Subject: FYI
From: MODERATOR
To: All
Date Posted: 14:42:33 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: ppp-70-249-138-254.dsl.rcsntx.swbell.net at 70.249.138.254

Message:
Culled from the disclaimer:

12. Username - You are free to choose what ever username that you wish but take note that those usernames that are demeaning to your own self or to others, vulgar or that contains other negative connotations are disallowed. Using handles with racial tones is also strictly prohibited on this forum.

P.s. You know yourself. Cheers!

/Mod

Subject: CONCUBINES, KIDS AND AIRPORTS
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 14:24:25 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
With regards to the recent spate of political protagonists diving into the gutter to dig up dirt about opposing presidential candidates, I think it is a distracting and gratuitous exercise. In fact my reaction can be summed up by Clark Gable in the movie, Gone With The Wind: "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn" I am less interested in Solo B's purported harem of concubines than in his plans to reduce unemployment (currently running about 80%) or giving us reliable electricity beyond the campaign period. I don't really care whether Charles Margai has out-of-wedlock kids. I am however all ears if he would commit as president to expand the runways at Hastings Airport and make it an international airport and save us all from the shuttle nightmare between Lungi and Freetown. Party activists, please give us for debate your candidates' positions for educated debate and dot innuendoes about their extra marital exploits and libidos. That is so boring. Remember these guys are not running for Pope.

Subject: festoes
From: mani
To: All
Date Posted: 13:04:16 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
The Patriotic Vanguard, Sierra Leone News Portal|

Politics in Sierra Leone: A Tale of Three Manifestoes

By Christopher Warburton, Ph.D Econ

In 1776 the Americans crafted one of the most enduring political documents in human history, the Declaration of Independence. By so doing they cleaned up and popularized fundamental tenets of British political philosophy which affirmed the inalienable rights of man. The document is a testament to the relentless desire of mankind to be free from the yoke of oppression by despotic or tyrannical government so that human beings can prosper.

The British had the Magna Carta (Great Charter) of 1215 to guarantee liberty, fair trial and representative government to all Englishmen. In France, the fall of the Bastille eventually resulted in the Declaration of the Rights of Man which defined the goal of every political association as the “preservation of the natural and imprescr1ptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property security, and resistance against oppression.” Of course the French were inspired by the Americans, and this concept of freedom defined the free market economy of laissez-faire that was so passionately supported by the physiocrats.

The mechanisms for achieving liberty, prosperity, and responsible government have generally lacked consensus, but modern politics in Sierra Leone ought to remind us of the writings of French philosophers and European political thinkers who were clearly appalled by the Old Regime and all it represented. Montesquieu was concerned about unwise, irrational, and outdated laws when he wrote L’Espirit des Lois (The Spirit of Laws) in 1748. Rousseau, who was born in Switzerland in 1712, published his Social Contract in 1762 because he was clearly worried about the irony that man is usually born free but everywhere he seems to be in chains. His diagnosis was that government must derive its authority from the consent of the governed-sovereignty of the people.

Voltaire did not quite fit the profile of a modern philosopher, but as a popularizer of ideas his writings made no less of an impact on his society. He was highly suspicious of the role of religion in politics and he became the self-appointed champion of all victims of bigotry and injustice. According to Voltaire religion had originated long before religious leaders, but it had been exploited ever since “the first knave met the first fool.” Intolerance symbolized all that was stupid, irrational and degrading in the Old Regime. Real contemporary democracies take action to safeguard religious tolerance and equal protection of religious faiths.

The idea of direct democracy in the Greek polis has been revolutionized and made more appealing by American’s representative democracy, which despite its short comings, has become an evaluative paradigm for countries in search of a just society. What has made America a political envy of the world is in fact the reverberating power of actionable and inspirational words which have transcended the immediate needs of American independence to define the ideal political challenges of America and other societies in the world (including Sierra Leone) in search of responsible government: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”

There are two significant component parts of the Declaration: (i) The removal of destructive government; and (ii) The replacement of such a government by one which can be trusted to guarantee the safety and happiness of a nation. Aspiration to the realization of the dreams of the American Declaration poses incredible challenges for Sierra Leoneans as they decide who their next leaders are going to be. This is so because: (i) The general level of [civic] literacy required to understand and appreciate representative government is suboptimal; (ii) Serious political parties are no longer oblivious of those fundamental rights which may be deceptively incorporated into their manifestoes; (iii) In the absence of optimal literacy and the presence of rhetoric and irrational behavior, it is not uncommon for some voters to resort to violence or retreat to their parochial cleavages in the Dark Ages of the twenty-first century. In much more advanced societies such cleavages are politely referred to as “bases.” However, when these bases are sufficiently aggrieved, they may not espouse unflinching loyalty if they have a strong sense of political and economic alienation or resentment towards their political parties.

