improvement is within reach as it is just a fraction of the difference between the worst and best performers. For example, in the dimension of Rule of Law, one standard deviation is all that separates the extremely low rating of Somalia from Cote D'Ivoire, or Cote D'Ivoire from El Salvador, or El Salvador from Italy or Botswana, and Botswana from the United Kingdom.

Where there is commitment to reform, improvements in governance can take place relatively quickly. While not the norm, a number of countries have made significant progress even in the very brief five-year period since 2002, as for example in Ukraine, Kenya, and Liberia in Voice and Accountability; and Angola and Algeria in Political Stability.

On average the quality of governance around the world has not improved much over the past decade, despite individual country improvements. For the countries that have done well, there have been a similar number that have experienced deteriorations in a number of governance dimensions, including Zimbabwe, Cote D'Ivoire, Belarus and Venezuela. And in many other countries no significant change in either direction is yet apparent.

This is the sixth update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, reflecting work over the past decade to develop evidence-based measures that help development stakeholders track the quality of institutions, support capacity building, improve governance, and address corruption.
The WGI measure the following six components of good governance:

Voice and Accountability - measuring the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence - measuring perceptions of the likelihoood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism

Government Effectiveness - measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies

Regulatory Quality - measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development

Rule of Law - measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence

Control of Corruption - measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests

"Measuring governance poses unique challenges. Governance is complex and has many different aspects, and so no single indicator can fully capture a country's governance performance" says Aart Kraay, Lead Economist in the World Bank's Development Research Group, and co-author of the report. "It is therefore important to draw on the wide variety of data sources on governance currently available. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a way of collecting and summarizing this wealth of information, based on the experiences and insights of stakeholders worldwide

Subject: WORLD BANK UNVEILS BEST PERFORMERS IN AFRICA
From: AFP
To: All
Date Posted: 13:04:59 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
WORLD BANK UNVEILS BEST PERFORMERS IN AFRICA

AFP

The World Bank has marked Sierra Leone as one of the few African countries that are making significant strides on the path of governance. This disclosure was made in a World Bank report ‘Governance Matters 2007, World Wide Indicators 1996-2006’ and was launched on July 10 by the World Bank Institute and the World Bank Development Economics Vice–President in Washington. According to the report, Sierra Leone has made an impressive performance indicating that good governance and corruption control are fundamental for long –term growth and reducing poverty.

The report which was authored by the World Bank’s Daniel Kaufmann Director of Global Programmes at the World Bank Institute, Aart Kraay Lead Economist in the World Bank’s Development Research Group Massimo Mastruzzi, member of the Global Governance Team World Bank Institute, builds on research on the importance of governance and its impact on development over the past decade. The report judged whether countries had free media, political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption. The helpful news is that good governance matters for other human development outcomes such as infant mortality, illiteracy and inequality as well.

Daniel Kaufmann maintained that such improvements in governance made by Sierra Leone are critical for aid effectiveness and for sustained long-term growth. Good governance has also been found to significantly enhance the effectiveness of development assistance in general, and of World Bank funded projects in particular.

Worthy of significance is that the measuring of countries’ performance and their improvements over time is a key item on the governance agenda. This year’s report represents decade-long efforts by researchers to build and update the most comprehensive cross-country set of governance indicators. The indicators cover 212 countries and territories drawing on 33 different data sources to capture the views of tens of thousands of survey respondents worldwide, as well as thousands of experts in the private, Non- governmental Organisations (NGO) and public sectors. The report shows that Sierra Leone, Kenya and Niger have shown marked improvements in Voice and Accountability, while Algeria and Liberia have strengthened their Rule of Law.

Angola, Libya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have made significant improvements in Political Stability, while Tanzania has recorded gains on Control of Corruption. The report shows however that other African countries still face enormous governance and development challenges. The report also noted that improving governance helps fight poverty and improves standards of living. Ten years of research shows that improved standards of living are largely the result of improved governance and not the other way round. When governance is improving by one standard deviation, infant mortality declines by two –thirds and incomes rise about three fold in the long run.

In the case of Sierra Leone, such an improvement is within reach as the country is back on track after a devastating civil war. This is the sixth update of the world wide governance indicator, reflecting work over the past decade to develop evidence –based measure that helps development stakeholders track the quality of institutions, support capacity building, improve good governance and address corruption. s

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), measure the six components of good governance: Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Control, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.

Legitimate and effective political Authority in managing society’s affairs is crucial to eliminating poverty and lifting the standards of the citizens in a country the report concluded.

Subject: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: DR. MICHEL SHO -SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 12:58:35 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: global.life.edu at 72.16.214.206

Message:
Man by nature is a political being, whether he directly or indirectly takes part in the process; nature has created him to be a political animal.

That notwithstanding, his interaction with his fellow political beings should be done with caution to avoid misrepresentation and misinterpretation. It is for that reason history plays a significant role in the development of any nation and mankind.

Qouting stevens - If you do not want to get involve, politics will involve you.

It is high time we as citizens of our beloved Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our beloved motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST.

Picking cotton is Picking cotton, it doesn't matter what title you hold and i am the first to admit that i am still picking cotton. we need to now work for country.

Your able servant in Training

Dr. Michel sho-Sawyer

Subject: Re: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: Dr. CHARLES CURTIS-THOMAS
To: All
Date Posted: 13:27:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: 208-58-72-25.c3-0.fch-ubr2.lnh-fch.md.cable.rcn.com at 208.58.72.25

Message:
"It is high time we as citizens of our beloved Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our beloved motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST". (Dr. Sho-Sawyer)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I applaud your comment. I am however perplex. You have written a few "articles" on the forum, but none of them has ever suggested anything that remotely resembles "holding our candidates accountable" or, for that matter, not "practicing syncophancy", or that is tantamount to "provinding your skills" (if any) "to your beloved motherland.

Please help me (and others) understand your position in the aforementioned subject. (Dr. C. CURTIS-THOMAS)

Subject: Re: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: Dr. MICHEL SHO - SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 17:41:12 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: cache-dtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 205.188.116.204

Message:
Dr. Thomas,

You are quite correct. I stayed away discussing politics but still endeavor once in a while to discuss nation interest.

I mostly stayed in peeperdom, acquiring information and knowledge for i am a young man.

Yesterday i finally finish reading Walter Rodney " How europe underdevelop Africa" and it dawns on me, what are we really doing to change from the past or is history reapeating itself here ( Salone 1967 much more to say about that but will leave it alone). The question which needs to be address is why our people still not fighting for national interest and from reading many article on this forum, most defend or critize instead of us talking about ways as citizen to hold whoever takes office accountable.

We are discussing their personalities, Instead of us requestinmg of them to discuss policies and issues, we are spending much time defending them. Shaka Stevens was defended by many and many suffered, when do we learn as people.

I am not saying we can't belong to a party, what i am asking is we hold who ever the candidates is accountable and not make him feel like hi is God, He has to recognize that he is there to serve the nation and not the nation to serve him.

If we start holding them accountable, they will hopefully stop signing away all our resources to the west and start rebuilding a proud nation. Our leaders need to know the people will not allow or tolerate inefficient governemnt anymore.

Practising syncophancy only allow them to take advantage of the illiterate popuplation.

I hope this help but maybe we can talk more on the phone.

Subject: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: DR. MICHEL SHO -SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 12:57:07 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: global.life.edu at 72.16.214.206

Message:
Man by nature is a political being, whether he directly or indirectly takes part in the process; nature has created him to be a political animal.

That notwithstanding, his interaction with his fellow political beings should be done with caution to avoid misrepresentation and misinterpretation. It is for that reason history plays a significant role in the development of any nation and mankind.

Qouting stevens - If you do not want to get involve, politics will involve you.

It is high time we as citizens of our belove Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our belove motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST.

Picking cotton is Picking cotton, it doesn't matter what title you hold and i am the first to admit that i am still picking cotton. we need to now work for country.

Your able servant in Training

Dr. Michel sho-Sawyer

Subject: Eddie Nyallay of NEC is a stunch SLPP member
From: Special Cut
To: All
Date Posted: 12:56:17 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: gw1.dc.gov at 164.82.146.3

Message:
Eddie Nyallay a former ISU thug sponsored by Sheki's APC to study gorilla warfare in Cuba. After studies he defected to the US and lived in the Wahington area. Hard times forced him to relocate to Sierra Leone.Nyallay is a DIEHARD SLPP member that happens to be one of the top bras in the National Electorial Comission. No wonder Solo B is so confident about victory. Take note, opposition and keep a close watch on this Electorial commissioner Eastern province. Watch him pose with NEC officials at the Awoko website

Subject: COUP PLOT IN LIBERIA
From: COUP
To: All
Date Posted: 12:55:43 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
BBC NEWS

Arrests over Liberia 'coup plot'

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took power last year after winning elections
A former Liberian army commander has been arrested for "subversive activities" - the first such arrests since landmark elections in 2005.
Gen Charles Julu headed the presidential guard under former leader Samuel Doe and led a 1994 coup attempt.

"There is hard evidence that this man was trying to plan a coup," Information Minister Laurence Bropleh told the BBC.

President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took power in 2006 after a 14-year war.

The BBC's Jonathan Paye-Layleh in the capital, Monrovia, says people are shocked at the possibility of renewed unrest in the country.

The United Nations has some 15,000 peacekeepers in Liberia - the second largest deployment in the world.

Mr Bropleh said there was video proof of the coup pot, which the authorities in neighbouring Ivory Coast had helped investigate.

Fighters from the two countries have been involved in conflicts on both sides of the border in recent years.

"The Liberian public should remain calm. There is no immediate threat to the state," he told Reuters news agency.

Student groups from Doe's Krahn ethnic group have condemned the arrests and called for the release of Gen Julu and the other former officer also arrested.

Subject: DENNIS BRIGHT MUST RESIGN
From: bobobele
To: All
Date Posted: 12:45:52 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: bobobele@aol.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
FOOTBALL STAKEHOLDERS SUPPORT NAHIM KHADI AS PRESIDENT

According to Western Area Football stakeholders at yesterday’s meeting, they fully support the Nahim Khadi executive because they were constitutionally elected by the football stakeholders three years ago in Makeni and their term has not yet expired.
The Western Area Football Stakeholders also blamed the Ministry of Youths and Sports for taking such action without the notification of the football stakeholders who have the constitutional right to suspend or remove the executive of SLFA.
They called on the attention of the Ministry of Youths and Sports to reverse their decision with immediate effect and that they are organizing the executive of Nahim Khadi to run the activities of football until May 2008 when their term of office shall expire and call for the congress to elect the new executive that would run football.
The Northern Region football stakeholders had also tendered signatory supporting Nahim Khadi as their president until May 2008.
They also condemned Dr. Dennis Bright decision to suspend the Nahim Khadi executive which is constitutionally elected by football stakeholders in Makeni town.
The Northern Region football stakeholder’s letter states that they were in full support of the Nahim Khadi executive and call for immediate reversal of the decision taken by the Minister of Sports to suspend an executive that has worked hard for the promotion and development of football within their tenure in office.
The Eastern Region football stakeholders have also submitted their letter of protest against the unilateral suspension of the SLFA executive by the Minister of Youths and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright. They also condemned the decision of the Ministry of Youths and Sports and urged the Minister, Dr. Dennis Bright, to reverse his decision with immediate effect.

Meanwhile, senior government officials have made their position very clear that the government has no business interfering into the decision taken by the Minister of Youths and Sports, Dr. Dennis Bright, to suspend the SLFA executive which was constitutionally elected by the football stakeholders of the nation.
Senior government officials yesterday confirmed to the New Citizen that the decision of Minister of Youth and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright, to suspend SLFA is unprofessional and did not have the blessing of the government.
The New Citizen was also informed that the government was fully aware of the rules and regulations of FIFA, governing football activities and that the government should not interfere with the regulations of FIFA, the football governing body, so that Sierra Leone would not be in the list of suspended countries through government interference.
Senior government officials yesterday have taken great exception to the Minister of Youths and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright’s decision to suspend a constitutionally elected executive and also assured the New Citizen sports that the matter would be amicable resolved within the shortest possible time to allow the Nahim Khadi executive to complete its term in office according the constitution of SLFA.

Subject: Re: DENNIS BRIGHT MUST RESIGN
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 19:00:46 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Na POWER (misuse of) exceeding the responsibility of his portfolio, if you don't watch it, he'll soon be appointing himself as referee and handing out APC-red cards.

But should he resign because of this non-violent action?
Methinks all things considered, he is a sportsman after all, so a stern warning (not to interfere and no interventions.........

Worst case scenario was in post apartheid South Africa.
The referee awarded the yellow card and the guy should him a finger, and that caused the red card, whereupon the finger man refused to leave the match - at which point (not even faintly reminiscent of ex-captain Foya) the referee took out his revolver from its holster and shot him dead..... and that was the last card.....

So you see by comparison, DR. Bright is only guilty of zealous enthusiasm, which many football fans are liable to be swept away by that kind of enthusiasm which makes you forget who you are......

Next thing you know is you want to sack the president...or order him to resign, when, mamouton, a stern warning could do……

Subject: 2 documents: " Building a capable state." Parts 1 & 2
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 12:35:30 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
It's a long one. Could have been posted in smaller sections. Anyway, it's talking to us and you may pause, as you wish......

There is a tendency, not only among the opposition, but also among men of those even in the Diaspora, many of those generally disgruntled with life & its slings and arrows of outrageous fortune who tend to want to blame it all on the SLPP.

This document entitled ”Building the Capable State in Africa” – makes some of what was hitherto unclear to become clearer.

The”Note” also features the “daunting “ package of tasks that are waiting for to challenge the seriousness of whoever takes over the State House on 11th August, come rain or shine.

These documents could be widely circulated.

With each and every party clamouring for attention and promising to deliver, like no other, it’s understandable that the APC thinks that they have a monopoly on ability to move Sierra Leone fast forward. The SLPP has a similar belief and St. Francis of the PMDC, also wants to work a miracle – if you will only give him a chance – to do so.

When judging the success or otherwise of the SLPP, we tend to forget that it’s the” simultaneous tasks of nation-building, state building, political development, and economic and social development and structural transformation.”

“ BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA”

SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGFVII) ON
“BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA”

OUAGADOUGOU-BURKINA FASO- 24-26 OCTOBER 2007

BACKGROUND AND PROCESS NOTE FOR THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

BACKGROUND

Since the 1960s African countries have been faced with the daunting and simultaneous tasks of nation-building, state building, political development, and economic and social development and structural transformation. A number of factors have been identified to explain Africa’s poor performance of Africa in maintaining peace, security and internal stability, promoting economic growth, and eradicating poverty. Among the major reasons identified are weak institutional and human capacities.
UNDP defines capacity as the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. Capacity Development (CD) is thereby the process through which the abilities to do so are obtained, strengthened, adapted and maintained over time . The ability of the state to manage rests on the capacity of its institutions and people as well as the prevalence of an enabling environment. Without capable institutions governments will not be able to develop and implement programmes to manage and deliver services. Weak capacity compromises the ability of the government to deliver services and to undertake its public sector management and regulatory functions. Inefficient government institutions hamper entrepreneurship and economic growth. It undermines civil society development.

Capacity and governance are linked. Sustainable growth and poverty reduction require national capacity to diagnose development problems and to formulate and implement appropriate solutions.

Why should Africa engage in capacity development dialogue?

a. Africa is the object and subject of Capacity Development
Over the last three decades, Africa and its partners have invested monumental effort and resources to develop capacity. Yet the continent continues to be capacity challenged. Effective capacity to formulate policies and implement and oversee them is lacking. Africa’s private sector is weak, its productive capacity too inadequate to take advantage of globalization. Public services are inadequate and in some cases deteriorating. Why is it the case? Why have the past policies targeting capacity development in Africa not produced the desired result despite the monumental effort and resources expended?

b. Africa’s voice is unheard
While Africa has been and still is the subject and object of Capacity development support by its development partners, it remains marginally involved in the dialogue and has made little input into the capacity agenda. Africa therefore needs to contribute to the definition of capacity in a manner that anchors the concept and its application in the continent’s realities and priorities, addressing its critical linkages to policy formation and implementation, individuals and institutions and how these interact to impact on the ability of continent to meet its peace, governance and development challenges.

These issues require consideration and AGFVII will provide the framework for reflection and agenda setting for building the capable state in Africa.

This Process Note is intended to provide broad guidelines for organizing the national consultations, the content and structures of the national reports, institutional arrangements, partnerships and financing. These are indicative and aimed at structuring and standardizing discussion and reporting on the national consultations. Countries are however free to adjust the organizational part of the suggested guidelines in this process note to suit local circumstances.

THE AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGF)

The AGF was launched in 1997 by UNDP and UNECA within the framework of the United Nations Special Initiative for Africa (UNSIA) The primary goal of the AGF is to bring together African leaders, representatives of the private sector, civil society organizations and other stakeholders in Africa, and officials from Africa’s development partners to exchange views and experience on major challenges and opportunities in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Since its launching AGF has held six sessions ending with the sixth session convened in Kigali-Rwanda in 2006 under the theme “Implementing the African Peer Review Mechanism: Challenges and Opportunities”

At the conclusion of the Kigali Forum and in recognition of the centrality of capacity in ensuring good governance and the delivery of services, it was agreed that AGFV11 should focus on the issues of capacity and capacity building for development and convene under the theme “Building the Capable State”.

THE SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM-AGFVII

The specific objectives of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum will be to:-

1. Deliberate on the meaning and definition of a capable state appropriate to the African context and its linkages to peace, security, good governance, and development.
2. Take stock of the experiences and lessons learnt from the efforts at meeting the capacity challenges in Africa including internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state
3. Brainstorm on the prevailing capacity development challenges and opportunities for building the capable state in Africa and their implications to Africa and its development partners.
4. Identify the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context, how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
5. Discuss how Africa can effectively respond in putting in place an African owned and led strategies for building the capable state and the nature of partnerships that will be required.

PREPARATION OF THE FORUM

The AGFVII preparatory processes will involve the holding of national consultations on country experiences in capacity development, preparation of national reports, and convening of the Forum itself. To facilitate these activities, an Issues Paper, a Process Note and six thematic technical papers will be commissioned for use as background for the national consultations and elaboration of the national reports that will inform the deliberations at the Forum.

1. The issues paper will provide the theoretical framework for the discussions within the national consultations that will be convened in the twenty seven countries leading to national reports on experiences and challenges of building institutions and strengthening state capacity for good governance and development.

2. Six technical thematic papers will be commissioned. These will be used as technical input into the national consultations and the deliberations at the Forum itself. The papers are on the following themes:-
a. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa
b. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance
c. State legitimacy and leadership
d. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance
e. The role of non-state actors
f. Globalization and state capacity

4. Twenty seven countries have been earmarked for participation in AGFVII. These countries were selected on the basis of linguistic and geographic balance, best practice and post-conflict experience. They are Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali and Togo from West Africa; Comoros, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Mauritius, Sudan and Uganda from East Africa; South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe from Southern Africa; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Cameroon and Gabon from Central Africa; Algeria and Tunisia from North Africa; and Central Africa and Chad from Central Africa invited as observers.

Five representatives including a media representative from each of the twenty-seven countries will be facilitated to attend.

5. In addition, a Heads of State segment will be facilitated- bringing six to seven African Heads of State or Government together with the participants of the Forum to deliberate on the capacity challenges. All branches of government, the private sector, civil society organizations, the African and international media, and Africa’s development partners will be invited to participate in the Forum

6. A Media Symposium will be organized as an integral part of AGF VII to deliberate on the role of media in the building of the capable state in Africa and on the effective ways of covering the state.
7. Mechanisms will be put in place to follow-up on the outcome and recommendations of AGF VII within national and regional programming.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES

1. OBJECTIVE OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

The national consultations are expected to do the following:-

a. Discuss the definition and characteristics of a capable state appropriate to the African context
b. Explore the linkages among peace, security, good governance, development, poverty reduction and a capable state
c. Deliberate on the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context
d. Examine how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
e. Identify internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state in Africa
f. Identify lessons learnt, best cases and worst cases in building and sustaining the capable state
g. Explore emerging challenges and opportunities in building the capable state and
Resource requirements for building and sustaining such a state
h. Prepare a report on national experience on building the capable state for submission to the Forum.
i. Determine composition of delegation to the Seventh Africa Governance Forum

2. ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

Each country is expected to organize broad based consultations bringing together all the key stakeholders in the country. In preparing for the workshops, the countries are expected to:-

a. Designate an appropriate focal point for organizing the national consultation and coordinating pre and post consultation processes leading to participation in the Forum
b. Draw up the terms of reference and designate experts to prepare any additional discussion papers that may be needed to supplement the Issues and Technical papers.
c. Select a facilitator(s) experienced in group animation and participatory group methodologies. The facilitator should also have strong writing skills to transform information obtained through consultative workshops into the national report
d. The consultations should be organized around interactive workshops that will permit free and spirited debate on the issues related to capacity development. Capacity development ministries and/or institutions should lead and animate the discussions on the basis of national experience.
e. Break out and dedicated sessions should be facilitated to consider the six focus areas of capacity development and on which thematic technical papers have been prepared-namely: - a. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa, b. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance, c. State legitimacy and leadership, d. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance, e. The role of non-state actor, and f. Globalization and state capacity.
f. The discussions, conclusions and recommendations of the workshops on the various aspects of capacity development should be captured in a Country Report that will be agreed on by the stakeholders as representing the national experiences. The report will be submitted to AGFVII.

Countries are free to use the Issues and the Technical Papers as they see fit- provided that they ensure focused and organized discussion capturing of national experiences in capacity development in a cogent report based on the format provided.

3. PARTICIPATION

Given the theme of the AGF VII, it is essential that the consultation include representatives of all key stakeholders including:-

a. National ministries of public service, capacity development ministries and institutions,
b. Parliamentarians, labor and employment organizations
c. Local government representatives
d. Civil society, think tanks, research and training institutions working on capacity development issues;
e. NGOs, women and youth
f. The private sector
g. Media

For logistical reasons, the national consultation workshops will have to be restricted to a manageable number of participants determined through local consultations. Notwithstanding the need to ensure manageability of the national process, it will be essential to ensure that all key stakeholders take part.

4. DURATION AND HOSTING

The national consultations should be held for at least three days between 15th June and 30th August 2007 at a place accessible and conducive to the participation by all stakeholders including those from outside the country capitals in particular the regional local government representatives.

5. REPORT CONTENTS AND FORMATS

The reports shall be prepared on the basis of the national consultations. They are expected to be concise and reflect the critical issues discussed and the general consensus arrived at on the challenges of capacity development in Africa and possible solutions. . While it is expected that consultants may have to be retained to do provide technical input, it is strongly suggested not to ask them to prepare national reports in lieu of holding national consultations. The reports should not exceed 30 pages including the executive summary with the following format-

a. Executive summary
b. A statement on the purpose of the national consultations
c. A descr1ption of the national consultations including process, agenda, participation etc
d. A survey of the national experiences/strategies in capacity development and challenges faced
e. A summary of a sustainable national agenda for building a capable state
f. Conclusions and recommendations for AGFVII

6. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The process will be jointly coordinated by UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa in close collaboration with the Steering Committee for AGFVII. The Steering Committee bringing together key partners will be set up to provide overall guidance to the preparatory work for the Forum. Similar committees or Task Forces may also to be established at the national level to coordinate and lead the process with the participation of the UNDP country offices and AGF VII focal points.

The UNDP and National Capacity development focal points will consult on the membership of these national coordinating committees.

7. ROLE OF COUNTRY OFFICES

UNDP country offices will play facilitative roles in coordination and provide financial support to the in-country preparatory processes and for the attendance to the Forum by stakeholders. The RR/RC will assist in organizing the UN country teams around providing technical support to the national consultations particularly in the preparation of national reports and participation at the Forum. UNDP country offices may also assist the national capacity development focal points with the preparation of the national reports on the format provided. National consultants may also be retained to assist with writing the reports.

8. TIMELINES

Pre-Forum: In-country processes

a. Designation of the National focal point for AGFVII: 15th June 2007
b. Holding of three days national consultations on experiences in capacity development.-the results of which would be captured in a report from each participating country summarizing the country consultation process, experiences and challenges related to capacity development-Between 15th June and 30th August 2007
c. Preparation and submission of national reports to RBA- 30th August 2007

Convening of AGFVII-24-26 October 2007

a. Convening of the Stakeholders’ Forum
b. Media symposium
c. The Heads of State Segment
“

SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGF VII)

Theme
“Building the Capable State in Africa”

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
24-26 October 2007

Concept Note
&
Technical Papers

REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

New York- June 2007

Contents

ACRONYMS 4
PREFACE 5
PART 1: CONCEPT PAPER
1. REINFORCING CAPACITY TOWARDS BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA 8
1.1 INTRODUCTION 8
1.2 CHALLENGES CONFRONTING AFRICA 10
1.3 RATIONALE REGARDING CALLS FOR THE CAPABLE STATE 16
1.4 INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE CAPABLE STATE 17
1.5 AGENDA FOR AGF VII 22
PART TWO: TECHNICAL PAPERS
PART 2 24
TECHNICAL PAPERS 24
2. STATE LEGITIMACY AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 25
2.1 INTRODUCTION 25
2.2. STATE, STATE CAPACITY, STATE LEGITIMACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION IN AFRICA 26
2.3. LEADERSHIP, STATE CAPACITY, LEGITIMACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 30
2.4. BUILDING STATE CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP UNDER THE AU, NEPAD AND THE APRM 36
2.5. CONCLUSION 38
REFERENCES 39
3. STRENGTHENING STATE PERFORMANCE THROUGH DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE 43
3.1 INTRODUCTION 43
3.2 DECENTRALIZATION DEFINED 43
3.3 CHALLENGES FOR DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 44
3.4 UNDERSTANDING STATE PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPMENT 45
3.5 SUMMARIZING THE AFRICAN CHALLENGE 49
3.6 STRATEGIES AND PROCESSES FOR EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE 49
3.7 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY AT LOCAL LEVELS 51
REFERENCES 52
4. GLOBALIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA 53
4.1 THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF GLOBALIZATION 53
4.2 . PROBLEMATIZING STATE CAPACITY 55
4.3 GLOBALIZATION, STATE CAPACITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN AFRICA 58
4.4 . ADDRESSING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CAUSED BY GLOBALIZATION 59
4.5 . GLOBALIZATION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CRISIS 60
4.6 . CONSTRAINING LIMITS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY FOR STATE CAPACITY 61
4.7 GLOBALIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD? 62
4.8 POLICY AGENDA FOR OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS TO STRENGTHENING STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA 64
4.9 CONCLUSIONS 66
REFERENCES 66
5. THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS 68
5.1 INTRODUCTION 68
5.2 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 68
5.3 OUTREACH LIMITED, FUNDING DOUBTFUL, LEGITIMACY CONTESTED 75
5.4 CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD 78
6. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 81
6.1 INTRODUCTION 81
6.2 AFRICA’S POVERTY CHALLENGE 81
6.3 AFRICA’S GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE 82
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 90
7. ENHANCING INSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN CAPACITY FOR IMPROVED PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE 91
7.1 INTRODUCTION 91
7.2 CONCEPTUAL AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 91
7.3 NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF CAPACITY CHALLENGES 92
7.4 EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CAPACITY CHALLENGES 95
7.5 THE WAY FORWARD: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 98
7.6 CONCLUSIONS: PRIORITIZING CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORT 106
REFERENCES 107
8. ROLE OF WOMEN IN BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 109
8.1 INTRODUCTION 109
8.2 INTRODUCTION OF GENDER INTO THE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE IN AFRICA 109
8.3 HOW WOMEN GROUPS ARE ORGANISED 112
8.4 FUNDING FOR WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS 114
8.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS AND THE STATE 114
8.6 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE 116
8.7 OPPORTUNITIES 118
8.8 CHALLENGES 118
8.9 THE WAY FORWARD 119
8.10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 120
REFERENCES 122

Acronyms

ACHPR African Charter for Human and People’s Rights
AGF African Governance Forum
ALPN African Leadership and Progress Network
APRM Africa Peer Review Mechanism
AU African Union
CBO Community Based Organization
CD Capacity Development
NSA Non-State Actor
DAC Development Assistance Committee [of OECD]
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS Economic Commission of West African States
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FUPRO Federation des Unions des Producteurs du Benin
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GLPF Great Lakes Policy Forum
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IFIs International Financial Institutions
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme
LIFE Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OANET l’Organisations des Acteurs Non-Etatiques du Tchad
OAU Organization of African Union
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NSA Non State Actor
ROPARWA Reseau des Organisations Paysanne du Rwanda
SACI Southern Africa Capacity Initiative
SAP Structural Adjustments Programmes
TA Technical Assistance
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSIA United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WHO World Health Organization

Preface

The African Governance Forum (AGF) was launched in 1997 by UNDP and UNECA within the framework of the United Nations Special Initiative for Africa (UNSIA.) While UNSIA has since folded, AGF has continued as a flagship governance programme bringing together African leaders, cooperating partners, representatives of civil society and the private sector to discuss a thematic subject that is considered to be important and timely in the advancement of good governance on the African continent. Four specific objectives underlay the AGF-namely:-
a. Strengthen development cooperation and partnerships among African governments, civil society organizations and Africa’s development partners for improved governance
b. Increase awareness and facilitate the exchange of information, experiences and best practices among African governments, the private sector, civil society organizations, development partners and other stakeholders on good governance
c. Encourage the development of concrete programs of action to promote good governance related issues and facilitate the mobilization of resources for these programs at the national level
d. Create an environment that is supportive of resource mobilization for follow-up governance related activities in Africa.

Since its launch, six AGF sessions have so far been held. The first one was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1997 and focused on a multiplicity of issues that included constitutional reforms, the media, capacity building, and decentralization. The second AGF, held in Accra, Ghana, focused specifically on ‘Accountability and Transparency while the third was held in Bamako, Mali, and addressed Good Governance and Conflict Management. The fourth AGF was held in Kampala, Uganda, and looked at the Contribution of the Parliamentary Process in Strengthening Good Governance in Africa. The fifth one was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on the theme: Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa. The sixth one (AGF-VI) was held in Kigali, Rwanda in 2006 and focused on “Implementing the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Challenges and Opportunities”.

The Sixth Africa Governance Forum in Kigali underscored the centrality of state capacity in strengthening good governance and delivering of development generally. To that effect, the Forum decided to devote the Seventh Africa Governance Forum to the consideration of the critical issue of capacity development and how the capacities of the state in Africa can be enhanced with a view to enabling them deliver services effectively. It is against this background that the seventh AGF will be held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 24-26 October 2007 under the theme of Building the Capable State in Africa.

The specific objectives of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum will be to:-
6. Deliberate on the meaning and definition of a capable state appropriate to the African context and its linkages to peace, security, good governance, and development.
7. Take stock of the experiences and lessons learnt from the efforts at meeting the capacity challenges in Africa including internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state
8. Brainstorm on the prevailing capacity development challenges and opportunities for building the capable state in Africa and their implications to Africa and its development partners.
9. Identify the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context, how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
10. Discuss how Africa can effectively respond in putting in place an African owned and led strategies for building the capable state and the nature of partnerships that will be required.

The AGFVII preparatory processes will involve the holding of national consultations on country experiences in capacity development, preparation of national reports, and convening of the Forum itself. To facilitate these activities, an Issues Paper and seven thematic technical papers have been commissioned for use as background for the national consultations and elaboration of the national reports that will inform the deliberations at the Forum.

The issues paper provides the theoretical framework for the discussions within the national consultations that will be convened in the twenty seven countries leading to national reports on experiences and challenges of building institutions and strengthening state capacity for good governance and development.

The seven technical thematic papers developed by independent African experts are intended to provide technical input into the national consultations discussions and the deliberations at the Forum itself. The papers are on the following themes:-
g. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa
h. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance
i. State legitimacy and leadership
j. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance
k. The role of non-state actors
l. Globalization and state capacity
m. Role of Women in Building the Capable State in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

This Document presents the Issues and Technical Papers developed around the theme of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum on Building the Capable State in Africa. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors.
On behalf of the Steering Committee of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum, UNDP- Regional Bureau for Africa would like to thank the authors of the various papers for sharing their insight into the challenge of capacity development at all levels and how that impacts on Building the Capable State in Africa and Professor Oliver Saasa for editing the original English versions of the papers.

Gilbert Fousson Houngbo
United Nations Assistant Secretary General and UNDP Regional Director for Africa

Part 1
Concept Paper

Concept Paper
1. Reinforcing Capacity towards building the Capable State in Africa
Ahmed Mohiddin

1.1 Introduction
In the pursuit of nation building and economic development, the first generation of African leaders considered centralization of political power and authority, the control of the material resources and the mobilization of human resources as the most critical factors. Nation building entailed the forging of diverse ethnic, cultural, racial, religious and traditional groups into one meaningful nation. This entailed top-bottom authoritarian socio-economic policies that did not necessarily reflect the wishes of the people, nor did they sufficiently empower them to effectively participate in the economic activities.

In the process of mobilizing the people, the one-party governance systems and authoritarian regimes that characterize many African political systems undermined and destroyed the growth and development of independently organized political groups and other critics in the civil society. The regimes attempted to co-opt existing fledgling civil society organizations, marginalized those not cooperating and destroyed those that appeared to be hostile or opposed to the regimes. Consequently, institutional capacity building was neglected, not considered a priority, and the residual but weak institutional capacity bequeathed by the colonial rulers was severely undermined. In some instances, the legislatures were allowed to decay, with their capacities to check and balance the executive virtually destroyed. There were no means by which the people could effectively air their grievances, articulate particular interests or, in general, call their governments to account.

The emergence of the military dictatorship in many African countries had extremely damaging impact on the capacity of the governance institutions. In their excessive preoccupation with security and control, they restricted the political process, marginalised civil society organizations, and suspended existing constitutions that were the basic foundations of good governance and democracy. They banned political parties, undermined the judiciary, threatened the media, frustrated private sector initiatives and often created an atmosphere of fear, suspicions and distrust amongst the citizenry. There were no checks and balances. Government accountability to the governed was virtually non-existent. There were, thus, neither institutional capacities nor concerns for capacity building.

In the circumstances of the euphoria of independence, coupled with the rising expectations, not much thought was given to the precise ingredients - the building blocks - that would constitute the capacity to maintain and sustain the political order and the economic institutions needed to produce goods and services. Beyond the general expansion of education and training, supplemented by foreign aid and expertise in improving technical capacities in selected ministries, very little was done or thought given to the issue of the appropriate capabilities for the fulfillment of the post-colonial development objectives. The inherited institutions were assumed, mutatis mutandis, to be adequate for the promotion of the development objectives. Issues of the appropriate capacity to sustain the post-Independence political order and the management of the economic institutions were raised in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. The World Bank noted in 1988:

Many countries in the region are severely handicapped in their development efforts by poor institutional performance at all levels—the limited capacity of government ministries to determine appropriate policies and allocate resources, the poor management of public sector enterprises, the fragility of the cooperative movement, or the undeveloped potential of the private sector. Many African countries also face chronic shortages of qualified local personnel, and still depend on foreign personnel, even to maintain existing levels of performance. Thus the need for strengthening the indigenous capacity of African institutions is urgent and broad-based programs for institutional development must be seen as central to any strategy for African development.

A lot has taken place in Africa in the course of the last two decades, opening up the political space and empowering people to participate in the development and democratization processes of their countries. Much also has since been written, debated and actions taken on the issue of capacity building in Africa. From the initial preoccupations with the lack of capital, administrative abilities and foreign technical assistance to wider concerns about governing and its consequences, and sophisticated appreciation of the role of the non-state actors, to the different types of capacity in the formulation of appropriate policies and their implementation, management of resources and the promotion of sustainable human development.

Capacity has now been acknowledged as the major ‘missing link’ in the development and democratization efforts in Africa. At the conclusion of AGF VI in Kigali in May 2006, it was agreed that AGFVII should focus on the issue of ‘Building the Capable State.’ This Concept Paper forms the overall platform from which the issues for AGF VII are to be discussed. As an Issues Paper, this piece aims to provide a conceptual basis for the more pointed discussions in Part Two if this document on Technical papers. Experience so far gained suggests that the capacity of the institutions of governance to deliver services efficiently, effectively, equitably and predictably needs to be addressed by African countries. Moreover, as countries must respond effectively and timely to the new global challenges and opportunities, African governance systems need to acquire appropriate capabilities. Africa, thus, needs a capable state appropriate to its conditions and experiences.

Africa is a vast continent with many and diverse human and material resources. It has great potentials for economic growth and human development. But it also has tremendous economic, social and political problems, as well as global challenges and opportunities. Some of these problems are deeply rooted in history. Some are the consequences of the colonial situation, the anti-colonial struggles and the exigencies of the Cold War. Others are the results of inappropriate policies as African governments were grappling with the development and democratization issues. While yet others are the consequences of the structural adjustments imposed by the international development community, and the continuous unavoidable processes of globalization. But changes also bring forth new challenges, opportunities and possibilities for those with the capabilities to respond to them positively. Whatever the root-causes of these problems and challenges, they all have to be responded to effectively with the appropriate policies, strategies and capabilities.

One of the positive responses is the New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD). Similarly, many African countries have voluntarily acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). APRM is essentially a mechanism to promote the political, social and economic objectives of NEPAD, and ensuring that the participating countries observe the principles and practices supportive of the objectives. The over-aching objectives of NEPAD are the promotion of sustainable human development; the eradication of poverty; continental economic and political integration; and the enhancement of global competitiveness.

This Concept Paper is divided into six sections. A brief review of the major domestic and global challenges confronting Africa is made in section 2. Section 3 dwells on the rationale regarding calls for the Capable State. Section 4, in turn, sets the intellectual framework for understanding the concept of the capable State. Lastly, Section 5 presents possible issues to be considered in the Agenda for AGF VII.

1.2 Challenges Confronting Africa
Africa is currently confronted with two sets of challenges. One is domestic, and the other is global. The domestic challenges include promotion of sustainable human development, including meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); promotion of peace, security and stability without which the achievement of sustainable development would be impossible; combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic and malaria; sustaining popular electoral participatory democracy; ensuring a thriving private sector; and, at the regional and continental levels, promotion of economic and political integration.

1.2.1 Capacity Challenges
Capacity has been identified as the ‘missing link’ in the African development and democratization processes. The issues of capacity and capacity building are very critical in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Good governance is a major factor in the creation of an environment of peace, stability and security, in which people may pursue various productive and creative activities, creating wealth and employment, and thus promoting human development and the alleviation of poverty.

Capacity building is a perpetual and complex process, entailing policies, strategies and their implementation; human, financial and material resources, as well as good leadership. It is an issue of empowerment, providing people with the capabilities and expanding their range of choices and opportunities for consultations and partnerships, as well as that of the availability and utilization of resources. It is not simply an issue of the availability of, for example, doctors, engineers, economists, or teachers, but those who have the appropriate specialisation and experience needed for the specific functions, and the creation of the appropriate working conditions. Capacity building thus requires an environment that would, in general:
a) Ensure the continuous supply of the appropriate capacity ingredients: human, material and financial resources
b) Create an environment of peace, security and stability so that people could engage in various creative and productive activities, creating wealth and employment, and thus the conditions for continuous supply of the ingredients for capacity building
c) Facilitate the efficient utilization of the human and material resources, and promote efforts to continuously up-grade information and knowledge, skills, techniques and best practices
d) Consolidate trust and generate social capital to promote co-operation and partnerships amongst the various groups of people in society, amongst and between the CSOs and CBOs, and with the government, the press, media and the private sector
e) Facilitate the observance of accountability and transparency in the public decision making processes, and enable people to call to account those in governance positions
f) Encourage people and their organizations to identify and discuss diminishing institutional capacities or such serious deficiencies in all the structures and levels of governance in their countries, design or suggest the appropriate capacity for the efficient and effective performance of those institutions.
g) Promote the unhindered circulation of ideas and opinions, information and knowledge, and the exchange of experience, insight and best practice.
In the light of the above, capacity building is a continuous process requiring continuous supply of the appropriate legal, institutional, human and material resources. The objective of capacity building is to ensure that institutions are efficient and effective in the performance of their respective functions. Capacity building has to respond to changes, needs and aspirations of the people, as well as adapting to, and adopting, scientific and technological changes, new ideas, organizational and managerial principles, experiences and relevant ‘best practices’ from within Africa or elsewhere.
Much broader and sophisticated concepts of capacity have emerged. Capacity now includes the wider issue of governance, its principles, institutions and supportive components in the civil society and the private sector. This has entailed major shifts from top-down authoritative rule to constitutionalism and the rule of law; democracy and social justice; accountability and transparency; inclusiveness and empowerment so that the people have the capabilities to effectively participate in public affairs; as well as being aware of the situation in which they live and work, of the available range of choices and opportunities, and to identify problems and suggest solutions. In short, a major paradigm shift has taken place, from the ‘brutality’ of big government to the ‘sensitivity’ of good governance.

Understanding the possible or potential causes of capacity deficiency is an important first step towards capacity building. Capacity problems may arise because of any of the following:
a) Lost capacity due to destruction caused by civil wars or severe political problems (bad governance) forcing professional and skilled people to flee to other countries, creating very serious brain drains.
b) Inadequate material and financial resources. The required quantity of trained and skilled personnel might be available but not matched with the required material and financial resources.
c) Inefficient utilization of existing capacity due, in part, to the following:
o People concerned are not fully applying themselves to the tasks at hand because of inappropriate or inadequate incentive such as poor remuneration or working conditions.
o Corruption, i.e., the miss-use and appropriation of material and financial resources for personal gains.
o lack of accountability and transparency in the system of governance.
o Lack of integrity, vision, commitment, and political will to get things done.

The crucial practical question for African countries confronted with the competing domestic needs and demands is: capacity for what? If, for example, one is concerned with the development of a country, then capacity needed might be that which would enable the achievement of the stated development objectives of the country. This will entail the capabilities for formulating sound and appropriate policies and strategies, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; mobilizing and managing human and material resources; mobilizing and managing funds to pay for the policies and their implementation; availability and accessibility of information and knowledge relevant to the tasks; management and utilization of social capital, trust, organizational inter-linkages and various kinds of partnerships, cooperation and consultations within the civil and private sectors. Thus, the capabilities to achieve the development objectives would be assumed to exist if:
a) institutions and organizations with the supportive personnel to perform the stated functions are in place;
b) personnel with the requisite skills to perform the specified functions are available;
c) there are leaders who are conversant with the needs and aspirations of the people, competent and honest, with integrity, vision and are committed to the fulfillment of the objectives; leaders who are able to mobilize and inspire people, defining the future while effectively responding to the present needs and demands of the people
d) the institutions and organizations have the adequate financial and material resources to perform the activities;
e) there are numerous independent professional and trade associations, civil society and community based organizations engaged in providing services for their members;
f) people working for the institutions and organizations work according to the best methods and techniques (best practice), following productivity-related principles, and governance-related principles.

It is important to make the distinction between capacity as a generic ability to get things done, and capacity for as specific ability to get certain things done. With reference to an institution, the notion capacity for would signify the specific capabilities that would enable the specified institution to perform the specified objectives efficiently and effectively. Capacity of an institution is, thus, essentially the product of the dynamic interactions of the performance of the people running and managing the specific institution, with the laws, rules and regulations, norms and traditions pertaining to the institution. The performance of the people will be determined by three factors: the availability of the supportive institutional infrastructures, equipment and adequate financial resources; their technical skills and professional competence to achieve the objectives of the institution; and their commitment and integrity in observing the rules and regulations, norms and conventions of the institution. Institutional capacity building, thus, entails acquiring the appropriate capacity ingredients for the specific institution; and this would depend on the nature and objectives of the institution.

The global challenges include the building of the appropriate capabilities to respond positively to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. In the past, Africans have tended to be reactive or even passive in the face of rapid global changes and, consequently, they became victims rather than beneficiary of globalization. Africans now need to be better integrated into the global economy. The response to the domestic and global challenges requires collective effort. For development to be meaningful and sustainable, it must be initiated and undertaken by the people themselves. Only when the people effectively participate in the development processes can development truly be of their choice. But the people must be sufficiently empowered, provided with the relevant information and knowledge to enable them effectively and meaningfully participate in the development processes. This is a critical challenge for capacity enhancement.

To respond positively to the capacity enhancement challenges, an enabling environment of peace, security and stability is required. Good governance plays a major role in the creation of this enabling environment. Governance is about power and its utilization. Governance enables people to utilize collective power to manage their affairs in the most efficient and effective manners, and in accordance with their needs and aspirations, cultures and traditions (see Chapter 3). To be effective in achieving people’s aspirations, governance processes need to be organized and institutionalised, so that power is utilised within the three arms of government, namely the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The involvement of other governance structures/systems in the civil society and the private sectors is equally essential (see Chapter 5 on the role of non-state actors)

In order to fully understand the importance of institutional capacity, it is useful to identify the operational and inter-dependent structures of governance, namely, political governance, administrative governance, economic governance, corporate governance, civic governance, systemic governance, and global governance. They could be defined as follows:
• Political governance is concerned with the participation of the people in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and livelihood. These relate to the issues of democracy, representation, power sharing and the relationship between the institutions of governance, such as the legislature or local council, the executive and the judiciary, political parties and civil society organizations.
• Administrative governance deals with the implementation of the decisions, the establishment of the institutional framework for the efficient and effective implementation of public policies and the supply of the public services.
• Economic governance relates to the decision-making processes related to the efficient allocat1on of economic resources in order to promote growth, the creation of wealth, employment, equity and sustainable development.
• Civic governance refers the working of the civil society, the relationship between and among the various voluntary and non-profit civil society organizations such as NGOs, CBOs, and cultural, ethnic and religious organizations.
• Systemic governance is responsible for the convergence of all the domains and processes of governance that brings together government [central and local], private sector and civil society in an efficient, effective and meaningful framework.