The Political Parties on Fundamental Liberties

Political parties can no longer exclude fundamental rights and liberties from their manifestoes. In this regard, the All People’s Congress (APC) cannot claim to be superior to the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), nor can the SLPP claim to be superior to the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) or the APC. Political elites are now familiar with the eighteenth century literature on fundamental liberties. Voters are therefore left with the daunting task of looking for nuances and impeaching suspicious assertions by asking the stubborn questions of: What? Why? How? For whom?

Apart from its commitment to representative government, the PMDC guarantees the constitutional and democratic rights of all citizens ( freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of association, freedom of information, right to free access to information, right to free, fair and expeditious trial, and freedom of the press).

The APC alludes to fundamental liberties as part of its core principles: “Freedom, human rights; human dignity; justice; equality; and the rule of law.” The APC writes: “Human rights have become an issue of great importance in contemporary times. This explains why it has come to occupy such an important and prominent place in State governance, the world over. Much of the misery and injustice of our time is the result of the reckless use of power. The abuse of power is a human problem and nobody seems to have a built-in-immunity from its corrosive effect. An APC Government is committed to limiting this tendency by ensuring the sanctity of life and the dignity of man.”

The SLPP states that: “No Government other than the SLPP Government can claim the accolade of heightening public awareness about human and citizens’ rights under the rule of law. And at no time have people become more conscious about their rights than now. This is a great achievement by any standard. But our work in this regard is not yet complete. In the post-election years ahead, we will set in motion a new public enlightenment campaign in order to ensure that every citizen of this country is fully aware of their civic rights as they are of their correlative civic obligations and responsibilities.”

Just what are the logical extensions of these fundamental liberties? Beyond what might seem to be their cursory restatement, they include the right to have food; health; education; and shelter. The political parties have done just fine in reminding the voters about how committed they are to guaranteeing these fundamental liberties.

The SLPP would like to increase access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation for all in both urban and rural areas. “The strategy in the five years is to continue to expand and strengthen the decentralised network of facilities for the delivery of safe drinking water and the improvement of general sanitation in both urban and rural areas. The provision of basic healthcare is considered a major priority for the SLPP Government. We will continue to demonstrate commitment to the improvement of the health status of the population, especially the rural and urban poor, in the next five years. The overall goal is to improve accessibility and affordability of health services to the population.”

As far as education is concerned, “the overall objectives of the education sector are to (a) promote basic education for all Sierra Leoneans; and (b) support manpower development in key sectors that has (sic) the greatest impact on economic growth, poverty reduction and prosperity. The main objectives of the SLPP government, during its next five years of office are to ensure the planned growth and development of the towns and villages of Sierra Leone and at the same time promote access by all citizens including the underprivileged to safe sanitary and descent housing.”

The APC contends that “Sierra Leone, once a pioneer in education and the envy of the sub region formerly known as the Athens of Africa, now finds itself in a deepening crisis that has undermined the very foundation of its educational system. Teaching and learning in many schools in Sierra Leone are at a minimal level principally because of poor classroom conditions, insufficient learning materials, lack of adequately qualified, well compensated and committed teachers. The APC considers education as the most important vehicle through which Sierra Leone will develop its human resources. An APC government will therefore facilitate, encourage and provide adequate and appropriate education.”

The APC argues that the “health system in Sierra Leone is in acute crisis. The whole country is serviced by less than six physician doctors, less than four surgeon specialists and less than three hundred nurses in the employ of government. The APC established the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences and the National School of Nursing while in governance. Disappointingly the SLPP government rendered these institutions unproductive and unable to meet our nation’s health needs. This lack of vision on the part of the SLPP government has had a devastating effect in the country to the extent that life expectancy has reached an all time low of 35 years for females and 33 for males. The party also recognizes that housing a basic necessity of life is in short supply in the country for all categories of the population.”