Some of these domains constitute the critical components of the NEPAD’s Basic Declarations on: Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-Economic Development. Some of these components are subject to the peer review processes under the APRM.

Governance entails a series of decision-making and their implementation. It is the quality of these decisions and the manner by which they are implemented that determines the effectiveness of governance. The quality of decisions and the effectiveness of their implementation will depend on a variety of factors, ranging from the constitutional/legal and ethical, the human and material resources, the working environment, leadership, commitment, political will, as well as the pattern of decision-making and its management.

In spite of the major governance and constitutional reforms undertaken by many governments in the course of the last two decades, capacity deficiencies continues to be one of the major governance issues in Africa. The African Governance Report [AGR], published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] in 2005, revealed various magnitudes of capacity deficiencies across all the governance systems in Africa, ranging from the state institutions to the non-state agencies in the civil society and private sectors. These capacity deficits have adversely affected the effectiveness of the governance systems and will continue to do so unless they are adequately addressed. In general, the current systems of governance in Africa lack the capacity to efficiently and effectively sustain the various domains and levels of governance –economic, political, administrative, and systemic—to perform their respective functions efficiently and effectively (see Chapter 7 on institutional and human resource capacity enhancement). Corporate governance, political governance and economic governance are still weak albeit incrementally improving in those few countries that have embarked upon serious comprehensive reforms. For various reasons, institutional checks and balances are very weak. Presently, there are no effective mechanisms to prevent governments - and in particular the executive branches - from being dominant, monopolizing power and abusing their discretionary authorities. They are also deficient in responding to the needs and aspirations of the people, and to the challenges, possibilities and opportunities of globalization or what the 21st Century might offer. (see Chapter 2 on State legitimacy and leadership in Africa). Legislatures in Africa are also generally unable to perform efficiently and effectively their constitutional obligations. In general, African legislators are inadequately educated, or appropriately informed on major issues affecting their constituencies, lack the relevant knowledge, information, sophistication, freedom and independence that would enable them to perform their functions efficiently and effectively, monitoring of the executive

The efficiency and effectiveness of the executive is, likewise, hampered by weak institutional capacity, due largely to inadequate supportive professional and technical personnel, material and financial resources, a clear understanding and acknowledgment of its role. In particular, the executive lacks the capacity for informed policy formulation.
Although the independence of the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed under the principles of the separation of powers, its institutional capacities to perform its basic functions of ensuring constitutionalism and the observance of the rule of law and due process of law in the governance systems are severely hampered in the average African country. This is largely due to executive interference, inadequate supply of judges and magistrates, lack of technical equipment and professional administrative support.

At another level, many political parties in Africa do not have the capabilities to effectively articulate and promote their political principles and visions of their preferred society or defend the interests and rights of their supporters. They lack the organizational capabilities, partly due to lack of professional and dedicated personnel, funding and leadership; and partly because of government’s tendencies of marginalization, exclusion and harassments. In some African countries, the political space for the opposition is still problematic. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are weak because of lack of organizational capabilities, funding, skilled personnel in advocacy and promotion of their interests and objectives. Many of these organizations receive substantial external funding, thus rather supply-driven and dependent; and not demand-driven and independent. Partly due to this external dependency and partly because African governments have not fully appreciated the role and importance of CSOs in the governance systems, many governments have been reluctant in accepting them as partners in the promotion of good governance, or as credible sources of inputs in the policy formulation processes.

1.2.2 Good Governance Challenges
As with democracy, there are universally recognized principles and institutions of good governance, but there is no universally acceptable/applicable model of good governance. There is, as well, clearly no African model of good governance. Both democracy and good governance are ‘works in progress.’ What might constitute good governance in Rwanda, given its post-genocide context, may not necessarily be the same in another African country that has not had such experiences. Or the governance priorities entailed in the accommodation of racial minorities or rectifying racial imbalances in a post-Apartheid South Africa; or the disproportionate ethnic economic or political power as is the case in some African countries. Similarly, what constitutes a governance priority in one African country, say the modernization of chieftaincy in Ghana, might not be necessarily the same in the other African countries.
Moreover, in this age of rapid changes and globalization, the continuous impact of foreign cultures and development paradigms impacting on Africa, it is important that Africa has its own perspectives based on its own knowledge and information, experience and insights on these issues. Changes are inevitable. However, in the realms of ideas and the best practices of getting things done - whether in the governance of people or the production and distribution of goods and services - there have always, historically, emerged powerful and influential ideas and practices that were often taken, mutatis mutandis, as universally applicable. These ideas and practices were usually referred to as conventional wisdom, or paradigms. How these ideas and practices - conventional wisdoms and paradigms - are created is not easy to explain. But how they gain currency and influence is less difficult to understand. Usually these ideas and best practices emanate from the most industrially advanced and politically powerful countries and find their way to, or get imposed on, the less economically advanced and politically weak countries.

Powerful multilateral institutions and major players in global governance like the IMF, the Organization OECD, because of their intellectual influences as creators of concepts and strategies of development, and their financial powers as providers of funds for research and development, set the objectives and conditions under which development takes place in the poor countries. In their attempts to grapple with the problems of development in the poor countries, the international development community has gone through a series of “buzz words” or “fashionable fads” since the late 1950s: from growth with or without trickle-down effects, through basic needs and integrated rural development to sustainable growth with equity and participation, liberalization and the markets; to, now, good governance as conceived by them.

At the outset of independence the state and the national structures of governance inherited by the first-generation of African leaders were modeled on those of the colonial powers. Apart from participating in the series of constitutional conferences that led to independence, which was essentially a transfer of power from colonial rulers to African nationalists, African scholars or intellectuals were not consulted in the major decisions involving the philosophical foundations of the state or the theories of government and economic organization they were about to inherit. The nationalists were focused on capturing the colonial state, and the colonial authorities were keen to ensure that their interests would be protected. The interests of the metropolitan countries thus permeated the constitutional conferences, and the constitutions, which were eventually structured, reflected the western historical experiences and theories of government. There was very little in them of any relevance to the historical, anthropological or sociological realities of Africa.
Whether these constitutions and institution were utilized according to the appropriate principles, conventions and practice or not is not the issue. What is important for the purpose at hand (i.e. better understanding of capacity and capacity building, and the crafting of an African capable state) is not that they were non-African structures of governance, or did not originate from the African practical experience of governance. Rather, to objectively examine the experiences in utilizing and managing these institutions, and in light of the domestic and global challenges confronting African countries, discuss what needs done to ensure that states in Africa have the appropriate capabilities to respond efficiently and effectively to these challenges.
1.2.3 Information and Knowledge Challenges
In this rapidly changing world in which information and knowledge are critical factors in responding to the domestic needs and demands, as well as the competitive global markets, decisions must be well informed and efficiently executed. Given the complexity of these decisions and the speed at which the necessary information and knowledge needed for the decisions must be organized and processed and decisions executed, it is important that those in charge of decision-making are appropriately educated, trained and experienced. This entails a process of continuous learning, training and adapting; and of being “in the loop” of the incessant flow of data, information and knowledge; in essence, a life-long education and training. It may also entail reforms of the governance institutions, making them more efficient and effective in response to the changing domestic needs and demands.

1.2.4 Media Freedom Challenge
Although the freedom of the press and media in Africa has much improved in the course of the last two decades, there is still the lack of capacity, particularly in investigative journalism. Funding, availability of personnel with the appropriate skills and experience, and government’s reluctance to provide access to information and data are the main reasons. Moreover, African governments are hostile to press reportage-exposing abuses of power or corruption, even when these allegations are based on governments’ own records. Transparency is still a major issue in the governance systems in Africa, thus rendering press reportage of public accountability failures very difficult and at times risky.

1.2.5 Research Capacity Challenge
Research facilities lodged in government ministries or departments are not as efficient or effective as they should be as they are constrained by the unavailability of the appropriate capacity ingredients and bureaucratic procedures. They also suffer from political interference, as research objectives are often politically motivated or their results are suppressed if they are politically embarrassing to the political masters. Independent think tanks and policy research centres are a recent phenomenon, initially promoted and largely funded by donors and the international development community. As they were part of the first phase of the democratisation movement in Africa, they often appeared to be critical of the prevailing political status quo and behaviour of the leaders. They were thus perceived by the incumbent political leaders to be hostile, and not as benign critics or potential partners and collaborators in the development and democratization processes. Hence, their effectiveness—capacity---is muted. The potential of the Universities as sources of capacity building facilities have been greatly weakened by lack of financial and material resources.

1.2.6 Implications of Capacity Challenges
Firstly, high levels of poverty in Africa are the more visible ramification of capacity limitations. On the one hand, poverty has been the consequence of lack of capacity to create wealth and employment, to deliver the needed social and other necessary services. On the other hand, persistent poverty tends to inflict disease and sickness, thus further deteriorating the already depreciated human resources; and more so as educated, trained and experienced people migrate to other parts of the country, or leave for other countries. Moreover, globalization coupled with liberalization have enabled Africans with marketable skills to migrate where those skills are in demand and well remunerated. This brain drain must be stopped; and those who are now settled in the developed countries - the Diaspora - are well educated and trained, endowed with the kinds of skills and experience that Africa needs in the 21st Century information and knowledge age. These people need to be persuaded to return home. For such persuasions to succeed, an enabling environment of peace, security and stability, democracy and good governance must be created (see more of this in Chapter 7).

Secondly, capacity challenges have also compromised the ability of African governments to effectively address the social and health challenges that are brought about by HIV/AIDS and malaria. These two diseases are the greatest killers in Africa. HIV/AIDS devastates the young, able-bodied, educated and productive adults, who are Africa’s major assets in the struggles for development and meeting the MDGs challenges. Malaria, in turn, kills the very young who are the sources of capacity building blocks, future citizens, leaders, creators of wealth, employment and generation of income. Appropriate capacity is, thus, urgently needed to eliminate and prevent the recurrence of these killer diseases.

Thirdly, the education sector in Africa has been severely undermined by both neglect and the series of structural adjustment programmes. Although the proliferation of private educational institutions from primary schools to universities has enhanced the opportunities for many to access education, it has also strained the existing capacity and somewhat lowered the standards. There is an urgent need to review education policies and existing capacity in the light of the domestic needs and demands and the exigencies of responding to the global challenges and opportunities, in which education and information are critical factors.

Fourthly, poor economic management and bad governance have created monumental unemployment and poverty in many African countries. They have created internal displaced people, economic migrants, refugees, rapid and unwieldy urbanization, anxieties, fears and a sense of insecurity amongst those who are rich; and hardship, anger, frustration and hostility amongst the poor and unemployed. Violent conflicts have been the main obstacle to economic growth, socio-economic transformation and the reduction of poverty. And the major victims of violent conflicts in Africa are the children. They are the most vulnerable segment of the population. Today’s children are the building blocks of the future societies. If today they receive proper education and development, protection and identity, health and survival, love and care, they will be peace loving and law abiding citizens, with strong work ethics, compassionate, responsible, responsive and accountable in their actions. They will be potential contributors to economic growth, development and the reduction of poverty.
Fifthly, although many African governments undertook reforms to improve the working of the private sector, capacity frailties have continued to compromise the emergence of a vibrant private sector in the average African country. The AGR cited several reasons, including lack of an appropriate predictable regulatory enforcement mechanism that is transparent and accountable; weak mechanism for consultation or partnership between government and private sector; limited and weak capacity within the informal sector for entrepreneurial development; persistent dominance of foreign-owned private sector; indigenous private sector under-funded, unable to compete with foreign corporations; weak corporate governance; and inadequate understanding of the role of the private sector in the promotion of human development.

1.3 Rationale regarding Calls for the Capable State
In the light of the challenges catalogued above, one of the biggest challenges facing the state in Africa in the 21st Century is the building of the appropriate capabilities to respond positively to the domestic needs and demands of the people, as well as the unavoidable global changes and challenges impacting on African economies and societies. In the past, Africans have tended to be re-active or even passive to global changes and, consequently, they became victims rather than potential beneficiary of the changes. Africans now need to be proactive, acquiring the essential knowledge and information, building the appropriate capabilities, identifying the possibilities and opportunities and responding to them effectively. In the course of the last two decades, the African State was demonized and vilified, primarily because it was perceived to be over-extended, inefficient, dictatorial and authoritarian. At the economic level, it was unable to deliver the needed essential good and services, including law and order, peace and security. Politically, it was regarded as dictatorial, authoritarian, unaccountable and irresponsive to the needs and wishes of the people. It was criticized by the scholarly and ideological neo-Marxist as well as the neo-Liberals and neo-Conservatives for its failure to deliver as expected by these critics. And it was also criticized by ordinary African citizens (the ‘wananchi’) for its failure to fulfill their expectations of independence. It has been variably referred to as: ‘parasitical state,’ ‘predatory state,’ ‘crony state,’ ‘kleptocratic state,’ ‘vampire state,’ ‘bourgeois state,’ ‘neo-colonial state,’ etc.

Africans were caught in the larger neo-liberal ideological hegemonic debates of the markets versus the state. Africans were mainly onlookers as they were not involved in the major debates on whether the market should be dominated or directed by the state; or the state should dominate the market. African perspectives were not acknowledged and addressed in the formulation of these policy measures in response to the globalization and market forces. In light of the experience and consequences of externally imposed paradigms on African societies and economies, who is entitled to design the appropriate balance between the state and the market in the contemporary African context? In a democracy, informed debates should be encouraged involving all stakeholders, including the government as the major institution in the State. There is also the imperative of taking into account the African perspectives in light of the more than four decades of experience in governance and managing the inherited institutions.
In the course of the last two decades there has been tremendous transformation in the governance systems of the African countries. The Continent witnessed the appearance of a new generation of young citizenry - most of who were born after the independence of their respective countries. They have been demanding effective participation in the decision-making processes. They have continued to insist on institutional and electoral reforms and new constitutions to reflect the prevailing African realities. They also demand for new leaders who were accountable, transparent, and competent, with integrity, honesty and commitment.

1.4 Intellectual Framework for Understanding the Concept of the Capable State
Governance is one f the important ingredients in the establishment of the Capable State. Governance is about power: how it is utilized, on behalf of whose interests or for what purpose; and about decision-makers, how they make those decisions and implement them, and how they can be made accountable for the decisions they have made and implemented. However, to be efficient and effective, governance has to be institutionalized into appropriate institutions. How the institutions of governance interact with one another, and with the people and organizations in the civil society and the private sector determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the system of governance (see Chapter 6 on the Role of the State and Africa’s Development Challenges).

The state is essentially a cluster of inter-related socio-economic and political institutions in society. It has the monopoly of collective and coercive power and commands attention from the civil society. The state is the main supplier of the basic and essential public goods and services, ranging from the maintenance of law and order, creating and maintaining the enabling environment of peace, security and stability, so that people could pursue creative and productive activities of their own choices, to the health and education services for all citizens. However, the role or functions of the State and its capacity to perform those functions vary over time. Functions or role of the State are subject to changing philosophical considerations and socio-economic circumstances. And with each change, there is the need to review the appropriate capacities needed to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the state.

Modern African states have their origins in the colonial period. They were initially created by the colonial rulers to serve their own imperial and colonial interests. Although some policies were promulgated in order to promote “political order and good government” and measures taken to encourage selected economic growth in the colonies, nation building was not the primary objectives of colonial rulers. The main functions of the colonial state were to ensure that ‘political order and good government,’ as conceived by the colonial authorities, prevailed in the colonies. When African nationalists achieved freedom and independence from the colonial rulers, the state they inherited was basically a colonial creation. Although based on new Constitutions, crafted largely by the colonial authorities, the functions of the post-colonial African states were basically not dissimilar to those of the colonial period. They, too, were intended to promote ‘political order and good government,’ this time as conceived by the post-colonial rulers and their supportive elites.

The transformation of the post-colonial state came basically from two main sources: the policies and actions of first-generation African political and military leaders, and the structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund (Breton Woods Institutions). In their determination to create their own conceptions of the political order and good government, nation building and economic development, the post-colonial African political and military leaders expanded the scope of the state both economically and politically. The exigencies of post-colonial nation building and economic development incrementally involved the state in various economic activities, producing goods and services, as well as controlling and regulating the economy. It became the main supplier of not only public goods and services, but other consumer goods as well. To ensure that the ‘political order and good government’ was maintained, the political and military leaders expanded the constitutional and political powers of the state. Either via the one-party political regimes or the military juntas, the state became authoritarian and dictatorial. Thus, both economically and politically, the state was very powerful but virtually unaccountable to the people. Because it was over-extended, its capacity to perform its various functions efficiently and effectively was invariably inadequate; it did not have the requisite capabilities to perform the functions. The state was extensive and expansive in society, yet ineffective in the delivery of the public goods and services.

In the 1980s and 1990s, SAPs initiated by the Breton Woods institutions, influenced by the neo-liberal thinking (Washington Consensus) on the role of the state and the markets, and supported by the international development and donor communities, drastically undermined the capacities of the state and many other public institutions throughout the continent. These included those in health, education, civil service and various parastatal organizations. Minimal government proposed and insisted by the international development institutions implied retrenchment of civil servants and diminution of the capacities of the public institutions to perform their functions efficiently and effectively. While the liberalization of the economy provided some potential for empowering the citizens to participate in the economy, this was done at the expense of the states’ institutional capacities to produce and deliver the essential public goods and services.

The cumulative impact of the first-generation of African political and military leaders, in expanding the scope of the state economically and politically without at the same time endowing it with the appropriate capacities, also drastically undermined the capacities of the other socio-economic institutions of governance to perform their functions efficiently and effectively. They, thus, all failed to deliver the needed public goods and services, as well as the consumer goods for the ordinary citizens. Although SAPs restricted the scope of the African state, retrenching its administrative infrastructure and, thus, creating unemployed armies of former civil servants, they also created a new socio-political phenomenon: the emergence of the huge number of civil servants - and the other people who serviced the retrenched public service - seeking employment for livelihood. Some of these people engaged themselves in various activities in the private or informal sectors, producing goods and services some of which used to be produced by the state. They thus either competed with the state or supplemented its services. And those who were more entrepreneurial and enterprising founded various types of NGOs, CSOs and CBOs purporting to serve the interests of their respective stakeholders or communities. Donors funded some of them while others consisted mainly of a few active individuals. But all of them claimed to promote the interests of their stakeholders, empowering them or protecting them from the abuse of powers by the state; or promoting democracy and good governance.

The civil societies are very active in Africa. There has been a proliferation of NGOs and CBOs, and other kinds of social and professional associations that it is now possible for people to establish various types of partnerships amongst themselves for the promotion of their mutual interests. The state has in many ways been overtaken by events. It has lost the monopoly of being the only provider of the essential services. In the realms of public security, education and health, private entrepreneurs are incrementally marginalizing the state. These changes have exerted a lot of pressures on the state, widening the gap between its capability and demands placed on it, on the one hand, and brutally exposing its inefficiency and irrelevancy at times, on the other.
The state of affairs above raised questions regarding State legitimacy and the associated trust in government. In light of the endemic economic and social hardships, tremendous political upheavals, including violent conflicts; the demands for better life, peace and security today, and the prospects of a much better more secure and peaceful life in the future; and given the continuous unavoidable global changes and challenges that are impacting on Africa, there are serious governance concerns in many African countries. There is, on the one hand, a mismatch between the domestic socio-economic changes and the demands of the people and the challenges brought about by globalization and its impacts on societies and economies in Africa and, on the other hand, the capabilities of the state to efficiently and to effectively respond to the domestic changes and demands, as well as the challenges, opportunities and possibilities in the global market places of goods and services, ideas and new methods of doing things.

Unable to deliver the public goods and services, the legitimacy of the state has been gradually eroded. Moreover, given the prevailing pressures of democratization and the insistence on accountability, the pressing needs and demands of the people for public goods and services, as well as the exigencies of global challenges and opportunities, trust in government---its capacity to respond effectively to these needs and challenges---has also become a major issue in many African countries.
What does all this imply? In governance systems, the state could be taken as the agent and the people. In this context, legitimacy entails the acceptance by the principals - the people - of the role or functions undertaken by the state. It would also entail the responsibilities of the state to provide the public goods and services needed and/or required by the people. In a democracy, there is an implicit ‘social contract’ between the state and the people-between those who are in charge of the state and performing its functions/roles, and those who are recipients of the services or are subject to the laws, rules and regulations made by those in authority. The foundations of this social ‘contract’ could be a Constitution.
The bottom line, however, is the capability and sustainability of the system of governance itself, whether democratic or otherwise, to deliver. In a democracy, the people have a voice, and they may call to account those in authority. There are also elections during which the people could change those in government or remove the entire government itself. And in between elections, there are the CSOs, the press and other organizations that call to account those in power and authority. In a non-democratic system of governance, where people have no voice and elections are either non-existent or liable to manipulation, people may resort to agitation and violence. In either case, if the state persists in its lack of capacity or willingness to deliver on its commitments and/or promises, people will gradually lose confidence in it, and ultimately its legitimacy will be eroded.

In any system of governance, it is the government that is responsible for the delivery of the public goods and services; or for the creation of the enabling environment in which such goods and services could be produced and delivered. But in the final analysis, government is a collection of people - elected politicians and appointed civil servants - working within the institutions of governance guided by the constitutional provisions, norms, traditions, and the political culture of the society in which they live and operate. It is the respective capacities of the relevant institutions and the people managing them that are critical for the delivery of the public goods and services, and upon whom the trust of government rests.
The Quest for the Capable State has emerged as an importance consideration in Africa. There is now an African consensus on these issues: NEPAD with regard to the human development challenges; and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to ensure the promotion of democracy and good governance. The quest for the capable state ought to be considered in the light of Africa’s experiences in governance and the need to acquire the appropriate capabilities to respond efficiently, effectively and timely to the domestic needs and demands as wells the global challenges and opportunities Africans are bound to encounter in the 21st Century. More importantly, due to the complexity of the modern world, the African state needs the capabilities for operating effectively in such an environment.

Moreover, state has been de-mystified, rendered more meaningful to the people, and big government transformed into good governance. People’s attitude towards the state has radically changed. They want a state that is technically capable of solving their problems. They want governments they can trust, that are transparent and accountable and ‘citizens friendly.’ Moreover, they are demanding to participate in the processes that would re-create or re-invent a state that is capable of solving the domestic socioeconomic and political demands, preventing and solving violent ethnic conflicts, promoting sustainable human development, and of responding to the competitive global markets. In the light of this ‘renaissance,’ what is now needed is the crafting of a Capable State that has the appropriate capacities for responding effectively and timely to developmental challenges. Clearly, in the crafting of the Capable State, the traditional African governance institutions need to be taken into consideration as they are still an integral part of the modern African state. Moreover, African countries are at different levels of development, engaged in various types of governance reforms in support of good governance and, thus, acquiring a wide range of knowledge, skills and experience towards the creation of the Capable State.

What then are the main characteristics of the Capable State? The basic issue is not a choice between ‘minimal’ state, ‘interventionist’ state, a ‘developmental’ state or a ‘welfare’ state. The issue is: what kind of state will enable Africans to efficiently and effectively respond to the domestic needs and demands, and global challenges in the 21st Century? What are the characteristics of such a state? Obviously, such a state must have the following capabilities:
a) To create, promote and sustain an enable environment of peace, security and stability- in which people could engage themselves in creative and productive activities of their own, producing goods and services, thus, contributing to the promotion of human development, responding to the global challenges and opportunities and, in the process, generate employment and tax revenue supportive of public goods and services.
b) To promote and sustain constitutionalism, the rule of law and due processes of law; accountability and transparency; ensuring better understanding of citizenship entitlements and obligations.
c) To create and maintain an appropriate and continuously flexible balance between the efficiency of the market forces, and the availability and delivery of the public goods and services; an appropriate balance within the African context between the needs of the creative and productive entrepreneurs and enterprising individuals, and those of the ordinary people/citizens for public goods and services.
d) To create the enabling environment and the appropriate policies, regulatory mechanisms and processes for the promotion of the private sector; ensuring good corporate governance; avoiding cronyism, and preventing corruption.
e) To empower the people. In a democracy, it is the people who decide the form and composition of government. It is also the people who ultimately acquiesce to bad governance or insist on good governance. But in order for them to do the latter or resist the former, people need to be empowered with the appropriate knowledge, information and other means of asserting their right to accountability and transparency of government and its agencies. In this context, there are four types of empowerment. One is related to knowledge and information. Not only do the people need to be informed about what the government is doing, but also what it is constitutionally mandated to do or forbidden to do. This requires good programmes of civic education, starting from schools, so that people are sufficiently empowered to behave as responsible citizens, checking government activities when the need arises, encouraging and supporting it when it deserves. Two, entails the creation of an environment in which people could freely exchange views, ideas, opinions, experiences, anxiety, fears, aspirations and visions.. Three, the people also ought to be empowered economically, to be reasonably self reliant and self-sufficient so that they do not have to depend on the generosity or manipulation of the government. Four, provide a reasonable level of welfare for all citizens, ensuring life and basic livelihood, the preservation of basic human dignity, and protection against electoral corruption.
f) To strengthen, expand and promote the public policy community (PPC). The PPC consists of people who either because of professional commitments, sense of civic responsibilities, or academic and intellectual interests regularly take part in the political processes and are usually consulted by policy makers, or whose views and opinions are respected and taken into account by the governments. The PPC is very weak, virtually non-existence in many African countries.
g) To manage diversities. Diversities are the enduring realities in Africa. The first-generation African political and military leaders detested the societal diversities and feared their impact on nation building. The struggles for diversities could be interpreted as those of political democracy - people asserting their identity, and recognition of their cultural rights and traditions.
h) To mobilize human and material resources. Effective responses to the domestic and global challenges would necessarily require the mobilization of human and material resources. Africa’s greatest assets are the people. They need to be liberated, mobilized and empowered: to be allowed to exercise their individual freedoms; provided with the opportunities to be educated, to learn new skills, acquire the necessary information and knowledge; and to engage themselves in creative activities of their choice in pursuit of their interests.
i) To promote and consolidate gender validation (see Chapter 8 on the role of women in building the capable state in Africa). In most African countries, women constitute the majority of the population. Good governance demands that all people must be involved in the democratic and development processes. Women play very critical roles in the development processes but are invariably excluded from the major decision-making processes.
j) To create an environment that will facilitate and promote the co-operation between the different generations of leaders and facilitate the recruitment and succession of leadership. Africa demands new leaders and style of leadership that is competent, honest, visionary and committed, that can steer Africa from the vicious circles of endemic problems. Indeed, a leadership that is in tune with the changing world, competent and committed to respond to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation. Clearly, that leadership is likely to emerge from the generation of young Africans. The major challenges are: one, how to synthesize the ideas, experience and wisdom of the past generation of leaders with the expertise and global perspectives of the young aspiring leaders; and, two, how to create and sustain the synergetic impulses of the two generations of leaders (for more details on how to handle this aspect, see Chapter 7).
k) To promote and sustain an open society. In the past governments and large business organizations kept a very tight lid on the information and knowledge for different reasons and information and knowledge was shared among the selected few. In this age of information and knowledge-based governance systems, organizations must have well-informed and knowledgeable work force. And for governments to be effective in the delivery of services, they have to share information and knowledge with the citizens. This is perhaps one of the greatest challenges likely to be encountered in the crafting of the Capable State. African States are used to control, hide or manipulate information and knowledge. They habitually keep their citizens in the dark.
l) To promote trust, understanding and the imperatives of national consensus amongst the political parties. This could be achieved through the nurturing of civil society that encourages them to refine and clarify their real differences, to reinforce their commonalities, to focus on the national issues, and thus minimizing the potentials for any frictions or fights between them selves. Foster dialogue between the party in power and those in opposition or the critics of the Government. This will minimize misunderstanding, expand the arena of trust and thus enhance consensus on national issues.
m) Promote democracy and good governance. Democracy will empower the people to organize themselves, articulate their views, grievances, needs and aspirations, and enable them to promote and protect their interests. The long-term sustainability of democracy and good governance will require vigilance and continuous participation of the people in public affairs. This requires continuous capacity building for all the institutions of governance, and other organizations and agencies in the civil society and the private sector (see Chapter 5 on the role of Non-State Actors).
n) Promote good politics and good government. The long rule by single parties and military juntas in Africa have confused the role of politics and misinterpreted the responsibilities of government in civilized societies. Single party dictators resorted to intrigues, regimentation, manipulations and coercion in support of what came to be known as the politics of nation building and economic development. The military dictators dissolved political parties, banned politics and banished politicians in the name of cleansing society of bad politics and corrupt politicians. They all used governments to achieve their objectives. Consequently politics and government have acquired bad names and mystics of their own.
o) Leaders and leadership that are competent and committed, aware of the current problems and able to identify future changes and challenges, and are continuously prepared to respond to such changes and challenges.

A capable state will always be prepared to continuously reassess itself and change itself (in its missions, in its institutional arrangements and structures, in its human and leadership capacity, in its partners and even in its ideological convictions) in order to suit emerging challenges. In fact, ability to change and adopt is likely to be the most important aspect of the Capable State. One of the problems with some states in Africa is that instead of changing (i.e. being masters of their changes), they have been changed by external agents. A capable state is expected to command and enjoy popular legitimacy in its monopoly and exercise of coercive powers. It would be unwise to entrust the crafting of the Capable State solely to a small group of people however politically important, experienced or learned they might be. The people must be involved. But how and when, and by what means or processes? This is an issue for AGFVII.

1.5 Agenda for AGF VII
The revolutions in participatory democracy, promotion of human rights and good governance, and the consequent emergence of the democratic regimes that have taken place in Africa in the last two decades have, on the one hand, accomplished a momentous task, namely, the destruction of dictatorial and military regimes and, on the other, have created serious governance implications and capacity building challenges for African countries. In the light of these achievements, a number of issues/interventions should be addressed. Firstly, continuous capacity building for the electoral commissions is important so that these important institutions are able to conduct elections efficiently, effectively and fairly. Secondly, there is need to ensure that the press and media have the appropriate capacities to perform their respective functions of informing and educating the people. Thirdly, civil society organizations should be allowed to have sufficient freedom and requisite capacities to empower the people. Fourthly, in a democracy, the legislature is one of the important governance institutions. However, for it to be able to perform its functions effectively it should have the appropriate capacity. Fifthly, to maintain the rule of law and to ensure compliance with the constitution, the judiciary must also be endowed with the appropriate institutional capacities.
Clearly, the role of the capable state is to ensure that all the institutions of governance as well as the other non-state organizations in the governance system are endowed with the appropriate capacities.

In the light of the above, the following is the suggested tentative Agenda for AGF VII:
a) Re-visit the scope of the state in Africa, not reducing it or expanding it but determining what the state should or should not engage, in the light of the roles of other actors in the private and civil society sectors.
b) Review and exchange views on capacity and capacity building issues in Africa: strategies, experience and lessons learnt.
c) Promote a better understanding of good governance and good politics, the conditions conducive to good governance and good politics, and the avoidance of bad governance and bad politics.
d) The nature and role of the state in the African context, its scope and strength and, given the dominant role of the private sector in the development processes, the need for the appropriate balance between the state and the market; and the processes by which such a balance can be crafted: by whom, how, when or how often.
e) Identify the characteristics of a capable state appropriate to the African context, and the manner or processes by which they can be identified, acknowledged and crafted into the capable State.
f) Review public sector reforms, including the civil service and the parastatals: strategies, successes and failures; lessons learnt.
g) Explore the mechanism and processes for strengthening good governance and deepening democracy.
h) Explore the frontiers of governance and democratization from the African perspectives and experiences, taking into account the role and status of traditional governance institutions.
i) Review the leadership issue and succession in Africa in light of the need to attract and retain young generation of Africans (within Africa and from the Diaspora) to be actively involved in issues related to the development of the continent, thus, reducing the brain drain and relieving drained brains.
j) Empower civil society organizations to engage effectively and meaningfully in the development and democratization processes, thus, providing support for the capable State.
k) Develop capacity for deepening regional and continental political integration
l) Review the role of the informal sector in the generation of wealth, employment, self-reliance; and the popularization of the private sector as the engine of growth and development.
m) Determine the role of local governance and local government as a critical component of the capable State.
n) Review the experience of gender validation, strategies used, success and failures, lessons learnt, and what needs done in the light of the quest for the capable State.

Part 2
Technical Papers

2. State Legitimacy and Leadership Development in Africa
André Mbata B. Mangu

2.1 Introduction
Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, one of the icons of the Pan-Africanist movement, Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan and black country to gain its independence in 1957. Subsequently, Ghana became one of the founding members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and later of the African Union (AU) that superseded the OAU. Ghana was also one of the first countries to participate in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the very first to be reviewed under the African Peer-Review Mechanism (APRM). For all African people across the continent and in the Diaspora, the celebration of the 50th anniversary of independence of Ghana was a historic occasion to reflect on the long road Africa has gone since colonialism, on the current state of affairs and the role that the state and political leaders are expected to play in order to achieve African renaissance.

During the anti-colonial and even the anti-apartheid struggles, African people were requested by their leaders to put independence and (political) freedom first while (economic) development would follow. On independence, the state, which was once used against them, was to serve as the main instrument to improve the life conditions of the people without which independence and freedom could be meaningless.

Unfortunately, African people did not take long to find out that they had been granted a paper, formal or flag independence only, with the tendency of their leaders to adopt a leadership style reminding of the one of the erstwhile colonial masters. Little attention was paid to social and economic rights yet critical for any genuine development project. A formal independence that could see African leaders just taking over from foreign colonial masters without improving their life conditions was not, however, the kind of independence that African people had fought for. Unsurprisingly, a number of the newly independent states were confronted with new struggles backed by the disenchanted masses of African people in what Nzongola-Ntalaja aptly referred to as “Second Independence Movement” .

Some fifty years after the “independence sun” started shining on the continent, despite the efforts that have been made thus far, Africans have not entered the promised kingdom of development. In some countries, the life conditions have been made even worse than under colonisation. The state and its new leaders have been held accountable for the “failure” of the “first independence” and the development project. From both inside and outside Africa, the blame lies with the state and African leaders whose fantastic rhetoric did not match up the deeds and popular expectations. They promised too much and yet achieved very little.

Despite the great amount of criticism levelled against African states and their leaders, “state disappearance” is no longer part of the wildest dreams of the most radical Marxists and communists. The state seems to be here to stay while new leaders are emerging in Africa without necessarily learning from the mistakes of their predecessors. The major hypothesis of this paper is that African states need to be reconstructed to reinforce their capacity. On the other hand, another generation of leaders should be encouraged.

State capacity is also based on the legitimacy of its political leaders. Such legitimacy requires that the state be founded on the principles of constitutionalism and democracy. Political leaders should themselves be legitimate in the sense that they should be elected during free and fair elections organised by an independent institution representative of all the parties and not subject to the government of the day. Legitimate leaders are likely to better serve the cause of development in Africa. On the other hand, there is a relationship between state capacity and democratic governance as a system of rule that maximises popular consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the expressed interests and needs of the public. The African experience of the fifty years of independence has demonstrated that state capacity could not be reinforced through a benevolent dictator or an authoritarian developmental state.

However, the reinforcement of state capacity and leadership legitimacy required for African states to embark irreversibly on the road to sustainable peace and economic development gives rise to a number of questions that still need to be addressed by policy makers, development agencies, and African researchers:
a) How do we understand “state”, “state capacity”, “state legitimacy” and what can be done to build capable and developmental states in Africa?
b) How can the economic, political and administrative structures of the state inherited from colonialism be transformed so that the state can reinforce its capacity to serve the interests of all African people, including the masses, and not only those of the leaders?
c) What is “political leadership” and why is it so important and how can a culture of developmental leadership be established and consolidated in order to reinforce state capacity to deliver sustainable peace and development?
d) Why is a democratic state more likely to promote development in Africa and how can a legitimate leadership better contribute to the reinforcement of state capacity than an authoritarian one?
e) What is “leadership legitimacy” and why is it so critical for the reinforcement of state capacity and for the success of the developmental project?
f) What measures are needed to make the electoral process more open, less expensive, and relatively free from major irregularities in order to enhance the credibility and the legitimacy of the regime and its leaders?
g) What does explain the reluctance of incumbent leaders to relinquish power in Africa and how can they be encouraged to leave office and to permit a process of political succession that is likely to enhance the legitimacy of new leaders and reinforce state capacity?
h) What role has been played by the international community, some of its powers and agencies, in the building of capable and democratic states? What role can they play in the process of “state reconstruction” and in encouraging the leaders not to manipulate the Constitution and to abide by its provisions relating to the terms of office?
i) Is there any life after the presidency in Africa? What is the practice emerging from individual AU member states and from the AU itself to encourage African leaders to abide by the Constitution?
j) What are the mechanisms in place to promote constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law, and to reinforce state capacity and how can these mechanisms be assessed?

Arguably, the low average level of state legitimacy and leadership has contributed to weak average performance in terms of development objectives in Africa. Accordingly, the state and leadership should be legitimate to increase their development performance. Against this background, this paper purports to contribute to the reinforcement of state capacity and to the emergence and the consolidation of a legitimate leadership in Africa.

2.2. State, State Capacity, State Legitimacy and the Development Question in Africa
State, leadership and legitimacy are contentious concepts that need to be examined in order to understand their meaning and the relationship between them and development in Africa.

2.2.1 State
The commonly agreed upon definition of a state was provided by the Montevideo Convention of 1933. This Convention defined the state as a person of international law possessing a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The state is a much broader concept than the government, as it also includes territory, territory and sovereignty. It is very often confused with the government in the mainstream social scientist political discourse. References to “state capacity” and “state legitimacy” connote this persistent confusion between the state and the government. The government being state’s representative, its actions – or its failure to act – are generally attributed to the state itself.

2.2.2 State Capacity
When Englebert argues that “[t]here should be little doubt left that Africa’s development crisis is one of capacity” and undertakes to explain “Africa’s capacity crisis,” the capacity of African states is understood to mean their ability “to provide the most basic services expected…, the very services – the security of people and prosperity – whose provision justifies their existence.” State capacity would also include the ability to devise and implement policies for economic development, to create stable environment for investors, to guarantee property rights, and to provide an efficient bureaucracy and a climate free of corruption. State capacity in Africa refers to the ability of the state to protect and promote all the rights of its people, including civil and political rights, social, economic and cultural rights, individual and collective or people’ rights. It is worth stressing the development is one of the rights enshrined in the African Charter for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). State capacity is, therefore, close to the concept of “political efficacy.”

In Africa, as elsewhere, a capable state is not a minimal state, indifferent to the sufferings and injustices, or insensitive to economic and social crises. When necessity requires and market mechanisms and social conditions do not guarantee the minimum without which men are actually demeaned, excluded and unable to enjoy their basic fundamental rights, the state should have the capacity to intervene. Not only are many African governments unable to provide these basic rights, but many are actively engaged in criminal activities of their own.

“Politics of the belly,” “patrimonial politics,” “corrupted” or “predatory rule,” “criminalisation of the state,” and massive human rights violations are evidence of the capacity of many African governments to act and deliver the “wrong goods”. African governments have also demonstrated their tremendous capacity through the rulership of many which appeared to be an exercise in “how to ruin a country.” If the power of leaders can be exercised to control, dominate, and to subjugate, it can surely be exercised to uplift, improve and develop. It is this state capacity that really matters, as it favours the developmental project.

2.2.3 State and Development in Africa
The state - reduced to government - and political leadership were singled out as the primary factor responsible for non-development or under-development in Africa in the mainstream discourse developed by Western leaders and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Yet, strong states were for long supported by democratic leaders in the West, by the major IFIs and other development agencies. Under the structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) devised to promote development on the continent, the developmental state was then said to be an authoritarian state or a “dictatorship of development.” Until the early 1990s, for instance, “Mobutu or the chaos” was still the underling principle of the American policy regarding former Zaire. On the other hand, as he toured West Africa when people were revolting against their authoritarian leaders and demanding respect for human rights, including political pluralism, the former French president Jacques Chirac declared that Africa was not fit for plural democracy. The discourse started changing in the 1990s, as African struggles for democracy intensified across the continent and the IFIs had come to the conclusion that their SAPs and “dictatorships of development” had failed. Then came their discourse on governance, which did not necessarily mean “democratic governance,” as they were more interested in business than in democracy.

The empirical and political scientist theories of state collapse or failure inspired by the American school of political science that managed to hijack the discourse on the state in Africa proved wrong. So did the sister theory of state-society struggle that alleged that citizens were disengaging from the state and the African state running without citizens.

The strong state that was once praised became the major problem of development in Africa. There was a trust shift from the state civil society. However, decades after it was proclaimed dead and buried, the state is always there even in countries where it was declared collapsed. Some state collapse theoreticians even found to their cost that African “failed”, “collapsed”, “shadow states” or “quasi-states” survived or persisted. On the other hand, the state that used to be a “problem” was progressively considered a “solution” to the problem of development in Africa . Accordingly, calls were made to “bring the state back in.” The state was blamed for its lack of legitimacy although there was no agreement on the content of this yet another contested concept or how the state could be legitimate to reinforce its developmental capacity. In order to achieve development, a “developmental state” is required, which needs to be governed by legitimate and accountable leaders responsive to the interests and needs of the people.

2.2.4 State Legitimacy
State legitimacy is used here to refer to the legitimacy of the government as it would hardly apply to other components of statehood, namely territory, population and independence. There does not seem to be a consensual definition of legitimacy. Englebert, for instance, held that “a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions.” A non-legitimate state is a non-indigenous or allochthonous one. In Englebert’s view, new African states lack legitimacy because they are not the indigenous creations of local history. Yet, endogeneity does not define legitimacy. According to Englebert, non-legitimate states are non-European and non-North American states. Englebert’s conception of legitimacy is, therefore, arbitrary and Eurocentric. Kalevi Holsti distinguished between vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy is an estimate of the strength of the relationship “between society and political institutions.” It is a crucial dimension of overall state legitimacy. On the other hand, horizontal legitimacy relates to the agreement within society on what constitutes the polity – the politically defined community that underlies the state. Englebert endorsed this distinction of vertical and horizontal legitimacy. However, it does not correspond to his concept of legitimacy that is centred on the endogeneity of the state in Africa. It is rather close to our understanding of legitimacy.

As far as we are concerned, legitimacy entails the acceptance by the people of institutions that seem to correspond to, and promote the values of, the society. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of governmental leadership by those who are governed. A government whose acceptance or legitimacy is contested is likely to resort to authoritarianism, intimidation, or manipulation, and to exercise power rather than to seek authority. The consequence is frustration, anger, and even aggression on the part of those permanently locked out of available social opportunities. According to Conteh-Morgan, a party or a government can be considered legitimate only if there is widespread acceptance that it is widely representative, or is dedicated to realising a set of overriding common goals that adequately benefit the entire populace. Englebert’s contention that a legitimate government need not be just, democratic, inclusive, popular or otherwise accountable to its citizens, but only indigenous, is controversial since there is a close relationship between state legitimacy and state capacity or developmental capacity.

One may distinguish between international or foreign and national or domestic legitimacy of African governments. The former relates to compliance or promotion of values and interests of the international community or those of some foreign states while the latter refers to the acceptance of the government by its own people. African governments used to be more interested in international and foreign legitimacy than in domestic legitimacy, as their life and survival mainly depended on the first. The interests - political, economic and even cultural (foreign languages established as official state languages to the detriment of national languages) - of their foreign masters or patrons prevailed over those of their own people. This was just the opposite to the morality in the so-called legitimate states of Europe and North-America where national interests come first and the government is mainly to care for national legitimacy that justifies its election and power. Arguably, increasing state capacity in Africa would require governments to be preoccupied first with national legitimacy and interests and not the opposite. It is perhaps here that the South African political motto of Batho pele (people first) should become the first principle of governance. State or leadership illegitimacy breeds state or leadership incapacity.

2.3. Leadership, State Capacity, Legitimacy and Development in Africa
A great deal has been written on leadership. Much of the literature on leadership has been produced in the United States where there has been a remarkable increase in interest in the subject since the mid-1970s. Probably terrified by the brutal nature of political leadership in most African countries, African social scientists, in general, and political scientists in particular, have shied away from the debate on leadership on their continent. In Africa as elsewhere, Blondel argues that one reason why political leadership has not been analysed is the fear which it has provoked and still provokes among generations of thinkers. As Hobbes would have put it, political leadership is a Leviathan, a frightening beat, which it is perhaps more urgent to tame or to charm than to dissect.

Of all forms of leadership, however, political leadership, in particular in a nation-state, occupies a special position because it is vastly more visible and, ostensibly at least more important. Many questions about political leadership refer to its meaning and its importance or role in society.

2.3.1 Political Leadership and Leaders
According to Blondel, leadership is as old as mankind. It is everywhere, and inescapable. Wherever there is a group, there is always a form of leadership .

2.3.1.1 Political Leadership
Leadership in general and political leadership in particular is an abstraction, a concept whose meaning is socially constructed. Some scholars define leadership as a process of human interaction in which some individuals exert, or attempt to exert, a determining influence upon others or a process by which one individual consistently exerts more impact than others on the nature and direction of group activity. According to Blondel, political leadership is a phenomenon of power; a power because it entails the ability of the one or few who are at the top to make others do a number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not do or at least might not have done. In Edinger’s view, “leadership is a position within a society which is defined by the ability of the incumbent to guide and structure the collective behaviour patterns of some or all of its members. It is at all times relational, interpersonal, and is based upon inequality of influence between the leader as the influencing agent and the followers as the objects of his efforts to cue their behaviour so that it will conform to his personal objectives.” Hah and Bartol also define political leadership as “the mobilisation and direction, by a person or persons using essentially non-coercive means, of other persons within a society to act in patterned and coherent ways that cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocat1on of values within that society.”

Blondel argues that leadership does not just refer to any power, but to influential power exercised on the society and that affects ostensibly the destiny of mankind. According to Cartwright, leadership is better defined as government by persuasion rather than force. The essence of leadership is the ability to persuade others to comply voluntarily with one’s wishes. Leadership involves voluntary compliance by those over whom it is exercised. It is the ability to obtain non-coerced, voluntary compliance which enables followers to obtain goals which they share with the leader. This is more related to leadership legitimacy than leadership itself. Hence, Blondel makes a distinction between leaders and office-bearers or rulers. Unfortunately, in many African countries, leadership has been and still remains power by force used against the people, as it was under colonialism, rather than power by persuasion or by conviction of the people themselves.

Political leadership in post-colonial Africa has been generally authoritarian, non-legitimate or based on an erroneous conception of legitimacy as the acceptance by the international community. It is also interesting to see how some African national leaders have been struggling to extend their leadership on the sub-regional and regional levels. As far as leadership style is concerned, Elgie distinguished between charismatic leadership, heroic leadership, revolutionary leadership, innovative leadership, transforming leadership, transactional leadership, personal leadership, individual leadership, collective leadership, consensual leadership, reactive leadership, and managerial leadership. An individual may have to exercise a combination of different types of and forms of political leadership at any one time.

2.3.1.2 Political Leaders
Political leaders are the most talked about elements of political life. Unlike leadership, which is an abstraction, leaders are individuals and real human beings, with their emotions, cognitions, predispositions, ambitions, styles of actions, characters, strengths, weaknesses, and personalities that make each leader unique. Although there are many political leaders at all levels of power, the most important are heads of state and government. However, political leadership at the regional or local level should not be neglected. The concept of political leaders is closely related to that of political elite, which was defined by Nadel as “an aggregate of people with distinct characteristics: a position of high status; some degree of corporate group character as well as exclusiveness; awareness of their pre-eminent position as the consequence of some attribute which they share by right; recognition of their general superiority by the society at large…”

Elgie identified three main historical approaches, theories or schools of leadership. The “Great Man” theory of history or school of political leadership has been associated with Thomas Carlyle who argued that leaders were morally good and great men or heroes, able to change the course of history as agents of social and political change. The cultural determinist school of history was, however, associated with Herbert Spencer. It denied that individuals – “Great Men” included – had any significant impact on the course of events, which was rather determined by the impersonal interplay of social and cultural forces over which individuals had little control. The leadership environment in which they operated shaped their actions, leaving them with little or no opportunity to make a personal impact on historical events. More attractive is the interactionist approach, endorsed by Elgie, and which holds that political leadership is the product of the interaction between leaders and the leadership environment with which they are faced. It acknowledges that political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the environment in which they operate and have the potential to leave their mark upon the system, but only if and to the degree that the environment (political, social, economic, and cultural) permits it. Political leadership and leaders are, therefore, important for social change and development despite their actions being subject to the environment, either national or international.

2.3.2 Importance of Political Leadership
The importance of political leadership is generally recognised. As one saying goes, “a fish rots from the head down”. The Book of Proverbs (29: 11) also rules that “Where there is no vision, the people perish.” Yet, such vision has to come from leaders. Since leadership appears to be a formidable power that can affect mankind, whose conditions deserve amelioration, it is clearly valuable, indeed imperative, to see how this power can help to bring about a better life for all in our societies. According to Blondel, “political leadership appears to be one of the clearest ways in which men and women can be induced to work jointly for the improvement of their lot; leadership seems able, by virtue of what it is, both to bring citizens together in a concerted effort and to do so over time by gradual achievements aimed at a common goal.”

As demonstrated by many scholars, leadership is also critical for the establishment of democracy and for democratic consolidation. In Huntington’s view, “democracy will spread in the world to the extent that those who exercise power in the world and individual countries want it to spread.” Clapham and Wiseman observe, “democratic consolidation is most likely to take place when a new leadership emerges, seeking to organise politics in a different way from those adopted by discredited parties and leaders in the past, but within the context of non-violent opposition and the acceptance of basic institutions.”

According to Wiseman, “key decisions taken by leaders at key points in the process have a great impact in enhancing or weakening the prospects of democracy.” Reflecting on democracy in India, Krishna held that “the genuine commitment to a liberal democratic policy by the first generations of leaders, especially the first Prime Minister Jawaharial Nehru …must be regarded as the key factors in the emergence and persistence of democracy in India.” As James Manor stressed, “Nehru might …have sought a radical centralization of power in his own hands, at the expenses of the party and of formal institutions. He might have employed populist slogans and programs as a substitute …for such institutions. Plenty of other leaders in Africa and Asia did so and they and their countries often paid a heavy price for it. He chose not to and as a consequence the liberal representative odder took root and acquired enough substance to endure into the 1970s and 1980s.”

As Wiseman further put it, “the characteristics of individual leaders are extremely relevant in determining the political outcomes and this holds true in relation to democratization as it does to any other political developments…The evidence from the relatively limited number of examples of cases where democracy has survived for long periods suggest that the question of political leadership was extremely important. The role of Seretse Khama (Botswana), Dawda Jawara (The Gambia), and Sir Woogsagun Rangoolam (Mauritius) in sustaining democratic political systems during periods when democracy was on the wane in Africa was of a crucial importance.”

In the light of the above,, political leadership does matter. Cartwright has demonstrated how, in Nyerere’s Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, for instance, a leader’s influence could have considerable effect to what happens to a state. This position has been strengthened in the study on Leadership Change and Former presidents in African politics.

2.3.3 Leadership Legitimacy and Elections
Elections are closely related to democracy. They are also instrumental for leadership legitimacy.

Elections and democracy have become virtually synonymous in Western political thought and analysis. Yet more recently, as Claude Ake noted, in the hurry to globalise democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War, democracy was reduced to the crude simplicity of multiparty elections to the benefit of some of the world’s most notorious autocrats who were able to parade democratic credentials without reforming their repressive systems . This was well captured by Liniger-Goumaz in his démocrature. As Bratton and Posner stressed, “formal procedures do not create a democracy because, as in Latin America – we should add Africa – experience has shown elections can coexist with systematic abuses of human rights and disenfranchisement of large segments of the population.”

Karl Terry rightly warned against two fallacies, the “fallacy of electoralism” and the “anti-electoral fallacy.” The first would result in the confusion between democracy and elections while the latter holds that elections do not really matter for democracy. The post-colonial experience reveals that several elections have been held and continue to be organised on the continent without Africa becoming a paradise for democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, elections are the defining institution of modern democracy. However, they are not synonymous. Some conditions are required for elections to be free and fair and promote democracy. First, elections must be universal. The entire population or its largest segments of adult citizens should be allowed to participate in the elections. Their exclusion from the electoral process is a mark of authoritarianism and cannot result in the elections contributing to democracy.

Second, the elections should be competitive, open to all political parties and people should be allowed to elect the candidates of their choice. Elections where people would be “voting without choosing,” to use Ake’s metaphor, could only result into what Mkandawire called “choiceless democracies,” which is a contradiction in terms. Candidates and their parties should be able to campaign freely. Third, the organisation of the elections should be left in the hands of an independent and autonomous body in the form of an independent electoral commission. This body should be representative of all or the major political forces to ensure the credibility of the process starting from the registration of voters to the proclamation of the results. Such a body should not be dependent on the government of the day. The electoral commission should also be made accountable and open to all political forces contesting elections. Key during the electoral process is the role of the media. Public media should be open to all candidates and parties on the same footing instead of being transformed into an electoral machinery for the incumbent government or the ruling party particularly addicted to power and capable of doing anything, including intimidation and corruption, to get elected or re-elected.

Elections should also be monitored by candidates’ witnesses and observers, national or international. Unfortunately, monitors could also be corrupt. The same goes for the observers with their usual “national anthem”: “elections have been globally free and fair and satisfactory, except for some minor shortcomings that cannot impact of the general result of the process”. In a very few cases have the observers from the AU, SADC, European Union and other international institutions declared that elections were rigged and invalid. Togo seems to be one of these unfortunate cases.

Democratic elections should be organised based on the law accepted or enacted by peoples’ representatives in Parliament, and not a presidential decree. The law should provide for rights, but also for duties and sanctions in cases of intimidation and corruption that is the main cancer of the elections in Africa. An independent and impartial judiciary should be empowered by the electoral law and the Constitution to pronounce on the electoral process in the final instance. Without such judiciary, elections can hardly be trusted as free and fair.

Under the conditions above, the electoral process is likely to be more open and relatively free from major irregularities. Problems generally arise after the elections. They relate to the acceptance of the results by the candidates, especially by the opposition candidates or parties, as the incumbents are generally expected to win. Another major problem is that elections are costly. In countries which are confronted with serious problems in terms of infrastructures, with no reliable roads or railways and where some regions are hardly accessible, the success of the electoral process requires funding, systems and materials (airplanes, computers, communication infrastructure) that many African countries cannot afford. Instead of relying on external donors, for elections to be legitimate, Africans should finance their own elections. One way to make the process less expensive would be the sharing of information and materials (kits, computers, boots…) as Africans in their respective countries go to polls almost every year. In this regard, South Africa should be commended for providing assistance to Ghana, Burundi, and DRC. The latter has also been approached recently to provide assistance to Togo.

2.3.4 Legitimate Leadership, Term Limits, and Life after the Presidency
In many African countries, the Constitution provides that the President can be re-elected only once. Few African leaders have complied so far. There are many reasons why incumbent leaders tend to cling to power. One of them relates to the logics of patrimonialism and to their fear of the unknown after the presidency. Many leaders fear prosecution and would better do everything to die in power. As a result, many have managed to establish a de facto presidency for life or some “presidential monarchies” with sons and relatives groomed to take over from them. As the constitutional limit on the term of office approached, a number of leaders embarked on a political campaign to get the Constitution amended and obtain a “come back call” from their parties. While some like Bongo (Gabon), Musevini (Uganda), and Nujoma (Namibia) succeeded, others such as Chiluba (Zambia) and Muluzi (Malawi) had to concede defeat and leave the office under tremendous pressure from the opposition, civil society and even some quarters of the ruling party.

President Nyerere was among the first African leaders to reflect on the term limits of the presidency. In September 1980, when he was nominated by his party Chama Cha Mapinduzi to stand for president at the next election for what he insisted would be the last time, he said the time had come for Tanzanians to institutionalise a method of changing the president, and to impose limits on his term in office. In November 1985, he handed over power to Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who had been popularly elected to the presidency. President Nyerere set up a precedent, which has been respected by all his successors who did not attempt to manipulate the Constitution.

The question that needs to be addressed, and which requires further research, is why incumbent African leaders tend to cling to power and how they can be encouraged to leave office and to permit a process of political succession that is likely to enhance the legitimacy of new leaders and reinforce state capacity. Life after presidency may mean insecurity, as those who were persecuted under their regimes might be tempted to take revenge. Life after presidency may also mean isolation and misery, as they would no longer enjoy the material and financial prosperity that came with power. This last fear is hardly understandable given the amount of wealth accumulated during the presidency. Dispelling this fear should be central to any endeavour to get African leaders abide by the Constitution and leave power at the expiry of their office term.

Despite the fate suffered by the Habré (Chad), Chiluba (Zambia), and Taylor (Liberia) who have been less fortunate than the Mengistu (Ethiopia) among the former presidents who are still alive, incumbent leaders should be convinced that there is life and even a better life after the presidency, as demonstrated by the case of leaders such as Khama, Masire (Botswana), Moi (Kenya), Nujoma (Namibia), Kaunda (Zambia), Muluzi (Malawi) , Chissano (Mozambique), Mandela, and De Klerk (South Africa), Rawlings (Ghana), Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Mkapa (Tanzania), Diouf (Senegal), Kerekou and Soglo (Benin), Konare (Mali), and even for the army of Nigerian ex-presidents (Yakubu Gowon, Shehu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Ernest Shonekan, and Abdusalami Abubakar. Many of these leaders have been actively involved in conflict resolution, mediation, and in the observation of elections. Some have set up centres for good governance to help incumbents learn from their past mistakes. Besides, they have created a forum that may be used to encourage incumbents who are reluctant to abide by the Constitution once their term has expired. Some of them have been used by their successors or recommended to AU, the UN and other international institutions to serve as mediators, facilitators, or special envoys.

Personal initiatives such as the one by the Sudanese multi-millionaire Mo Ibrahim should be commended as an original initiative by an African to stimulate good governance, respect for constitutionalism, democracy, human rights and compliance with the constitutional limits on the presidency. Former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan was appointed chairman of the board of the 5-million US dollar Mo Ibrahim Prize. The first laureate of this prize, who will be announced by the end of 2007, will receive 1.3 million US dollars, which is relatively bigger than the Nobel Prize. Each year he/she will receive 200.000 US dollars to finance any development project in his/her country. After ten years he/she will be entitled to a retirement pension of equal amount (200.000 US dollars) until his death. The importance and value of this Prize should not be neglected as no African country can currently provide such a pension for retired leaders.

Apart from such initiatives, legal mechanisms should be envisaged to encourage good governance and respect for the constitutional limits on the presidential term of office. These may include immunity from prosecution, retirement pension, housing, medical care, annual air tickets for former presidents and immediate family members, and small secretariat. President Kabila has tried to do so for his four former vice-presidents during the transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, this could not have been dealt with secretly through a presidential decree as a personal affair but rather by an Act of Parliament. Fortunately, the DRC Constitution provides that all former elected Congolese presidents are ex officio members of the Senate (for life).

A State Council may also be established, as in the Nigerian case. The State Council consists of all former leaders. It is presided over by the incumbent president. Its mission is to advise him/her and his/her government on some national issues submitted to the Council and to assist in addressing them. On the regional level, a Council of Elders may also be institutionalised under the AU. It would comprise all former African leaders (Heads of state and governments as well as former OAU General Secretaries/AU Chairpersons of the Commission) to assist the Chairman of the AU and the Commission and advise them on issues of democracy and good governance now taken seriously under the AU Constitutive Act, the NEPAD-base instrument and the APRM document.

2.4. Building State Capacity and Developmental Leadership under the AU, NEPAD and the APRM
Complementing national constitutions, the AU, NEPAD and APRM instruments contain a number of objectives, principles and standards aimed at promoting democracy and good political governance that are critical for the reinforcing of state capacity and for the emergence and consolidation of a developmental leadership needed to achieve an African renaissance. For the time being, these objectives, principles and standards constitute the minimum package and may be used as benchmarks for assessing the commitments of African leaders to building state capacity and for consolidating leaders’ legitimacy on the continent.

2.4.1 The AU Constitutive Act
The AU Constitutive Act [Article 3 (g), (h), (k), and (n)] provides that the objectives of the AU are inter alia to:
a) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
b) promote respect for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
c) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
d) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The AU is also expected to operate according to the following principles:
a) the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
b) promotion of gender equality;
c) respect for democratic principles , human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
d) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;
e) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;
f) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

Since all African countries with the exception of Morocco are AU member states and are bound by its Constitutive Act, the above objectives and principles may help build a capable state and reinforce legitimate leadership.

2.4.2 The NEPAD and APRM Instruments
NEPAD was launched in July 2002 as an African initiative to “eradicate poverty and to place African countries, individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and African development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing.” Its twin objectives are, therefore, the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance. The APRM was inaugurated as NEPAD’s lynchpin. It was established as a mechanism to implement NEPAD. It was provided for in the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and annexed to this Declaration. The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance is the main instrument on which the work of the APRM is based. If taken seriously, the DDPECG should contribute to the reinforcing of state capacity and leadership legitimacy in Africa. In this Declaration, African heads of state and government of the AU undertook to work with renewed determination to enforce:
a) the rule of law;
b) the equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual;
c) individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the Constitution;
d) equality of opportunity for all;
e) the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
f) adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments.

They are also committed to just, honest, transparent, accountable and participatory government in public life and undertook to combat and eradicate corruption. They held that in the light of Africa’s recent history, respect for human rights had to be accorded an importance and urgency of its own. Moreover, they accepted as a binding obligation to ensure that women have every opportunity to contribute on terms of full equality to political and socio-economic development. In support of democracy and the democratic process, African leaders undertook to:
a) ensure that their national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountable governance;
b) promote political participation, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment;
c) enforce strict adherence to the position of the African Union on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of our continental organisation aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, peace and security;
d) strengthen and, where necessary, establish an appropriate electoral administration and oversight bodies and provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are free, fair and credible.

African leaders also committed to good governance. They agreed to adopt clear codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the national, sub-regional and continental levels; to promote accountable, efficient and effective civil service; to ensure the effective functioning of Parliaments and other accountability institutions in their countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies, and to ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption. Finally, they agreed to promote and respect human rights as entrenched in their national constitutions as well as in regional and international human rights instruments that they ratified.

The DDPECG spells out the institutions and processes adopted to guide peer reviews, based on mutually agreed codes and standards of democracy, political, economic and corporate governance. Compliance with the mutually agreed codes and standards aimed at promoting democracy and good governance and human rights would send a strong message that African leaders are committed to building a capable state and reinforcing the legitimacy of the leaders that is critical to Africa’s development.

2.5. Conclusion
In our societies, leadership has come to be concerned principally with the improvement of social and economic conditions. Blondel holds that “the most important aspect appears to be a daily concern or the improvement of society, where long-term developments are balanced with the recognition of current problems, and where technical and economic progress is associated with a major interest in the well-being of citizens.” Modern political leaders do not choose to be concerned with the continuous improvement of their societies: they have to take this concern on board or they may not stay in office. The population often demands that their lot be improved and, even if they do not, the leaders themselves believe and are repeatedly told by others that it is their duty to achieve social and economic progress. If leaders are to be essentially concerned with the “cure” of social and economic ills, and if this role entails the continuous guidance and direction of the population, it is simply not possible to dismiss leaders as either unimportant or dangerous, as many of the classical political theorists did, or as playing a crucial but exceptional part, as Weber’s model of authority suggested. On the contrary, leadership has to be viewed as continuously playing a positive part in developing society. Efforts have, therefore, to be made to ensure that leaders do fulfil this positive role. This entails, in the first instance, a precise determination of the personal quality and institutional support that are most appropriate.

This paper dealt with state capacity and leadership legitimacy in Africa. The challenge of building or reinforcing state capacity for effective delivery of the development process is one of the major challenges confronting African people and leaders. The present paper has argued that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the incapacity of the post-colonial state and its legitimacy is not based on the fact of the state being foreign to Africans as an imported product inherited from colonisation. In Africa, as elsewhere, the state cannot be said to be totally indigenous. It emerged as a force imposed by the colonisers and maintained by the most powerful members of the society. Its capacity mainly depends on its “domestication” by the people.

A capable state and a truly developmental state has to be a constitutional and democratic state where constitutionalism and the rule of law prevail. Development is more promoted by legitimate leaders, those elected by the people during free, credible and fair elections organised by an independent and impartial body also subject to an independent and impartial judiciary. Elected leaders are accountable to the people.

Building a capable state in Africa therefore means reconstructing the state on the foundations of constitutionalism and democracy to ensure that it is governed by elected and accountable leaders committed to delivering on the promises made and whose political survival depends on their legitimacy. Such leaders should be encouraged to embark on good governance and to leave office after the expiry of their terms. Such leaders are likely to comply with the Constitution when the latter provides for secure life, materially, financially and legally, after the presidency. The Constitutive Act of the AU, the NEPAD instruments, especially the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance on which the APRM is based set objectives and principles that constitute a step forward in building state capacity and promoting a responsible, legitimate and developmental leadership on the continent. The fact that African leaders may voluntarily agree to subject their governance and leadership to peer-review constitutes an unprecedented development on the continent.

Notwithstanding the above, adopting the different codes and standards under the AU Constitutive Act, NEPAD and APRM instruments would not be enough on a continent characterised by the paradox of constitutions without constitutionalism and elections that contributed more to consolidating authoritarianism instead of democracy. States should comply with the principles of constitutionalism and democracy in international instruments they ratified and which are binding, and those entrenched in their own Constitutions and other pieces of legislation. Similarly, the much talked about African Renaissance cannot be achieved with a great number of incapable states characterised by illegitimate or undemocratic leadership. Contrary to what was said of “East Asian tigers” which delivered under “benevolent” authoritarianism, the African experience with “dictatorships of development” under de jure or de facto one-party or military rule once supported by some Western governments and international financial institutions teaches that constitutionalism and democracy is the only way to build developmental states and leadership legitimacy that is critical for Africa’s development. Developmental leadership required for state capacity has to be a legitimate one. To consolidate, such political leadership requires a favourable environment at the national level and also at the international one. A new approach is expected from African regional and sub-regional institutions and from the rest of the international community.

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3. Strengthening State Performance through Decentralized Governance
Kadmiel Wekwete

3.1 Introduction
The African State faces major challenges in its quest for consolidation, modernization and capacity to address the needs of its citizens. Historically, a product of the various colonial traditions, the African State has evolved through the turbulent post colonial period and is beginning to show some signs of stability as the democratic processes are taking root, and the political and administrative systems begin to function in a regular fashion. While the Africa Governance Report 2005 still mirrors major capacity deficiencies across all the governance systems (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone), the recent Africa Peer Mechanisms Reviews offer some hope as the respective African Governments are showing a willingness to address the challenges that they face objectively and in highly transparent ways.

The African State has a strong centralized tradition given its historic control function under the colonial systems. State power and its apparatus were designed as potent weapons to control native populations and, therefore, perfected repressive mechanisms, allowing little room for participation in decision making politically, administratively and economically. The inheritance of the post colonial state was, therefore, that of highly centralized bureaucracy guarding the interests of the elite and performing the functions in a highly top down manner. This created the inevitable tensions resulting in major political and civil crises as the State grappled from being an exclusive to an inclusive one.

Whilst clearly the democratization of the State and its institutions has been the number one challenge, decentralization of its powers and function has always been the other important side of the coin. Once the system begins to democratize, it also seeks to empower its citizens, to reach out to the marginalized groups and seeks the participation of the different levels and spheres of government. The political rationale for decentralization has always been crafted in terms of better governance and democratization, greater efficiency and accountability and greater ability to engage and protect the rights and values of citizens.

3.2 Decentralization Defined
Decentralization is defined broadly as the transfer of public authority, resources and personnel from national level to sub-national spheres and jurisdictions, and has three key components – political, administrative and fiscal. Ndegwa (2002) in a stocktaking survey in Africa attempted to measure the extent of decentralization in Africa. The political decentralization index was computed from the mean of the following: number of elected sub national tiers, the score for the existence of direct elections for local governments and the score for turnout and fairness of elections; the administrative decentralization index consisted of the score for the clarity of roles for national and local governments provided by the laws, score indicative of where the actual responsibility for service delivery resided and the score where the responsibility for (hiring and firing) civil servants resided; and the fiscal decentralization index was based on the score given for the fiscal transfers from central government to localities and the proportion of public expenditure controlled by the localities.

Of the 30 countries analyzed, 50% scored high to moderate, whilst the other 50% had low levels of political decentralization. The top 5 included South Africa, Uganda, Namibia, Kenya, Ghana and the bottom 5 were Burundi, Benin, Congo DRC, Niger and Chad. In many cases political decentralization was a manifestation of democratic reform that has been characteristic of the continent since the 1990s, and has continued to improve beyond 2000.In terms of administrative decentralization, Uganda and South Africa were the two top performers, with 10 moderate performers, and the rest with very poor and rudimentary systems. Public sector reform programmes have propelled Administrative decentralization and have even occurred without political decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is generally poor across the continent and in 19 of the 30 countries analyzed, local governments control less than 5% of the national public expenditure (for most developed countries it is well above 10%). Only South Africa with constitutionally mandated local governments approached 5%. In general, the situation is even more dismal because of the very limited local revenues generated at local levels, creating a situation of total dependency on the centre.

Whilst it is useful to review decentralization using the composite indices across countries, it is also important to recognize the legislative traditions, which underpin the nature and structure of local governments. Overwhelmingly the State in Africa is unitary, which is highly centralizing, and has colonial traditions reinforcing that. Whilst the Anglophone tradition caters for more devolved local government systems, (indirect rule tradition) it highly restricted what the local authorities could do and made them very dependent on the State and limited to the functions stipulated in the laws and regulations. The Francophone tradition is more centralized and local authorities are under the state “tutelle.” Central government has direct control on many aspects of everyday life and has direct control on local government staff. Decentralization in the postcolonial State has, therefore, had to grapple with these traditions linked to the overall manifestations of state power at local levels.

3.3 Challenges for Decentralized Governance in Africa
It is important to recognize that decentralized governance manifest itself in many forms and structures in Africa. Each of the countries has its own manifestation of sub national governance and the distribution of functions and authority vary significantly. Of the 47 countries in Africa, only 4 have Federal constitutions (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Comoros). South Africa has a unique semi federal system whose constitution mandates devolved powers to the regions and to local governments. In the rest of Africa, the types of sub-national governments are created through local legislation which creates regional, provincial, urban and district local government laws. In most cases, there are two parallel systems in existence, namely, the deconcentrated administrative systems linked to sector ministries and the local authorities, which are locally elected bodies with specifically defined functions. In most countries, the most visible distinctions are between urban and rural local authorities and in some cases regional authorities. The common denominator for local governments is the fact of having democratically elected bodies and being backed by law to perform specific functions.

The first challenge for decentralized local governance is linked to the political and administrative manifestations of these sub-national governments. They are poorly defined, resources not clear and not back their functions, and they are too politicized and lack a critical mass to perform their functions. Until recently when there have been systematic efforts to have decentralization policies and laws, there was a tendency to have duplication of functions and little technical capacities at the local levels to make decentralization a reality. The parceling of the sub-national units of local governments also tends to be highly politicized and incumbent governments and presidents use their prerogative to create districts and provinces to suit their political needs. These local governments end up being too small to function and given the relatively low population densities in some parts of Africa, lacking the critical mass in terms of population served.

The second challenge is the ability to provide and deliver services. This is a major challenge and an important part of the State performance scorecard. There is weak capacity to deliver services, inefficient institutions and lack of crucial linkages to national policy formation and implementation. This is a major challenge in terms of addressing poverty and trying to reach the millennium development goals. Typical services that are provided by local authorities include: water supply and sewerage; transport systems and services; physical planning and building; preventive and primary health care, pre school and primary schools; local legal and regulatory systems and social welfare. All these services require technical capacities on the part of local governments and financial resources –human and fiscal resources must accompany the transfer of responsibilities to local governments. As highlighted in the ULCG final declaration (May 2004)
“One of the cornerstones of decentralization is the implementation of transfer of financial resources between different spheres of government. Local authorities need these resources to carry out their mandate, to develop services but also to ensure capable human resources to serve their citizens…”
The third challenge is fiscal capacity, which is critical in assuring the necessary resources for service delivery and the function of local authorities. This is a major challenge because far too often there are no funds delivered and there is no revenue generating power and authority ceded on sub-national governments. There are five major forms of fiscal decentralization: self financing or cost recovery of public services through user charges; co financing through which users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions; expansion of local revenue through property or sales tax or indirect charges; intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from the taxes collected at the centre to local government for general or specific uses. In most African countries the capacity by the central governments to provide transfers has been hampered by the lack of systems and lack of political commitment to promote local development. The bulk of African citizens have until very recently been rural and the capacities to generate local revenues have been limited. Hence the only real transfers have happened when donors have participated in projects and programmes.

3.4 Understanding State Performance in Development
3.4.1 Overview
Mkandawire 1998 states: “The African state is today the most demonized social institution in Africa, vilified for its weaknesses, its over extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of the markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity and its absence…” The list of names and characterizations is endless.

In defining the developmental state Mkandawire 1998 highlights two components: the ideological and the structural. In terms of ideology, the developmental state is essentially one that conceives its mission as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization. The state structure side of the definition emphasizes the capacity to implement economic and social policies effectively, and such capacity is determined by institutional, technical, administrative and political dimension.

Decentralization within the context of democratic developmental states must reflect these ideological and structural dimensions. Most typically, local governments and other sub national authorities are seen as carrying the State mission and mandate – they are part of the overall project to achieve economic and social development. Therefore, state performance in terms of achieving national targets (poverty reduction, MDGs) has to be filtered through the lenses of the decentralized spheres of government. The key question is what power local governments have to influence overall state performance –what is it that they are accountable for? What resources and capacities do they have to achieve the objectives? How much is decentralization viewed as part of achieving the state objectives?

In order to understand the significance of decentralized governance through local Governments and other sub-national institutions, we have to understand their mandates and the functions and resources attributed to them. These vary from country to country and are not easily aggregated. This paper will therefore briefly review some of the specific country cases and draw some general conclusions from the practices. Decentralized governance is reflected and embedded in the sub national spheres of government, which the State legitimizes through legislation and the constitution.

3.4.2 South Africa
Before 1993, South Africa operated under apartheid, which was the basis of the National constitution, and the basis for the functioning of the Republic. Apartheid was about segregation of races at all levels of society, and South Africa had detailed legislation on all facets of segregation. The end of Apartheid heralded a new beginning, which resulted in South Africa adopting a democratic constitution and reorganizing the political and administrative system. The State completely overhauled itself and undertook to address the deep wounds and challenges left by apartheid. This re engineering is ongoing, and there are major challenges that include very high degrees of inequality, major deficits in services and infrastructure among the disadvantaged groups, high unemployment and high levels of crime in the major cities.

With an estimated population of 44 million, the Republic of South Africa is a unitary state subdivided into 9 provinces. The 9 provinces contain three categories of local governments –metropolitan councils, district councils and local councils. Each of the provinces has its own legislature with Provincial Premiers. The provinces have power over agriculture, education, environment, health services, housing, local government, public transport, regional planning, roads, economic development and traditional authorities, most of which powers are also reflected in the local government powers. Provincial and local governments are at the forefront of development and the State has reinforced them through powers given to the different spheres of government and significant inter governmental transfers. The post Apartheid State has used decentralized governance as a vehicle for change and a way of engaging citizens at the local levels to consolidate democracy and promote participatory development.

Local government is enshrined in the constitution in Chapter 7 of the 1996 constitution of the Republic and further supported by the provisions for Cooperative Government and local government financial matters. Other significant legislation include the Municipal Finance Management Act 2003 and the Intergovernmental framework 2005. Thus, the Local government organizational structure is well established and has been a subject of extensive deliberation at national levels. Local Government Finances continue to undergo substantial financial changes and the number of local authorities has been restructured from 843 to 284.
In comparison with other African countries, South African local governments have significant capacity to generate local revenue through utility fees, property rates, fees and charges, and through intergovernmental transfers. The local government expenditures are made for the following: Electricity 26%, Finance and administration 25%, Water 20%; Public Safety 6%, road transport 5%, waste management 4%, Housing and Health 4%, and other 10%. These expenditures exclude education, which is the responsibility of the central and provincial governments.

Whilst local government revenues are inadequate to address the significant levels of urban and rural poverty, they are a significant input into the local and national economies and critical for state performance in development. South Africa is predominantly an urban society and so the metropolitan councils are an important and significant feature of the economic landscape. (Contribution to GDP 7.5%)

3.4.3 Tanzania
Tanzania is a unitary state, with Zanzibar having autonomy for non-union matters. It is administratively divided into 26 regions, which are further divided into districts and further into divisions and has a population estimated at 36 million. There are 22 urban councils and 92 rural councils on the mainland and 10,075 registered village councils. Local government was abolished in the 1970s and re-established with functional councils in 1984. More recently, Tanzania shifted towards a multiparty democracy model and adopted a liberalised stance towards the development of the economy, resulting in a major interest by the international development partners to support the development agenda. Consequently, the economy has significantly been opened to private capital and has registered significant economic growth. Since 1997, there has been major public sector reform, including a Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) covering political, financial and administrative decentralization, reflecting the new ideology and perspective of the State.

The Constitution of the United Republic 1997 provides for local government through legislation. The objective of local government is to enhance the democratic process and to facilitate development. The main local government legislation includes the Local Government Finance Act 1982; Urban Authorities Act 1983; Regional Administration Act 1997 and the Local Government Laws (miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1999. Tanzania has embarked on a comprehensive local government reform that seeks to promote democratic and accountable local governments with a strong financial base and capacities to deliver services. There has also been significant effort to reform and rationalize the role and function of central government ministries and parastatal organizations.

Up to 75 % of local authority budgets are derived from transfers from the central government, while the balance comes from local revenue sources that include fees (taxi registration, bus stands, forestry products); licenses (road and liquor); property taxes and rents. Government transfers and donor basket funds are the most significant income sources for local authorities. The bulk of these resources are conditional grant transfers, which are linked to sector ministries responsible for education, health, water, roads and extensions services, which are also the key services provided, by local governments. Other smaller transfers are in the form of unconditional grants and equalization grants.

Whilst the local governments have a clear mandate for service provision in both rural and urban areas, their roles are undermined by the dependence on the centre, which makes them very weak when it comes to planning and implementation. They have limited discretion when the funding is all conditional and earmarked. Urban local authorities which are able to generate their own revenues have stronger leverage in terms of service provision and have responsibilities met through their own generated revenues. However the ongoing reforms in Tanzania are redefining centre-local relationships and giving local governments a central role in maintenance of law, order and good governance, promoting local economic and social development and ensuring effective delivery of service. The Local Government Reform Programme (1998) has emphasized the need to promote effective linkages and coordination between civil service reform, sector reforms and local government reforms.

3.4.4 Malawi
Local Government in Malawi was established during the colonial period under the centralized British District Commissioner system. This system depended on the control of traditional chiefs who were allowed to retain their traditional functions provided they remained loyal. They provided the services that were required by the colonial state such as forced labor, contract labor for plantations and mines, and labor for the towns and cities. The postcolonial order initially adopted the colonial inheritance and re engineered to meet the goals of one party system of government, operating in a highly authoritarian way. This operated from 1964 to 1994 when the one party state was abolished and a new multi party state constitution was adopted.

Malawi is a unitary state with an estimated population of 12 million. It is predominantly an agricultural economy divided into three administrative regions and with 27 districts forming the basis of local government. There are 12 urban authorities, which include 3 city assemblies, 8 town assemblies and one municipal assembly. Since the adoption of a multi party democratic system, major strides have been made to democratize the political system and to decentralize the function of local governments. Decentralization has been a priority since 1994 seeking to create democratic local institutions, strengthen the levels of participation in the process of development and service delivery, and promoting local economic development

Local Government is enshrined in the 1995 constitution and its role and function has been fully articulated in the 1998 Local Government Act, which provides a framework for decentralized governance, establishing assemblies and defining their functions. Urban local authorities are well established in Malawi offering a wide range of local services and catering for some 14% of the total population. The 27 rural districts are the core of the local government system in Malawi and have been given a wide range of responsibilities in the legislation, reflecting the national policy and plan priorities. They however have a limited resource base and are heavily dependent on central government and donor transfers. The local Governance and Development Management Programme supported by UNDP and UNCDF since 1994 has been the cornerstone of the support to the Malawi Government decentralization programme. This resulted in the adoption of the national decentralization strategy and policy 1998, local government act 1998, local government finance commission.

The post-1994 State used the local government system to reduce the excesses of centralization and to reach out to the rural communities through more participatory ways and giving them a voice in local politics and development. Rural local government is still weak but it has expanded the political space and enabled the State to reach out more effectively than through the centralized ministries. The Sectors have also decentralized in response to the National decentralization policy and there is evidence of increased donor support to rural development. Poverty reduction is still the number one priority in Malawi, which calls for more public sector expenditure on infrastructure and service delivery, local economic development and to meet the huge millennium development goals deficits.

3.4.5 Uganda
Uganda is a unitary state in East Africa with a population of 26 million. Uganda has had a very turbulent political history resulting in major civil and political conflicts. After achieving political independence in 1962, Uganda inherited a British colonial system, which had been the model for the British “indirect rule” policy and had a potentially vibrant agricultural economy. Post colonial governments sought to mould this inheritance to suit their new goals and this created a source of major conflict resulting in a military coup and subsequently a sustained guerrilla war which brought the National Resistance Movement to power in 1987.The struggles characterizing the establishment of a stable post colonial State and system centered around a lack of consensus on the nature and structure of the government system, highly politicized ethnic/regional differences, centralization of power and lack of accountability. (11)

The National Resistance Movement under the leadership of President Museveni was committed in 1987 to transform the function of government and to make it more decentralized and representative. Based on the experience of Resistance Councils that they had established during the guerrilla campaign, NRM argued for the formalization of the Resistance Councils into the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute 1987. This was passed in 1993 as the Local Governments Statute. The Government of Uganda launched a decentralization policy in 1992, which has continued to be refined to the current Decentralization Policy Strategy Framework 2005. The objectives of the decentralization policy include the transfer of real power to local governments (human and financial resources); promoting a feeling of ownership of programmes and projects executed by local governments; improving financial accountability and responsibility for payment of taxes and provision of services; improving local authorities’ capacity to plan, finance and manage the delivery of services. These objectives are clearly articulated in the Local Government Act 1997. (12)

The key pillars to the Uganda local Government system are the District and City Councils, which delegate authority to the lower tiers. Below the District Councils are sub counties, which serve as electoral constituencies and form the basis of the representative structure of the District Councils. There are 55 District Councils with 903 sub counties, and below that are smaller parish and village councils. There are 14 urban jurisdictions (1 city and 13 municipal), which fall within district structures but enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in terms of their function and management. Whilst the politics of these sub national political jurisdictions continues to be dominated by the dictates of the centre and is problematic (politically and administratively), there is evidence in the last 15 years that decentralization has become enmeshed with the country’s overarching poverty reduction strategy and has become a key feature of service delivery. The local authorities share of execution of total government expenditure per sector, excluding the share directly financed by earmarked donor projects, rose from 30% in 1997/8 to about 37% in 2004/5, with the sub national governments picking the responsibility for 75 % of the resources assigned to education, 62% to health and 57% for water services. (IMF Working paper 2006). The government of Uganda allowed local authorities to handle a significant share of capital projects most of it through the conditional grant system.

The main sources of revenue to the local government system in Uganda are: intergovernmental grants (conditional, unconditional and equalization) –79%; Local taxes –9%; market dues, licenses –10%; property taxes other user fees and charges - 2%; Donors are a critical part of the Uganda development equation at central and local levels accounting significantly to the support to all the development sectors of the economy. The bulk of local government expenditures go to education, health, water and agriculture support –these are the national government priorities in the PEAP and PRS. Indeed the biggest challenge that the Uganda local governments face is that pertaining to the revenue framework where they exhibit a very high dependence on the centre, which reinforces a deconcentrated rather than a devolved system. There are serious limitations with own revenue instruments (common to African local governments), which are limited, suboptimal and subject to serious political manipulation. There are also capacity constraints as they relate to public financial management, including budgeting and planning financial management, including budgeting and planning, weak expenditure controls, accountability and governance.

3.5 Summarizing the African challenge
The survey of the four countries is by no means exhaustive –it just presents a snapshot, which needs to be enlarged to cover the 43 sub Sahara countries. Several key messages emerge from these brief surveys. Firstly, many of the African governments which have embarked on democratic reforms in the last 2 decades have also embraced decentralized governance as part of the package. They have used various forms of decentralization to consolidate the position of the State in promoting participatory democracy and development. Local governments have been seen as an important vehicle for establishing the voice of citizens through locally elected bodies. Secondly, local governments have suffered in most countries from flaws in capacity and institutional design, and therefore have been unable to deliver services effectively. They do not have the systems that enable them to plan and effectively engage in the public expenditure management framework. The main outcomes in the service delivery arena have been fragile and achievement on local development (MDG’s; PRS) weak. Thirdly, weakness in the revenue framework is one of the most glaring deficiencies for most local governments in Africa. Without donor, support transfers from the centre are generally negligible, and only manage to cover the recurrent costs. This dependence (70% and above) makes local governments function largely in a deconcentrated rather than devolved manner. They process what they are given and have little room to maneuver in terms of own planning and prioritization. The own revenue stream is very weak (except in urban jurisdictions). There are structural characteristics (volatility of their collection bases, lack of adequate information on property and economic activities and poor administrative structures) that undermine their function.

However the major overriding issue continues to be the overall capacity of the State to function and coordinate the other spheres of government at sub national levels. Most African States continue to function in a sectoral and not a territorial manner. The sectors of the economy organize the public expenditure management framework. The sectors (agriculture, health, education) are managed from the centre and de-concentrate through field office structures. This does not take into account the territorial dimension, which is the basis for organization of local governments. The bulk of public resources that are authorized by national legislatures are directed towards the sectors and the relationship with local governments is only usually significant in terms of implementation. Only South Africa has a clear constitutional provision that guarantees resource allocat1on to provinces and local governments, whilst in other countries the fiscal framework is usually overridden by sectoral concerns. The argument should not however be understood as an either/or for local governments and sectors, but that there should be clarity on who does what and give them the resources they need to carry out the function. The two models of managing the economy are complimentary and have to be designed to ensure maximum complimentarily. This calls for a strong centre, which is able to provide strong and effective oversight.

3.6 Strategies and processes for effective decentralized governance
A recent survey undertaken by the informal working group on local governance and decentralization (November 2006) revealed that there were 500 projects with significant elements of support to decentralization and local governance, and whose average project budget was 4-6 million Euros. The majorities of the projects have been occurring in selected geographical areas and do not seem to be integrated with systematic reforms for the public sector, and have spread their support to civic society, communities and local governance. This is far from the ideal where decentralization is considered as an integral part of poverty reduction strategies and thus expected to be part of sector support programmes in education, health, agriculture and water. However, in some countries, it was found that donors are overcoming these problems and supporting in an integrated way decentralization and local governance (Uganda, Tanzania, and Malawi)

UNDP supports programmes in 95 countries in programmes encompassing decentralization, local governance and urban/rural development. UNCDF, which works jointly with UNDP and is focused on the LDCs, has a portfolio supporting local development programmes, which sought to pilot and promote decentralization and local development in up to 20 African countries in 2006. Local Development programmes support local governments in terms of local planning, fiscal management, improvement of local access to services and capacity development. The pilot work has in many countries been precursors for larger policy impact and replication programmes by governments and the other bilateral and multilateral partners.

The most important innovations in the Local development Programmes have been in the following areas: (UNCDF: 2004):
a) Financing innovations: this includes designing fund allocat1on modalities; creating local discretion and limits; providing capital budget support; establishing performance based funding; targeting funding on specific priorities; and supporting improvement in local revenue collection. All these measures are critical to the fiscal decentralization agenda.
b) Planning and budgeting: effectively linking planning and budgeting,; introducing inclusive and cost effective planning; and strengthening the various aspects of technical planning.
c) Implementation and production: encouraging and introducing procurement procedures and practices; developing procurement and production modalities; strengthening supervision, monitoring and oversight; training and upgrading the skills of contractors; and establishing effective operations and maintenance.
d) Capacity building: including formal training and learning by doing.
e) Accountability and transparency: including communication strategies for downward and upward accountabilities, and instituting strong M&E systems

Significant debate has been generated among development partners and governments on the best way forward in support to Decentralization and Decentralized Governance. In a discussion paper prepared for the International Conference on Local Development (June 2004), three alternative approaches to local development were put forward: decentralized sectoral; local government; and direct community approaches. The three share common objectives- increasing local access to public infrastructure; public services and economic opportunities; increasing the empowerment of local actors; and enhancing sustainability of local development processes. However when it comes to the ground they promote different institutional arrangements which can indeed have different long-term outcomes.

Decentralized sectoral approaches tend to be sector focused promoting deconcentration within the framework of a given sector (health, education). There is a danger of serious overlooking of local governments and conflicts in terms of priorities, thus weakening the local planning and empowerment process. The sector wide approaches, which have been promoted, have been positive in supporting the technical and financial needs of the sector but tend to leave out building the necessary capacity of local institutions, which, in the long term, are critical for local ownership and sustainability. Indeed, the emphasis on operational management severely limits strategic response to local conditions and priorities. There is also a tendency for the centre to believe they have the answers to the problems and to have a top down approach.

Local government approaches focus on the transfer of responsibilities by the State to lower jurisdiction and promote the development of local capacities to plan, priorities and implement development. The quality of local governments and their capacities is a very crucial factor for success and in many cases accounts for the failures. There is therefore a need for a holistic picture of decentralization, which has to be supported by the constitutions and legislatures in order to avoid excessive politicization of decision making, poor coordination and vulnerability to “demand overload” when citizen expectations and the devolved responsibilities exceed local government capacities.

Direct community approaches include a range of social funds that are channeled directly to communities, which utilize a project structure outside government to implement the programmes. Direct Community Funds are very effective in terms of reaching the target groups and in achieving delivery targets. In the end it is a combination of the three approaches and making them compliment each other, which is the secret to long-term sustainability. This is being recognized in the new programmes where the design of the local development funds is very much being linked to government ownership and integrated within the government norms and regulations. There is also a greater recognition that promoting decentralized governance is about strengthening the capacities of the State and therefore its central involvement is the most important factor for success. The Decentralization and Local Governance Study (2004) highlighted the following key issues for Donors and the different approaches for capacity building:
a) need for long term donor commitment as the reform of local government systems is a time and resource-consuming exercise.
b) Central Government condition is a precondition for effective support. Donors cannot push governments to reform and that capacity building is an integral part of any needed support.
c) Improvements of coordination between donors and partner governments are a prerequisite for success.
d) It is essential to scale up piloted interventions in district/municipalities /and cities into national programmes in order to build on the lessons learnt.
e) There is a need to build on, and emphasize the poverty dimension of decentralization programmes.
f) There is need for more focus on building local government own revenues in order to create sustainability.
g) There is a need to build capacities of civil society and grassroots organizations in order to strengthen local voice.

3.7 Capacity Development necessary to achieve public service delivery at Local levels
There is no golden formula for capacity development for decentralized governance in Africa or indeed elsewhere in the world. It is, however, clear that there is a need to package support to enable the process to proceed with clear goals and targets. Decentralization is a process of reform, which requires careful re-engineering of existing systems, building the necessary alliances and ensuring full political support. Most countries moving towards decentralized systems therefore develop policy strategy frameworks that guide the process in the short, medium and long term, and integrate the objectives of decentralization with the broader national policies. This includes the Poverty Eradication Plans, Millennium Development Goals Plan and a variety of Sector wide plans.

How do we build capacity to strengthen political decentralization? Emphasis in most plans is to build the capacity of citizens through civic groups, community groups and through local government participatory mechanisms. The objective is to deepen the democratic process at the local levels and ensure that citizens are engaged in the local decision-making, the planning process and the implementation of the development process. Support has also been provided to the voting process and providing the necessary voter education at national and local levels. The challenge in most cases is that local people are not made fully aware of the real decisions taking place and tend to be involved in small marginal activities. There is, therefore, need for investment in the education process to overcome the rampant adult illiteracy, which would unlock potential for participation in the political and development process. Training of elected councilors is another very important input in the capacity development at local level. The key outcomes should be: a) Local political leaders are fully cognizant of their roles and responsibilities and acting in the best interests of their citizens; b) Central and local government leaders establish clear partnership for local development; and c) Local civic organizations, community based groups, religious groups and traditional groups are effectively interacting in partnership to achieve local development.

How do we build capacity for administrative decentralization? The first challenge is to define the functions clearly and know the capacities needed to make the functions a reality. What do we need to make a local authority function? What sort of personnel should be in place? What kind of resources are needed to fund the functions and the capacities needed at the local level? In many countries, the central government itself is very weak and unable to provide the necessary guidance to local governments.

How do we build the capacity for fiscal decentralization? This is another very essential dimension for local decentralized governance to take place. Most decentralization policy frameworks capture the fiscal transfers from central government that are necessary for the decentralized delivery of infrastructure and services. These include unconditional grants, conditional grants and equalization grants. There has also been elaboration of the formulas that are needed to ensure that localities utilize their allocat1ons effectively and efficiently. In most countries, the institution of local government finance commission has been put in place to intermediate between central and local governments. However, as highlighted in many countries, the local revenue framework is extremely weak resulting in a large and unhealthy dependence of sub national governments on the centre, revealing hierarchical monitoring and top down planning. There is an urgent need to develop and expand the necessary instruments for “own revenue” for both urban and rural authorities, which requires improving the administrative arrangements and collecting capacities for local taxes and charges. There should also be non-interference and manipulation by the central government, which undermines the locally elected authorities’ capacity to generate local revenues.

References
Commonwealth local Government Forum website: www.clgf .uk UNCDF website: www.uncdf.org United Cities and Local Governments website: www.uclg.org
De Valk P and Wekwete K.H, Decentralization for participatory planning?, Gower Aldershot 1991.
Mawhood. P., Local Government for Development: The experience of Tropical Africa, John Wiley, Chichester, 1983
Mkandawire.T, Thinking about Developmental States in Africa Conference paper, United Nations University,, October 1998.
Ndegwa S. N., Decentralization in Africa: a stocktaking survey, World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series No 40, November 2002.
James S. Wunch and Dele Olowu, The Failure of the centralized State: Institutions and self-governance in Africa, ICS Press 1995, San Francisco, California
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Survey on support to Local Governance and decentralization: For the Informal Working group on local Governance and Decentralization, OECD 2006
Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice, The World Bank 2007
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Delivering the Goods –Building Local Government Capacity to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, UNCDF 2006
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa, Proceedings from the Cape Town Symposium 2002
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Local Government Initiative: Pro poor infrastructure and service delivery in Africa, UNCDF 2004
United Nations Development Programme, Report on Role in Decentralization and local development, UNDP Evaluation 2000 (in conjunction with German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

United Nations Development Programme, Decentralized Governance for Development: a combined practice note on decentralization, Local Governance, Urban and Rural Development, UNDP, March 2004
World Bank, Linking Community Empowerment, Decentralized Governance and Public Service provision through a Local Development Framework, World Bank, International Conference paper June 2004 (Human Development, Social Development and Public Sector management Networks)

4. Globalization and State Capacity in Africa
L. Adele JINADU

4.1 The Problematic Nature of Globalization
4.1.1 Definitional Challenges
How do we conceptualize and problematize the relationship between globalization and state capacity in Africa? What problems and challenges does globalization pose for state capacity in Africa? Posing the question in this way is intended to link the character and direction of the African state, and the interplay of economic, political and socio-cultural processes within it, to the impact of globalization. In Africa, exogenous material, political, and socio-cultural forces have historically offered challenges, opportunities and constraints to state capacity on the continent. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that globalization is unproblematic for state capacity in Africa. A starting point, therefore, is to problematize globalization as a central determining factor in building state capacity on the continent.

But what is globalization? And which, or whose globalization is the reference to? This question becomes important, since globalization is an example of what Gallie [1955] has described as “essentially contested concepts.” The “contested” nature of globalization is evident in current debate about its meaning and nature. The debate has pitted “hyperglobalist,” “skeptical,” and “transformationalist” accounts of globalization against one another. [Held & McGrew, 2001:324]. However, a common defining element in these different accounts, models and versions is its use to refer to a complex set of historical and material processes, which has resulted in, or is the catalyst for “a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power…[It] can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness.” [Held & McGrew, 2001:234]. Or, as another definition has put it, “Globalization…[has] to do with the growing influence that economic, social and cultural processes at the international level have on those same processes at the national or regional level.” [United Nations/CEPAL/ECLAC, 2000:25]

4.1.2 Globalization as Ideology
If globalization reflects economic, cultural and political exchanges and diffusions from one part of the world to the other, it requires typologizing or differentiating, historicizing or contextualizing. Additionally, and more importantly, and in view of its diffusionist and hegemonizing logic, it is important to focus on its underlying ideological or normative anchor or driving force, what Leys [1996:43] has characterized as “the global theory of development.” Globalization, in other words, has its own ideology, if only because “every system of power tends to develop its own ideology, and ideology guides and rationalizes the governmental policies that impose and sustain the system of power.” [Lowi: 2000:17] But the ideological superstructure of globalization has varied from mercantilist, protectionist, and Keynesian to the now regnant neo-liberal ones, with their combination of differing emphasis on two functional prerequisites of capitalist development: free enterprise or “possessive individualism,” and social control by the state.

The basic ideological contention is, therefore, not about the exclusion of social or state control but how to conceptualize and determine the extent and limit of that control, how much of it should be concentrated at the centre and its institutions, and how much should be devolved from central to local control. But as I have argued elsewhere [Jinadu, 2000:71], the ideological basis for the contemporary phase of globalization is neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on economic and political liberalization and its consequential rejection of social democracy and Keynesian state interventionism. Indeed neo-liberalism is a theory of world capitalist development.

4.1.3 The problematic nature of globalization for Africa
In spite of the talk about the “end of history” [Fukuyama, 1992], the realignment engendered by this new globalization, as in the hegemonic emergence of the United States, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the new, enlarged European Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the commandist economies of its satellites in Eastern Europe, and the projected reforms of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions, has highlighted and problematized the contradictions of this new process of globalization, whose undercurrents are much more structurally fundamental, reflecting the contradiction between capital and labour, than efforts to characterize them as arising from the clash of civilizations and cultures would suggest. [Huntington, 1996]

Therefore, to understand why it is a problem for state capacity in Africa, it is important to conceptualize the model globalization used here as referring specifically to a complex set of interconnected multi-linear, multifaceted and dialectical and still unfolding historical processes. The processes are propelled by the transnationalization of finance capital, in search of new markets, and the logic of capital accumulation. Typically, the processes are characterized by structural differentiation and unequal functional integration or interdependence and exchange between metropolitan and dependent or satellite nations, peoples and markets. They are mediated and facilitated on a world scale by technological advances, world trade regimes, and by hegemonizing and universalizing or homogenizing cultural and intellectual institutions, even as they generate their contraries or competing responses.

More recently, this homogenizing globalization has resulted in the emergence of the internationalized state and of a “ layer of transnational institutional authority above” the state, both of which facilitate the creation of transnational market interests, the movement of transnational capital, and the emergence of networks of national and transnational state actors [MacLean, et. al., 2001]. It has, however, necessitated, as a strategic policy response to the inherent logic of this globalization, new modes of political and economic governance structures and processes, which are not only derogating from traditional concepts of sovereignty but also are impelling new definitions of the state and of citizenship, while also creating new and competing political and cultural identities. This development has had profound implications for the character of the state in Africa, as indeed elsewhere in the world, and has further complicated the question of state capacity in Africa.

The trajectories of this model of globalization as a historical and structural process of capitalist and imperialist domination on a world scale, and of the global diffusion or replication of its economic substructures and cultural and political superstructures, have been well outlined and analyzed by others and need not be repeated here. [Aina, 1996; Ake, 1996; Amin, 1976, 1992; Griffin & Khan, 1992; Hoogvelt, 1997; Leys, 1996; McBride and Wiseman, 2000; Nabudere, 2000; Robertson, 1992; Rodney, 1972; Rugumamu, 2001; Scott, 1992; UNDP, 1996; Wallerstein, 1974]

However, the point to emphasize here, in order to locate the problem of state capacity in Africa within the context of this mainstream version of globalization as a historical and structural-materialist, diffusionist process from the West to other parts of the world, is that in its engagement with Africa, it has historically been characterized by uneven market and cultural exchanges between unequal partners, the underdevelopment of Africa’s human capital and the fragility of its economic and political institutions. But globalization has not only led to the marginalization of Africa but also denied it the possibility and prospects of auto-centered development, by regarding it [Africa] as a “follower society,” in the image of hegemonizing and globalizing West.

This is why, regarding its impact on state capacity in Africa, it is important to go beyond Eurocentric or “west-centered” perspectives on globalization, in their emphasis on “time-space compression,” “shrinking world,” “integrated markets,” “global interdependence” to problematize globalization in terms of “the inequality, unevenness and injustice embodied in the New World Order…and the social, economic, political and gender implications and consequences of the global restructuring of capital through SAPs.” [Aina, 1996:20-21]

So defined and problematized, globalization needs to be analyzed in terms of the opportunities and challenges it has posed for the state formation process in Africa, and particularly for the prospects and possibilities for the development of auto-centered or indigenously based state capacity on the continent.

4.2 . Problematizing State Capacity
4.2.1 Defining state capacity in Africa
But what does state capacity mean in the context of the African state? The answer to this question is partly to be found in the attributes, or the powers and functions normally associated with the modern state. Such attributes, no doubt shifting and variable over time, include sovereignty; the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force to ensure law and order, to enforce contract, and to deter external aggression; the pursuit of the public welfare, through public political institutional processes and public policies; and physical, natural, social, cultural, and human resource endowment and development.

State capacity is also a function of the complementary, indeed reinforcing and consolidating role of subsidiary associations and groups in mediating the relationship between the state and its institutions on the one hand, and the civil society, on the other hand, and in conferring legitimacy on the state. This is another form of human resource endowment or capacity. State capacity, therefore, is a function of the strength or deficit of these attributes, and of the extent to which a political culture of public spiritedness prevails within both the political leadership, the citizenry generally.

State capacity is also a function of the distance between the state and these subsidiary associations and groups. In other words, state capacity depends on the extent to which citizens take their civic responsibility seriously and will defend their own sovereign rights; believe they own the state and belong to it; and have confidence in its ability, through legal and political processes, to manage or contain conflict impartially.

4.2.2 State capacity, democratization and inclusiveness
This perspective towards state capacity, which neither narrowly restricts it to, nor defines it exclusively in terms of, human and physical resource capacity-building or capacity-enhancement, nor limits it to econometric or statistical computations of gross domestic product or national income data, though it includes and requires both, assumes a democratic, open, participatory, and socially inclusive political system, based on what might be described as a social contract between the state and its citizens. While it also assumes that there is a strong connection between state capacity and the direction and substantive content of public policy, it views state capacity as a function of both a combination of democratic political and legal culture, and of the evolution and durability of democratic public political and socio-economic and cultural institutions. What the perspective also underlines is the need to shift focus to, and to specify the determining material and socio- political conditions or environments for state capacity, and how to restructure or change them to enhance state capacity. This is what Amartya Sen [1999:38] meant when he hypothesized that the “instrumental freedoms [political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security] tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, but they also serve to complement each other…strengthening their joint importance.” This is why he [Sen, 1999:298] concluded that, “Development is indeed a momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities.”

Although there is ebb and flow of state capacity, which is to say that it is always, and necessarily developing, waning and waxing, depending on historical or conjunctural forces, much also depends, in the long run, on the character of the state and its ability to sustain and continually renew, regenerate or re-invent itself. Much also depends, in this regard, on the answer to the question, “to whom does the state belong?” For to pose this question is to raise the critical issue of access to the state, and to project participation and social inclusiveness as important conditions for expanding and consolidating state capacity on a sustainable basis in Africa as elsewhere.

4.2.3 Pan-African Dimensions of State Capacity
There is another dimension, a Pan-African one to the problem of state capacity. This is the compelling need for collective action at the African continental and Diaspora levels by African countries to deepen, consolidate and move the integration process in Africa forward, so that common problems of state capacity facing them can be more collectively handled. Historically, globalization has divided and balkanized them, carving out political, economic and cultural spheres of influence, and weakening their ability to act collectively to defend their common interests. Collective action by them will require new governance structures to strengthen African regional economic communities, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, along lines that will, by democratizing decision-making and public political processes within their member-states, enhance state capacity in various sectors.

Given the perspective towards state capacity, what conditions determine or shape its exercise, and what does globalization have to do with it? What major issues and constraints of state capacity have globalization and the character of the African state posed for Africa? Put differently, what do globalization and state capacity have to do with the crisis of development in Africa? The answer is to be found in the form, which the capacity constraint of the African state has typically assumed and which I characterize as the massive problem of the structural condition of the African state, notably:

(a) Weak management capacity in the public services, including failure to mainstream issues of gender equity into the development process;
(b) Low investment by the public and private sectors in research and development;
(c) Structural violence in the special sense of yawning poverty or social injustice and institutionalized inequities, with the typical African state having the worst social indicators in the world;
(d) Militarized physical violence by agencies of the state to cower and suppress legitimate agitation by victims of structural violence and ethnic minorities, leading to prolonged and decimating fratricidal civil wars, which sometimes assume regional dimensions;
(e) The prevalence of endemic and preventable diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS;
(f) Kleptocratic rule, of which “the total amount of financial resources believed to have been siphoned off by African leaders was once reported to be US$200 billion.” [Tiepoh, 2000:39]
(g) Huge external debt burdens;
(h) Monocultural economies, which make the African state dependent on, and vulnerable to downwards fluctuations and manipulation of world market demand for them, as has been experienced by Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, and Zambia;
(i) High levels of illiteracy;
(j) Fragile and deteriorating infrastructures in education, health, roads and transportation, water resources;
(k) Brain drain, resulting in the loss of critically key resources in all areas, with its implications for national capacity for policymaking, planning and management, assuming serious proportions all over Africa, and especially more pressingly so in conflict-affected countries on the continent like Angola, Burundi, the Democratic republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.
(l) Environmental degradation.

This massive problem of the structural condition of the typical African state is significantly due to the contradictions arising from globalization and the dependent character of the African state. They arise from the lingering or residual colonial inheritance of dependent political and socioeconomic and psycho-cultural structures, institutions and processes, which are at the heart of the problem of state capacity in Africa. They reflect the dialectics or antinomies, the historically deep contradictory push and pull of globalization and localization or indigenization in Africa.

Particular mention must be made of one dimension of the contradictions arising from the interface between globalization and state structures in Africa, namely prolonged African conflicts, such as those in the Great Lakes Region, Liberia and Sierra Leone, that revolve primarily over strategic resources in which economic and political forces of globalization and their regional and national proxies have deeply entrenched vested interests. In post-conflict situations in such countries, state capacity is compounded, by the urgent and pressing problem of shortages of trained and skilled personnel, which are due to the killing or emigration of such personnel, and the decay of educational institutions and facilities.

Various dimensions of the analyses of the contradictions of globalization and the character of the African state, and of the reaction of the African people to it, are reflected, for example, in the writings and political theory of a distinguished pantheon of Black and African intellectuals, which includes Claude Ake, Samir Amin, Amilcar Cabral, Cheik Anta Diop, William B. Dubois, Frantz Fanon, Mahmood Mamdani, Dani Nabudere, Abdel Gamal Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Leopold Sedar Senghor, and Issa Shivji, among others, who offered an Afro-centric counter-interpretation or perspective to western-driven globalization, and of the relevant variables to provide the organizing variables for studying it.

Placed in the broader context of their assertion of the contraries of globalization, defined as the diffusion of hegemonizing and homogenizing western values and institutions to Africa, the idea of Pan-Africa, in its different theoretical formulations and policy prescr1ptions by these intellectuals, underscores another important element in the dialectics of globalization and state capacity in Africa. This is the common Pan African understanding and prescr1ption that there is need for a coordinated African continental and African Diaspora response, transcending state boundaries, and requiring some diminution of state sovereignty to impel collective transnational or transterritorial collaboration or economic and political integration or union among African countries and peoples of African descent to help build and strengthen state capacity in Africa.

This historic search for “collective development strategy and integration schemes,” which has been made more pressing by the process of European integration and the deepening of the western-driven globalization process in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the post 9/11 War on Terror, led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), of various regional economic communities on the continent, of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Union (AU). This same search has provided, more recently, the driving motive force for the current call for the establishment of African Union Government, with legislative and executive competence in a number of “strategic areas of focus.” .

The contradictions also go to the heart of the implications of globalization for the prospects and possibilities of development in Africa. The crisis of development in Africa, which is as much economic as it is political and socio-cultural, and which has been graphically reviewed on an annual basis in recent years in the UNDP Human Development Report, shows that in many sectoral areas, African countries are far behind and are, therefore, unlikely to meet the expectations of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals.

It is in this respect, for example, that the African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM] is a welcome and desirable development in providing a continental framework for monitoring, with a view to strengthening good governance and state capacity issues on the continent in the four thematic areas of (a) Democracy and Good Governance; (b) Economic Governance and Management; (c) Corporate Governance; and (d) Socio-Economic Development. By the same token, the revitalization and strengthening of regional economic communities like ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC, together with recent proposals to rationalize some of them, to make them outward looking in a more Pan-African manner, under a harmonized “multilayered, multidimensional” approach, so that they can serve as “building blocks towards deep continental integration” [African Union, 2006:28] is a desirable development.

The assumptions of this proposed Pan-African “common interest” perspective to state capacity in Africa are the following:
(a) Owing to the “increasing wave of globalization, and the emergence of strong regional, economic and trading blocs in other continents, the challenges of over dependence and under-exploitation of its potentials have increased the marginalization of the continent in world affairs,”
(b) “The goal in pursuing development through a common interest perspective is to bring about human progress in Africa; restore human dignity to the African people…promote progressive African social and political values and defend the African personality;”
(c) There is need to develop the human potentials of Africa and include the people in the development process,” so as to
(d) “Build [Africa’s] collective capability and capacity to act as stakeholder and not an outside in world affairs, and to fully participate in shaping international norms and agendas.” [African Union: 2006:8]

4.3 Globalization, State Capacity and the Development Process in Africa
What does globalization and state capacity have to do with the crisis of development in Africa? A point of departure is to suggest that we view contemporary globalization dialectically and analyze it concretely in respect to the crisis of development, or African crisis for short. This is important, because globalization is Janus-faced—it has had positive and negative impact on state capacity in Africa, and rabid anti-globalization postures may miss or overlook its positive aspects, while uncritical adulation of globalization may obscure and draw focus away from some of its negative impact on state capacity in Africa.

Yet, given the nature and the economic, cultural and political context of globalization’s encounter with Africa, highlighted by racialism, the political economy of colonial rule, and the pervasiveness and durability of the colonial inheritance, in the form of neocolonialism and the neocolonial state, much of the radical progressive African critique of globalization is understandable. [Ake, 1992; Amin, 1992; Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 1995]

If we take the political economy of colonial rule as a starting point, it was authoritarian. As for state capacity, colonial rule typically underdeveloped the colony’s human and physical resource endowment; so much so that “after decades of colonization, the multitude of children in the streets is greater than those in the classrooms; the number of hospital beds is pitiful compared with the number of the sick; the purpose of the highway system is without regard to the needs of the colonized but absolutely in line with those of the colonizer.” [Memmi, 1967:113]

In the circumstance, this state of affairs exacerbated the deliberate divide and rule policy and created regional, racial and ethnic disparities and inequalities in access to education and the provision of infrastructures. Such conditions started off the postcolonial African state on a poor human and physical resource and capacity base, posing major human and physical endowment and capacity challenges to the emergent postcolonial stat. It also sowed the seed of ethno-regional and racial conflict within it, with grave and decimating consequences for state capacity.[Atkinson, 1999: 24, Horowitz, 1985:160; Mamdani,2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987]. However, the radical critique of globalization by its African and other critics should not be mistaken for a call for autarky or isolation. As Aime Cesaire [1955:10] once observed,

“I admit that it is a good thing to place different civilizations in contact with each other…whatever its own genius may be, a civilization that withdraws into itself atrophies, that for civilization exchange is oxygen...But I ask the question: has colonization really placed civilizations in contact? Or if you prefer of all the ways of establishing contact, was it the best? I answer no.”

Cesaire’s and Memmi’s position is that globalization should be guided, defined and underscored by the interrelated notions of recognition, reciprocity and mutuality in relations between cultures, nations and peoples, and that it should move towards and become what Sachs [2005:358] characterizes as “an enlightened globalization.” In other words, such an enlightened globalization would address and promote the pressing imperative of global poverty reduction, global social justice and equity, global income redistribution, global environment and global democracy and social inclusion. It is a globalization that throws up and promotes “the possibilities of capitalism with a human face, in which the remarkable power of trade and investment can be harnessed, while acknowledging and addressing limitations through compensatory collective actions.” [Sachs, 2005:357]. In short, what Cesaire’s position implies is the possibility for Africa and the Black World, in bringing their own cultural, socio-economic and political perspectives and agenda to bear on the globalization process, to make it truly global and non-parochial.

But moral suasion has its limits, and nowhere is this truer than in the case of globalization, where power relations are politicized as relations of economic and political superordination and subordination, arising out of its being a process of unequal exchange and social relations of production among unequal partners. As Fanon pointed out, with respect to the Third World, although “what it expects from those who for centuries have kept it in slavery is that they will help it to rehabilitate mankind…it is clear that we are not so naïve as to think that this will come about with the cooperation and the goodwill of the European governments.”[Fanon, 1968:106]

4.4 . Addressing Capacity Constraints Caused by globalization
In the light of the above, the African engagement with globalization calls for struggle and contestation beyond moral suasion. It involves the “remarkable politicization of social life, while also creating new modalities and institutional arenas through which its imperatives are contested.” [Held and McGrew, 2000:325] The “institutional arenas” of the struggle and contestation are, of course, varied and may move from local to international spaces, at the level of GATT or the WTO, for example, and may be pursued by less conventional, that is, bloody and revolutionary means.

Because globalization constraints the domestic and external terrains of policy choices for the African state, invariably blurring the tenuous distinction between the internal and external policy fields, the policy process within the African state becomes the critical focus area where struggle and contestation over the substantive content of policy and state capacity are waged, as is clear from popular resistance to donor-driven civil service reform initiatives in various African countries. In this way too, globalization becomes a critical factor in the structure and process of the domestic and external politics of the African state, and with implications for state capacity, particularly with respect to endogenous policy formulation and implementation in public sector administration and management. The resistance to globalization and the character of the state in Africa has in several African countries taken the form of deep-seated popular-based autonomist mass political action and, sometimes, rebellion by social movements and citizens across Africa, against authoritarian rule generally and the externally imposed structural adjustment policies of various African governments. [Adekanye, 1995; Beckman, 1992; Gibbon, Bangura and Ofstad, 1992; Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996; Mamdani and Wamba-Dia-Wamba; Osaghae, 1995; Rudebeck, 1992]

The interdependence of the domestic and external political economies, which is one of the hallmarks of globalization, becomes problematic in the African context in some critical respects, in view of the continent’s inherited fragile economic and political institutions and its underdeveloped human resource endowment. This is what has been referred to as “the failure of development, the impossibility of achieving any significant economic development in the absence of a strong and democratic state capable of resisting the negative pressures from world capitalist expansion and of encouraging popular legitimacy and participation.”[Tiepoh, 2000:38; Amin, 1982:1]

First, the typical African state generally lacks the capacity for independent action and to resist the imposition of economic and political conditionality by the forces and institutions of globalization. This is why, in many cases, the African state lacks the capacity to control and hold accountable multinational corporations and local ones. Secondly, the African state typically lacks the human and information technology-based capacity to engage the industrialized countries on an equal intellectual footing at multilateral bargaining and negotiation meetings.

At the national level, political independence and political sovereignty can be a powerful weapon in constraining the activities of multinational corporations in the African neo-colonial state. This can be achieved through legislation, the emergence of a local African bourgeoisie with an independent national political base, and the creation of local constituencies for local affiliates of metropolitan multinational companies, as Sklar [1975] has shown in the case of Zambia. The conflicts of interest or fractured loyalties thus created diminish from, and vitiate the loyalty of these local affiliates to their metropolitan headquarters. In this way, “market relationships that transcend nationalism and nationalization may prove to be the most enduring ties between the capitalist powers and their colonies.” [Sklar, 1975:86]

Yet this intertwined set of market relationships engenders its own contradictions, because “[it] perpetuates imperialism.” [Sklar, 1975:86] Such contradictions typically constraint state capacity because they give rise to (a) corruption, (b) repatriation of surplus abroad, (c) leakages in the tax on corporate profits, through corruption, inadequate assessment and lack of reliable and credible information on which to base the assessment, (d) neglect of in-service training, requisite skill acquisition and manpower development training for indigenous staff, and (e) little investment in research and development.

4.5 . Globalization and the Explanation of the African development crisis
What is the nature of the relationship between globalization, economic and political liberalization, and the African crisis of development? Is democracy compatible with structural adjustment policies? Or put, differently, is economic liberalization a necessary condition for political liberalization? For some, the answer is, at best, ambiguous, or both “yes” and “no,” and depends on conjunctural factors. [Van de Walle, 1994:129; Robinson, 1996]. To others, structural adjustment does not undermine democracy. [Bluwey, 1992:45]. Yet others point to its anti-democratic and authoritarian impulses and consequences, which undermine the long-term prospects for democracy, and therefore for state capacity on the continent. [Beckman1992].

This is also part of a broader concern with globalization, democracy and the state in Africa. Applied to Africa, the dominant neo-liberal ideology of contemporary globalization subsumes a theory of the African state as weak, overextended and ill equipped, as currently constituted, to undertake the task of economic and political development in Africa. In this respect, neo-liberalism marks a paradigmatic shift in the application of development theory to Africa, with a refocused intellectual shift by mainstream development scholars and practitioners to the application of the “new institutionalism,” and rational choice theory to the solution of the development crisis facing the African state. [Apter, 1996; Leys, 1996, chapter 4].

Presuming the benefits and merits of the interplay of unfettered market forces as the most rational and efficient allocator of economic resources, neo-liberalism argues for the minimalist state in Africa, and for political liberalization, in the form of competitive liberal democratic party politics. Following the logic of the neoliberal assumptions, the Bretton Woods Institutions and Donor Countries moved to require from African countries the acceptance and adoption of a policy reform package of conditionalities –implementation of structural adjustment, economic liberalization, democratization and public service reform.

The advantage of this new institutionalism is in highlighting institutional weaknesses and failures as causes of the poor performance of the African state, and consequently of the impairment of state capacity. Situating the primary reason for institutional failures and weaknesses in the preeminence accorded social needs, in other words, politics, over citizen’s economic interests, rational choice theory, for example, attempts to provide a basis for overcoming them by recommending that policy must henceforth assign primacy to the autonomy of market forces and market relations as the catalyst or engine of development. Its “main achievements have been in throwing light on relatively micro-level institutional problems” of development. [Leys, 1996:82]

Yet as Leys [1996:95] has argued in riposte to neo-liberalism,
It is not politics that “impair” market efficiency, but market forces that conflict with social goals; and in reality what is at stake in Africa is precisely a conflict between principles of “market society” and alternative conceptions - some traditional, some modern - of collective welfare. The assumption, then, that in dealing with “economic matters” rational people act primarily for material advantage is by no means a “natural” starting point…it is a highly political one, which takes as “natural” what is in fact at stake in the struggle for Africa’s future.”

The weakness of neo-liberalism is, therefore, that by emphasizing the presumed allocative efficiency of market forces and their unfettered play, it deliberately overlooks market imperfections and the significant role the state must necessarily play through macroeconomic policies and political regulation or social control in strengthening state capacity, especially when the so-called market policies conflict with social goals that must remain the responsibility of the African state, given the reality of underdevelopment and the problem of state capacity it underscores. To advocate a minimalist state or a “rolling back” of the state, without addressing and redressing the issue of market imperfections, especially when “the market is driven by [multinational] or big corporations rather than individual entrepreneurs” [Lowi, 2000:19], at the domestic and global levels, is to expose the African state to the vagaries of the world market, further weaken state capacity and leave the African state vulnerable to external manipulation. In short, the institutional weaknesses which neo-liberalism has correctly identified are due as much to the overextended reach or stretch of the typical African state as to its vulnerability to market imperfections. Removing those imperfections and reforming the world system in a manner that addresses global asymmetries must be the focus of policy at the national, regional and global levels to build and strengthen state capacity on the continent.

At the political level, the renewed focus on democratization as a dimension of the development crisis in Africa reflects, what might be characterized as “global democratic transitions,” beginning with those in Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal) and Latin America. But the roots of these “global democratic transitions” are also deeply embedded in neo-liberal and rational choice theory and are reflected in the underlying neo-liberal argument or thesis that the ideology and practice of African Socialism, the one-party state, the single party-dominant state, military rule, and other forms of authoritarian rule, which pervaded the African political landscape in the three decades or so after independence, merely served to create market distortions and imperfections, thereby impairing, or even stunting state capacity, through their denial and suppression of individual choices, options and initiative in the political marketplace. According to this line of reasoning, it is this institutional failure or weakness, which accounts for and therefore, explains the vicious cycle of political instability, lack of accountability, prebendalism, coups d’etat and in a number of cases violent ethno-religious conflicts and internal wars, and with it massive internal and external displacements of peoples or refugee flows, as prominent features of the postcolonial state, which vitiated state capacity on the continent.

The neo-liberal and rational choice theory policy prescr1ption is, therefore, that liberal democracy or “democratic governance,” in Africa must build on individualism and self-interest, in other words, on “exchanges among rational self-interested citizens.” [March and Olsen, 1995: 6] This prescr1ption has assumed the form of the conditionality of the African donor community for liberal democracy, defined as limited or constitutional government, based on the Schumpeterian competitive multiparty electoral model.

4.6 . Constraining limits of economic and political conditionality for state capacity
How much light has such a focus and prescr1ption thrown on the political dimensions of the crisis of development in Africa? From a comparative perspective, it has directed attention to the Latin American experience with democratic transitions, as design projects over which domestic and external conjunctural social forces contend, and which are susceptible to anti-democratic or authoritarian reversals. Yet some serious and troubling state capacity problems remain to be addressed from the application of “global democratic transitions” to Africa.

A major problem is that neo-liberalism conflates the problem of democracy in Africa with that of liberal democracy and its institutions. As a result, it fails to address the critical design and political problem, which ethnicity, politically mobilized for competitive electoral politics by political entrepreneurs, poses for the simple majoritarian principle of “winners-take-all” in liberal democracy. To address and redress this problem, searchlight needs to be turned on other models of democracy or new modes of democratic governance, based on power-sharing arrangements at the national level, and power devolution or the granting of self-government or the right to self-determination in local or sub-national political spaces to assuage and protect ethnic minority rights.

Secondly, the neo-liberal version of liberal democracy fails to adequately relate the problem of democracy and of democratic transition in Africa to the structural problem of underdevelopment, which is due to the structural inequities and unequal exchanges created by the imperialist logic of contemporary globalization. Therefore, there is also need to direct policy focus towards removing externally driven distortions created by the imperfections of the world system, which continue to pose a threat to the prospects for democracy and state capacity in Africa. In the same mould, Andre Gunder Frank [1993:35] argues that, given the asymmetrical nature of globalization, and particularly of the economic forces driving the global economy, democratic transitions in the South “may well become… a fig leaf for continued exploitation and oppression of the South by the North.”

A third problem is that the form of liberal democracy, which the West and the donor community have put forward as a political conditionality, has led to “the democratization of disempowerment in Africa,” where “people are voting without choosing,” which reduces “democracy to governance, and governance to the political correlates of structural adjustment, particularly the rule of law, transparency and accountability,” and under which “state power is constituted in such a way as to render democracy impossible,” whereas “what is needed by way of democratization is the transformation of the state, for in the absence of such transformation elections can only be a choice between oppressors.”[Ake, 1994:1,2,8]

The point of Ake’s argument is indeed that neo-liberalism shows scant interest in focusing on grassroots-based social movements and their implications for triggering, initiating, sustaining and consolidating a people-centered democracy and thereby strengthening state capacity in Africa. What neo-liberalism is perpetuating is the type of anti-people colonial inheritance, which Fanon described as involving a deal between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the emergent African petty bourgeoisie, creating what Ake characterizes as “a salient duality,” by which is meant the “partial displacement of the state by informal communities, ethnic groups and nationalities…[Thus] the state has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it. It is largely regarded as a hostile force to be evaded, cheated, defeated and appropriated as circumstances permit. Accordingly most people have turned away from the state to seek safety and fulfillment in their community, ethnic group or nation. The demands, which they make on these social formations have turned them into informal polities, in competition with the state.” Ake [1994:6-7].

The political conditionality of the donor countries and institutions is, on this view, a major impediment to democratization and to the strengthening of state capacity in Africa. Indeed, the argument of Gill and Rocamora [1992:502] is that the neo-liberal version of liberal democracy “is in danger of becoming a term of political mystification or obfuscation, serving as a euphemism for sophisticated forms of neo-authoritarianism.”

4.7 Globalization and state capacity in Africa: The way forward?
Given the perspective that informs this paper and its analysis of the relationship between globalization and state capacity in Africa, what is or should be the way forward? In other words, how is Africa to overcome the constraints, challenges and opportunities for building and strengthening state capacity in Africa on a sustainable basis?

3.7.1 External and Domestic Material and Political Conditions for State Capacity
More importantly, there is need to focus more critically on the constraints, challenges and opportunities offered by the external and domestic political conditions for state capacity. Politics at the global and domestic level are about power relations and how the contradictions they throw up are to be mediated to serve the res publica, or the common interest of humanity. This will require the following:

(a) Reforming, restructuring and transforming contemporary globalization in all its facets, on the basis of mutuality, recognition and reciprocity. This will require new Afrocentric epistemological foundations for thinking about African and global development, and a combination of short-, medium- and long-term strategies of moral suasion and struggle to emphasize issues of global asymmetries, and how they can be redressed on the basis of global social justice, global income redistribution, and related issues of economic and socio-cultural rights, global inclusion, global democracy and sustainable global environment.
(b) Emphasizing the use of “appropriate” or “sustainable” technologies, whose characteristic is that they ‘fit’ the lifestyles and social organizations of local communities, growing from them, requiring less reliance on outside experts and drawing more local expertise, as has been illustrated by McPherson and Radelet [1995] in their study of rural development through the innovative use of small-scale technologies in the Gambia. This perspective on the social and cultural embededness of knowledge, or what has been referred to as “collectively owned communal forms of skill and knowledge,”[Farrands, 2000:70] underscores the fact its people, in other words, its human capital, is the greatest resource of the African state, and the key to development and growth; that their views, and prioritized needs matter and must inform development.
(c) Re-designing or re-inventing new Pan-African approaches to state capacity, with emphasis on strengthening the collective capacity of African continental and regional institutions to respond to the challenges of globalization, turning its negative implications for Africa into opportunities to reform globalization, and make it truly global, while also turning its searchlight inwards, through the African Peer Review Mechanism, among other Pan-African institutional processes, towards nurturing, strengthening and sustaining conditions for democracy, development, peace and stability within African countries.
(d) Reconceptualizing democracy, to take into account the positive role which culture can and should play in generating and institutionalizing new modes of governance on the basis of power-sharing; political and social devolution; respect for human rights broadly defined to include cultural, economic, political and social rights; broad-based participation and social, including gender inclusion; accountability, ethics and transparency in governance; “the democratization of political information and opinions as a public investment in the democratic knowledge enterprise,” to use an expressed borrowed from India, as part of a broader, wider and more inclusive process of popular participation; separation of powers; establishment of independent horizontal oversight (accountability and transparency) institutions, like Ghana’s Serious Fraud Organization, and the Commission on Human Rights and Justice, or Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, to fight, check and aggressively prosecute corruption, impunity and related abuses of political power; and the emergence of a robust civil society and a socially responsible private sector.

3.7.2 A framework to overcome constraints to state capacity as capacity-building
Given these material and socio- political conditions for building and strengthening state capacity, broadly defined, how can the challenges and constraints on state capacity (narrowly defined as capacity building and enhancement) be addressed? A useful way to address this question is to highlight and underscore the following specific objectives spelt out in 1989 by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in its alternative framework for Africa’s economic and political structure: (a) enhanced production and more efficient use of resources; (b) greater and more efficient resource mobilization; (c) improved human resource capability; (d) strengthening science and technology. This can be complemented by the underlisted “major policy issues for governance,” in the presentation to African Ministers for Environment at the Regional Prep COM for Africa at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Nairobi, Kenya in October 2001, entitled “Making the Concern of Africa the First Concerns of Africans.”[African Forum for Strategic Thinking, 2002 17-20]:
a) Enhancing the capacity and efficiency of the State through - retooling the state and ensuring that necessary human capacity is not tapped away from government.
b) Ensuring a stronger role for the State in economic management for development - to promote corporate social responsibility; subordinate economics to social/political agenda and promote economic heterodoxy beyond neo-liberal policies.
c) Promote gradual regional integration based not only on economic factors, but people to people cooperation to enhance development and reduce poverty especially…regional cooperation on information and communications technology.
d) Incorporation of vertical and horizontal participation of civil society organizations in the formulation, development, implementation and monitoring of new policies, programmes and strategies for sustainable development.
e) Effective application of the principle of gender mainstreaming in all spheres of development in the short term, but also working at redesigning society to eliminate practices that discriminate against women and other marginalized groups.
f) The concept of security…should be broadened to encompass security of the environment, economic, food, cultural, and individual human rights.
g) There is need to respect traditional knowledge with respect to the management of biological diversity and its use, including the use of natural medicine and indigenous food products.
h) There is need for research in all aspects of natural resources, particularly with respect to agricultural resources for enhancing food security.
i) Training of youths and adults in information technology is urgently needed
j) Scientific research and development need to be increased, especially with respect to agricultural technology. National science and technology policies warrant start up and further development.

4.8 Policy Agenda for overcoming constraints to strengthening state capacity in Africa
Further to the framework for overcoming the challenges and constraints of building state capacity in Africa, what follows are specific illustrations of an agenda for policy action to (a) achieve effective human resource management in the African civil service; (b) strengthen accountability in financial management in the African civil service; (c) enhance the capacity of the legislature to undertake their oversight and budgetary functions. This list is not an exhaustive one but is selected to illustrate an approach to the general problem.

4.8.1 Effective Human Resource Management in the African Civil Service
Rationale: Re-energizing the civil service in Africa to play its central coordinating role in the democratic process and economic management.

Strategic Objectives: Evolve a more professionalized, gender-sensitive civil service; emphasize and reward merit in the selection process, without abandoning representativenesss, especially in plural ethnic countries; strengthen ethics and accountability mechanisms; and introduce modern management techniques and principles, with emphasis on performance targets (see Table below).

RESULTS

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES
TIME-FRAME & MANAGEMENT
1. A transparent, professionalized civil service, open to talent, with equal opportunities to women, and a reward system based on merit.
1. Introduce competitive examination into senior civil service positions
2. Systematic use of open performance appraisal
3. Strengthen the civil service commission or similar commission or institution
4. Introduce and implement a blueprint for women in management and women in development
5. Introduce/strengthen Civil Service Code of Ethics and adopt anti-corruption measures. 3-4 years (2007-2010)

2. A well-trained, innovative and well-remunerated civil service, under modern management conditions.

1.Invest in training and upgrade management development.
2. Continuous training to improve skills, including specialized training to adapt to new technology.
3. Reorient training to focus on economic management role of the civil service, and to organizational changes and service improvements target.
4. Enhanced salary structure and package of allowances, including pension scheme in the civil service—Pay Reform.
5.Broad acceptance and introduction of modern management principles and techniques like Total Quality Management in the civil service.
6.Introduction of Strategic and Business Plans in the civil service
7. Widespread use of information technology in the civil service. . 3-4 years (2007-2010)
3. Improvement in policymaking and implementation and service-delivery of the civil service. 2. Strengthen Policy Review units in the civil service.
3. Establish a central policy coordinating and monitoring unit in the Office of the Head of Service or its functional equivalent.
4. Encourage senior civil servants to attend courses in Policy Analysis regularly.
5. Introduce Clients’ Charter and provision of quality counter services in the civil service.
6. Establish service improvement units in the civil service to monitor, audit and assess level and speed of service provided in the civil service. 3-4 years (2007-2010)

4.8.2 Strengthening Accountability in Financial Management in the African Civil Service
Rationale: Efficient and effective financial management in the African civil service is indispensable to sustainable human development and socio-economic growth.

Strategic Objectives: Strengthen mechanisms for public financial management; review and modernize Financial Instructions and General Orders or similar civil service rules to make for
transparency and accountability in public financial management; strengthen and empower the Auditor-General’s Office and the Anti-Corruption Commission or their functional equivalents; enforce Code of Conduct; and encourage private sector and civil society to play complementary oversight roles (see Table below).

RESULTS
ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES TIME-FRAME & MANAGEMENT
1. Prudent and transparent financial management culture in the civil service. Encourage financial discipline, including elimination of waste and plugging of leakages.
Avoid deficit budgeting and/or reduce budget deficit.
Adopt open tendering in procurement and contract award. 3-4 years (2007-2010

4.8.3 Enhancement of the Oversight, including Budgetary Role of the African Legislature
Rationale: The African legislature has suffered from neglect under authoritarian rule and has generally been weak relative to the executive branch. Under the current wave of democratization, it has become important to enhance the capacity of the African legislature to enable it play its constitutional roles of lawmaking, including appropriation and oversight more effectively and efficiently.

Strategic Objectives: Build and enhance the capacity of the African legislature; and strengthen the internal structure and organization of the African legislature, especially through the application of IT and its research and library resources (see Table below).

RESULTS

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES
TIME-FRAME & MANAGEMENT
1. Prudent and transparent financial management culture in the civil service. Encourage financial discipline, including elimination of waste and plugging of leakages.
Avoid deficit budgeting and/or reduce budget deficit.
Adopt open tendering in procurement and contract award. 3-4 years (2007-2010)

4.9 Conclusions
To conclude, what all this demands is a fundamental shift in the political culture of the African political leadership and the emergence of a public-spirited citizenry. This will particularly require the political will by the leadership and the cultivation by the people of the cultural gestalt so vital to nurturing a people-centered and gendered democratization process, as a condition for developing and enhancing state capacity in Africa. As Adedeji [1995:139] has put it, “Africa needs a new generation of men and women who engage in politics and governance on the basis of values shared with the people…The African elite should aspire to become a bourgeoisie—not necessarily a national, but definitely a regional one—committed to developing and transforming the continent. The people and their organizations, for their part, must be ready to take part in all aspects of public life, systematically building up their capacities to contribute to the design and implementation of policies as well as vigilantly monitoring those who govern.” The exhortatory words of Fanon [1968:311] are still as relevant and pressingly urgent today, as they were almost 30 years ago:

Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we are plunged, and leave it behind.”

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5. The Role of Non-State Actors
Jenerali Ulimwengu

5.1 Introduction
It is generally recognized that the process of building a capable state requires the participation of all the vital forces of a nation. A capable state is one that has all the attributes of a modern, strong, responsible and responsive state, a state capable of effectively discharging its duties of delivering security, peace, prosperity and other pubic goods to its people. Although the state has traditionally been considered as the focal point of this process, other sectors, including non-state ones, have an important role to play, and the importance of this role has grown significantly over the past couple of decades as the limitations of the post-colonial state in providing for the needs of its people have been made all too clear.

It is thus important to identify these other actors and recognise those areas wherein they can contribute, and have indeed contributed, to the process, as well as to appreciate better their nature, their mode of intervention, the constraints hampering their action as well as to explore ways in which their participation can be rendered more fruitful and less problematic. But before we delve into the subject of non-state actors and their role in the creation of the capable state in Africa, it would be useful to look into just what the capable state is and means, and what it has meant for the African continent since the advent of independence half a century ago.

5.2 Definitional Issues
5.2.1 Overview
The capable state may be defined as one that effectively fulfils its obligations to its constituents by providing and safeguarding a range of goods, both tangible and intangible, that assure its people of a secure public space wherein they can live and love, produce and reproduce, and pursue the enjoyment of the fruits of their labour and love. Such a state will have attributes such as territorial integrity, public order and safety under the rule of law; ample political space for individual and group self-realisation; and socio-economic justice and equity that minimise conflict and foster intra-national peace and harmony. It is the absence of these attributes within states that creates what have come to be known as “failed”, “failing” or “dysfunctional” states, whose common denominator are varying degrees of precariousness.

In these terms, the African state that came into being upon decolonisation had its work cut out. From centuries of successive forms of extreme exploitation, oppression and brutalisation, African nations found themselves confronted with the daunting task of, on the one hand, putting in place governance systems that would ensure the survival of the nation-state that was essentially an artificial creation of the colonial regime, cobbled up from a multitude of disparate and often mutually hostile ethnic entities and, on the other, assure a minimum of livelihood for the people by delivering education, health and other social services, securing good prices for agricultural produce, providing jobs through mining and industrialisation, and generally taking care of the nation, including providing welfare for those who could not fend for themselves.

Herculean as these tasks were the first crop of African leaders assumed them with gusto. In fact it was the leaders who enthusiastically promoted these expectations, either because they needed seductive promises to make their peoples rally to the anti-colonial banner, or because they genuinely believed that once the colonialists were out of the way all was possible. Mkandawire sheds a harsh light on this “central preoccupation” with “development”. “African leaders have always been aware of the need for some nationalist-cum-developmentalist ideology for both national building and development… The quest for an ideology to guide the development process inspired African leaders to propound their own idiosyncratic and often incoherent ‘ideologies’ to ‘rally the masses’ for national unity and development. If such ideologies are still absent it is definitely not for lack of trying.” Thus, it was made possible for people to expect that the state would do everything for them, in this way fostering the concept of l’Etat-providence, the provider State. Some African states did indeed attempt, with varying degrees of success, to deliver on some of their promises, but it did not take long for most of these attempts to prove Sisyphean, rolled back by a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
a) Poor governance and managerial practices;
b) Over-centralisation of power in the hands of a small group, or of one individual;
c) Emergence of authoritarian/dictatorial/military regimes;
d) Failure/reluctance to devolve power and responsibilities to local authorities;
e) State corruption;
f) Ethnic bias, nepotism, exclusion of whole sections of populations;
g) Deterioration of terms trade on the world market;
h) Unsustainable levels of state intervention in delivering social services;
i) A crippling dependency syndrome on the part of populations heavily reliant on government handouts, and on the part of governments dangerously dependent on donor handouts.

By the end of the 1980s, it had become clear that the various development strategies different African countries had followed had not led to the desired outcomes. Despite the earlier promise of the 1960s, and the modest but positive growth figures of the 1970s, the 1980s came to be known as the ‘lost decade’, a grim epitaph epitomizing the shattered dreams of a whole continent, a reality from which African countries, having lost their initial elegance, have not fully emerged to this day. The World Bank blamed this inability to deliver development on “a strategy (that) was misconceived” in the sense that in their hurry to modernize, African governments were wont to copy rather than adapt Western development models, with the result that they found themselves with “poorly designed public investment in industry; too little attention to peasant agriculture; too much intervention in areas where the state lacked managerial, technical and entrepreneurial skills; and too little efforts to foster grassroots development.” This top down approach, according to the World Bank, “demotivated ordinary people, whose energies needed to be mobilized in the development effort.”

It has been rather a case of ‘double jeopardy’ in the sense that the State that promised to deliver economic development – the ‘developmental State’ – also took away political and individual rights, constricting the political space in which citizens could enjoy full political participation, the argument being that incessant political bickering and rivalry would sap the developmental potential and undermine the nation building project.

In the end, the African State, caught up in its ‘developmentalist’ quest, delivered neither economic development nor democratic governance . The State became more ‘commandist,’ more intolerant of contrary ideas from its citizens, less reluctant to devolve power to local entities, more given to the use of force as a solution to political issues, and gradually descended into the mire of autocratic rule, the more egregious of which were military dictatorships and/or, later, rule by warlords and their militias.

Faced with this stark reality, it became imperative to rethink governance with a view to finding alternative ways of confronting the development challenges of our peoples. At this same time, towards the end of Africa’s ‘lost decade’, momentous events were taking place in the world that were destined to usher in a major paradigmatic shift in world political relations. The end of the ‘Cold War’ was unfolding even as efforts were being made to see African countries ‘democratise’ and the discourse of that process threw to the fore a hitherto little heeded breed of protagonists, variously known as civil society, NGOs or non state actors. In Eastern Europe, some of these organisations played a central role in bringing about the fall of the Communist regimes, such as was evidenced, especially, by the Polish experience with the workers, union-based Solidarnos, as well as other civil society movements in Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union itself. Although there is little evidence to suggest that these movements sustained their role in the new, post-Communist governance systems –except that a trade union leader took over the State in Poland, and a poet in the Czech Republic – their importance had been recognized and stood ready to be deployed elsewhere. Africa, just like Eastern Europe, was emerging from a long period of negative development, and, as such, it was thought, what had worked in the former Communist regimes might work in African countries.

As we shall see later, this would have a bearing on the way many of these non state actors, whether packaged as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or simply Non State Actors (NSAs), would be viewed in many African countries, which would also, to a large extent, inform their effectiveness on the ground.

The concept of Non State Actors (NSAs) has gained currency worldwide in the past couple of decades, as researchers, sociologists, activists and mediators have sought to comprehend and recognise the nature of interventions that fall without the purview of the State and yet have to be reckoned with if a certain beneficial action has to be enhanced or if a given knotty situation calls for sustainable denouement. NSAs cover, but are not limited to, NGOs, and may generally be subsumed under civil society organisations (CSOs), although it is important to note that an important attribute distinguishes some NSAs from the concept of civil society. In much of the literature on the subject, these three concepts are often used interchangeably, with the concomitant confusion that such interchangeability may sometimes engender.

Civil society is a concept which, although ancient in origin, has seen more frequent usage over the past three decades, and its current usage, emphasising its non-state character, is a far cry from the attributes given it by the philosophers of antiquity, who, in fact, saw it as part of the state. Its evolution down the ages, through the Enlightenment, to 19th Century revolutionary (esp. Marxist) thinking and to its current, firmly non-state character, makes interesting if sometimes confusing reading, but this paper concerns itself chiefly with the present situation, the aim being to understand the interaction between the state and non state actors and how that contributes, or may be helped to contribute to the building of a capable state in the Africa of today and tomorrow.

One interesting reading about civil society is by Michael Edwards , who finds that “Civil Society has become a notoriously slippery concept, used to justify radically different ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence and suffused with many questionable assumptions.” And yet Edwards goes on to state that Civil Society, at least in its operation, has created a “third sector,” that part of society that over time has developed in the space between the family and the state, but excluding commercial firms, a space wherein the “habits of the heart”, including such attitudes and values as cooperation, non-violence and trust are privileged and nurtured, thus helping to foster “a different rationality, identified as civil.” It is this space thus created that may be summed up by the exclamation, Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen! Inherent in this injunction is the primacy of the position of the citizen in the mediation of social relations unhampered by the coercive force of the State or the philistine pursuits of commerce.

Conceived in the general framework of resistance against State-sponsored despotism and unwanted intrusion, as well as against the basest appetites of the profit motive, the notion of Civil Society was given a new impulsion during and after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which coincided with the end of Africa’s “lost decade.” Ironically, the new dynamism of the civil society movement has also come about as a result of what has been termed “retrenchment and privatisation” of the State, the erosion of the traditional power of the State in the wake of “rapid global market integration, increased mobility of people and capital and rapid social and technological change.” These developments have been accompanied by the breakdown of the traditional welfare state, trade unions and the nuclear family, doing away with the conventional safety nets, and leading to heightened levels of uncertainty and feelings of vulnerability, creating a need for new forms of organisation to fill up the vacuum left behind by these rapid transformations.

In the African context, the conditionalities imposed by the Breton Woods institutions in the 1980s, including the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), meant the disengagement of most African governments from economic activity as well as from their role as providers of social services such as education and health, termed in those years by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as ‘non-productive’ sectors. The new forms of organization of the ‘Third Sector’ that have sprung up on the African continent as a result of these developments have been extremely diverse and do not lend themselves to easy categorization, although we can identify the main types of NSAs, including NGOs, CSOs, and their role in governance issues as well as how they relate to the State in Africa. Yet it is always useful to remember that civil society, in various forms, has always existed in African societies, as we are made aware by Aina.

Generally, NSAs in Africa can be grouped in the following, non-exhaustive categories, each one with attributes and characteristics that may vary from country to country and from time to time, although there is enough between them to allow the discernment of important commonalities.

5.2.2 Non Governmental Organizations
This is probably the most recognizable category, with the biggest name recognition, having been on the scene longest. These are mostly single issue organisations, engaged either in development activities or in advocacy work. In development work they tend to be restricted in scope, operating in small geographical areas, covering small groups of people. In single issue advocacy, they have chosen problems close to the heart of the founders, such as rural poverty, women and children rights, campaigns against female genital mutilation, etc. Sometimes, though, they have extended their wings vertically to build synergies with other grassroots organizations doing similar work, eventually leading to the formation of national umbrella organizations. In other instances, the movement has been in the other direction, where the national/umbrella organization came first and then ramified downwards.

Some of NGOs have chosen to serve more broad-based constituencies, such as when they cover multifaceted area like human rights, general gender issues, poverty, development forums, political liberalisation, economic liberalisation, etc. Sometimes they have tapped into the knowledge base of single issue associations, which has helped them to present a more holistic picture of NGO activities at national or regional/international level. According to Aina these may include, in an urban setting, “Christian and Islamic religious associations, ethnic associations, women’s organizations, professional associations, employers’ and occupational bodies, student and youth groups, cooperative/mutual help groups, special interest groups such as human rights associations, and a new range of NGOs such as community and neighbourhood groups and philanthropic and welfare associations…”

NGOs and civil society organizations generally acquired new vigour and currency in the development lexicon worldwide in the early 1970s, especially before, during and after the first United Nations Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, in 1972. This was followed by the 1974 UN Conference on Population in Bucharest, and subsequent major UN conferences on development issues (women, social development, environment, human rights, population, urbanisation etc.) where the presence of NGOs - parochial, national and international - kept growing. These parallel conferences, the number of whose participants has now largely outstripped that of the governmental delegates, have exerted considerable influence on the proceedings, and even outcomes, of the formal meetings. Many of these NGOs are headed by urban-based educated elites, with ties to donor agencies and versed in the development lingo favoured by donors, which gives them easy access to funding and linkages with their Northern counterparts. This has been important, not only in making more funding accessible but also in facilitating synergies between Northern and Southern NGOs, which have helped to popularize internationally causes that would have otherwise remained parochial and inconsequential in the eyes of the wider world.

5.2.3 Other Civil Society Organisations
Although the definitional difficulty plaguing this area remains intact, it may still be fair to state that some civil society organisations do not sit well within the appellation NGO, even if they do certainly share many attributes with the NGOs, such as being, simply, non-governmental. Some of these are described below.

Media
One of, if not the most important actors in African governance, the media has seen its importance rise exponentially over the past two decades or so, in tandem with the liberalization of African political and economic regimes. Whereas up to the end of the 1980s a large percentage of African print, and a quasi-totality of electronic media were in the hands of governments and their agencies, today most of the media outlets - including radio and television - are in private hands. This has broken state monopoly over the sources and the content of information. In a significant number of countries, this new media reality has been instrumental in sensitizing public opinion against corruption, graft and sleaze, offering a platform to political and social views previously muzzled and helping to curb official impunity in issues of human rights abuses.

Faith-based Organizations
Organized around a confessional community, they help members of their congregations to get together and pool resources, including sharing ideas, to tackle common problems. Their activities may include adult literacy classes; training in basic trades and skills. Their basic financial sustenance is assured by the confessional centre around which they operate – church, mosque, etc. – although often they contribute small sums towards the realization of their own projects.

Trade Unions
Traditionally the most potent of all civil society, African trade unions were born in the crucible of the anti-colonial movement for national independence, and for a brief period after independence they formed the core of the social forces engaged in an attempt to define the parameters of governance in the newly independent state, but were soon muzzled and subsumed within the one-party state. With the rise of neo-liberalism and the onslaught of the Washington Consensus, with privatisation of state enterprise as a central plank, the power of trade unions withered from dwindling numbers and the concomitant political irrelevance. In some countries (e.g. Zambia, Zimbabwe) they morphed into political parties and abandoned their traditional role.

The Private Sector
This category encompasses a wide range of actors, mainly involved in for-profit pursuits in commercial, trading, contracting, farming, mining, and other areas. Its importance has grown dramatically since the economic liberalization processes that have taken place across the continent, especially with the marked withdrawal of the state from many of its former economic interventions. It ranges from large corporate entities to small and medium entrepreneurial actors providing a variety of services to the community. It is also a sector that, on a very basic level, provides gainful employment for a huge number of citizens, thereby helping to reduce the size of armies of unemployed youth, and includes peasants, artisans, petty traders, vendors and hawkers. As we witness the dramatic retreat of the African state from direct economic activity and service delivery, the private sector is steadily assuming a more central role in the provision of many services that were once the preserve of the state.

Business associations
Although representing for profit constituencies, chambers of commerce, agriculture, manufacture, mining etc. can play an important role in economic governance, including advising their governments on how to help them grow their industries in equilibrium with the interests of other sectors of society, as well as in the promotion of self-regulation. The importance of these associations arises out of their centrality in the productive sectors.

Professional Bodies
Organisations representing professionals bring to the table of governance the views and experiences of those groups of people who oil the machinery of governance on a day to day basis and without whose active input there would be little governance to speak of. Lawyers’ guilds, medical practitioners’ associations, accountants’ bodies and others, play a crucial role in ensuring that their adherents perform their duties diligently and with probity and in checking professional misconduct and sanctioning fraud. They are of special importance in promoting self-regulation in areas in which governmental bodies lack specialized competence.

Academia, Student and Youth Organizations
These are among the most vocal and articulate members of civil society, supported by their relative youth and exposure to new ideas. In many cases, they have tended to be more confrontational with the state, which has led to frequent closures of many of the universities in Africa. The role of academia has, however, been undermined by the lure of attractive consultancies, usually commissioned by governments and/donor agencies. These activities, lucrative as they are for the consultants, leave little time for serious teaching and also lead to intellectual compromise, as it becomes difficult to bite the hand that feeds one.

Cultural Associations and Kinship Networks
Many of these have their roots in pre-colonial times and survived the colonial experience, even if that experience distorted their function and took away much of their luster. With the ‘retrenchment’ of the State and its withdrawal from the provision of essential services, these networks have assumed a new vigour as individuals and groups seek safety nets where they find succour in an environment of uncertainty and desperation. These are more loosely and informally organized and in many instances have had to weather centralizing tendencies of states that have tried to suppress them as part of an ostensible nation building project, such organizations being viewed as tribal and, therefore, divisive. Mabogunje gives examples of these networks in various parts of the continent where, faced with diminishing central state presence and assistance, the local population has organized self-help organizations, including age grade associations, to deal with multifarious problems, including economic self-help and security, such as the kombi-naam of the Mossi people of Burkina Fasso.

5.2.4 ‘Non Civic’ Non-State Actors
In the general category of Non State Actors, wherein we have identified civil society actors that can be labelled as ‘civic’ civil society, is it possible to talk about ‘non-civic’ civil society, or would this be a contradiction in terms? In a continent that has been seriously devastated by armed conflict and in which almost half the countries have, over the past two decades, experienced insurgencies or internecine conflicts of varying levels, it is prudent to take the role of armed non-state actors seriously, not only because most if not all these insurgencies and conflicts have expressed a governance grievance such as exclusion, but also, and especially, because efforts deployed for the solution of these insurgencies have often proven futile without the direct participation of the insurgents themselves.

Armed non-state actors may not be easy to fit into any rough and ready definitional category, but they can be recognised in the following categories, which cannot be in themselves exhaustive:
a) Rebel groups which have an expressed/stated incompatibility with the government
b) Militia operating locally, based on support from an ethnic community or clan
c) Warlords controlling geographical areas and populations
d) Vigilante groups
e) Civil defense forces, clearly operating outside state control
f) Private companies offering security and military services

Different armed groups have had different reasons for taking up arms, to fight either against their states or against other non-state groups. Most times the issue in contention has been the perceived exclusion of sections of the population from full enjoyment of citizenship rights, including participation in governance systems or access to resources, and a belief that another group or groups are having a lion’s share of the ‘national cake’. An egregious example of this in the African context is the conflict that is raging in the Nigerian Delta region, where armed insurgents have militarily taken on oil multinationals, kidnapped their employees and conducted non-state diplomacy before their release. Elsewhere, the forms of real or perceived exclusion vary; they may be ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographical or political, usually triggered by discontentment among groups of politicians left out of the political processes and who now turn to their natural constituencies.

Quite often in these conflicts the success of an armed group in marshalling support will depend on the legitimacy of their claims as assessed by members of their groups as well as the advantages members of such groups hope to reap by joining up or giving support, weighed against continued fealty to a state that may no longer fill the bill of protector and provider. This has been offered as an explanation for the young people who, having been snatched from their families and kin and placed outside normal societal structures, ‘confer on commanders a surrogate father role.’

If members of a community are convinced that their State security forces are more inimical to their safety and wellbeing than the rebel forces in their area, they may willingly join up with the latter, such as was revealed in a 2004 study of women’s behaviour in conflict zones. It was shown that in 18 different armed rebel groups ‘nearly all women joined armed groups to shield themselves from violation of their physical and mental integrity” by state forces. The activities of these groups are all too often underwritten from across the border, such as when neighbouring states support each others’ insurgents (eg. Sudan/Uganda; Liberia/Sierra Leone; Rwanda/Zaire; Chad/Sudan; etc.) or by interested foreign powers, especially in the Cold War context (the West’s support for UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique).

Whatever the origins of these insurgencies, and notwithstanding their behaviour vis-à-vis international norms regulating the conduct of war and conflict, it is important to keep them in mind and to know what motivates and sustains them and how they can be brought into the process of peace making.

Experience has taught Africa that in the search for the denouement of a conflict, all the main actors must be involved as much as is possible to explore the extent to which they can contribute to that process (Mozambique, Angola, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, etc.). But for this to take place, the fear must be overcome that dealing with these groups confers on them underserved respectability and legitimacy. Obviously, that is a risk that needs to be managed, the overriding interest being to minimise civilian suffering and general destruction.

A question that comes to mind when dealing with armed non-state actors is whether they can be held to account for violations regarding human rights in the areas of their operation, considering that they are not signatory to any treaty relating to the conduct of combatants. This has had the effect of making some of the insurgents virtual outlaws. The Somali case is instructive on a number of issues. In a situation where for about two decades now there has been no central authority, the country having been carved up into fiefdoms run by warlords, the problem of security, especially for the weaker clans( such as the minority Bantu and the low status Yibir, Tumal and Midgaan) has been central to any discussion of that long running crisis. The norm has for a long time been that the stronger clans will lord it over the weaker clans and take from them practically whatever they want, including land and famine relief food, apart from virtually enslaving and holding them on their farms.

Violence against women and children, including kidnappings and rape, is very common in such a situation of pervasive lawlessness. In the absence of a structured state, the different Somali clans have resorted to traditional ways of regulating life, securing the little they can in terms of order and settling disputes among themselves.

Traditional institutions such as xeer( customary law enforced by clan elders) and diya (blood money) for such egregious offences as murder, rape and theft, have been resurrected and they seem to be working well in some of the communities long used to total breakdown of law and order. In addition, there is greater realization of the strength that can be marshaled if the smaller and weaker clans come together and organize self-defense strategies against the larger and more powerful clans. This has meant not only that the smaller clans, the natural prey of the bigger ones before, can no longer be taken for granted, but Also that this inter-clan solidarity might in the future provide a basis for a Somali-bred drive for peace and unity, though this must remain a distant aspiration.

5.3 Outreach Limited, Funding Doubtful, Legitimacy Contested
After dealing with the major groups of non state actors and described some of their salient features, let us now examine some of the problems that hamper their operations and limit their efficaciousness. Quite importantly, there exist strong feelings of mutual suspicion between African states and NGOs and other non-state actors. African states generally mistrust NGOs and other non-state actors for a variety of reasons. These include the suspicion that many NGOs are ‘invading’ traditionally government territory, arrogating to themselves roles that are the preserve of states, thus, undermining their authority and discrediting them. The fact that most of these non-state actors do not have their own funding and have to rely on foreign funding has led to suspicion as to their real motivation, the suspicion being that they are really “Trojan Horses” doing the bidding of their funders, who may have interests inimical to those of their states. Indeed, one study of non-state actors in Uganda, Ghana and South Africa found that, “The ability of most African civil society organisations to generate adequate funds from indigenous sources is generally constrained by relatively low levels of industrialisation. The middle classes are often key actors in the formation and staffing of civil society organisations but .. they lack the wealth and commitment to provide the resources for running costs through donations or structured fund-raising efforts”

It is worth noting that a new impetus was given to the role of non-state actors by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which spelled out the relationship between the European Union, African states and non-state actors, predicating continued EU financial support for development on increased participation of non-state actors. Governments and other state structures have a way of going about their activities, and non-state actors, not being governmental departments, have their own way of doing things, often less structured and informal, and this has led to misunderstandings and working at cross purposes. Basically, governments question the legitimacy of non-state actors, especially the fact that they have not been mandated by any recognised, representative authority, they are not elected and do not report to anybody apart from their own internal mechanisms, which are themselves suspect in the eyes of government.

Many non state actors, including NGOs, are led by urban-based, educated elites, many with a political axe to grind as they may have been excluded from the mainstream of political activity and, in the eyes of governments, tend to be mere fault finders without any positive contribution to make to the development effort. It would be a mistake to think that these suspicions concerning the role of non-state actors are the preserve of African states and their agents, because even non-state actors have questioned aspects of their roles. For instance, Shivji, a non-state actor par excellence, posits that the surge in NGO and other civil society activism on the continent is part of a neo-liberal onslaught aimed at undermining the state democratisation process by privileging fragmented action at the expense of any project to overhaul the entire governance systems that are really vestiges of a colonial past:

“Imperialism under the name of globalisation is making a comeback while refurbishing its moral and ideological image. NGOs were born in the womb, and knowingly or otherwise are participating in the imperial project, or at least in the process of refurbishing its image. No doubt, there are very fine and dedicated people in the NGOs who are genuinely committed to the struggle to better the world. But there are serious blind spots and silences in the NGO discourse which objectively result in the NGO world participating in the imperial, rather than the national, project. For, NGOs cannot be pro-people and pro-change without being anti-imperialist and anti-status quo”.

Writing in the Sunday Mirror (Harare) Mabasa Sasa tackles the role of Northern NGOs in the growing NGO industry in Africa, giving the example of the American think-tank, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which he says “were created so that they would, in turn, create subsidiary civic bodies they would do their dirty foreign affairs work the American state Department could not be seen doing by the public” He quotes William Blum’s Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower. The idea was that the NED would do, somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing for decades, and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma associated with CIA covert activities” From a different angle, another, commentator posits the near irrelevance of NGOs. Writing in The Economist, John Grimmond talks of “NGOs and their selected agendas,.. woolly-minded people.. riddled with ethnocentric assumptions developed in conditions that don’t exist anywhere in the contemporary world… no longer based on any coherent theory or principles.. an ideological rendez-vous for erstwhile antagonists.. ineffective as a model for social and political practice...”

For their part, non-state actors suspect that governments are executing a ‘hidden agenda’ without regard to the real interests of the people, or tend to ignore those who have been excluded from political processes by, say, ethnically based systems. With rampant corruption, graft, nepotism and favouritism in most African states, the belief that government agents are given to self seeking is quite strong. Governments are viewed as inefficient and, by their very nature, unable to cover the interests and concerns of all their constituents, thus, leaving huge gaps that must be serviced by focused groups that relentlessly apply themselves to specific areas of activity in which they have built strong affinities and competencies. Particular mention is made of roles that can be played by non-state actors in areas where the government ability to act meaningfully is heavily constrained. In Chad, which has known long periods of instability, with a succession of fragile governments, is weighed down by rebellions and the presence of huge foreign economic interests that have often acted against the interests of local populations, we find an interesting demonstration of what civil society can do. In order to counteract the effects of unchecked exploitation of the oil resources of the country and the opaque practices in the disposal of the revenues accruing to the government from this economic activity, communities living in the oil producing areas came together to form the Entente des Populations des Zones Petrolieres with the specific goal of monitoring state expenditure of oil revenues. To link up the different interests of Chadian civil society at the national level, an overarching umbrella organisation, l’Organisations des Acteurs Non-Etatiques du Tchad (OANET) was formed, which coordinates and harmonises the activities of different players in various civil service fields and gives a united voice.

In Burundi, another country which has had more than its fair share of bloody conflict, another example emerges of what non-state actors can do in a situation of instability and near state collapse. Within the framework of the Great Lakes Policy Forum (GLPF), bringing together international organizations, governmental and non-governmental agencies, business leaders and the media to find ways of building sustainable peace and preventing further bloodshed, a number of activities were undertaken, including confidence building measures across the ethnic divide . Activities included forming inter-ethnic women and youth groups to support the peace efforts spearheaded, first by Julius Nyerere and later by Nelson Mandela in Arusha and Dar es Salaam. Pivotal in this enterprise was the role played by a civil society radio station, Studio Ijambo, which produced “a wide mix of radio programmes that addresses the daily issues confronting Burundians in a manner that promotes dialogue, reconciliation and peace building, using common ground journalism techniques,” a far cry from the nefarious role played by Radio Mille Colines in the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda.

Another interesting experience can be garnered from South Africa, with the work done by civil society organizations in ensuring public safety in a generalized situation of insecurity during the transition from Apartheid to democratic governance. Although the new ANC government had, since 1994, put in place legislative measures intended to bolster public safety, such as the National Crime Prevention Strategy, crime rates soared. In 1999 a South African NGO, U Managing Conflict (UMAC), which had been founded in 1985 at the height of insecurity and violence all too often instigated by the Apartheid regime, set to work to translate policy and legislation into action, including monitoring violence. Working in close collaboration with local authorities and interacting with other civil society organisations, UMAC helped launch the Community Safety Forum project, involving community policing that helped to radically reduce violent crime in several notoriously dangerous places. The success of UMAC’s work is attributed to the commitment of the organisation’s leadership and the support accorded them by local authorities.

With varying degrees of success, examples abound on the continent of organizations of civil society that have made a mark on their communities, whether it be in organizing community safety, policy advocacy or provision of services.

5.4 Conclusion and the Way Forward
We have already seen above a few examples of how NSAs can play a significant role by intervening in areas where the formal state has not been able to provide certain public goods. One area we have noted is security and public safety, not only in failed states, such as Somalia, but also in areas within a national polity where pockets of insecurity have seriously challenged State capacity to deal with security issues such as we have noted in the case of Burkina Faso and South Africa. Equally, we have shown how civil society bodies, such as the Burundian radio station, can help to foster civic responsibility by propagating norms of civility and good neighbourliness. These interventions have proven effective in facing up to challenges that the State cannot handle.

In addition to security and public safety, NSAs have been lending the State a helping hand by making salutary interventions in service provision. A good example of this point is South Africa, essentially because the long years of Apartheid and the neglect of service provision to non-White communities made the latter more attuned to self-reliance and better positioned to devise their own programmes to take care of their problems, a culture that has been taken on board by the post-Apartheid South Africa.

In Malawi, with a much poorer government and weaker capacity, cooperation between the state and NSAs s has also proved useful in the provision of essential services. Nigeria offers an interesting contrast because, even with abundant resources, the trend has not been in favour of privileging private or non state actors, especially when these are small in size and acting in small geographical areas. Instead, larger organizations, mainly state and parastatal ones, are accorded priority

Turning to another sector, agriculture, where the African state has been relinquishing its erstwhile domination of farmers’ cooperatives, two examples may suffice to show what can be achieved when NSAs, organized around autonomous farmers’ associations, are given space for action, providing services to their constituents in the fields of extension, research and marketing. In Benin, for long under a heavily centralized economy, the gradual withdrawal of the state has given rise to a powerful and delivering farmers’ association, the Federation des Unions des Producteurs du Benin (FUPRO), while in Rwanda the Reseau des Organisations Paysanne du Rwanda (ROPARWA) offers similar services to producers of potatoes. Both these organizations work in close collaboration with government agencies that provide research and other services, while keeping in close touch with the farmers, advising them on best farming practices and looking out for their interests at the level of marketing and pricing. These are but few examples out of many that can be found across the African continent. They all attest to the fact that room exists for close and productive cooperation between the state and non state actors, and that where this cooperation thrives, both sectors stand to gain.

Despite the continued mistrust that exists between governments and non-state actors, there is clearly room for them both to play their roles in bringing about changes for the better in the lives of their constituents, as long as they can learn to respect each other and find common ground for their work. Civil society organisations cannot supplant government, because the role of government in governing, legislation and provision of overall security cannot be obviated but, likewise, government cannot cover all aspects of governance and development. Concerted action is called for here. It is important to note the novelty of the activities undertaken by non-state actors, which have seen new resurgence only over the past two decades or so, but it is also worth noting, as does Mabogunje, that “in most African countries, even the state itself is an institution in the process of evolving. Soon after Independence, it was assumed that development and unity required strong, highly centralised governments and that local governing institutions were mainly of distracting significance…Unity was confused with uniformity and all opinions contrary to those expressed by the state and its officials are regarded as threatening.” On the other hand, as observes Bashaw, “there is an obvious danger in developing a myth about NGOs on the sole assumption that they can be trusted simply because they are different from the state.” Indeed even the efficaciousness of these organizations has been questioned, as seen earlier. The 1993 UNDP Report raises the question as to the measure of success of these organizations, answering it with a sobering reflection: “Nobody really knows. What seems clear is that even people helped by successful (NGO) projects remain poor.”

In “The relationship Between the State and the Voluntary Sector”, John Clark explores principal ways in which states can influence the operational environment for NGOs:
a) The nature and quality of governance (pluralism, accountability).
b) Legal frameworks (registration, reporting requirements)
c) Taxation policies (imported goods, local philanthropy)
d) Public consultation and information
e) Coordination
f) Official support (government funding, contracts).

In order for non-state actors to have a real impact on governance processes in their countries, they have to show that they themselves conform to the basic norms of good governance, transparency and accountability by respecting their constitutions and ensuring probity in their financial affairs. It is no good for groups of unelected citizens to point fingers at wrongdoing in government when they cannot account for their own activities. An interesting piece of advice is given as to how NGOs should behave for their advocacy work to be effective. Former US Ambassador John W. MacDonald, drawing on his long experience working with NGOs, advised them to take the following factors into account when dealing with interlocutors in the public sector:
a) Take cognizance of the differences in approach between state and non-state actors, styles and modes of operations.
b) Take into consideration the factor time: Many state actors want results to show ‘on their watch’
c) Let them take short-term credit for ‘instant’ success, and you can have long term change in policy
d) Work through personal contacts, seek the face-to-face encounters as they tend to last and have greater impact than faxes and emails.

It takes two to tango, as the adage goes, and here it is imperative for both state and non-state actors to know that the only acceptable finality of their intervention is the improved wellbeing of the people that they serve. In the ongoing democratization process, this is the desired outcome and both sets of actors must never lose sight of this.

Whereas the state and its various agencies, including the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, need formal structures of state in bringing about that democratisation, if they do not seriously engage civil society, their efforts will amount to little more than formalistic democratization, what Nzongola-Ntalaja has termed the “caricatural identification of democracy” a far cry from the “realisation of democratic principles of governance in practice and the balance of social forces.”

At all levels of national life, and throughout the processes of national socio-economic development, it is imperative that all the vital forces of the nation be taken on board, allowed to contribute fully and be listened to. Hence the importance of getting the views of all stakeholders in the national development processes, from conception, to planning, implementation and evaluation.

An example of what non state actors can do to input into these processes is offered by the South African Women’s Budget Initiative, which involves representatives of women’s organizations in national budgeting processes, and in which women have been keen to assert their views and make sure that “budgets follow policy, and not vice versa”, advocating “expenditures that promote equity within public service,” calling for a “gendered budget” and suggesting ways of “trimming the fat”, i.e. curbing wasteful expenditure in government. It is gratifying to note that many African countries are adopting the practice of letting non state actors take part in pre-budget dialogues.

It has been stated that, whereas government must continue to provide the overall policy orientation and regulatory environment, as well setting the rules by which the various actors must play, “civil society actors are necessary to build bridges between the alienated and marginalised and various levels of government,” because “governments often lack the necessary ‘inroads’ at the community level effectively to understand or to address local risks, while community action and local knowledge are in many cases still poorly integrated into the overall governance structures and resources at the local, district, regional and national levels There is therefore need to harmonise the action of local communities and the private sector with government resources. In the one specific area of the private sector, it may be useful to refer to a solicitous quote from a quintessential state actor who should know:
“In many areas of public responsibility, the private sector is better able to deliver effective services, often because of the dynamics of competition, or because it generally has advanced technical or risk management capacity. By bringing private capital and expertise into state enterprises, we gain access to technology and skills transfer, as well as to the capital needed for expansion and organizational renewal.

6. The Role of the State and Africa’s Development Challenges
John-Mary Kauzya

6.1 Introduction
The State is a critical player in the development process of any country. However, it is not the only player. Private and civil society sectors play important roles in development alongside the State. In discussing the role of the State in development, within the context of Africa, there is a danger of following the classical roles of the State as stipulated in the literature of political science and public administration or political economy and development administration. Understanding the classical role of the State is indeed desirable but Africa has a specific challenge of how to cause poverty eradication and development; and probably recalling the classical roles of the State is not necessarily helpful in the matter. This paper poses, and seeks to propose some answers to, a pragmatic question. Developing Africa and getting its people from the claws of poverty is a huge challenge that must be met. What should the State do? The paper first briefly illustrates the big challenge of poverty eradication in Africa and points out that for this challenge to be met, the State must address the governance challenge which itself is not a small one. The thread that runs through the paper is the argument that whether it is on poverty eradication or strengthening governance, the State is critical and has a number of roles to play in: (i) building capable, intelligent, and effective States, (ii) restoring stability, peace and security including building capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve all conflict, (iii) enforcing constitutionalism and the rule of law, (iv) modernizing and strengthening national judicial systems to ensure fair, accessible and affordable justice for all, (v) ensuring respect for human rights including protection of the vulnerable, ethnic minorities, women, and children, (vi) promoting popular participation and strengthening institutions of participatory democracy and local governance, (vii) strengthening the capacities of the public sector especially for effective delivery of services, and (viii) creating and sustaining Trust and Legitimacy of State Institutions through Leadership, Ethics, Integrity, Professionalism, Transparency and Accountability. The paper also reiterates, on each of the challenges identified, that it is not enough for Africa to build capable states. It must, most importantly, build effective and intelligent states.

6.2 Africa’s Poverty Challenge
Africa is caught up in a complex development situation in which it is facing numerous challenges essentially stemming from the desperate need to develop African people and get them out of the claws of abject poverty. All the other challenges discussed in this paper are linked to the poverty challenge. Every country in the world has a challenge of developing its people and all peoples in the world have the challenge to develop their countries. This challenge in Africa is enormous given the extent of poverty on the continent. Africa is largely poor by all standards. The majority of the countries classified by the United Nations as “Least Developed Countries – LDCs” are in Africa. Which ever yardstick is applied (income, nutrition, access to health services, access to portable water, life expectancy, access to education, human physical security, environment, etc), most African countries fair very badly in relation to the rest of the world. This is not to ignore the enormous achievements that have been registered in a number of African countries in developing their societies. It is just to underscore the fact that a lot still remains to be done and what ever achievements so far realized need to be used as stepping stones and building blocks for further development.

It needs to be pointed out though that the tendency to lump all African countries in the same category when discussing poverty in Africa should be discouraged. It is true that Africa is largely poor but not all the countries on the continent are on the same scale of poverty. Therefore, it is appropriate to design poverty reduction strategies taking a country by country approach. What is presented in this paper can only be a framework that can be adjusted to the socio-politico-economic situation, the nature of poverty as well as its levels in each given country. On the whole, if Africa is taken as one block, the picture of poverty is very grim as indicated in the table below.

Facts on poverty in Africa
• 315 million people: one in two of people in Sub Saharan Africa survive on less than one dollar per day
• 184 million people: 33% of the African population – suffer from malnutrition
• During the 1990s the average income per capita decreased in 20 African countries
• Less than 50% of Africa’s population has access to hospitals or doctors
• Three quarters of the 42 million people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide leave in Africa
• In 2000, 300 million Africans did not have access to safe water
• The average life expectancy in Africa is 41 years
• Only 57% of African children are enrolled in primary education, and only one of three children do complete school
• One in six children dies before the age of 5. This number is 25 times higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in the OECD countries
• Children account for half of all civilian casualties in wars in Africa
• The African continent lost more than 5.3 million hectares of forest during the decade of the 1990s
• Less than one person out of five has electricity.
• Out of 1,000 inhabitants 15 have a telephone line, and 7.8 out of 1,000 people surf on Internet.
Source: United Nations Program (www.africa2015.org/factspoverty )

The challenge of eradicating, alleviating, or at least reducing this kind of poverty, belongs to the State, leadership, and people of Africa primarily although global development partners can also assist. “Africa faces grave challenges and the most urgent of these are eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance”.

6.3 Africa’s Governance Challenge
6.3.1 Overview
The continent is confronting a number of other challenges which it must overcome in order to achieve poverty eradication and socio-economic development. Some of such challenges are already identified and expressed in the Declaration by African Heads of State meeting in Durban in South Africa on “Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance” as well as in long term strategic vision documents of many countries in Africa . These include the following: enforcing the rule of law, ensuring equity and equality, equal opportunity, individual freedoms for all citizens before the law; practicing just, honest, transparent, accountable, and participatory government and probity in public life; combating corruption which both retards economic development and undermines the moral fabric of society; restoring stability, peace and security including building capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve all conflict; ensuring respect for human rights including protection of the vulnerable, ethnic minorities, women, and children; and promoting gender equality to tap the potential of women. As can be seen, all these challenges are related to issues of governance and the enormity and complexity of the challenges require the adoption of sound governance and public administration institutions and practices. In other words, a fundamental challenge in Africa also concerns building not only capable States but also effective ones to confront all these challenges. Below we will briefly discuss some of these governance related challenges, beginning with the challenge of building capable and effective States.

6.3.2 The challenge of building capable, intelligent, and effective States
The AGF VII focuses on building a capable State in Africa. However, this paper proposes that, beyond discussing how to build capable states, political, managerial, administrative, technical and intellectual leaders in Africa should also consider how to build effective states on the continent. Capability refers to the state of strength while effectiveness refers to the dynamic application of strength to achieve the intended objectives through successful and efficient performance of the necessary tasks. A capable state will be an effective state only when its capability is used intelligently to engineer collective action to satisfy the general interest in areas such as law and order, security of person and property, public health, education, service infrastructures or any other areas collectively agreed as critical to the well being of the population in question. In other words, a state may be capable but not effective if its capability is not used in society’s interest. One would say that an effective State is one that applies its capability intelligently by focusing its capability on the fundamental tasks it must perform and leveraging its capacity shortfalls by creating partnerships, collaboration and networks with private sector and civil society. An effective state will not only be capable but also intelligent. In the context of the challenge of eradicating poverty in Africa, an intelligent State is one which goes beyond the traditional roles, functions and institutional structures of the State such as: strong institutions of governance and the rule of law; credible judicial and legal institutions; effective legal frameworks for economic activity; adequate steering, regulatory and enforcement capacities, respect for human rights and freedoms, provision of basic services, security, etc. An intelligent State bent on fighting poverty should also promote a sharp focus on the needs of the poor; intolerance of corruption; transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs; participation by all citizens in the decisions that affect their lives; creation of an enabling environment for the private sector and civil society; promotion of social justice, universal access to quality services and productive assets; creation of an enabling environment for people-centred development; public and private sector partnerships in the promotion of business with emphasis on micro-industries and small and medium size enterprises; access to information; promotion of technological and infrastructure development . If Africa has got to get its people out of the poverty trap, there has to be significant sustained improvements in the capability, intelligence and effectiveness of the State in each country. It is the role of the State to continuously improve its capability, intelligence and effectiveness.

A capable, intelligent and effective State will work with actors in the private and civil society sectors to redefine and agree upon its mission and mandate as well as the challenges these actors are intended to concern themselves with. The aspirations of the entire country in terms of socio-politico-economic development and the challenges that stand in the way to the attainment of these aspirations must be analyzed, diagnosed, discussed and agreed through consultations and participation of a cross section of the population. At the same time, the sharing of responsibilities and means of collaboration and participatory action among all sectors (public, private and civil society sectors) must be determined. In this way, the missions of the State will be redefined and understood and agreed by all the other actors. When the redefinition of missions is done in a participatory way involving all sectors, chances become greater for each governance actor to know what the others are doing and how collaboration should be approached. This also provides a reference point for the state to focus on what it can and must do.

It is equally noteworthy that the capability, intelligence, and effectiveness of the State needs to be seen at the various levels and in the various institutions of the State. The Legislature must be capable, intelligent and effective in its legislation, foresight, and representative functions. The Executive must be capable, intelligent, and effective in its policy and strategy formulation and implementation, service delivery, and performance control functions. And the Judiciary must be capable, intelligent and effective in the administration of fair accessible ad equitable justice to all. Likewise all other institutions established by the State whether for public investment (such as Public Enterprises) or for accountability (such as Ombudsman) must be capable, intelligent and effective in the functions for which they are established. At the same time, State institutions in Africa need to realize that they are operating within the context of relatively week civil society and private sector and, therefore, need to support the growth of such sectors so that they can eventually be capable, intelligent and effective partners in the development and governance processes. Whether the institutions of the State are decentralized or centralized should be part and parcel of the State’s search for balanced capability, intelligence and effectiveness.

There is need to put the challenge of building capable, intelligent and effective States in Africa into a proper historical perspective. A search for appropriate strategies for building capable, effective and intelligent States in Africa should start from an accurate understanding of the historical perspectives of governance and public administration institutional development on the continent. In this paper, it is understood that the problem of state institutional development in Africa is more of inadequacy than of absence. By inadequacy is meant two things. On one hand, the existing state institutions have within them weaknesses which have to be corrected in the process of developing State capability, intelligence and effectiveness. On the other hand, there are areas where institutions do not exist or exist in inadequate numbers calling for institutional creation as part of the measures. This is mostly the case in institutions that would create strong collaborative and participatory linkages among government, civil society, private sector and the citizens themselves in the act of governance and public administration.

We need to bear in mind that by referring to building institutions of the State, we are treating a fairly complex sphere. First, governance is a concept that is wider than (but which includes) State institutions and State action. Taking this into account, we need to guard against considering only institutions of government. We need to include in our discussions institutions that complete collaboration, involvement, consultation, and participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public sector, private sector, and civil society) in the act of governance. Second, institutions are social constructs which encompass not only temporal structurally conditioned behavior but also tendencies that are products of socio-politico-economic and historical conditions of the context in which they operate. In this case, we need to discuss State institutional development in Africa with lenses that permit us to look at not only the historical conditions that shaped them which may offer some explanations to their strengths or weaknesses but also the future perspectives that create imperatives and directions for developing appropriate institutions that will lead African countries into the 21st Century. Lastly, we need to guard against the temptation to write about State institutions in Africa as if Africa was one homogeneous entity. The reality is that institutional development in the various countries of Africa is at different stages and this has to be taken into account especially when one is looking at institutions at national and local levels.
The genesis of the Sate institutions in the majority of African countries lies in the colonization of the continent. In pointing out this, the paper takes it as a historical given fact without seeking to engage in a debate as to whether it was wrong or right, fair or unfair. Basically, colonialism sought to entrench sufficient bureaucratic structures of administration that would permit it to accomplish its mission of subjugation and resource exploitation “Colonialism, to a great extent, supplanted or suppressed the various traditional administrative organizations, and with them their administrative cultural values. In most parts of Africa, the traditional administrative organizations were done away with and replaced by bureaucratic organizations styled after the system in the mother country. In this the civilizing mission of the colonial masters had limited scope; it was mainly concerned with pacifying the natives for purposes of facilitating exploitation of natural resources. As such, little investment was put into the development of complicated administrative infrastructures; the administrative systems consisted of skeletal organizations, only large enough for the purposes of extracting revenues and ensuring orderly governance. ”

In the context of the above, colonization imposed legal, political and administrative institutions and systems alien to African local realities. After independence, most African countries did not experience stable politico administrative institutions as contradictions between liberalised politics and socialist policies culminated into single party authoritarian regimes relying heavily on “strong men”. Later, many of these regimes were toppled by military coups consolidating further the culture of strong personalities as the basis for exercise of power and public authority. Institutions that would promote representation, consultation, involvement and participation of the people in governance and public administration did not have room to grow. This has been the deep root in the call for a second liberation in Africa which gave birth to liberation movements on the continent. Some of them have had some success and others are actually still engaged in power struggles giving rise to violent conflict on the continent.

Thus, at the national level, in many African countries, as a result of the personalization of power and of the neo-patrimonial nature of the State, the tendency has been towards institutional decay rather than development. By definition, a neo-patrimonial system develops when political actors do not recognize the state as an institution and the power to rule resides in a person rather than an office. There is little division between public and private spheres as these two largely coincide in one person, the dictator. Thus, there are no formal mechanisms of competition or of participation. Rather, politics is practiced as a zero-sum game with a winner-take-all, something that perpetuates violent conflict and power struggles.

There have been prior attempts to remedy the situation. But most of these attempts have tended to over concentrate on building the capacity of public administration as an instrument of State action without paying attention to the wider issues of governance which determine in the first place the effectiveness of public administration. The historical significance of this now is that strengthening the State in Africa first and foremost would entail indigenizing its institutions not only in terms of their missions and objectives but also their behavior and responsiveness to the needs of the continent and its people. Clearly, with this historical perspective in mind, the State in the 21st Century in Africa will differ in important ways from that of the past.

6.3.3 The Challenge of Restoring Stability
Conflicts in Africa have aggravated the poverty situation by diverting human, financial, and material resources from development activity. Many African countries (Angola, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Eretria, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, etc) have gone through significant national instability. What makes conflict, violence, and war in Africa a critical governance issue is that most of all the wars have been internal to these countries, meaning that they could have been stopped if the countries had effective mechanisms for managing conflict. One of the cardinal roles of the State is to protect its people and ensure peace and security of person and property. The magnitude of conflicts and wars that have taken and are taking place in Africa suggests a certain degree of failure on the part of some States to restore peace and stability. The linkage between conflict and poverty makes the challenge of how to restore stability, peace and security of person and property an urgent and critical one. In this regard, Africa Union has established a body to handle issues of conflict. The launch of the Africa Union’s Peace and Security Council which is legally empowered to intervene in any African Union member country that experiences genocide, crimes against humanity, undemocratic change of government or an uprising by rebel forces, affirmed Africa’s political will to rid the continent of violent conflicts.

Notwithstanding the above, reliance on the Africa Union Peace and Security Council for solving conflict at the national level is a manifestation of the failure of the State to effectively manage conflict. The ability of governance and public administration institutions to resolve or manage conflict is critical to building long term solutions to the challenge of restoring stability, peace and security, including the capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict. Conflicts on the Continent may be caused by disagreements on development objectives, on distribution of development outcomes, on sharing of resources, or on safeguarding special political, cultural, traditional, ethnic interests. Unless efforts at good governance as part of the peace building process take account of the link between governance at community, civil society/private sector, national, regional, and international levels, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations regarding the development of frameworks for peace building, calls and plans for demobilization and disarmament will remain futile.

Furthermore, a fundamental function of the state is to secure the individual and collective safety and security of all its citizens. In this respect, governments need to pay particular attention to the security of the people and must widen the understanding of security to include security in terms of hunger, disease and shelter. People who are engulfed in poverty are likely to behave in ways that compromise objectives of peace and security.

6.3.4 The Challenge of Enforcing Constitutionalism and Rule of Law
The rule of law is fundamental to the socio-politico-economic development process and to the fight against poverty. This is largely because development, in general, and poverty eradication, in particular, is linked to investment; and the rule of law provides a conducive atmosphere to investment. No investor, local or foreign, wants to put their resources into a situation where the investment is not protected by law. The rule of law begins with constitutionalism. It should be noted that one of the negative elements of governance and public administration observed in a number of African countries since independence are fragile and unstable constitutional arrangements and unconstitutional practices in the conduct of public affairs. We need to explore the explanations for this fragility and instability in the constitutions. The explanation may be in their structures and provisions or in the weaknesses of institutions that are expected to ensure respect for the constitutions. However, it may also be in the behavior and attitudes of political leaders concerning constitutionalism. National constitutions that are based on consensus over major issues of national socio-politico-economic interests are critical to the survival of any institutional arrangements that are put in place. Constitutions are the basis for the practice of the rule of law. Institutional capacity and competencies must be developed in the management and operation of national democratic institutions, including national assemblies, the judiciary, and the executive. But the first strategy for strengthening the institutional foundations of good governance in Africa is greater appreciation and acceptance of the philosophical and legal foundations of the rule of law by both rulers and the people. The State needs to be seen not as a network of relations built around a strongman, but as a set of functions that are to be performed in a neutral and objective way. People must trust the agents of the State and everyone, including their leaders, to always act within the limits of the law. Bu the laws themselves must be seen to be fair and just laws that enshrine the protection of every one and not only particular interests.

There are a number of ways of constitution making and these depend on the particularities of a given country and the aspiration of its people. It is, therefore, difficult to pinpoint one particular way of making a national constitution that can ensure durability and stability. We can however, point out that when a constitution is made through consultative methods that bring together all the socio-politico-economic forces and interests of the country and strike agreement on the rules of the game putting the interest of the people at the center of everything, there are chances that the resulting constitution will be durable and less fragile. The significance of this is that institutional development starts with constitutional foundations that provide for the existence of these institutions. But we need to distinguish constitution as legal texts that provide institutional arrangements and rules of the game from constitutionalism which is the behavioral and practical aspect of conducting Public affairs following and respecting the provisions of the constitution all the time. The problem regarding constitutions in many African countries is not so much of absence of national constitutions but rather disrespect for their provisions. In the light of the failure of many governments, national convening processes to elicit the aspirations of the citizenry, followed by arduous constitutional formation and reformulation processes are being undertaken in many countries to adapt to new and more appropriate forms of government. In this paper, we are advocating for participatory approaches to articulation of national aspirations and long term strategies. This approach is mostly required in the process of constitution-making because constitutions are not only long term strategic national outlooks but also perennial in nature. The challenge of constitutionalism and the rule of law is linked to the challenge of restoring stability, peace and security, including building capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve all conflict, because the constitutions and the laws provide mechanisms and agreed frameworks for resolving conflict peacefully.

6.3.5 Challenge of Modernizing and Strengthening National Judicial Systems
With the complexity of the task of eradicating poverty in the context of globalization which has lead to the growing number of actors at the national, regional and global levels, Africa is witnessing an increasing need for more effective regulation, enforcement mechanism, and robust judicial institutions and systems. Sound legal frameworks, as well as an effective and independent judiciary is a crucial pre-condition for a country’s success in dealing with poverty in a globalized world. Poverty eradication demands strong and effective judicial systems for a number of reasons. First, a capable and effective judiciary is critical in putting in place a stable conducive environment for the growth of entrepreneurship and investments. For African countries to attract foreign capital and promote local entrepreneurship, they must be attractive to long term investment. For this to happen, it is imperative to have appropriate, fair and accessible laws and effective administration of justice. Potential local and foreign investors will invest only if they perceive the country to be politically stable and the legal and judicial system supportive. The courts of justice have a very important role to play in guaranteeing that property rights are respected, that contracts are legally binding and that transactions occur in an atmosphere of legality. A strong and efficient judiciary is, therefore, essential in providing a stable environment for the growth of investments and economic activity. Given that investors, even local ones, can choose where to invest, and in a globalized world they have the whole globe to choose from, legal stability is a must not only to attract them but also to promote the development of a strong domestic market. There is a growing awareness that a judiciary able to resolve cases in a fair and timely manner is an important prerequisite for economic development. In many developing countries, the judiciary is not consistent in its conflict resolution, and carries a large backlog of cases, stifling private-sector growth and causing the erosion of individual and property rights. While globalization has spurred economic development, its benefits have unevenly impacted different segments of society. The poor often lack legal rights to empower them to take advantage of opportunities and provide them with security against arbitrary and inequitable treatment. Discriminatory laws and arbitrary enforcement of the laws deprive protection of individual and property rights, raise barriers to justice, and perpetually lock the poor into the poverty trap. Inadequate access to justice is, therefore, one of the major obstacles to poverty eradication and development. It is the role of the State in Africa to secure the effective administration of justice.

6.3.6 The Challenge of Ensuring Respect for Human Rights
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides a comprehensive coverage of human rights and freedoms and commits African government to ensure adherence to them. They include the right to assemble freely with others, the right to freedom of movement, the right to participate freely in the government of one’s country, the right of equal access to the public service of the country, the right to property, the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, the right to receive equal pay for equal work, the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, the right to education, elimination of every discrimination against women and the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions, and the protection of the disabled. In the context of poverty eradication, it is imperative to realize that poverty itself constitutes a denial to people of some of the human rights expressed in the Charter for example, education, health, services, property etc. There is a tendency to believe that only State institutions and public sector agents abuse human rights. While it is true that individual agents of the State do often violate human rights, agents of private sector and civil society sometimes do violate human rights as well. This makes the State very critical in protecting the human rights of its people. It is one of the critical roles it has to play and, in some cases, playing this role can put State institutions on a collision road with some segments of the society. This is the case, for example, in cases where some traditional and cultural practices and beliefs are found to be in direct contradiction to the human rights. For example, the practice of female circumcision against the will of the girls, the denial of land and property rights to women , forced or arranged marriages, etc. constitute violation of human rights but are still cherished by the societies that practice them. The State needs to take on such cases in an intelligent way involving negotiation, persuasion, legal provisions, and ensuring that these are abandoned in a peaceful manner.

6.3.7 Challenge of Promoting Popular Participation and Participatory Democracy
Eradicating poverty in Africa will remain difficult if the people themselves do not participate in the process of fighting poverty. One of the problems confronting African countries concerns how to put in place structures that promote and support the participation of the people in determining the direction and content of their socio-politico-economic development. One of the measures being implemented by some countries in this regard is decentralized governance. Decentralization is being implemented to ensure political, economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local level structures and systems. The major objectives of decentralization would include the following:
a) To enable and reactivate local people to participate in initiating, making, implementing, and monitoring decisions and plans that concern them, taking into consideration their local needs, priorities, capacities and resources by transferring power, authority and resources from central to local government and lower levels.
b) To strengthen accountability and transparency by making local leaders directly accountable to the communities they serve and by establishing a clear linkage between the taxes people pay and the services that are financed by these taxes.
c) To enhance the sensitivity and responsiveness of Public Administration to the local environment by placing the planning, financing, management, and control of service provision at the point where services are provided, and by enabling local leadership develop organization structures and capacities that take into consideration the local environment and needs.
d) To develop sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels that will serve as the driving motor for planning, mobilization, and implementation of social, political, and economic development.
e) To enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring, and delivery of services by reducing the burden from central government officials who are distanced from the point where needs are felt and services delivered.

It is the expectation that, when implemented adequately, decentralization will evolve institutions that are not only democratic, accountable, and transparent but also efficient and effective in service provision and community development. Institutions that need to be strengthened at local level in this sense are local councils, local executives and civil service structures as well as structures that ensure collaboration involvement and engagement of local actors in the management of public affairs at local levels.

6.3.8 The challenge of Strengthening Capacity of Public Service
One of the institutions that operationalise and sustain State action is the Public Service. Governments all over the world have historically engaged in efforts of making their public service institutions effective. African countries cannot be exception to this. The first requirement for effective institutions of the public service is enshrined in the Charter for the Public Service in Africa, namely, that the Public service should be strong and be based on accepted principle of neutrality, legality, and continuity as well as the fundamental values of professionalism, ethics, and integrity. These should form the behavioral aspects of the institution of the public service on the continent. The Public service is critical to the development process especially since it is at the center of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the delivery of the critical public services such as health, education, agricultural extension, environment protection, etc. which are at the core of reducing poverty. Countries that do not have effective institutions of the Public service are likely to lag behind in poverty eradication.
There is need for adopting institutions in the Public Service which ensure partnerships, adaptability, citizen-orientation, information sharing, and partnerships. Over the past years, there has been a growing consensus that no single actor, private or public, has the capacity to solve on its own the complex and diversified problems that societies are being confronted with. Just as the concept of the omnipotence of the State was erroneous, reality has proven that the market has a great potential but that without solid institutions and regulations, it can generate dangerous and far-reaching imbalances. Partnerships between the State, the private sector and civil society institutions have proven to be very important in both social service delivery and policy-making processes.
In order to foster a new relationship between civil servants and citizens, State institutions ought to be more open, flexible in the face of change, and especially more accountable to the public at large. Greater attention should be given to developing a more service-oriented spirit among civil servants and to ensuring effective and transparent mechanisms for citizens to channel their complaints concerning poor, inefficient or denied access to public services. Flexible structures and processes are being favoured over the more traditional and bureaucratic patterns. This is important because the ability of governments to include and synergize, as well as the disposition to listen and respond, are almost universally accepted as an important source of policy legitimization. An important mechanism to promote the development of public administration institutions that operate in an open, transparent and efficient way is for countries to share amongst themselves best practices in the area of public service delivery.
Both Central Agencies and line Ministries must be capable and effective in terms of the systems and structures that guide their operations. The central management agencies or coordinating ministries (e.g. Ministries responsible for finance and planning, ministries responsible for public/civil service etc) have a key role to play: they must be directive, supportive, facilitating, and collaborative. The central agencies are usually composed of ministries or agencies that support political decision-making (secretariat services to the cabinet or council of ministers) and manage planning, finance, public expenditure, personnel and real estate property. On the one hand, central agencies need to be directive through maintaining the overall management framework for government administration and coordinating the implementation of the policies of the Government. On the other hand, they are expected to be supportive by empowering the line or operational ministries to achieve specific targets. Hence the primary role of the central guidance function in the fight against poverty is to develop consensus on a vision, to formulate a long-term strategy in the identified sectors and to coordinate the implementation of that strategy administration-wide. That implies that the central agencies need to approach the line ministries as internal clients, to be assisted in implementing targets at all levels of the country. That approach requires the agencies to put in place processes for consulting the line ministries before introducing new administrative and management policies or changes to existing ones. It also requires a shift in the mindset of the central clusters’ staff from one of command-and-control to service-orientation in dealing with line ministries’ staff. In carrying out both roles, the central agencies need to set up a new coordination mechanism or build into an existing one a process and system for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of specific anti-poverty strategies. Those tasks, though seemingly straightforward, can be daunting in resource-poor countries and/or those with historically weak institutions. The central agencies in such countries need assistance in building up or reinforcing their capacity.

6.3.9 The Challenge of Creating Trust and Legitimacy of State Institutions
If the African State has to play an effective role in poverty reduction and development, it must enjoy full legitimacy and trust at whatever level and in whatever sector. There is a tendency to view public trust in terms of the way private or civil society agencies trust government or public sector agencies in general. This is half the story. There are situations where government or public sector agencies do not trust private sector or civil society. In terms of governance, trust is supposed to be mutual. If the assumption is that the three sectors (public, private, and civil society) have to combine forces and work in harmony for development, then the trust among them must be mutual. Trust is constructed around and sustained by the behavior and actions of human beings, especially leaders, within institutions. Creating legitimacy and trust can be done by establishing strong participation mechanisms and by defining the roles and relationships of different spheres of government. Sustaining legitimacy and trust includes the development of a management/administrative and political culture based on the rule of law, transparency and information sharing, ethical behavior as well as professional conduct sustained by the integrity of leadership. It requires socio-politico administrative systems which ensure effective public accountability and avoids impunity and arbitrariness in the management of public affairs. Corruption and lack of accountability in public offices squander development resources and undermine the trust the public has in state institutions. The international community that would come to support poverty reduction and development efforts also loses trust in the State and withholds its support, thus, making development work even more difficult. Therefore, in Africa building adequate administrative leadership capacities around issues of not only mastery of laws, rules, regulations and procedures, but also transparency, accountability, ethics integrity and professionalism is critical for the sustainability of public trust and democratic governance. The trust and legitimacy of State institutions at community, national, and international levels are largely defined by government leadership in the areas of integrity, trustworthiness, dependability, honesty, rationality, justice, prudence, morality, due process, fairness, consistency, predictability, effectiveness, accessibility, transparency, accountability, professionalism, etc.

6.4 Conclusions
Africa needs capable, effective, and intelligent States to overcome the severe governance challenges such as those discussed in this paper in order to effectively support efforts of poverty eradication. But in this lies a deeper critical question. Will overcoming the governance challenges lead to poverty eradication? One would say that this is subject to debate. What aspects of governance influence which aspects of poverty and in which way? In is increasingly becoming accepted that poor governance inhibits economic activity and, therefore, lead to poverty. For example, failure to manage conflict may lead to violence and wars, thus, disrupting people’s economic activity and social safety nets and aggravating poverty. Failure in public policy analysis, formulation, and implementation, may lead to poor delivery of essential public services such as health and education. In a similar way, failure in investment in infrastructure such as roads, communication, electricity, etc. can result in the discouragement of entrepreneurship and investment, thus, curtailing opportunities for employment and economic growth. A capable, effective and intelligent State is most likely to practice good governance and to mobilise resources and energies of the population as well as external development partners towards reduce poverty.

7. Enhancing Institutional and Human Capacity for Improved Public Sector Performance
Oliver S. Saasa

7.1 Introduction
The challenge of capacity building for effective service delivery has preoccupied most African countries since their independence. There are a number of institutional and resource constraints that have continued to work against African countries’ capacity to meaningfully design and implement their developmental interventions. To address these constraints, capacity building and enhancement has been recognized as being central in these countries’ developmental process. Increasingly, there is mounting recognition among African leaders that capacity development is at the centre of development and that, without it, even past achievements could be reversed. Similarly, there is growing self-examination in the West regarding the degree to which aid, for example, is helping in strengthening capacity development in developing countries. One USAID White Paper noted in this regard:

The strength and performance of institutions, particularly as evidenced in the quality of governance and rule of law, are the primary determinants of development. Resource transfers in the absence of institutional capacity do not yield sustainable outcomes…The primary determinant of progress in transformational development is political will and commitment to rule justly, promote economic freedom, and make sound investments in people. For foreign aid to most effectively contribute and support recipient self-help efforts donors should…[inter alia]…focus on strengthening institutional capacity and dealing with absorptive capacity issues.

Similarly, the World Bank underscored the role of capacity building in poverty reduction:

An effective poverty reduction strategy process and a productive partnership can be built only on a platform of strong public capacity: capacity to formulate policies; capacity to build consensus; capacity to implement reform; and capacity to monitor results, learn lessons, and adapt accordingly. Building the requisite capacities turns out to be a formidable challenge. For these reasons, enhancing the capacity of African states has risen to the top of the continent’s development agenda.

In the light of the above, this paper attempts, firstly, to define the meaning, scope and main elements of capacity building at both the institutional and human resource levels and, secondly, lays out the main challenges in Africa that continue to compromise the improvement of public sector performance in the average country on the Continent. A look at some of the capacity building initiatives in Africa is made. The paper ends with recommended strategies for institutional and human capacity enhancement, focusing on interventions that are required to create a Capable State in Africa.

7.2 Conceptual and Definitional Issues
Capacity is the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. Capacity Development (CD) is, therefore, the process through which the abilities to do so are obtained, strengthened, adapted and maintained over time. In the context of this understanding, institutional and administrative capacity can be defined as the set of attributes related to both structural/systemic attributes and human capital/resources that, collectively, define the organisation’s ability to perform its mandated functions. Within the public service, typical aspects of capacity are the quality of civil servants, organisational characteristics, the diffusion of ICTs among organisational units, the intergovernmental relations, and the style of interaction between government and its social and economic environment. In the context of this definition, institutional capacity building can be defined as the provision of technical or material assistance designed to strengthen one or more elements of organisational effectiveness. The elements of organisational effectiveness include governance, management capacity, human resources, financial resources, and service delivery. At the national level, institutional capacity is often used as shorthand for a country’s administrative and management capacity, particularly with respect to implementing economic policy choices. At this level, it encompasses a wide range of activities examples of which include the following:

a) the making and enforcement of rules and laws, including judicial reforms;
b) the ability to effectively plan government expenditure and the delivery of public services at both the central and local government levels;
c) the establishment and operation of appropriate regulatory and/or prudential frameworks for conducting productive business;
d) the ability to collect the statistical information needed for effective policy implementation;
e) systemic capacity to absorb additional resources, including external assistance/aid;
f) the effectiveness of agencies to fight corruption and enhance governance; and
g) the protection of property rights.

Human resource capacity development, in turn, relates to the provision of a trained work force; to the promotion of knowledge and skills that are required by a society to acquire greater prosperity through the building of productive capabilities. Human resource development can be perceived as both a process and a goal since it can be an end in itself as it results in the realization of human potential and the development of individual self-reliance.

7.3 Nature and Magnitude of Capacity Challenges
The issue of institutional capacity vis-à-vis the public sector reforms should be understood in the context of African countries’ ability to train and utilise (as well as retain) their human resource. Presently, most African countries’ human resources remain grossly under-utilised and unutilised. There exists in an average African country uncoordinated and fragmented approaches to Human Resources Development; lack of data on training needs; uncoordinated training programmes; lack of sectoral and organisational training guidelines/policies; inadequate linkages between training output and the labour market requirements; inadequate support for training by end users; wastage and misplacement of personnel; and lack of monitoring mechanisms to determine the capacity and productivity of the trained personnel to contribute meaningfully to national development.

At one level, the public sector in Africa has grown so large that its capacity to perform effectively and efficiently has been checked. At another level, because of the situation described above, coupled with governments’ fiscal stringency measures particularly during the period of World Bank and IMF-induced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the public sector on the Continent has been unable to recruit and retain the needed well-trained and skilled human resource. The public sector’s low salaries; poor conditions of service, particularly for professionals; and a largely uncompetitive working environment have all worked against the creation and consolidation of the required professionalism in such fields as economic planning and management. Generally speaking, civil servants in the managerial and professional scales have continued to suffer from poor job satisfaction and the accompanying low morale, principally a function of being poorly paid and overburdened. As a result, the public sector in many African countries has increasingly become employer of last resort for qualified/able personnel and a haven for the unemployable.

Senior professionals in the civil service in Africa are also frustrated by the over-centralised decision-making systems. Power and decision-making authority have generally been monopolised by those at the very top in the management hierarchy. Consequently, senior managers are often over-burdened while lower level managers remain largely under-utilised, a phenomenon that has resulted in severe frustration at both the senior and lower level ranks. Consequently, many professionals in the civil service have either devoted less time to their official duties and undertake moonlighting activities, or have opted to become part of the brain drain away from the public sector to either the private sector or abroad altogether in search of’ ‘greener pastures.’

It is equally noteworthy that the administrative structure of any government is a strategic component of a Capable State for it improves the government’s policy development and analysis, programme formulation and evaluation, and implementation and overall coordination of results. The need to develop a strong institutional framework in African countries cannot be overstressed since, in most of these countries, institutional arrangements and processes are weak and systems are generally not fully geared to the new challenges of development. The following problems that are related to organizational fragmentation in the average African country are worth observing:

a) duplication of functions and overlapping jurisdiction;
b) dilatory and outdated procedures causing delays in handling of business at higher costs; and
c) loopholes in administrative procedures leading to difficulty in maintaining objectivity, accountability and transparency in decision-making. Here, weak policy and decision-making systems are essentially due to limited central capacity for policy analysis and strategic, long-range thinking, giving rise to poor coordination, weak implementation and accountability, and absence of corporate orientation in large central ministries, which, in turn, results in blurring the distinction in policy making and policy implementation.

In a number of countries and due to the lack of clear role definition between the different levels of government, ministers are often deeply involved in matters of detail, on the one hand, and senior administrators are reluctant to delegate responsibility to lower levels, on the others. Such tendencies have given rise to centralization with the resultant prohibition of strategic thinking and problem-solving capacity. Such weaknesses have also provided avenues for ethical irresponsibility, including corrupt practices.

It is increasingly becoming evident that where capacity is weak, i.e. where a government is unable to effectively carry out its own policies, the consequences for society can be very costly. A good example is the capacity to make reasonably accurate budget forecasts. In Africa, the difference between budgeted and actual recurrent expenditure in some countries can be as high as 30-50 percent. Such difficulties in forecasting mean that the country’s leadership cannot make the best decisions on how to spend public money. Weak capacity, thus, compromises the ability of many African governments to deliver services and to undertake their public sector management and regulatory functions, a state of affairs that has checked the capability and efficacy of the State in Africa. Weak and/or inefficient government institutions have continued to hamper entrepreneurship and economic growth and private sector development constrained. It is in this respect that, in discussing the notion of the Capable State in Africa, there should be recognition of the need to address the challenges of capacity in a manner that anchors the concept and its application in the Continent’s realities and priorities, addressing its critical linkages to policy formation and implementation, and how these interact to impact on the ability of the Continent to meet its peace, governance and development challenges.

Capacity limitations in the field of Economic management is one of the most evident frailties of most African countries and for which capacity enhancement at both the institutional and human resource level require immediate attention. Economic sector reform are being undertaken in many countries, targeting primarily state enterprise restructuring, including privatization; deregulation; and financial and tax reforms for improving overall economic management. Irrespective of the ideological divide and the manner in which the Breton Woods institutions attempted to manage these during the SAP era, there is still a growing recognition of the importance of the private sector and a realization that the private rather than the public sector could hold key for sustained economic growth. The move in many African countries toward more democratic and, therefore, participatory modes of power, as well as the abandonment of centralized economic management approaches, have tended to affect the general perceptions regarding how public administration reforms should be handled. Notwithstanding these initiatives, many African countries, though making spirited efforts to install or strengthen market mechanisms, have correctly acknowledged that the market is not an alternative to government because of specific roles to be played by both public and private sector.

The role of aid in capacity development has often come in through Technical Assistance (TA), which encompasses the range of activities that are designed to develop human resources through improvement in the level of skills, knowledge, technical know-how and productive aptitudes of the population in a developing country for the purpose of improving development outcomes. This form of assistance includes the provision of policy advice; the implementation of projects; and the building of the recipient’s institutional and human resource capacities through training or on-the-job counterpart skills transfer.

When better facilitated and managed within an enabling policy environment, TA could play a useful role in institutional and human resource development particularly in those areas where certain competencies are inadequate or non-existent. It is also increasingly becoming clear that the demands of SWAp implementation as well as the emerging approaches that touch on harmonisation and alignment of donor interventions do require externally-sourced competencies and skills that should complement local talent. While many governments in Africa recognise the many positive contributions that cooperating partners have made through TA, the lack of overall, consistent and coherent strategy in this area has inadvertently frustrated a number of capacity building efforts. In many cases, assistance to a country has included, and sometimes specifically tied to, foreign consultants/experts who are meant to transfer technical skills and knowledge through the supported projects. Quite often, however, permanent skills transfer does not happen due to a host of factors that include the following:
a) TA is often supply-driven, or imposed as a price for financial assistance rather than a response to local demands.
b) Projects are over-designed, revealing, quite often, limited appreciation of the virtues of ensuring local input and adaptation.
c) The usually uncoordinated and sometimes duplicative flow of bilateral and multilateral sources of technical assistance has created monumental co-ordination problems among cooperating partners themselves and for the recipient country.

Moreover, TA does not come cheap, as the UNDP revealed as far back as 1994 in its Human Development Report:

In practice, the record of technical assistance has often been unsatisfactory... Perhaps the most disturbing is that after 40 years, 90 percent of the $12 billion a year in technical assistance is still spent on foreign expertise - despite the fact that national experts are now available in many fields. Often, poorly planned and monitored technical co-operation programs rarely have clear criteria for assessing the existing technical capacity of recipient countries or for measuring and monitoring additional capacity building. Nor do they seem able to forecast how each country is expected to graduate from the need for technical assistance.

Very little has changed since then. TA still continued to be tied to external assistance and, globally, there seems to be little effort to untie TA from the external support ‘packages.’

7.4 Efforts to Address the Capacity Challenges
Effort to develop institutional and human resource capacity for improved public sector performance can be addressed by focusing a number of interventions. Important among these are three: one relates to the concern for improved performance in public bureaucracy through modernization of methods, techniques and procedures of work and more effective management of human resources. Another is the process of change required within the government sector to sustain efficient economies in the emerging context of globalization. The third is the increasing concern for efficient and effective delivery of key public services through decentralization (see below).

The achievement of the ideal system described above calls for a comprehensive approach in which several parallel initiatives are undertaken at different points in the State system. These various initiatives involve performance management, greater participation in decision-making throughout an organization; supportive organizational structures, information and financial management systems; and definitive instruments for incentives and rewards for civil servants through proactive personnel management as well as strong executive leadership development. In the light of this, many countries and organisations have undertaken administrative reform. A sample of some of the most prominent ones would shed light on what has been happening.

Firstly, the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance has continuously supported developing countries and countries in economic transition in their efforts to reform their public administration structures. Pursuant to the proposal of the United Nations General Assembly Resumed Session on Public Administration and Development held in 1996, the United Nations emphasized that efficient public administration is the foundation for developing strong civil society, market-friendly economies and guaranteeing of human rights. The Resumed Session recognized the importance of international cooperation in improving public administration through a deliberate programme of exchange of information on administrative reform so as to illustrate the variety of reform strategies which were being undertaken in diverse countries as well as to highlight organizational innovations to governments facing similar challenges.

Secondly, the Capacity 21 Initiative is another illustrative example of global effort to address the capacity challenges. Launched at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment & Development (UNCED), Capacity 21 worked with developing countries and countries in transition to find the best ways to achieve sustainable development and meet the goals of Agenda 21. While it is now largely a legacy initiative being built upon by Capacity 2015, some of the initiatives are still on-going. Since 1993, Capacity 21 has worked with over 75 developing countries and countries in transition to adopt innovative capacity-building approaches to address environmental degradation, social inequity and economic decline. The long-term goal of Capacity 21 in the region is to work with national and regional institutions and organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa to build their capacities to integrate sustainable development principles and approaches in all areas of planning and development. Specifically with respect to Sub-Saharan Africa where it operated in 12 countries, Capacity 21 Regional Programme pursued four immediate objectives:
a) Strengthen national programmes in sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 21.
b) Enhance networking and learning between regional institutions, government organizations, the private sector, NGOs, civil society and donors.
c) Provide support for preparations for World Summit on Sustainable Development at the national and regional levels.
d) Reinforce institutional and human capacities for sustainable development.
Capacity 21 has since been replaced with Capacity 2015, which works through a series of partnerships to build capacities at the local level to realize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and continues.

Thirdly, in its effort to address the capacity constraints in Africa, the World Bank, through its Capacity Building Initiative, sought to identify the main capacity challenges in Africa and came up with a number of conclusions that are noteworthy (Box 1)

Box 1: Capacity Building in Africa
o First, capacity is central to development. Capacity is the combination of human resources and institutions that permits countries to achieve their development goals. It allows people to achieve the objectives they set for themselves. Lacking human and institutional capacity, countries must rely on foreign expertise and resources to perform the elemental tasks of development. It should therefore be at the core of any future development strategy or agenda. This implies that African countries and their donor partners must adjust the way they think and act in approaching development to place capacity at the centre.
o Second, capacity is complex. It involves far more than the economic capabilities of the government sector - which is how capacity has traditionally been defined. It includes political and social factors in addition to economic ones, and applies to a multitude of interlinked sectors and areas. This implies the need for strategic solutions to capacity problems that address interconnected aspects of capacity simultaneously.
o Third, African countries differ considerably in their levels of capacity and in the nature of the economic, political and social environment that affects it. To the extent that problems of capacity differ, solutions of a "one size fits all" nature will be ineffective. This suggests the importance of assessing and devising solutions to capacity problems at the national level.
o Fourth, African countries have lacked ownership of, and commitment to, capacity building. Most African countries have not come to view their capacity problems as critical, and this is reflected in a lack of focused strategies to deal with them along with continued dependency on expatriate technical assistance. Without African commitment and ownership of capacity building efforts, no amount of donor support or encouragement will reverse the situation. This means that African countries will have to demonstrate commitment if they are to benefit from donor assistance for capacity building in the future.
o Fifth, donors have tended in the past to exacerbate Africa's capacity problems by providing solutions based on imported "supply-driven" models. By providing expatriate technical assistance cost-free, they have unwittingly had a negative impact on the growth of local capacity. By performing the work of development for African countries, they have dampened local ownership and commitment. And they have diluted the impact of capacity building through taking a piecemeal, project-by-project approach, with very little co-ordination among donors. The World Bank has undertaken a number of initiatives, programs and projects designed to contribute to capacity building, including the African Capacity Building Foundation; however, these have not yet had an adequate impact.

Source: World Bank (1996), Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa, Washington D.C.

Fourthly, another illustrative capacity enhancement effort is the African Leadership and Progress Network (ALPN), a nonprofit organization located in Washington, DC, and Abuja, Nigeria, which is developing what should eventually become a global network of African and non-African ("Africanist"1) professionals, experts, scholars, and intellectuals. ALPN aims to realize the following:
a) facilitate the generation, discussion, exchange, and dissemination of ideas and innovative approaches in various subject areas, thereby harnessing knowledge/intellectual capital that can help to foster African development;
b) help to nurture and provide intellectual support and mentoring to young and emerging African leaders; and
c) facilitate the formation of professional, business, political, and social networks and alliances that can serve to advance discourse and action on various issues that are critical to African progress.

In effect, the Network helps to address the ‘human capital drain’ issue by harnessing the intellectual capital, professional expertise, and other resources of ‘overseas Africans’ to foster technology and knowledge transfer, and thereby help to enhance human and institutional capacity in African countries.

Fifthly, the Southern Africa Capacity Initiative (SACI) is a UNDP initiative that aims to help Southern African countries with very high HIV and AIDS prevalence rates to arrest the capacity erosion caused by the epidemic in key sectors and meet their development challenges for a brighter future. Box 2 summarises SACI’s mandate.

Box 2: Southern African Capacity Initiative (SACI)
About SACI
The United Nations system is developing a strategy to respond to the interlocking challenges of HIV & AIDS, food insecurity and governance. SACI represents UNDP’s direct contribution to those efforts.
What is SACI?
SACI aims to help Southern African countries with very high HIV & AIDS prevalence rates to arrest the capacity erosion caused by the epidemic in key sectors and meet their development challenges for a brighter future. These countries, already struggling to deliver essential public services to their populations under the best of circumstances, now must cope with the crippling loss of valuable human resources to HIV and AIDS. SACI will be implemented differently in different countries, depending on the specific circumstances and needs, as well as on initiatives already under way. We will make maximum use of technological innovations to improve capacity and expand outreach.
How does SACI work?
Through SACI, UNDP is working to support governments’ efforts in the following areas:
o Adapting and developing policies to effectively respond to the unique challenges of providing services in the HIV & AIDS era – developing leadership capacity and skills, and empowering institutions to continue functioning and delivering services
o Promoting new and expanded options for delivering key services – fostering effective new partnerships between and among governments, businesses, schools, and religious and other civil society institutions, bringing them together to strengthen capacity and finding innovative technology solutions to support their efforts
o Meeting intensified demands for skills resulting from the HIV & AIDS epidemic – finding ways to accelerate skills training in key areas, strengthening the learning infrastructure and expanding learning and training opportunities
o Stabilizing capacity to offset the immediate loss of skilled human resources in affected sectors by mobilizing volunteers locally, regionally and globally to confront critical lost capacity in the short term – and establish the foundations for a sustainable long-term strategy.

Lastly, the challenges that are brought about by Technical Assistance also ought to be addressed. First and foremost, African governments need to appreciate the urgent need to identify and address the existing gaps in national technical capacities which have continued to compromise positive growth and development. The rationale for TA should, in this regard, be founded on the need to fill the identified gaps in order to enhance the technical capacities of the country. Presently in the average African country, there is no comprehensive and prioritised inventory of the gaps in the national technical capabilities, something that has given considerable operational latitude to many donors (often driven by what they perceive to be the country’s ‘felt needs,’) to articulate and define the country’s requirements in this area. Consequently, it has become difficult to distinguish between a genuine (i.e. demand-driven) and an externally-induced (supply-driven) need for TA, a condition that has continued to threaten local ownership in many African countries.

To address the challenges above, African governments should recognise that local ownership of TA acquisition and utilisation would be feasible only under the following conditions:

a) when African governments have a clear knowledge of the nature and extent of their existing technical gaps and how much of this could be filled through external assistance;
b) when governments can establish how much locally-based resources are available and how these could be retained and complemented by external TA in a sustainable manner;
c) when existing local institutions are strengthened in a way that would secure sustained supply of technical expertise; and
d) when technical assistance is fully integrated into African countries’ own national development programmes, work-plans and budgets.

In the context of the above, it is recommended that the need for TA must be defined by, and supportive of, national efforts and that, rather than being an isolated component of aid, it ought to be carefully calibrated into, and become an integral part of, the African countries’ respective national planning, in general, and human resource development strategy, in particular. In the final analysis, the value of TA should be measured by the degree to which it has facilitated the transfer of technical expertise to the recipient African governments.

7.5 The Way Forward: Recommended Actions
To complement efforts towards the creation and consolidation of the Capable State in Africa, a number of actions are recommended. These are presented below.

7.5.1 The Leadership Challenge
Political will to assume local ownership and leadership of capacity building effort is cardinal. Perhaps above everything else, African governments ought to recognize that the challenge of implementing far-reaching institutional and human resource development programmes requires extraordinary political will and talented, dedicated, patient, and persistent professionals whose level of commitment to the mission of local ownership of their country’s Development Agenda is unwavering. While capacity enhancement in the public sector is both desirable and doable, it is hard work. It takes time and dedication to rethink old ways of doing things and to develop new, more country-driven ones and will not be achieved without investing in change and meeting the costs that come with that change. It will have to be planned and programmed over a period of time for it shall not happen overnight. It will also require close and continuous monitoring and reinforcement at different levels. This means that the new ways of doing things shall require a team of ‘Champions’ at the highest level in the political hierarchy in each country to lead the drive forward. The degree of willingness on the part of African governments themselves to acknowledge their respective weaknesses, first and foremost, and their readiness to face the challenge of finding solutions to those obstacles, would ultimately determine, to a significant extent, the level of success to be achieved. In addition to the requisite political will to champion the capacity building effort, there also is a matching need to equip the technocrats within Governments to be able to push forward, through positive interventions, the agreed reforms commitments. To effectively do this, capacity enhancement challenges within government systems will have to be addressed unreservedly.

Africans themselves have to take responsibility for their own progress. In this regard, the development of indigenous capacity and homegrown policies informed by local knowledge and perspectives provides the best hope for Africa’s development challenge. There is also the issue of who else could provide leadership beyond those who are already in the government systems on the Continent. At this level, the challenge could be extended to the well-off and accomplished Africans to proactively take charge of fostering capacity enhancement and the evolution of visionary and transformational leaderships in their countries. The financial, intellectual, and other resources of accomplished Africans, especially those outside the continent (Africans in the Diaspora), are yet to be fully tapped and effectively utilized toward fostering African progress, particularly leadership/governance capacity building. And, in most countries, much of the exceptional young leadership talent is wasting away due to under-investment in human capital development.

In the light of the above, rather than feeling helpless and hopeless and continuing to complain about poor leaderships and the unsupportive and ‘imperialist’ international community, accomplished Africans must seek innovative ways to effectively harness and leverage their immense but largely untapped resources to implement leadership/governance capacity building initiatives. Such resource-pooling need not be financial. With the numerous options and possibilities provided by the Internet and advanced information and communications technologies, Africans in the Diaspora can contribute substantial intellectual and other non-financial resources, even without being physically present in their own countries.

The use of local knowledge and viewpoints is equally important as African countries face the challenges of institutional capacity building. By virtue of the superior knowledge of their countries’ peculiar political, economic, social, and cultural environments, local experts are better-positioned to develop unique ‘homegrown’ ideas and approaches that would best address their countries’ needs. There is, nevertheless, room for external support. Box 3 presents the on this issue from the Blair Commission for Africa.

Box 3: Getting Systems Right: Governance and Capacity-Building
Effective states – those that can promote and protect human rights and can deliver services to their people and a climate for entrepreneurship and growth – are the foundation of development. Without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact. While there have been improvements in many African countries, weakness in governance and capacity is the central cause of Africa’s difficult experience over the last decades. Improvements in governance, including democracy, are first and foremost the responsibility of African countries and people, and they take time and commitment. But there are also actions that outsiders can take both to support and to avoid undermining good governance. Two areas are crucial: capacity (the ability to design and deliver policies) and accountability (how the state answers to its people). [The Report proposes as follows]:
• Providing strong political and financial support for the pan-African and regional organisations, particularly the African Union and its programme NEPAD;
• Making changes in donor behaviour, to get fully behind a comprehensive national strategy for capacity-building;
• Building up professional skills and knowledge, including by revitalising Africa’s higher education, especially in science, engineering, and technology;
• Broadening participation and strengthening institutions that improve accountability, including parliaments, local authorities, the media, and the justice system;
• Increasing transparency of revenues and budgets, especially in countries rich in natural resources; this also makes a powerful contribution to conflict prevention;
• Tackling corruption, including repatriation of stolen state assets;
• Strengthening the quality and management of data.

Source: Our Common Interest: Report of the [Blair] Commission for Africa, March 2005

Clearly, initiatives conceived and implemented by nationals with local knowledge and perspectives are most likely to result in the policies and approaches that are most appropriate for a country’s political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances. The obvious starting point in this regard is capacity building to foster good governance. The findings of the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s African Governance Report 2005 show that “there is a pressing need for the implementation of a bold and innovative programme to effectively develop and use Africa’s governance capacity. We need to implement a bold, cross-cutting and comprehensive, Africa-led programme for capacity development, backed with substantial funding from our international development partners.

Capacity building programmes should go beyond just technical training in narrow fields - which are, of course, necessary, but not sufficient - to also include the development of talented young and emerging leaders into future leaders in the political, policy, business, and civil society sectors who have a global view and sound understanding of the realities and challenges of global geopolitics, finance, and economics; and that possess strong private sector mindsets and a competitive entrepreneurial spirit. Most of the existing capacity building initiatives are aimed at training technical professionals, and are not specifically focused on developing transformational leaders, i.e., those who will be able to deal successfully with the global geopolitical and economic development challenges of the coming decades.

7.5.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Public Service
It is recommended that the strengthening of the public sector through well-conceived reform programmes should be at the centre of management capacity improvement in Africa. When managed properly, such reforms would result in the improvement of the performance of the public service, focusing on the following:
a) making the public sector efficient and responsive to national needs;
b) enhancing public sector capacity to design and implement appropriate policies for national development; and
c) rationalising public service structure and expenditure in order to meet governments’ fiscal objectives.

The institutional reform measures should be complemented by an effective State performance monitoring mechanism that should strive at setting clearly-spelt, measurable and realistic government objectives. The UNDP Capacity Assessment Practice note (Box 4) is recommended as an important starting point to use as a tool for monitoring and tracking performance.

Box 4: Core Issues in UNDP Capacity Assessments Module
One or more core issues can serve as the primary driver of a capacity assessment. The core issues in the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework are: 1) leadership; 2) policy and legal framework; 3) mutual accountability mechanisms; 4) public engagement; 5) human resources; 6) financial resources; 7) physical resources; and 8) environmental resources.
1. Leadership
The relationship between capacity development and leadership is a fundamental one: fostering good leadership maximizes and protects investments in capacities within the enabling environment, as well as at the organisational and individual levels. Among capacities assessed in this category are the abilities to foster ownership; manage relationships with key external stakeholders, including the ability to negotiate; develop, communicate and give direction on vision, mission and values; develop and implement a system for overall management; and create an environment that motivates and supports individuals.
2. Policy and Legal Framework
Without a strong policy and legal framework in place, countries can experience problems of poor adherence to international norms and standards, prevalence of anti-poor and gender bias in justice systems, and poor implementation of national laws and regulations intended to benefit disadvantaged groups. This category focuses on the capacity to develop and sustain a policy and legal framework that is independent, impartial and fair – a system that is critical to the alleviation of poverty and achievement of the MDGs.
3. Mutual Accountability Mechanisms
An efficient, responsive, transparent and accountable public administration is not only of paramount importance for the proper functioning of a nation; it is also the basic means through which government strategies to achieve the MDGs can be implemented. Public administration is also the main vehicle through which the relationship between the state and civil society and the private sector is realized. Assessing capacities to manage and support an accountable public administration and ensure the reforms required, often on a long-term and sustained basis, is essential to effective governance and to providing a sound basis for equitable development. This category pertains to the capacity to ensure accountability through prevention and enforcement; strengthen national integrity institutions; increase public participation and build coalitions; and work with the international community.
4. Public Engagement
This category pertains to the capacity for inclusion, participation, equity and empowerment of individuals across all the functional capacities. It covers the systems, process and tools required to assess the vulnerability, exclusion and marginalization of peoples. It also looks at the public space for dialogue and debate, state-citizen consultation and feedback processes. A second component of this category pertains to the mobilization, access and use of information and knowledge. Attention is given to access to and use of the Internet, the role of the media, the adaptation of global knowledge to local circumstances, knowledge networking, and incentives to encourage learning.
5. Human Resources
Human resource capacities are at the heart of enhancing human development, and the Capacity Assessment Framework may be expanded with queries in this segment to address this area in greater depth. Specific areas of assessment include recruitment and promotion policies; performance assessment and management mechanisms; incentives (monetary and non-monetary); monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; and training.
6. Financial Resources
The capacity to manage financial resources is fundamental to success within the enabling environment and at the organisational level; this applies to the management of both internal resources (national budgets) as well as external resources (development funding). A concept key to external resources is Direct Budget Support (DBS), which is broadly defined as joint government/donor mechanisms to permit external resources to be channeled directly through national budgets, using national allocat1on, procurement and accounting systems, to supplement public expenditure on nationally agreed priorities. Among capacities assessed in this category are national and local capacities to negotiate, manage, utilize and monitor DBS in ways that best support the human development agenda and achieve the MDGs, including capacities for the management of development finance and development cooperation.
7. Physical Resources
Physical resources consist primarily of material resources and infrastructure. In the context of the Capacity Assessment Framework, the capacity to build, maintain and manage these resources is the focus. So, the capacity assessment does not, for example, ask for a count of the number of bridges but the capacity to construct and provide continuing services necessary to keep them operational.
8. Environmental Resources
This category pertains to the capacity of countries to manage their environment and natural resource and energy sectors, to integrate environmental and energy dimensions into poverty reduction strategies and national development frameworks, and to strengthen the role of communities in promoting sustainable development.

Source: UNDP, Capacity Assessment Practice Note, New York, 2006

In addition, the performance monitoring mechanism should be supported by an effective management information system that is capable of providing accurate, reliable, timely, and user-friendly data that is required not only for organisational performance monitoring of key performance indicators but also for the broader aspects of policy analysis. African governments’ capacity in economic forecasting, programming and strategic planning, for example, depends on the availability of timely and reliable data. The focus on making government systems more effective should be seen to be particularly urgent now in the face of significant challenges given the increase in global competitiveness, changing political climate, environmental concerns, the rise of civil society, and paradigm shifts in the role of the government from control and regulation to facilitation and flexibility.

It is equally noteworthy that efficient financial management is an integral part of reforms that focus on capacity development. This involves increased transparency and accountability in the budgeting system and decentralisation of tax collection and resource management. At the same time, it is true that only a properly skilled stock of human resources can ensure proper management of resources.

Institutional reforms should also include, in addition to public sector policy and structural changes above, strengthening of the civil society, private sector and other key governance actors. The process of change requires national governments to learn lessons, primarily from the countries within Africa with similar socio-cultural, political and economic set up. This is essential for reducing mistakes and conducting reforms in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Reforms in Uganda, for example, can serve as a better example for Zambia.

Demands for improved service delivery should prompt African governments to explore better practices with a view to extending services in a cost-effective manner as well as to customize services for the special needs of the citizens particularly in regions that are most hit by poverty. With the increasing pressure for maintaining a minimum standard of service, governments should experiment with administrative frameworks that promise to be more efficient and effective. Systems that allow for greater participation of people’s organizations and the private sector in planning, decision-making and implementation should also be targeted.

Complementary to the above, African governments should strive to simplify systems and procedures and to allow for greater involvement of private sector under the new regime of economic transformation that should aim to facilitate greater flow of local and foreign investment. Capacities should also be natured that facilitate the upgrading of regulatory frameworks and policies that broaden ownership base, develop capital markets and mobilize revenues for priority government expenditures. Fundamentally, these steps should contribute substantially in enhancing private sector growth in the average African economy.

In the light of the above, the following should be considered as being among the most strategic prerequisites for a strong, effective and capable State:
a) Efficient and effective public administration that includes an enabling regulatory framework for investment and the private sector. This, complemented by a tax administration that adheres to equity principles and is corruption-resistant, will enable an increase of the tax to GDP ratio;
b) An equitable decision-making process - inclusive, pro-poor, sensitive to civil society demands, and accountable;
c) A transparent and accountable development management system and one that can allocate resources without bias in favour of special interest or prone to corruption; and
d) Encouragement of decentralization linked to the demands and wishes at community level.

7.5.3 Enhancement of Human Resource Capacity
Although human resource capacity enhancement is an integral part of the above-discussed efficiency and effectiveness of the public service, it deserves special treatment. Above all, African governments should strive to improve human resource management. The major directions ought to primarily be on the size and cost of public service that could necessitate ‘right sizing’ and improving human resource performance, including more effective methods of managing this vital resource. While right-sizing could mean cutting back on the size of the civil service personnel, the sustainability of such action evidently requires more effective legal and executive instruments to maintain tight control on recruitment practices. Alongside these issues, there is a continuing need for addressing problems of performance, discipline, personnel management procedures and insufficient incentives as well as adequate remuneration and conditions of service for the majority of public service officials. Some attempts are being made in several African countries to introduce strategic planning, performance-oriented incentives and rigorous disciplinary sanctions for poor performance and corrupt practices.

On the longer-term issues of civil service reform, there is need to squarely address the erosion of the concept of merit, excessive political patronage in recruitment and promotion, and entry methods from ruling political party cadres. This is particularly urgent given the fact that these frailties have continued to impact negatively on the values of professionalism in the career structure, causing problems of morale in the overall public service structure. There is also an apparent absence in some instances of a central human resources management agency to develop policies and monitor personnel management functions on a government-wide basis. The responsibility over human resources management issues needs concerted effort in the average African country and the significance of an effective performance review function intertwined with the process of accountability is a critical issue in this regard.

In the light of the above, human resource capacity building and retention should be at the centre of institutional capacity enhancement effort on the African Continent. No amount of external resource flow would result in sustainable outcomes if the requisite human resource capacity on the continent remains frail. Without the required competent, experienced and motivated human resource that would drive institutions and systems forward, no amount of planning effort would be rewarded with positive change. To the extent that institutional reorganizations and capacity building depends on human resources, addressing the existing human resource capacity gaps through training and retention of professionals within the civil service should receive the highest priority.

The human dimension of empowerment is quite pivotal when addressing the human resource development challenge. Governments are a complex interaction of systems and people. It will not work effectively if people in the public service do not have the right combination of skills, knowledge, and attitudes, and if there is not a structured system in place for the regulation of interaction. The human dimension should, thus, consist of more than training; it is also about the involvement of those people in the determination of the mission and goals of the government, the analysis of its shortcomings and the determination and implementation of solutions.

Clearly, human resource development, particularly those that pertain to planning and implementation, should not be confined to the public sector alone. Many NGOs and the private sector currently partner with government in the provision of public services. In this, there is a two way process, on the one hand, to equip government to deal with partners, including the private sector and NGOs; and on the other, to upgrade the capacities of civil society (including the private sector) in dialoguing with government.

7.5.4 Institutional Capacity and Equity Considerations
African governments in the capacity building reform process should always be aware of the rights of the people over national resources. Hence, reforms should adequately address the issues of proper distribution and re-distribution of national wealth. This needs appropriate policy formulation and implementation, aimed at optimal participation of the people. Strengthened democracy can ensure that. Experiences show that despite vigorous reforms in some of the African countries, the benefits are not successfully extended throughout the population. On the other hand, isolated reform programmes may not yield expected results in the context of enhanced sectoral integration in the society.

It is important that reforms address adequately the ways to develop modalities and mechanisms for efficient and sustainable use of state controlled resources through equitable sharing. Isolated initiatives at the local and national levels by the government, CSOs, NGOs and the private sector may not lead to the needed level of impact on the governance, reforms and development as a whole. Reform process aimed at attaining expected level of governance should ideally involve i) creation of favourable development relationships among the key governance actors: government, civil society and the private sector; ii) identification of most effective resource use and management modality; iii) decentralisation; iv) effective support to the disadvantaged groups: the rural and urban poor, women and children, the ethnic and religious minorities.

The notion of decentralization underscores the value of equity in both resource planning and resource use. Decentralised systems seek to improve governance in three ways: by improving the efficiency of resource allocat1on; by promoting accountability and reducing corruption; and by improving cost recovery. Eight benefits of decentralization can be identified: the deduction in power, size and cost of central government; improved efficiency in decision-making; better co-ordination of development activities at the local level; greater equity and effectiveness in the allocat1on of resources; better responsiveness from government to the needs of marginalised groups; enhanced participation in development; improved transparency and accountability; the more effective mobilization of resources; and the reduction of spillover effects by concentrating costs and benefits within local areas. It is generally held that the reduction of poverty is more likely to be assured when the people for whom pro-poor interventions are meant are allowed, through empowerment, to effectively participate in these interventions. Decentralization, for example, is generally assumed to facilitate redistribution and poverty alleviation since it brings greater grassroots level control over resources and their utilization.

Experience worldwide, however, point to the reality that decentralization has usually meant the deconcentration or devolution of power and authority from the central government to sub-national (local government) authorities, be they provincial or district administrations, urban municipalities, local/rural councils, county authorities, etc. In most cases in Africa, decentralization stops at this level and rarely do governments recognize that civil society/grassroots institutions may suffer as much from the centralization of power at the sub-national level as they did under the country’s central government command. Because of this recognition, the main challenge now in discussions of local governance should be to ensure that the strengthening of local government through decentralization moves hand in hand with a deliberate effort to mobilise and strength civil society structure, processes and institutions at lower levels in a manner that would allow their relationship with local authorities more interactive and mutually reinforcing. Civil society is located below sub-national governments and includes actors and structures that initiate social or political action, ranging from individuals, organized pressure groups, associations, and agencies, to the media. It also encompasses private sector bodies, parent-teachers associations, trade unions, neighborhood organizations, and, rarely appreciated in the so-called ‘modern’ governance systems, an array of formal and informal organizations that, in the African context, include local and informal structures and systems of traditional leadership that are located outside the realm of the formal political domain. In short, decentralization in Africa has rarely been extended to civil society.

In essence, effective civil society involvement at the municipality level calls for a deliberate effort to reach out to local communities beyond the decentralized structures of sub-national authorities. Effective participation by civil society requires capacity strengthening that targets enlightened intervention, including the improvement of the institutional environment in which varying interest groups co-exist. In this respect, Africa should find ways in which central and local governments can restructure, reform and strengthen their institutions so as to facilitate the development of civil society. A number of good experiences with local governance capacity strengthening exist for possible replication. In a number of countries, for example, individuals at the local level have been empowered (through civic awareness and organisational and personal skills development) to productively attend to their local level developmental challenges. The UNDP-supported Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment (LIFE), for example, has played an important role in the enhancement of local governance through, inter alia, the building of sustainable networks in the targeted communities. LIFE builds alliances of community groups, civil society organizations and municipal governments and links civil society and local institutions of governance in such a fashion as to make them both mutually reinforcing and individually and collectively stronger. In addition, the LIFE programme seeks to encourage a culture of participatory democracy; ensures the coordination and effective mobilization of resources at the local level; and encourages local self-reliance and development.

7.5.5 Capacity in a Competitive Global Environment
One of the emerging challenges for Africa when discussing the tenets of capacity building and strengthening relates to how it should prepare itself in the face of the challenges of globalization. Firstly, it is important that African governments develop the capacity to absorb and make use of the new trends that the new international process produces. Countries should try to adjust to, and strive to benefit from new trends rather than wholesomely resisting or condemning them. Such processes include, inter alia, intensification of international network (particularly in the area of South-South cooperation; emergence of multiple options resulting in increased responsiveness to market conditions; shift to consumer-driven market decisions; and shift to high technology industries.

Secondly, the global economy is increasingly becoming hostile to the immediate interests of poor countries that are mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, prompting the need to develop the required capacities to cope under such stressful and inhospitable global environment. Although developing countries’ share in the world trade system has increased in the last decade, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) clearly illustrates the extreme case of marginalisation in global trade. The share of SSA in world trade has seen a continual decline. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Africa region has remained negligible, at approximately 1 percent of GDP, representing 0.8 percent of all FDI and 2.1 percent of FDI going into all developing countries. The low levels of FDI being attracted by Africa confirms the region’s exclusion from the intra-firm network, which accounts for the largest contribution to growth of world trade. Africa’s terms of trade have also declined by over 15 percent since 1970. The share of SSA’s trade in the world markets has also fallen by half since 1970 and accounts for less than 2 percent of all world trade, thus, placing Sub-Saharan Africa at the very margins of the global economy.

Does trade effectively contribute to poverty reduction and should Africa invest its meager resources in building the needed capacities for trade enhancement? The answer is not straight forward. According to World Bank studies, the 40 percent of the lower strata in the LDCs have been the losers of trade liberalization and poverty has remained pervasive in most countries in SSA where approximately 50 percent of the population is currently below the poverty line. For many developing countries, it is increasingly becoming obvious that the formula: “trade liberalisation leads to growth and growth leads to general well-being” has proven to be too simplistic. To make trade and economic growth pro-poor in the sharing of benefits, developing countries have to respond to the challenge at two different levels, namely, at the internal and external levels. Internally, trade reforms, particularly in the context of a liberalized regime, is most effective when it is combined with the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and sound institutions. It is, thus, here where the primary focus in capacity development at the internal level must lie.

Macroeconomic stability in a liberalized economic environment is fundamental to trade enhancement as it frees capital and provides the requisite environment for private sector growth that is so important for trade expansion/diversification. The need to raise aggregate savings and investment is also cardinal. Presently, most low-income countries of Africa face serious aggregate savings constraint. It is equally noteworthy that the growth benefits of trade reform are likely to be limited or elusive in those low-income countries that lack a supportive policy environment and whose entrepreneurs are constrained by weaknesses in the institutional and market infrastructure for production and trade. But most importantly, it is clearly industrial and agricultural development and diversification that will enhance trade, particularly intra-regional trade, rather than the mere removal of barriers to trade per-se. Hence, the most crucial challenge for Africa at the country level is fundamentally bordering on enhanced production of tradable goods and services. In this regard, one of the main challenges for African countries is to strive to maximize industrial output growth rate through increasing the range of manufactured exports; increasing the value-added for primary exports; consolidating, in a guarded way though, market liberalisation in a way that allows national producers to respond promptly and positively to economic-cum-market signals. Attending to supply side constraints is particularly important in this regard.

At the external level, the close connection between fair trade, economic growth and poverty reduction has been repeatedly pointed out, not least at the Monterrey conference on financing for development in March 2002 and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September of the same year. Trade can make a considerable contribution to sustainable poverty reduction but only when the multilateral trade regime is favourable to the special interests of developing countries. Since developed countries constitute the main export markets of low-income countries, developed-country market access barriers have continued to limit their export opportunities. Currently, global market access barriers penalize low-income countries because their exports are concentrated in products characterized by highly restrictive market access conditions. In this regard, a supportive multilateral trade environment is crucial for improving the economic gains Africa could accrue from trade liberalization under globalization.

Currently, the industrialized countries’ trade barriers for products that are mainly exported by developing countries are higher than for export products of the industrialized countries. Through the OECD countries’ tariffs alone, developing countries are losing about as much income as they are receiving through development cooperation/aid. Under the Uruguay Round, the OECD countries lowered their tariffs on the products of other OECD countries by 45 percent, but tariffs on developing countries’ products only by 30 percent. Similarly, the particularly high tariffs on processed exports from developing countries make it harder for them to diversify their economic and export structures and to reduce their dependence on commodity exports. Developing country exports of manufactures face much higher trade barriers than exports from developed countries. In one World Bank study, it is estimated that barriers to manufactured exports account for around 70 percent of the total export barriers faced by developing countries. With tariff escalation, tariffs rise with the level of processing, with the effect of reducing the demand for processed imports from developing countries, thus, frustrating the diversification of these economies into high value-added exports. External market access barriers are especially high in agriculture and labor intensive manufactures, with tariffs in excess of 15 percent. Clearly, then, manufacturing should be at the heart of a new round of trade negotiations if it is to benefit African countries. At the same time, there is need to relax African countries’ supply response capacity constraints so as to enable them take fuller advantage of the new opportunities offered by global markets.

Against the above background, what demands should African countries present in the round of world trade talks, particularly after the disappointing outcomes from Seattle, Doha and Cancun? Firstly, any further reforms of trade in the context of liberalization need to be in the interests of Africa. Where African countries have exportable products, developed countries should give them fair opportunities to trade them. Secondly, more coherence is required between development policy and trade policy, particularly among the OECD countries that consume most of African countries’ exports. Thirdly, opening markets and dismantling trade-distorting barriers must target principally those sectors where African countries have export potential and comparative advantage. Fourthly, sharper customs tariffs reductions should be effected in certain sectors of particular importance for African countries (e.g. textiles, clothing. footwear).

Lastly, all being said, the strengthening of African countries’ negotiation capacities is pivotal for them to have their collective voice better heard in the multilateral trade negotiations. Africa needs to be able to assert its interests in the global system. But to do this effectively, the Continent needs to be able to find a negotiating position that benefits its future development and then actually possess the requisite capacity to able to defend that position.

7.6 Conclusions: Prioritizing Capacity Building Effort
In the light of the discussion in this paper, the following are recommended as the most pressing institutional and human resource capacity enhancement aspects that should receive priority in Africa:
a) Reform must come from within: Many African countries depend on external agencies for support in dealing with their economic reconstruction. The change process must be locally owned, must be participative, and, above all, must be driven by the needs of the public.
b) Leadership and Commitment: Strong leadership and commitment to achieve reform is essential if change is to be sustained. This does not equate with centrally imposed solutions as leadership has to be provided in a sensitive way so that those who might otherwise resist are themselves tuned into engines for change.
c) Focus, Implementation, and Feedback: There must be a vision in public sector reform of the society that people want to live in and of the public service that is needed to achieve such a society. Fundamental questions about the role of the state need to be addressed to achieve this vision, following discussion with all political parties and representatives from the private sector, trade unions, NGOs and other community organisations.
d) Developing a Results and Client Oriented Culture: Public sector organisations are still largely dominated by an administrative culture in which the centre lays down the rules and delegates very little authority to the periphery. Performance is assessed in this culture in relation to conformity rather than the successful performance of tasks. The administrative culture needs to be changed into a purpose-led managerial culture where the achievement of results becomes the dominant ethic, constrained as appropriate by legal and financial requirements.
e) Change as a Dialectical Process: Empirical evidence suggests that lasting changes in administrative reform can only be achieved through a participative approach that harnesses the knowledge and commitment of a wide variety of interested parties through a dialectical process.
f) Social Equity and Income Distribution: There is a need to strike a balance between the development of market based economies and the development of more equitable and democratic societies.
g) The Use of National and Regional Expertise: Institutional capacity strengthening effort has often relied heavily on inputs from consultants from outside the African region. In the locally and regionally, there is a growing number of people sensitive to local conditions and equally capable in the technical aspects of reform. The skills of such people must be exploited to the full.
h) Information Technology: The process of capacity enhancement depends on the availability of timely and accurate information. Thus, investment in information technology is essential. This is investment not just in hardware and software but also in the people who will manage and use the computer systems.
i) Creation of an Enabling Environment: As governments adopt a different role in relation to the direct provision of services and production of goods through divestment and privatisation programmes, they also need to examine their role in relation to private sector activity. Governments increasingly need to become facilitators of national dialogue and creators of an enabling environment for private sector activity and local and foreign investment.
j) Macroeconomic Stability: Sound macroeconomic policies, including a transparent and enabling domestic business environment and an efficient financial sector based on the rule of law, are fundamental. This requires effective macroeconomic management capacity, including legislative and regulatory abilities and debt management skills.

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8. Role of Women in Building the Capable State in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities
Rudo Chitiga

8.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the role of women in building the capable State in Africa. Its starting point is that women’s organisations in Africa are the main voice and channel through which the questions of gender equality, the role of women in development and society; and the constraints women face in participating in development at all levels are articulated and addressed. It assesses the ways in which the state in Africa includes gender in its analysis and planning. An examination of the nature, activities, internal governance, relationships and effectiveness and of women’s organisations in society, including their influence in traditional African governance systems, is made. The paper also analyses how these organisations relate with the state and their influence in shaping national development plans and strategies. The last part of the paper identifies the challenges and opportunities in making women a core part of building the capable state in Africa.

There is increasing attention on how to create lasting poverty reduction in Africa and to usher in proper growth, human prosperity and peace. The sobering realisation that Africa will not meet the MDGS in 2015 and even in 50 years has resulted in emphasis being placed not only on ensuring adequate resource flows to Africa but, equally important, in building competencies capacities within institutions in Africa for the design, implementation and management of poverty reduction programmes.

In the past ten years, many efforts at both continental and international levels have focused on Africa. The most significant was the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, an organisation that is programme driven and seeks to engage governments and African citizens, including women and legislators, in the promotion of peace, security and stability. The African Union sees these as a prerequisite for progressive societies and prosperous citizens, able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the globalised world. The adoption by the AU of gender parity principles in all its organs has created an important and groundbreaking context to the participation of women in Africa’s development. The adoption of the Protocol to the African charter on human and peoples' rights on the rights of women in Africa and the adoption of the Solemn declaration on the rights of women in Africa provides a continental value system and legal framework for gender equality. The recent adoption of the AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance further consolidates this framework. Gender equality is a key component of building the capable state. According to the World Bank, (2001) perpetuating gender inequality limits economic growth and diminishes effectiveness of poverty reduction programmes. Addressing gender is, therefore, an integral part of development effectiveness. It is widely acknowledged that the effort of building capable States requires the contribution of skills and perspectives and participation of both men and women in society.

8.2 Introduction of Gender into the Analysis of the State in Africa
8.2.1 Political participation
In historical times, African women played a key role in the affairs of the state taking on formal roles as chiefs in many societies particularly in West Africa. Nigeria today still has a large number of women traditional chiefs. Kraft (2003) reports that queen mothers in Ghana wield a lot of power and influence behind the scenes. They nominate chiefs and kings and can also impeach them. In addition to their role as legislators and governors, women also played an important role as spiritual mediums and influenced policy direction, decision making in their localities. Kraft (2003) quotes Niehass who states that most of Africa’s rainmakers are women, as fertility of the soil is associated with women’s fertility.

Manuh (1998) asserts that the traditional spheres of influence of women largely disappeared at independence when customary laws were encoded. Mbaw, (2006) notes some exceptions. She cites the example of Senegal where the state adopted what she refers as “state feminism” which sought to build egalitarian systems where women were involved in all aspects of national development, including political process. McFadden (1999) also argues that women’s political involvement in the anti- colonial struggles provided an entry point for their engagement in politics in African countries and the modern state. In the liberation struggles, women participated in non-socially prescribed roles. The struggle for independence in Africa particularly in Southern Africa where it took the form of armed struggle resulted in gender shifts where women were trained to take on roles previously reserved for men. Conversely, men shared domestic tasks with women in the camps. However, on attainment of independence, there was pressure for them to revert back to the traditional roles. In Zimbabwe, ‘training centres’ were set up to help women ex-combatants go back to their prescribed roles. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, for example, the commitment from the liberation struggle resulted in the establishment of strong ministries and programmes for advancement of women and for the ‘integration’ of women into the development processes.

Women have been at the centre of conflict situations playing a key role in protecting vulnerable members of the family and bearing the brunt of the violence, in terms of violence against them and children. They also are at the forefront of rebuilding communities and societies after the conflict. Women are, however, not systematically included in the formal peace building processes. Women have had to use indirect channels to get their issues onto the table. It was through the efforts of women’s organisations that the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on women in conflict. This has opened doors for greater women’s involvement in peace building and for gender to become a key part of programmes addressing conflict and peace building.

8.2.2 Economic participation
Women’s organizations made several other inroads into the policy arena in Africa. The 1980-90s were characterised by the adoption of economic reform programmes in many parts of Africa. Negotiated under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, the implications on women were extremely negative. The reduction of government expenditure in the social sector as part of the structural adjustment programmes resulted in shifting the burden of social care to women. They became the gap fillers as the state withdrew from the social sector. The introduction of user fees removed any opportunity of the girl child from poor families of going to school. With time came the recognition that women’s voices needed to be heard in the discussions on economic development. It was not long before advocates called on the state to take into account the contribution of women to the care economy and to national production in general and, importantly, for this to be reflected as economic indicators.

The gender sensitive budget initiatives became a key framework for introducing gender into the government planning. It is an effort to enable government to clearly determine where the resources are going and provides a methodology for allocating resources to the most in need so as to address poverty and inequality. These initiatives are now a key tool for building the capability of state institutions to provide for greater inclusion in development and account for its commitments to gender equality and the re-distribution of resources. Budlender (2004) states that there are initiatives for gender budget analysis in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which are all at different stages of development. South Africa has gone the furthest and implements full gender budgeting since 1995. UNIFEM (2006) also reports successful cooperation and technical support to the ministries of finance in Senegal and Morocco, which has resulted in integration of gender into the budgeting processes. The budget, as a key aspect of macro economic policy, is a strategic tool to ensure gender equality and that provisions are made to ensure women benefit from development.

The opportunity provided by the gender budget initiatives should, however, not cloud the still unresolved issues surrounding women’s access to economic assets and productive resources such as land, property and credit. The current wisdom being passed on to governments by international financial institutions to privatise basics services such as water and electricity and introduce access based on ability to pay user fees shows that the economic choices made by the state are still not rooted in gender analysis. The current privatisation efforts go against the evidence that gender inequity limits economic growth. For instance, women who form the majority of the poor and are primarily responsible for fetching water and ensuring access to basic services for the whole family have come under extreme pressure as they struggle to access services and cope with switch offs and disconnections. Elson, (2001) argues that water has becomes an additional commodity in the shopping cart of women.

8.2.3 Social aspects
Social aspects of gender were brought into the analysis of the State in Africa in the creation of a legal framework. At independence, most countries managed to include gender in the bill of rights. In others, there was debate as to whether, in the post independence era, women should have equal rights to men. The rights perspective, in particular the interpretation of customary law, became a key arena for debate in parliament among women’s groups and society in general. Laws were introduced to guarantee equal opportunities in employment, e.g. labour laws and rights under family law in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance and custody of children.

Religion also played a role in influencing the social status of women, in particular Christianity and Islam. Bodram, (2004) notes that, in the past, men monopolised the power of interpreting the Quran. However, women have increasingly taken over this role resulting in different and progressive interpretations. Regarding Christianity, Olujubu (2004) notes that, unlike the mainline churches in which few women have risen to leadership positions, there are large numbers of women in leadership positions in the new Pentecostal churches across Africa. Both argue that these developments will have a positive effect on society’s perception of women.

In the area of education, women’s studies on the historical role of women and their contribution to traditional development have only just emerged in universities. Manicom, (1992) writing about South Africa, refers to the “women’s chapter” in historical analysis, which should be written in order for society to understand the contribution of women to nation building and move away from the notion that the state has been against women or vice versa.

Due to pressure from women’s organisations and the international community especially the UN system, governments set up projects to address women in development. This was to comply with the commitments of the Mexico and Copenhagen, and Nairobi and more recently Beijing conferences on women. Special funds were set up to help women access credit to support income-generating projects in both rural and urban areas. In addition, there were initiatives to review the legal status of women and introduce laws giving them majority status and other social and economic rights in line with the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women (CEDAW).

Women’s development, therefore, entered national planning systems through an international framework. Although there was pressure from women’s organisations within the countries, their main argument was that governments comply with international agreements. Indigenous arguments were not used much except in cases where women had played a role in the liberation struggle arguing that they had fought side by side with men and deserved a place in the development of the country.

8.2.4 National machineries
As previously highlighted, most African countries set up institutions for the advancement of women. These ranged from fully fledged ministries, department to small desks within another ministry. National machineries provided the institutional framework for implementing programmes for gender equality and provided a focal point for advocacy on gender equality. They also provided the national framework for implementing international agreements such as Beijing Platform of Action and its follow up. The status of the national machinery depended on the political will for the empowerment of women. The mandate of the machinery changed with the global changes from women in development to gender equality. According to DAW, most national machineries suffer from lack of resources and capacity. Another report by DAW (2005) asserts that national machineries reported they had not been fully enabled to carry out their role. DAW also reports that many representatives from national machineries felt they had an overextended portfolio and were unable to cope with implementing programmes, monitoring line ministries and coordinating national effort towards gender equality.

8.3 How Women Groups are Organised
8.3.1 Overview
Historically, there was a strong tradition of grassroots organisations led by women in different parts of Africa. Women created some of the earliest civil society associations in Africa. Women have always been influential in matters of local economic social, cultural development. They led community self help initiatives such as mothers unions, savings clubs and thrift societies such as the susu of West Africa and the stokvels and zenzele clubs of South Africa. In Southern Africa, many of the women’s organisations prior to independence focused on improving various roles as mothers teaching them how to decorate houses and to look after children and husbands. Domestic Science and home economics were the most popular training programmes provided by extension workers from women’s organisations and the colonial governments. Organisations challenging patriarchy and discrimination against women came to the forefront in the 1970s when women were mobilised to participate in the first world conference on women and development in Mexico 1975. The conference led to the birth of development organisations and to the branching out of professional women’s organisations such as the Association of University Women into activities that questioned the status of women and mobilised women for action to claim their rights.

Women’s organisations in Africa today can be categorised into five groups. These categories are not mutually exclusive.

8.3.2 Community-based Organisations
Community based organisations comprising self help groups based mostly at local level. Their main activities are related to poverty reduction and include adult literacy, micro projects, saving, credit and trading, including cross boarder trading. Community based organisations can be found in both urban and rural areas and are often linked to larger service organisations as clients or beneficiaries but do not form part an organic movement. The focus and priority of their work is to strengthen social safety nets and enabling livelihoods. Funding for this group is mostly through member contributions which are often subsidised by grants from donors who in this case are local NGOs. Their direct interaction with policy makers is limited except in cases of market women associations who are directly affected by city by laws. Cross boarder traders also confront customs regulations. They also benefit from government funds for supporting community-based activities. Funding also comes in the form of revolving loan funds and other micro finance schemes.

Women’s direct interaction with policy makers is limited, except in cases of market women associations which are directly affected by city by-laws. Cross border traders also confront customs’ regulations. Market women in Africa, particularly in West African states, have been very influential in policy change. Market women’s associations have led protests against rising costs of living, municipal by-laws and other adverse effects of government policies. Market women’s associations are an important radar/barometer of the mood of urban people and are an important indicator of people’s perceptions on the capability of the state.

8.3.3 National Organisations
Closely related to this group of women’s organisations are large national associations of women. These are sectoral and professional e.g. rural women, journalists etc. This group of organisations cut across a wide spectrum of activities ranging from local livelihood activities, adult education and skills development rights education and advocacy. Most of these groups are wholly dependent on external donor support save for small member contributions. They are also involved in administering funds to assist community based activities. They are also part of national partnership programmes on poverty reduction, micro finance, HIV and AIDS which provide access to special funds. This category of organisations is the most visible in policy advocacy often questioning policies and pushing for greater gender mainstreaming and awareness. They are linked to the international women’s movement either as national chapters of international organisations such as FIDA, Country Women’s Association, etc. The networks define global priorities for the association which are informed by the member associations. Because of their international connection, these organisations often have access to global policy fora such as the UN with whom they have consultative status.

8.3.4 Faith-based Organisations
Faith based organisations, both Christian and Moslem, are among the earliest forms of organisation for women. In addition to religious teaching and worship, these groups also engage in activities to build the capacity of women through training in skills that can increase incomes for women. Faith based organisations have provided strategic support to women cross border traders offering accommodation and protection.

8.3.5 Research and Advocacy Organisations
A fourth category is of a hybrid of research and advocacy organisation. Many of the organisations are linked to the women’s studies departments of universities but are also found outside the academic framework. Examples include: Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Networks (ZWRCN), Gender links, (South Africa) Gender and Development Action (GADA) (Nigeria). These organisations specialise in evidence-based policy influencing the conduct research and develop frameworks for changing policy. A key area of their work includes gender budgets, analysis of trade impacts and influencing national gender policies. Their main contributions include developing local frameworks for gender analysis.

8.3.6 Pan-African and Sub-Regional Networks
The fifth category of organisations are pan African or sub-regional networks formed to advance the status of women and for gender equality. Among the most well known are African Women’s Communication Network (FEMNET), Women Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), African Women Economic Empowerment Network (AWEPON), EASSI, Femmes Afrique Solidarité (FAS) Equality NOW, Women Under Islamic Laws, and African Women’s Association for Research and Development (AAWORD). These organisations were formed by African women to create economies of scale for achieving gender equality. They are mostly membership based or work in coalitions. Their work has been targeted at promoting simultaneous advocacy, policy and or research work in countries where they have members. They also carry out policy advocacy targeted at regional economic communities and Pan African intergovernmental organisations.

This group of organisation has come to represent the voices of African women at the international level, often facilitating regional preparations and caucuses at international meetings. An example of their influence and effectiveness is the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights adopted by the African Union Summit in Maputo in 2002. This came as a result of relentless advocacy work by a coalition of Pan African networks, Jurists and Human rights organisations working with the Human Rights Commission and the Gender department of the then OAU secretariat. The protocol came into force in 2005 after a region-wide campaign for its ratification.

A coalition of organisations led an initiative to push for gender parity in appointments to the organs of the Africa Union. Their work also led to the first ever open debate on gender equality among Heads of State which took place in 2004 and resulted in the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. At sub regional level these networks have had impact in other sectors including on peace building and conflict resolution. For example, the Mano River Peace Network is an initiative of women from Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone who came together in 2001 to respond to the conflict in their countries. Their work led to opening up of communication between the warring factions. They also influence the negotiation process.

8.4 Funding for Women’s Organisations
Like most NGOs in Africa, women’s organisations are funded by external donors including foundations, bilateral and multilateral agencies and international NGOs. Only a small part of their funding comes from membership fees and local fundraising ventures. There was a lot of debate in the 1990s aimed at discouraging NGOs from getting money from their government. There appears to be a double standard when the same organisations are happy to receive money from foreign governments. In addition, their counterparts and partners in international NGOs get a significant part of their income from governments. There is still a residue of fear among NGOs of being co-opted into the government’s agenda resulting in them losing the trust of their peers. Under the new dispensations where the agenda of government includes poverty reduction and pro-poor development and good governance, the challenge for women’s organisations and civil society in general will be to resolve the question of the relationship with the state.

There are synergies among the different organisations. A number of initiatives have been replicated in different countries providing leaning and networking opportunities. The adoption of gender policies by regional economic communities has also provided a framework for collaboration and joint action among organisations as can be seen in the above examples on the AU. Similar work has been carried out at the sub regional level with ECOWAS, SADC and EAC who have all adopted declarations on gender equality as a result of the efforts of the women’s organisations.

Although women’s organisations come together and collaborate, there are tensions around a common understanding of gender equality. Some organisations see their role as helping meet the practical needs of women and see no place for including men in any analysis except in labelling them “the advantaged”. Not all women’s organisations have the resources and capacity for gender sensitive planning and analysis. Quite often, being in the women’s movement is equated to gender awareness which is not always the case. In many countries, it is easier to bring women’s organisations together under the banner of empowerment of women. This appears to be the lowest common denominator that holds the movement together.

8.5 Relationship between Women’s Organisations and the State
Increasing democratisation in African countries has resulted in opening up of spaces for civil society organisations to operate. Many governments have developed policies to define the relationship between government and civil society. Women’s organisations have a cooperative relationship with the national machinery in most countries. This partnership is necessitated by need to join forces in pushing for gender mainstreaming and for women’s empowerment. The international conferences have also fostered partnership between women’s organisations and national machineries. Women’s organisations have in many cases supported the capacity of national machineries by offering background papers and advocating for greater resourcing for the ministry or agency responsible for gender. The “cosy” relationship has not stopped women’s organisations organising protest and demonstrations against specific policies or programmes which have a negative effects on women. Many of the victories won by women have been through protest, petitions and lobbying parliamentarians to introduce laws to protect women. Examples of areas where women have had successes include laws on violence against women.

Notwithstanding the above, women’s organisations are not immune from the general tension that characterises relations between government and civil society especially NGOs. A key area of tension is in the allocat1on of resources. Donors have sometimes indicated a preference to work through NGOs as they respond faster and are close to the people. Governments often see this as a redirection of resources that should have been channelled through them. The reaction by many governments is to accuse NGO’s of pursuing a foreign agenda. Another area of tension is that surrounding accountability and legitimacy with governments claiming that, as the elected authority, they are the voice of the people.

In the past, governments sought to control organisations through legislation. This legislation, originally aimed at keeping a watch on the voluntary sector, has progressively become enabling. In some African countries, the regulation of NGOs falls under the Ministry of Internal Security. African civil society organisations sought to develop self regulatory mechanisms as early as the mid 1990s. The most common of these were codes of conduct and codes of ethics developed by networks and their membership. Many countries now have NGO codes of practice/conduct and ethics. Most of these codes are voluntary and do not have clear ways of enforcing compliance, according to Yaansah, (1997). In addition, a number of sectoral codes have been developed. Examples include a code of good practice for NGOs responding to HIV&AIDS. Recently under the sponsorship of the African Women’s Development Foundation, African feminists came up with a charter of feminists principles which include individual ethics to guide feminists in their work. Women’s organisations in Africa, under the umbrella of WiLDAF and FEMNET, have organised several fora to promote greater accountability among women’s organisations.

Governments in Africa and indeed in many countries are happy for civil society organisations to complement their efforts by carrying out development programmes in areas where the state has withdrawn or in times of emergencies. However, when it comes to civil society doing advocacy and interrogating government policies and decisions, they face opposition from the government. This opposition takes many forms including, in extreme cases, deregistration and tightening of laws governing NGOs. Government often trivialise the voices of NGOs by questioning their legitimacy and claiming that governments are elected into office while civil society organisations are not.

The ability of women organisations to prepare shadow reports when they are not included in the official preparation process or dispute the official report have led many governments to avoid embarrassment by involving women’s groups and other stakeholders in the preparation of official reports such as those to the Commission on the Status of Women, CEDAW and recently on the MDGs.

There are many cases of partnerships between government and women’s organisations in achieving gender equity examples. They range from event targeted cooperation such as commemoration of International Women’s Day to project based collaboration. A number of frameworks are now in place at national level to facilitate collaboration. Most programmes adopted by governments include the need to involve all stakeholders in their implementation. In some cases, there is legislation providing for partnerships such as the NGO policies adopted by many governments. International frameworks such as the Beijing Platform of Action and the MDGs also provide frameworks. The fight against HIV/AIDS has promoted the establishment of a single multi stakeholder national planning and coordination framework. Accessing resources from agencies such as the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB require the setting up of multi stakeholder country coordinating mechanisms for joint implementation.

Women’s organisations have actively engaged with the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Gender Budgeting Initiative. Women’s organisations have, therefore, acquired the necessary experience and exposure to become key instruments for women’s participation in building the capable state.

Twenty case studies in multi stakeholder partnerships for gender equity undertaken by the Commonwealth Foundation in 2004 and 2005 revealed the following lessons:

a) The commitment to partnership was often not accompanied by a budget and other resources.
b) Partnership required accommodation of the different ways of working, including approval and decision making processes between government and civil society. Partnership activities were more successful where investment had been made in induction and partnership building activities where undertaken. This included even cases where people knew each other as in the case of many women’s organisations and officials from the national machinery. In some of the projects, civil society organisations had no capacity to attend the many meetings that government required.
c) Partnership projects often present additional work for already stretched civil society organisation. Capacity building is required to enable organisations to continue their everyday work and to participate effectively in the partnership projects.
d) There was need to agree on, and clarify roles, responsibilities, project goals and results. Projects with clear terms of reference and a memorandum of understanding were more successful.
e) It was found that arriving at a common understanding on gender and the gender aspects of the specific programme was a key requirement.
f) It was found that the concept of partnership still needs to move from rhetoric to practical areas. Commonwealth Foundation (2005, 2006)

8.6 Participation of Women in Governance
The ushering in of multiparty politics, free and fair elections, freedom of association and free media has created opportunities for greater participation by men and women in public life and in decision-making positions. The social Watch Gender Equality Index shows that Rwanda has shown the most significant progress in achieving gender equality. (Social Watch, GEI, 2007). According to the International Parliamentary Union, women in parliament in sub Saharan Africa average 17.5 percent. Some of the major constraints for women’s participation include the following:

a) The unequal power relationships which exist in the private sphere are reflected in the public sphere where society still looks down on women entering politics.
b) Although progress has been made in administering free and fair elections, most elections are still characterised by violence which discourages women from participating.
c) Until recently, there were not many role models for young African women wishing to pursue politics.
d) Lack of facilities and resources to prepare women for political office. Elections cost money and many women do not have the wealth required to launch a political career.
e) Lack of facilities to lighten the roles of women in the domestic sphere leaving them very little time to engage in politics. Women are too poor to find time to pursue politics.
f) Politics is still mystified and not related to the day to day capabilities of women in particular rural women who are made to feel that, because of their lack of education and exposure, they do not qualify to participate in local politics. According to Mutume, (2004), women confront a political system that is modelled for men.
g) The structure of many political parties restrict women from running for political office as women candidates are supposed to only come from the women’s wing of the party and not from the main branch of the party which is seen as the man’s branch.

Efforts to increase the numbers of women in governance followed the Beijing platform of action’s target of achieving 30% have included the adoption of quota systems guaranteeing positions for women in parliament and in local government structures. This has been introduced either in the constitution, reform of electoral law and systems or political party decrees. The countries that have achieved the targets of 30% in Africa are Rwanda 48, 8% Mozambique 34%, south Africa 32, 8% Burundi 30, 5%, Tanzania 30, 4%, Uganda 29, 8% Seychelles 29, 4% and Namibia 26,9% ,(IPU, 2007).

It has been found that although having women in parliament does not in itself guarantee that policies will address the concerns and need s of women, Matlosa, (2007) states that the quantitative increases in the numbers of women should be followed by qualitative increase in the power and authority that women are given. UNIFEM and others assert that quota systems enable a critical mass of women to organise for greater gender equality. They help kick-start the process of empowerment of women. It is important to facilitate the organisations of caucuses among women parliamentarians and to strengthen links and support networks of women’s organisations and academia.

To be effective, women in parliament require good and reliable sources of evidence-based research and analysis. Many African parliaments have limited research capacity. To enable women parliamentarians to be effective, it is important that support be directed in this area. The work of UNDP in West Africa to identify ways of supporting parliamentarians who are illiterate and/or those who cannot work in the official languages of parliament will go a long way towards encouraging women to enter politics by providing them with the required support services for meaningful participation. Women’s organisations have led campaigns for inclusion of women candidates in party lists. In Zambia, for example, the NGO Coordinating Committee ( NGOCC) provides training for women who are interested in entering politics. They also established a campaign fund to assist women to meet the cost of campaigning. In Ghana, women’s organisations came together to develop a Women’s Manifesto which was developed from consultations with women at all levels of society. It was then handed over to the different political parties. An interesting development is reported by Kraft (2003) who argues that the increased visibility of women in public life has resulted in more women being appointed as traditional leaders. She cites the example of a former bank manager in Botswana who was appointed as paramount chief, and the declaration by the King of Swaziland that he and the Queen Mother were equals.

The low participation of women in politics is also reflected in the public service where women are still in the minority at decision making positions. The countries where progress has been made in achieving the 30 percent target have also made significant progress in the numbers of women in senior positions within the public service. Another area of governance where women are not represented is the economics sector where very few women sit on boards of directors of financial institutions even those where the government is a key shareholder. Given the prominent place of economics in the fight against poverty and in national development, it is important that women participation is increased in all key economic institutions and decision-making bodies. Box XX reports the case of Rwanda.

Box XX: The Rwanda case study
The case of Rwanda shows a country that used the opportunity of rebuilding the country after the genocide to create a society where men and women played a key role in nation building and in benefiting from the results. By the end of the conflict, Rwanda's population was 70 per cent female. Women then were acting as community leaders, financial providers and heads of households. The Government for National Unity (GNU) - the transitional authority formed in 1994 - considered women an excluded group and understood their involvement in governance to be essential for longer-term democratization and sustainable peace.

The constitutional development process was broad-based involving consultations with men and women at grassroots level. It resulted in a commitment not only to gender equality but to action towards removing discrimination against women. This move strengthened the constitution from just a statement of intent to one of purpose. Action included strengthening policies and laws for gender equality, opening up space for policy to be informed by civil society and decentralisation to ensure maximum participation of women at local level. Rwanda’s transitional government established three initiatives to ensure the inclusion of women in decision-making posts.
• a parallel system of women’s councils and women-only elections that ensures a mandate for all election bodies. These councils are elected by women only at the grassroots level and at each successive administrative level.
• a triple balloting system that ensures the election of women to a set percentage of seats at both the sector and district levels. In the September 2003 election, each voter cast three ballots at the sector level: general, woman's and youth ballot, selecting one person from each. Those women who are more experienced opted to run on the general ballot to allow those who are less prepared to run on the women's ballot.
• the establishment of the Ministry for Gender and Women in Development, as well as gender focal points at all levels within Government and ministerial bodies. These ministerial positions guarantee the proposal and implementation of policies that are sensitive to the needs of men and women. The new Constitution requires that women fill 30 per cent of policy-making posts in the country.

A network of institutions for monitoring and implementing gender equality has been established. These include the following:
• Ministry of Gender Equality and Development
• Gender Consultative Group - made up of ministry gender focal points
• Women in Parliament Forum
• Political will

The process was led from the highest level with the country‘s president playing a prominent leadership role. The fact that their inclusion in government is a nationally driven force strengthens Rwanda's system even further.

Results
The systematization of women’s engagement in policy-making has clear benefits:
• Endemic problems affecting the female population have a better chance of being addressed when they occupy top-ranking posts in the government. (Remmert, 2004)
• The women in Parliament have played a key role in introducing gender based budgeting.
• The Ministry of Gender in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and civil society set up an interagency group to engender the PRSP.
• Women contribute to the country’s physical reconstruction, social healing and reconciliation. This has been recognized and institutionalized by the current government. (Remmert, 2004)

8.7 Opportunities
The identified key opportunities for taking action at national level to increase the role of women in building the capable state are as follows:
a) New aid modalities: UNIFEM (2006) argues that the harmonisation of aid under the Paris Declaration offers a number of opportunities for furthering gender equality. A key pillar of the new aid modalities is national ownership of development priorities and strategies. Women’s organisations have played a key role in debating and influencing national policies. Women should, therefore, be key players in the processes of arriving at national development plans and priorities. Predictability of aid which is part of the new modalities should also provide opportunities for investment in areas of gender equality which give long term results such as institutional and attitude change. Performance assessment frameworks that will be developed as part of the accountability system also provide opportunities for including indicators of gender equality.
b) Existence of regional and sub regional frameworks for gender equality: Preparation for the UN processes for the advancement of women provided a platform for African governments to come together to develop common positions on gender equality, starting with the Arusha Forward Looking Strategies and later the Dakar Platform of Action, an African common position was developed. The parallel civil society process also helped build coalitions of women’s organisations at the continental level which have played a key role in ensuring gender stayed on the agenda of African development priorities. The formalisation of this in the form of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality provides an important context and framework for action and an opportunity for developing common strategies, peer learning, and pooling expertise among African countries. The establishment by the Africa Union of the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as one of its organs provides an opportunity for civil society to engage with all the programmes and processes of the AU.
c) Global attention to poverty reduction: The MDGs represent a global consensus to take action towards ending poverty. As Africa is the continent most affected by poverty, discussions and resources for the implementation of the MDGs invariably focus on Africa. Thus, Africa should take advantage of the policy space provided by the MDGs to tackle gender inequality which is a cause of structural poverty.

8.8 Challenges
The following are some of the major challenges in the field of gender:
a) Lack of political will: Many reports have pointed out that the absence of political will remains a major obstacle to achieving gender equality. Political will is required to drive the translation of laws and commitments into concrete well resourced programmes of action to achieve results. Studies have further shown the missed potential for growth by perpetuating gender inequality. For example, Blackden et al (2003) show that if women in Kenya and Zambia received the same capital investment in agricultural inputs and land as men, agricultural output would rise by between 15-20%. Despite this evidence, political will is still not strong enough to create the “tipping point” for gender equality.

b) Weak capacity in national machineries: The project of involving women’s participation in building a capable State could be another burden on already stretched national machineries. National machineries continue to shoulder the responsibility for gender equality as well as for the empowerment of women with minimal capacity. Most national machineries suffer from inadequate funding with the largest percentage of the funding coming from external donors.

c) Lack of national monitoring and coordination mechanism: ECA reports that among the challenges for achieving gender equality is the absence of a national mechanism to ensure sector and stakeholder wide gender action. UNIFEM (2006) also reports that most reports measuring country performance on frameworks such as the PRSP still do not include gender equality indicators. Combined with the absence of gender disaggregated data, accountability for gender equality is reduced.

d) Valuing the contribution of women: Most of women’s contribution in the informal sector and in the domestic sphere is not captured in national accounts resulting in the continued undervaluing of women’s contribution to national development. The Beijing platform of Action places emphasis on the need for gathering and disaggregating data which can be used to evaluate women’s contribution. UNIFEM also reports that the absence of disaggregated data outside health and education makes it difficult to measure performance in other areas of the economy.

8.9 The way forward
What then should a state do when planning to build its capability to deliver basic service and protect citizens and to manage the economy do to ensure engendered development, maximum participation and equal benefit by women? According to CODESRIA,(2006), the case for engendering the state should be made early on in the process of defining the architecture of the capable state. Lessons from the past show that adding on gender after the fact is not effective. UNIFEM (2006) argues that the harmonisation of aid under the Paris Declaration offers a number of opportunities for furthering gender equality. A key pillar of the new aid modalities is national ownership of development priorities and strategies. Women’s organisations have played a key role in debating and influencing national policies. Women should, therefore, be key players in the processes of arriving at national development plans and priorities. Predictability of aid which is part of the new modalities should also provides an opportunity for gender equality which gives long term results such as institutional and attitudes change. Performance assessment frameworks that will be developed as part of the accountability system should also provide opportunities for including indicators of gender equality.

Preparation for the UN processes for the advancement of women provided a platform for African governments to come together to develop common positions on gender equality. Starting with the Arusha forward looking strategies and later the Dakar platform of action, an African common position was developed. The parallel civil society process also helped build coalitions of women’s organisations at the continental level which have played a key role in ensuring gender stayed on the agenda of African development priorities. The formalisation of this into the form of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality provide an important context and framework for action which provides an opportunity for developing common strategies, peer learning, and pooling expertise among African countries. The AU Assembly in 2007 reported that Algeria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have so far submitted their baseline reports as part of the requirement of the solemn declaration. This should be replicated in other countries. The establishment by the Africa Union of the Economic Social and Cultural Council ECOSOCC as one of its organs provides another opportunity for civil society to engage with the Secretariat, parliament and ministers and heads of government of the AU.

The MDGs represent a global consensus to take action towards ending poverty. As Africa is the continent most affected by poverty, discussions and resources for the implementation of the MDGs invariably focus on Africa. Africa should take advantage of the policy space provided by the MDGs to address gender inequality which is a cause of structural poverty. Muntemba (2007) argues that a cost benefit analysis enables the realisation that gender equality makes economic sense. She identifies three areas, namely, access to education for girls, access to land and productive resources for women, and participation by women in decision-making as areas where studies have shown that achievements in these areas result in direct benefits to society.

8.10 Conclusions and Recommendations
Building the capable state that is able to design and implement country-owned and driven policies requires the participation of all sectors of society and the active engagement of both men and women. The strategy for moving forward requires consolidating, mainstreaming and innovating. African countries have a history of women playing a key role in traditional societies even in times of conflict and war. Women’s organisations are active in all spheres of society and increasingly help women to cope with poverty and the negative impacts of globalisation, HIV and AIDS and armed conflict. They provide a critical channel through which women at all levels can be involved in building the capable state. However, for this to happen, investment needs to be made in creating an enabling environment for their operations and in providing resources for institutional development and growth.

The national infrastructure for gender equality should be widened so as not to overburden national machineries. Public sector reform initiatives incorporating gender mainstreaming would ensure the broadening of institutions working on gender equality and create a base for engendering national plans and development frameworks. Building a capable state requires political will and commitment at the very top. Involving women in this task requires even greater commitment and political will.

In the light of the conclusions above, the following are the recommended actions for enhancing women in governance under the capable State:

a) Turning back the tide of regression: Many countries in Africa have made progress in the advancement of women. However this progress has been undermined by unsuitable economic policies, conflict and war and HIV/AIDS. Turning back the regression tide is, therefore, a priority. It involves review of policies to ensure they take into account the gender impacts of programmes and allocating resources to take corrective action. In some cases, this requires a brave State that is able to go back on previous wisdom. A case in point is the government of Tanzania which cancelled a US$140 million World Bank supported water privatisation contract after it registered adverse effects on the poor (Guardian 2005). The lesson from this case is the need for community participation, in particular that of women who are responsible for securing basic services for the family.

b) Engendering national development plans: Building the capable state requires coherent national policies and frameworks for gender mainstreaming. A DAW report quoted earlier states that, although gender action plans exist in many countries, they are not integrated into national development plans. A common framework for gender mainstreaming and an accompanying monitoring framework are, therefore, essential. This should entail the following actions:

a) Common framework for gender mainstreaming: Longwe, (2002) argues that increasing the numbers of women in management and decision making positions should not be seen as a substitute for gender objectives which are often missing in government development plans. A common framework for gender mainstreaming that can be used by all ministries should be developed. UNIFEM (2006) cites a successful UNDP initiative which provided technical support in gender mainstreaming to the Public Sector Reform Unit in Mozambique.
b) A multi stakeholder monitoring body: This body should be established to monitor the programmes of government and carry out periodic gender audits on specific programmes. This requires strengthening of national statistics institutions to enable the collection of gender disaggregated data.
c) Enabling framework: For women’s voices to be heard in policy making, it is essential that the organisations that represent them are robust and have technical, organisational and management capacities required for full participation in national development. Governments should consider providing resources, including financial support, to women’s organisations for capacity building and to manage large projects and funds which will be available through the new aid modalities. In implementing programmes, governments should pay special attention to building national capacity by preferring to work with national organisations. Frameworks for partnership should reflect this. Funding should also be made available to enable women’s organisations to continue their role in monitoring gender equality programmes. National machineries charged with overseeing gender equality should be revamped to achieve streamlined mandate, clarity of roles and relationships, status, capacity and resources to implement programmes and to create and disseminate knowledge on gender equality and the contribution of women to national development.

c) Participation of women in governance: A key reflection of the capable State will be the numbers of women in decision making positions in the different governance structures and processes. Some of the strategies already outlined include adopting national programmes to educate society on the role and contribution of women to national development and portraying images that show women as leaders. Where they do not exist, quota systems should be introduced to achieve at least the 30% target agreed at the Beijing platform. Matlosa (2007) argues that electoral systems have a direct impact on the likelihood of women being elected into parliament. He argues that the proportional representation system provides more opportunities for special interest groups and women to get seats. This is supported by WEDO, (2005) who found that proportional representation was used in all but two countries where women occupied more than 30% of the seats in parliament.

d) Removal of obstacles to women’s participation: Despite ratification to international instruments such as CEDAW and the protocol to the African charter on the rights of women in Africa, discriminatory laws and practices are still entrenched in administrative and systems and customs. The removal of all forms of discrimination against women is still work in progress in most African countries. The protocol to the African charter on human and peoples’ rights on the rights of women in Africa provides a comprehensive checklist of the areas where measures should be taken to remove discrimination and to protect women as well as ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities in all spheres of social, economic, political and cultural life.

e) Capacity building and creating an enabling framework: Although there is a need for public sector wide capacity development, special attention is drawn here to national machineries and women’s organisations as they are the key drivers for increasing women’s roles in building the capable state. This should take the following form:
a) Women’s organisations: To be effective as agents for increasing women’s role in building the capable state, women’s organisations need robust technical, organisational and management capacities. In this regard, governments and donors should give priority to providing capacity building, including financial support to women’s organisations to manage large projects and funds which will be available through the new aid modalities. Funding should also be made available to enable women’s organisations to continue their role in monitoring gender equality programmes. In implementing programmes, governments should pay special attention to building national capacity by preferring to work with national organisations. Frameworks for partnerships and government policy on civil society should reflect this.
b) National machineries: National machineries charged with overseeing gender equality should be revamped to achieve a streamlined mandate, clarity of roles, relationships and status. Significant injection of capacity and resources are required to equip them to implement programmes and coordinate better with line ministry efforts. National machineries also need to continuously create and disseminate knowledge on gender equality and the contribution of women to national development.

f) Participation of women in governance: Despite ratification to international instruments such as CEDAW and the protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, discriminatory laws and practices are still entrenched in administrative systems and customs. A key reflection of the capable state will be the numbers of women in decision making positions in the different governance structures and processes. This includes the adoption of national programmes to educate society on the role and contribution of women to national development and portraying images that show women as leaders. Moreover, where they do not exist, quota systems should be introduced to achieve at least the 30% target agreed in the Beijing Platform of Action.

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Remmert. C , (2003), “Rwanda Promotes Women Decision-makers” in The Chronicle: Role of women in building a capable state series http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue4/0403p25.asp
Ruffin F, A. (2003)10 Stories The World Should Hear More About. Women as Peacemakers: From Victims to Rebuilders of Society. UN Chronicle online edition http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue2/0204p13.asp
Rugabiza. V, (2005). The role and impact of academics in providing gender equality and women’s rights in the great lakes region? UNESCO
Rwandan Women Parliamentary Forum, (2007) Gender, Nation Building and the Role of Parliament, (International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law: http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol1iss3/self.html www.rwanda2007.org/Concept_Paper.pdf
The African Capacity Building Foundation, (2005), Strengthening Capacity for a Developmental Public Sector in sub-Saharan Africa: ACBF Launches Public Sector Management Training Program
http://www.acbf-pact.org/newsletter/archives/2005/fourth_quarter/index.asp
UNDAW (2005). Report of the Consultation on the Role of National Machineries in Beijing + 5 Follow-up & National Agenda Setting. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women.
UNDP, 1997. Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document. New York: UNDP.
UNDP, (2000). Women Political Participation and Good Governance: Challenges for the 21 st Century. United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM,(2000) Progress of the World’s Women 2000, Biennial Report, United Nations Development Fund for Women.
UNIFEM (2006) Promoting gender Equality and partnerships in new aid modalities and partnerships .UNIFEM Discussion Paper, United Nations Development Fund for Women.
WiLDAF, (2002), “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) –Implications for women and poverty eradication”. 46th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women. (CSW) United Nations, New York.
World Bank, (2006), Gender Equality as Smart Economics: A World Bank Group Gender Action Plan ;( fiscal years 2007-2010) World Bank, September.
http://devdata.worldbank.org/atlas-mdg/
Zuckerman, E. (2001), Engendering PRSPs: Why it reduces Poverty. Paper presented at WIDER conference, Helsinki August.
UNDAW (2005), Report of the Consultation on the Role of National Machineries in Beijing + 5 Follow-up & National Agenda Setting; Division for the Advancement of Women- New York.

Subject: Army Promotions
From: Wachiwee
To: All
Date Posted: 12:12:26 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: harry@yahoo.com
Entered From: 79-66-67-170.dynamic.dsl.as9105.com at 79.66.67.170

Message:
Does anyone know the names of the promoted top brass in the army?

Subject: STUPID DADDY SAJ
From: THE CRAB
To: All
Date Posted: 12:02:55 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: THE CRAB @ VARIZON .NET
Entered From: ip-207-145-43-5.iad.megapath.net at 207.145.43.5

Message:
DADDY SAJ IS A BIG DISAPPOIUSNTMENT TO MANY SIERRA LEONEAN,AND A DISGRACE TO THE MUSICIANS ASSOCIATION IN SIERRA LEONE.MR STUPID DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH DAMAGES YOU HAD DONE TO YOUR CAREER?MR STUPID,YOUR MISTAKE IS MERCILESS,AND IT WILL COST YOU YOUR CAREER.ENDORSEMENT FOR THE SLPP IS A SHAME TO YOUR FAMILY,YOUR RECORD LABEL,AND MOST OF YOUR FANS.THE FIGHT WAS BRAVE, BUT YOU SECEDED FROM THE CAUSE.WHAT ABOUT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION E DO SO PACK EN GO? EMMERSON DADDY SAJ POTTOR,EMMERSON DADDY SAJ NA SWEGBEH.THE CRAB WILL BITE MR STUPID DADDY SAJ,BECAUSE MR STUPID UNDERMINING, MUSICIANS REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE IN SIERRA LEONE.SHAME ON YOU STUPID DADDY SAJ,BALD HEAD MAN, AND A BLOOD CLOT.COMMON SENSE IS NOT COMMON,NO COMMON SENSE,NO EDUCATION,U NA SORRY CAT.

Subject: Re: STUPID DADDY SAJ
From: shamsu deen- cole
To: All
Date Posted: 18:56:29 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: shamsu2000@hotmail.com
Entered From: ool-4355b29b.dyn.optonline.net at 67.85.178.155

Message:
Who so ever the Crab is, must know that in sierra leone today, every man has the right to say, support or vote for who they like. When Daddy Saj was singing against the SLPP GOVERNMENT, many people love his songs. Now he Daddy Saj realise that notwithstanding what the SLPP FAIL TO DO, THEY THE SLPP IS STILL BETTER FOR SIERRA LEONE THAN ALL THE OTHER PARTIES PUT TOGETHER.

SO MR CRAB, BE A MAN , PUT YOUR CORRECT NAME SO THAT WE KNOW WHO YOU ARE. DON'T BE A CHICKEN, BE A MAN. TODAY THANKS TO THE SLPP, WE HAVE DEMOCRACY IN SIERRA LEONE. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO HIDE YOU IDENTITY.WE ARE NOT LIKE THE APC, WHO USE TO ATTACK AND BEAT PEOPLE. TODAY YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT ELECTION IN SIERRA LEONE, DURING THE DAY OF APC, THERE WAS NO ELECTION ALL WE HAD WAS SELECTION."DEM PICK AM". DADDY SAJ MAY BE STUPID, BUT HE IS MAN ENOUGH TO SAY WHAT HE WANTED TO SAY. I HAVE RESPECT FOR A MAN THAT MAY BE STUPID, THAN FOR A MAN WHO CANNOT STAND UP AS A MAN.STOP HIDING BEHIND A CRAB AND BE A MANNNNN.

Subject: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: CADMUS
To: All
Date Posted: 10:42:39 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 82.198.250.67

Message:
Alieu Iscandri,

I would like you to exercise your mind to this very important question and answer it HONESTLY and SINCERELY.

Are you honestly comfortable with the fact that your once respected Party APC is now a bed-fellow of the feared, ruthless RUF child-killers, rapist, and worse?

I know that you are sincere, and I believe that Mr Mansaray is an Honourable man,(so Am told) therefore let the world hear your answer. Are you going to remain with the killers or are you going to send in your resignation to Bra Koroma anytime soon?We can always have you in SLPP.

I can remember, Alieu once wrote that the RUF was a Mende creation to fight the APC in Sa Lone. Does that Logic still hold?

Would it then be true that the APC and the RUF have always had the same agenda?

Does APC approve of RUF's Policies past and present?

Since ther is not a single sierra leonean that was not affected by the RUF rebel war, are you not likely to lose support and hence Votes? Is that a wise move.

In that light Alieu, will you still condemn the Kamajors?

I remember Hamlet's soliloquy which propounds alternative concerning "the slings and the arrows of outrageous fortune" And ( as shakespear in his wisdom almost always does) Corollaries are left to the reader.

Incidently it's " The pangs of disprized love.." Subtly different from unrequited.

Alieu Please reply

NOTE:

And Bra Cormie, I would like to have your take too. You were once an interllectual contributor to this forum, but since Alieu's last visit to Europe, you have become an APC activist..no problem there, I was just wondering how persuasive Alieu must have been.

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: M. Alieu Iscandari esq
To: All
Date Posted: 17:37:15 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
We can always have you in SLPP?
Me keh?
" I shall go to eat potatoes with the lowest of peasants rather than sign or hold the document of my countrys shame (Slpp membership card) SLPP or I, I or they, for they and I cannot lead sierra leone together, I have come to know them and I dont trust them."

culled form the speech of some european monarch about to lose his crown to napoleon.

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: CADMUS
To: All
Date Posted: 09:13:28 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 82.198.250.76

Message:
Alieu,
But do you trust RUF?

I will put it another way...Do you trust the RUF more than you trust the SLPP?

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 12:06:39 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You asked,

”Are you honestly comfortable with the fact that your once respected Party APC is now a bed-fellow of the feared, ruthless RUF child-killers, rapist, and worse? ”

The first question could also read

” Are you honestly comfortable with the fact that the once feared, ruthless RUF child-killers, rapist, and worse are now bed-fellows with your respected Party APC ? “

There has been the Special Court, yes, and Inclusion would be a good idea and policy of a future president of all Sierra Leoneans on the path of Peace and Reconciliation.

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 12:00:40 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Are you honestly comfortable with the fact that your once respected Party APC is now a bed-fellow of the feared, ruthless RUF child-killers, rapist, and worse?
The first question could also read ” Are you honestly comfortable with the fact that the feared, ruthless RUF child-killers, rapist, and worse are now bed-fellows with your once respected Party APC “

There has been the Special Court, yes, and Inclusion would be a good idea and policy of a future president of all Sierra Leoneans on the path of Peace and Reconciliation.

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: FODAY MANSARAY
To: All
Date Posted: 14:01:21 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: FMANSARAY@AOL.COM
Entered From: at 216.86.58.52

Message:
My friend ,I am sure you are familier with America history and the Formation of the America Union. Namely, how the America's West became the Symbol and Flag Bearer of the America crusade.The defiance,defeat,repentance and finally the pioneers for Peace was the Republic of Texas Check the history of the Republic ofTexas.Sierra leone needs healing and the only cridible leader to pursue and accomplished that goal is the (PRESIDENTIAL )front Runner Ernest Bai Koroma.He has proven that he can unite people and organizations many times.

This is not politics it is simple reality.Check it out

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UY7zFSE8YAY

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 18:26:50 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Yes Sir, I hear you loud and clear.

If the APC or PMDC or the SLPP could implement what Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma says about the diamonds not leaving Sierra Leone in their raw state......it would be better for the country, as it is for them in Botswana, Namibia and Angola

And the dual citizens act of which he speaks is also a very significant accomplishment of restoring what was once lost during the APC era....

Well, I listened - more than once, to parts 1 to 4 of Hon. Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma's speeches in America....

Subject: Re: APC/RUF Affair what is your take Mr Iscandri, and Foday.
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:57:11 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
"...He has proven that he can unite people and organizations many times..."

Why was there a NEED to UNITE your apc organization in the first place?

Presently, is your apc really united? Forget about the PR stuff for now. Is the apc really united at the present time?

That is not what I hear from Serry-Kamal, and Eddie Turay. Have you heard from them lately?

Subject: Sengbe, where are you and JOhnny Leigh?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 09:02:45 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You and your foregone conclusions, do you know what time it is?
Do you remember Neil Kinnock?
You probably don't because you're on the other side of the Atlantic.

Subject: Re: Sengbe, where are you and JOhnny Leigh?
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 13:57:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
Thank you kindly, for that bit of good music, and info.

Presently, I am listening to Cele Le Roi of Viva la Musica, one of Papa Wemba's bands.

Wasn't Neil Kinnock a member of the Labour Party cabinet of Tony Blair in his first term? Where is he now? I know he probably said something about corruption in Sa Lon. Did he not?

Subject: Re: Sengbe, where are you and JOhnny Leigh?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 18:12:02 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
It's good to have you back in person and not through in-person-a-ation by someone else....
The things about Neil Kinnock is that it was brilliant and it was vastly expected that he was going to win that election - he was already cruising around in an official looking PM's limousine, and so we were all SHOCKED, that he didn't.
Learned the old lesson thereby, not to count your chickens, before your hens get laid...and so too the SLPP must work very hard, up till the last minute, and not take a "clean seep" fore granted...

Here's the latest song

Subject: AFRC/West-side Boys sentenced
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 08:17:42 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:

Announcement on SLBS- Radio

Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara-single term of 45 years

Sintige Borbor Kanu-single term of 50 years

Alex Tamba Brima-single term of 50 years

My question: Why do we still have Victor Foh out? He needs to be arrested for crimes against humanity.

Subject: VIP TOILETS IN SIERRA LEONE
From: THAVARISH
To: All
Date Posted: 07:40:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: adsl-074-228-219-218.sip.asm.bellsouth.net at 74.228.219.218

Message:
OONA LOOK OO.SENGBE we need your expertise after we take over on Aug 12th

Subject: Re: VIP TOILETS IN SIERRA LEONE
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 14:53:08 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
I hear you my brother, and I will answer the call.

Qak miniez za voot, thavarish?

Subject: Re: VIP TOILETS IN SIERRA LEONE
From: Joke
To: All
Date Posted: 10:43:49 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 83.229.112.2

Message:
Answer the call!! of nature, in VIPT

Subject: Re: VIP TOILETS IN SIERRA LEONE
From: THAVARISH
To: All
Date Posted: 23:11:47 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-71-204-124-192.hsd1.ga.comcast.net at 71.204.124.192

Message:
Miniez za voot..krasnaia debushka.

Subject: The APC Libran
From: Clairvoyant
To: All
Date Posted: 06:04:25 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
As a clairvoyant, it is revealed to me that Ernest Koroma, leader of the APC is Diplomaitic,urbane, Romantic, charming, Easygoing, sociable, Idealistic and peaceable character but my mystic ball saw a downside of him being: an Indecisive, changeable, gullible, easily infuenced,flirtatious and self-indulgent character. Which beggars the question; Can he run our nation with the utmost effectiveness? That my ball saw a big NO!

t Koroma, leader of the APC is

Subject: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:49:52 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
As a setting leo born on the 6th August, it is undoubtedly accepted amongst realist that he is the man who was born to be a leader but did not know that. It dawned on him very late in his life and many of us are thankful to be alive to see this powerbase with an unimaginable velocity demonstrate an uniterrupted brilliance. Thank you lord for such a gift unto our brighter steps. In him, berewa, God has our fulfilment in the realisation of our dreams for a better nation of one people.

---------------------------------------------------

Honourable Solomon Ekuma Dominic Berewa, Vice President of Sierra Leone, Leader and Presidential candidate of the SLPP, hails from Yengema, Bumpe Chiefdom, Bo District in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone. He was born on the 6th August, 1938.

Mr. Berewa attended the Catholic Primary School in Serabu from 1948 to 1953, and Christ the King College in Bo from 1953 to 1958 as a foundation student. After successfully completing his secondary education, he entered Fourah Bay College in 1958 concentrating in Latin, Politics, Philosophy, and Ethics. He graduated with a B.A. in 1963. Solo B then took up a teaching position in his alma mater, C.K.C., from 1963 to 1966.
He joined the Sierra Leone Cooperative service in 1966. Solo B then got an award to take up studies at Stanford Hall Loughborough College in England from 1966 – 1967, where he graduated as a Cooperative Officer. In 1968, he furthered his studies for a Certificate in Agricultural Marketing at the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, England. He returned home to continue service as a Cooperative Officer until 1970 when he resigned to further studies in Law.

Solo B entered Inns of Court School of Law, London in 1970 and graduated with honors in 1973 (Barrister-at-Law, Inner Temple). As a student, he won laurels from The Council of Legal Education in the Bar Final Examination in Private International Law (Conflict of Laws), and from Inner Temple in Law of International Trade. Back home, he became a Law Officer from 1973 to 1980.

Solo B is a founding partner of the Law Firm, Betts and Berewa. He worked in this firm from 1980 to 1996. While with the firm his services were engage by the Republic of The Gambia as a Special Prosecutor in 1982. He was the first criminal law and evidence lecturer in the law faculty of Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone. He also served on the National Policy Advisory Council of the NPRC. It was here that President Kabbah spotted him as a resourceful, trustworthy, and hardworking person during the drafting of the constitution.

President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah appointed him Attorney-General and Minister of Justice in 1996. In this capacity, he led government delegation at peace talks between the government of Sierra Leone and the infamous RUF – Abidjan Accord in 1996; exit plan for RUF/AFRC in Conakry, 1997; Lome Peace Agreement ending the rebel war and the establishment of UN Peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone in 1999; Peace talks in Nigeria in 1999 and 2000; tripartite meetings between the government, RUF/AFRC and UN for disarmament of armed groups and the restoration of civil state authority in Sierra Leone 2000 to 2001.

In May 2002, President Kabbah again appointed Solo B Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone. His handling of this position dubbed him “the functional VP”. He is a very trusted and loyal lieutenant of H.E. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Few of the special responsibilities he has undertaken with distinction include leading and chairing the consultative group meeting in Paris with donors; directing the preparation of the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Chairman of DEPAC with donors; he is the Chairman of the Sierra Leone Police Council
– “A Force for Good”.

Solo B believes in maintaining a very strong family unit. He recently became a widower with five children – the Late Mrs. Deborah Berewa (May her soul rest in perfect peace), Annie (daughter), Solomon Jr., Rev. Father Augustine Berewa, Martin and Francis. Grandchildren: Simche, Kwamah, Yeanie, and Solomon III
As the father of a catholic priest, he has a very strong catholic faith. In his leisure time, Solo B likes playing church organ and reading biographies.

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 09:43:06 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Chez, You get my vote as the most hyperventilating Solomaniac, buddy. The fawning earnestness in which you sing the glorious praises of your great leader Solo B makes me just wanna hurl. Really, Chez why would you want to foist on the country this guy on the premise that since he is a frontline "kakatowa" of Kabbah's failed regime, he is uniquely qualified to learn from his mistakes and do better. No he won't Chez. Solo B is not a democrat. He is a kakistocrat. You are enamored with the fact that Solo B is the man who engineered the creation of NASCA and NASSIT. Yes, the thought behind these creations are laudable but the facts are dark. More than one billion dollars from the UN, EU, Britain, Arab Countries and many more have been poured into NACSA to rehabilitate the country. Most of that money is unaccounted for. They built a few shanties, schools and dirt roads leading to nowhere. The rest of the money is financing Solo B's campaign and is a personal piggy bank for the ruling kleptocracy. Is it a coincidence that Solo's favored golden boy, Alhaji Kanja Sesay, the NASCA chief is today, hands down, the richest Sierra Leonean in the galaxy? Facts are stubborn Chez. You and Sia Tiyaama, the oher SLPP propagandist are entitled to your facts but please don't try to sanitize the real facts. And these are that Sierra Leone today is a broke, dreary place with permanent black out, no economic activity and governed with thieves who have committed economic terrorism. Solo B does not deserve the presidency. He deserves a rendez vous with a cell block.

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: M. Alieu Iscandari Esq
To: All
Date Posted: 18:31:03 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
You and Sia Tiyaama, the oher SLPP propagandist are entitled to your facts but please don't try to sanitize the real facts.

Are they really entitled to their OWN FACTS?

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Lady J
To: All
Date Posted: 12:15:50 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 65.205.131.33

Message:
You wrote “Chez why would you want to foist on the country this guy on the premise that since he is a frontline "kakatowa" of Kabbah's failed regime, he is uniquely qualified to learn from his mistakes and do better” Hmmmm… Me sef wan for noe.

This was his previous response to another thread … “Bambay, we have all suffered. I left Sierra Leone on foot and arrived in the UK after two years. All presumed I was dead. I will go no further on this but to tell you that we have all suffered and what you make out of suffering is what matters to me now. Suffering is a good advice and prepares your mental faculty for response in difficult circumstances.”

Chez, we do understand that suffering does strengthen the mind, and it’s what you make of it that make or break you. It doesn’t mean you have to succumb to a country’s self created suffering. If we chose to follow your path, then we must be suffering from the Stockholm syndrome “The Stockholm syndrome is a natural response to trauma. It is an emotionally attachment of a victim to it-s aggressor.” Chez … Please free yourself……

“To strive with difficulties, and to conquer them, is the highest human felicity; the next is, to strive, and deserve to conquer: but he whose life has passed without a contest, and who can boast neither success nor merit, can survey himself only as a useless filler of existence; ad if he is content with his own character, must owe his satisfaction to insensibility."
Johnson: Adventurer #111 (November 27, 1753)

We all need to STRIVE, not DEPRIVED of the opportunity to do so.
That’s all we are asking of the failed regime, and the only way we can accomplish such a feat, is to vote the SLPP out. They did their ASSESSMENT (Manifesto) the previous election, and instead of PROCESSING it, they took a RECESS, and the country became a MESS. Let’s face it, he had the opportunity, and he blew it.

Peace and Blessings

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Sengbe Big AXE
To: All
Date Posted: 15:50:05 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
Like him, or hate him, Solo B is gonna be the next President of Sa Lon. And the Good Lord said so too.

He is the MOST QUALIFIED of the three for that position. The others, Charles and Ernest, have no business in this contest. They are untested, unqualified, inexperienced, untrustworthy, vindictive, and they are both "chunnehs" to lead our folks out of the dark ages. We need someone who does NOT need on-the-job-training, and Bra Solo B is that man.

If you love Sa Lon, and you want her to develop, Bra Solo B is the one to vote for, NOT Charles, NOT Ernest.

Me and "my boys" (Cadmus, Chez, Alieu Sesay, APC, Independent Man, John Leigh, and the other SLPPers on this forum) so love our mother country that is why we support SOLO B for the presidency this time around.

And I will bet my bottom dollar that SOLO B, and the SLPP are gonna win the general elections in August.

Any takers?

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 23:17:04 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
If your slpp dreams come true then please prevail uon them to

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 09:35:42 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
That road will, and must be repaired, Bra Cornie.

In fact I believe that Sulima, in Pujehun District, must be one of the focal points of our developmental goals in the next SLPP administration. A city should be built there, and due to its proximity to Monroe City, in Liberia, a viable metropolis will emerge in the future, serving the two countries.

I intend to buy property in Sulima in the future. If the roads were pliable enough, it would take only an hour to go to Sulima from Jimmi Bagbo. So you see, it is very close to my own personal roots.

Bra Cornie don't you have some roots in this area? I know your cousin Raymond does. Or, am I mistaken?

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: Chez winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:20:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
I left Sierra Leone under the APC regime and prepared myself for better inspite of the struggles I encountered in the process. I prayed that one day the evils within the country will pass away and bring our country to bear good fruits. now we have that and we want to chuck it away. There is none better now than what we have - SOLO B. Charles is a lacks integrity. He is dishonest and always economically with the truth.

Out of my sufferings i have conquered and I am happy to do that which I do - always helping others less fortunate.

anger should not come into this - show me what you guys have got and I will make comparisons. So far nothing said about these untested guys is convincing.

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION
From: fed up
To: All
Date Posted: 11:40:07 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
Your are wasting time trying to educate this guy. I have stopped reading Chez a long time ago.

Subject: Re: THE DETERMINED SLPP LION-RES NOR RES AR DON WIN
From: bobobele
To: All
Date Posted: 08:22:49 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: bobobele@yahoo.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
Candidates go into an election citing the positives and believing the electorate will vote based on the candidates positive attributes and not on the negatives.

When a candidate sees the negatives as his strength, it is an affront to the inteligence of the people of Sierra Leone. It is like saying 2 ship loads of rice unaccounted for is the tip of the iceberg. Wait till you see what I do with the lungi bridge.

Subject: AN THE APC INSURANCE CONNOISSEUR
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:45:17 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
Is he a better match for Berewa? Could not find his record of his achievement aside his work as a self-proclaimed insurance connoisseur. His untested vision for Sierra Leone is remarkable.

-----------------------------------------------------Ernest Bai Koroma, the Leader of the All People's Congress (APC), is considered by his numerous followers all around Sierra Leone and in the Diaspora as The Hope of the Future.

Born October 2nd 1953 in Makeni, Bombali District, Northern Sierra Leone , Koroma attended the Sierra Leone Church primary School, Government Secondary School (Boys) Magburaka and Fourah Bay College , University of Sierra Leone .

He graduated in 1976 from Fourah Bay College , University of Sierra Leone following which he taught at the St. Francis Secondary School in Makeni before joining the Sierra Leone National Insurance Company in 1978.

Koroma moved over to the Reliance Insurance Trust Corporation (Ritcorp) in 1985 and became its Managing Director in 1988, a position he outstandingly held up to the March 2002 Elections.
An astute business man and a Chartered Insurer, Koroma is also a Fellow of the West African Insurance Institute (WAICA), an Associate of the Institute of Risk Management in the UK and a Member of the Institute of Directors in the UK.

Ernest is married to Sia Koroma and they have two children. Sia Koroma is from Kono District, Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. She attended Annie Walsh Memorial school and completed post-graduate in Bio-Chemistry at London University . The Koroma children are currently pursuing studies in the UK

Koroma's Record of Leadership

The Honourable Ernest Bai Koroma's leadership experience and vision of renewal in Sierra Leone represents the grassroots of Sierra Leone and the disadvantaged. Throughout Sierra Leone he is recognize for his unblemished public record. Koroma's positioning in the government has never been associated with corruption, unlike other candidates and office holders. The people of Sierra Leone deserve leadership that is honourable and corruption-free. That honesty and fair opportunity for all will lead the journey from Grass to Grace.

As his promise of a "new direction" holds out a hope for the future of Sierra Leone, Koroma, who holds an unblemished and enviable public record, has consistently demonstrated that he passionately espouses those key tenets of democracy such as, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, probity, freedom of the press, transparency and accountability.

Koroma has demonstrated great stewardship of the APC party over the last six years and under his leadership, the APC swept virtually all the seats in the Western Area during the last Local Government Elections of 2004. This was in spite of efforts by conservative elements in the party to undermine his leadership. However, Koroma's leadership is considered to be a blend of the old and the new. He has proved that he is committed to reform and will tackle tough issues.

Koroma was elected as the APC's Presidential Candidate for the 2002 Presidential Elections on 24th March 2002 . Despite court challenges to his leadership because of his youth and the 2002 APC Constitution, the Koroma has shown himself to be a true survivor and a man of vision. Koroma was again unanimously elected as Leader/ Chairman and Presidential Candidate of the APC at a National Delegates Conference in September 2005. Currently, he is the Minority Leader in the Sierra Leone Parliament.

Koroma has skillfully guided the party to reconciliation and is the undisputed leader, standard bearer and presidential aspirant of the APC with all the party stalwarts and executives fully committed to serving under his direction.

Age 54 years, Koroma is a voice of a generation of young visionary leaders, full of hope and new ideas for the future development for Sierra Leone. He is the youngest major candidate aspiring to the Presidency in the 2007 elections and is being put forward by the All People's Congress as "the democratic hope for Sierra Leone ." Sierra Leone is a country at the cross roads of change from an old order that has left a mark of despair to a new government inspired by a vision of hope.

The overwhelming victory that the APC enjoyed in the Local Government Election in the most densely populated Western Area, including the capital City of Freetown, is a sign that the electorate is ready for the "New Direction" and Hope that a Koroma presidency offers.

Koroma's Vision for the Future of Sierra Leone

Ernest Koroma has a simple but highly effective and meaningful vision for Sierra Leone . He plans to serve all Sierra Leoneans, local, regional and international regardless of ethnicity, party affiliation and devoid of regional preference, providing a safe and stable environment for individuals and families to prosper.

Koroma will make it a priority to restore the reliable delivery of basic public services of electricity, water and sanitation, dangerously absent for more than a decade. He will restore the dignity of the Sierra Leonean people (presently in comatose state), from young to old. He will work to restore faith in the joy and benefits of hard work, and deliver a country where the rule of law is adhered to, with consistent and fair application across all segments of society. Koroma will lead Sierra Leone from a society of dependency to a society of self-reliance and strong leadership.

This vision according to Koroma will be realized only when the country is better able to lift up the human spirit of the Sierra Leonean and manage her affairs and economy through a thriving growing private sector working in an honest and mutually beneficial partnership with Government. Ernest Koroma promises to deliver "a government that is willing to listen and build both local and international partnerships."

A business titan in his own right, Koroma is blessed with a clear and procedural vision of how to turn the economy of Sierra Leone around; remove the impediments, spur growth, encourage local and foreign investment, create employment, erect stake-holdership, generate wealth, and empower Sierra Leonean self-sufficiency to reduce reliance on outside donors.

Subject: Re: AN THE APC INSURANCE CONNOISSEUR
From: Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 06:59:30 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-71-172-31-34.nwrknj.fios.verizon.net at 71.172.31.34

Message:

I am glad you observed that point. We have heard that Ernest Koroma has long a record of achievement. Where is the proof. He was thrust upon the Reliance insurance company by Siaka Stevens.

Let him show the improvement in Reliance Insurance company since he took charge. Publish the financial statements, then we can see his level of achievement.

Remember, Govt entitities are more difficult than running private businessess where executives have more power as they are accountable to less people.

Talk is cheap, we need concrete evidence that Ernest is competent to manage Sierra Leone. I really have n't seen that yet.

Subject: Re: AN THE APC INSURANCE CONNOISSEUR- THE LEGACY OF AN ICON
From: bobobele
To: All
Date Posted: 10:46:49 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: bobobele@yahoo.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
RITCORP Bags Le 1.038bn Profit in Sierra Leone
By Abu Bakarr Munu
Jul 13, 2007, 12:10 Email this article
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One of the most credible and reliable insurance companies in Sierra Leone, the Reliance Insurance Trust Corporation Sierra Leone Limited (RITCORP), last Wednesday presented its Annual Report for the year ended 31st December 2006 to shareholders of the company at their 19th Annual General Meeting held at the Santano House, Howe Street in Freetown.

Addressing shareholders, the Chairman Board of Directors, Mr. Mohamed Babatunde Cole noted that the overall performance of the country’s economy for 2006 was encouraging, and that inflation rate dropped to 8.26% in December 2005. He said the average annual yield on treasury bills in 2006 was 14.1% as compared to 20.3% the previous year, 2005. He further said that substantial growth in export earning was mainly as a result of resumption in mining of Rutile and bauxite during the period under review.

Mr. Cole explained further that the Leone depreciated against the US Dollar and stood at Le 2,953. 26 to US$1.00 as at December 2006 from Le 2,898.22 to USD 1.00 in December 2005, and that an interest rate on saving deposits was 8% during the period.

Explaining further, Mr. Cole said despite the above analyses, the industry has continued to experience increased operational expenses due to severe shortage of electricity supply which impacted negatively on the profit margin of the company. He said gross premium income for the year under review was Le 3.179bn as compared to Le 2.841bn during the previous years.

"The underwriting profit before tax was Le 949m as compared to Le 852m in 2005", the Chairman added.

He announced to the shareholder that the company recorded a profit after tax of Le 1.038bn for the year 2006 as compared to Le 980m in 2005.

He went on to state that, the marginal increase in profitability was due to increased operational cost and stiff competition due to the emergence of new insurance companies in the market.

"Our Management has promised to redouble its efforts for an improvement in income generation", he said.

The Chairman went on to say that shareholders were informed last year that, there were plans to erect the head office building and also took the opportunity to inform shareholders about a tender notice that was put out for the construction of the said building and that the Sierra Construction System has been accordingly awarded the contract. Adding that the turning of sod took place on the 25th May 2007 and the entire works on the construction of the said building have been scheduled to complete by December 2007.

The Chairman further explained that, they continue to provide development training for staff by sending them on workshops, seminars, conferences and as well as assisting them in taking relevant external professional examinations.

"The relationship with our Reinsurance Brokers CK Re continues to be good as through them we continue to maintain our reinsurance bouquet with Munich Re and Africa Re. Our membership in the African Insurance Organisation, the West Africa Insurance Companies Association and locally the Sierra Leone Insurance Association continues to be active", Mr. Cole said

He went on to say that, the Board of Directors was pleased to recommend a dividend of Le 1.50 per share to all members on this company’s register as at 31st December 2006".

On behalf of Board Members, he expressed profound gratitude to shareholders for their continued confidence and trust in their ability to manage the company, and to the customers for their continued patronage as well as to their loyal and devoted staff for their continued dedication to duty.

Subject: Re: AN THE APC INSURANCE CONNOISSEUR- THE LEGACY OF AN ICON
From: Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 21:01:15 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-71-172-31-34.nwrknj.fios.verizon.net at 71.172.31.34

Message:
Good Try, this does not reflect Mr Koroma's Stewardship. Mr koroma was poltiking during the fiscal year 2006. Give us finacial information from when he took over the helm of reliance. The company made $3million in an industry that is not very competitive. Where most claims are not paid. A one year report does not cut it, it is not enough to evaluate a potential president of Sierra Leone. It is the same false praise that was heaped on Tejan Kabba. He worked in the United Nations, because of that everybody thought he would save Sierra Leone.

Did any body bother to ask where he worked at the United Nations , what was his record of acheivement at the united Nations. No , just working at the United Nations was good enough. Where is Sierra leone Today.

We do not need to make the same mistake with Ernest Koroma. I am not yet impressed with him.

Subject: PMDC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:25:36 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
can he be a better leader? Check his deeds and self-acclaimed accolades!!!

Subject: Re: PMDC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
From: APC
To: All
Date Posted: 07:42:08 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157