The PMDC reports that “life expectancy in Sierra Leone averages 37 years, one of the lowest in the world. Maternity and infant mortality rate in Sierra Leone are among the highest in the world. There is a high prevalence of preventable diseases due to inadequate and ill-equipped health infrastructure, inadequate access to health and other social services in both urban and rural areas. Doctors, nurses and supporting staff are relatively few in number. The party believes that prevention is better than cure and that it will create the enabling environment for citizens to live healthier lives, as good health is an important catalyst to economic and social development necessary for national prosperity and political stability.”

The PMDC recognizes that “human resource development is crucial to turning the economy around. Notwithstanding the billions poured into the education sector over the years, the best we could get are poorly constructed schools with few trained teachers, resulting in disappointing results in public examinations. Sierra Leone, once heralded as the Athens of Africa, now lags behind less endowed nations in the provision of education. As a political Movement, PMDC recognizes education as a key investment in human resources, which is grossly lacking at the moment. The thrust of the PMDC’s education policy shall be geared towards addressing the following: a) Quality education at all levels. b) Affordable education for all; and c) Accessibility to education nationwide.”

The PMDC notes that “public buildings and offices, quarters, barracks, their furnishings and trappings nationwide are in dire state of disrepair and grossly inadequate. Meanwhile a significant number of our compatriots have no place to lay their heads. The institutional and legislative framework for a housing scheme in this country is weak and inadequate. The PMDC in government will: a) Commit to developing policies, plans and programmes that will satisfy the housing requirements of the nation; b) Develop a national policy and objective on housing that will be geared towards meeting the national housing demand by increasing the national housing stock and satisfying the hopes and aspirations of the low-income sector of the workers of our country; and c) Create an enabling environment that will facilitate local and foreign investor-participation in housing schemes through appropriate incentives.”

Voters must now sift through the competing claims on fundamental liberties to make wise and reasonable choices. History is not generally kind to incumbents who seek a fresh mandate when the electorate is doleful and enraged because of their adverse policies. On the other hand, incumbents and a ruling political party with the ability to demonstrate and persuade voters that they have accomplished or met reasonable guarantees or standards of fundamental liberties tend to have a reasonably good shot at re-employment. A government which is up for reelection must then be prepared to defend its record, the immediate evaluative criterion for its reappointment.

Challengers face voter skepticism and their chances of capturing political power are highly dependent on trust and the degree of destruction caused by an old regime. Their past records on issues and voting patterns become highly critical for a convincing bid.

Beyond the seemingly solemn promises, those who aspire to the position of political leadership must then satisfactorily explain what they have done in and out of office to: reduce the level of poverty; increase the level of education; foster constitutional reform of bad laws (e.g. land tenure); create equal opportunities; foster economic prosperity; and uphold property right rather than promote its arbitrary repudiation.

The electorate is entitled to know: What proportion of the government’s budget was set aside to attain or guarantee fundamental liberties? What fraction of it was squandered? What was the agenda of the opposing political parties on these social issues? Was the opposition complicit or did it acquiesce? Corruption and poverty are evident threats to the realization of fundamental liberties. Voters must therefore decide which public officials have inflicted undue hardship on them as a result of corrupt behavior or abuse of authority, keeping in mind that all contestants, regardless of party affiliation, must be held to a rigorous standard of scrutiny.

Representative democracy implodes when salient political questions are answered by blood and iron or the irrational conduct of an unenlightened electorate. Bad governance and underdevelopment thrive on the cycle of gun-toting politics, mediocre political participation, and adverse [s]election, which are so characteristic of political episodes in the history of the nation.

Representative Government

The theory of separation of powers has become a well respected principle and system of government. It is a system that is intended to guarantee the now familiar fundamental liberties, but more so to check or forestall the excesses of government. The concept of checks and balances is integral to the essence of representative government. What this means from the American perspective is that there must be: separation of control; separation of personnel; but not necessarily separation of functions. Government is broken up into three branches: (i) the executive; (ii) the legislative; and (iii) the judicial. A member of one branch of government cannot be a member of another, nor can one branch of government control the other.

Notwithstanding the separation of personnel and control, the executive branch which is responsible for enforcing laws, could also grant pardons (a judicial function), give executive orders, or veto legislation (a legislative function). The legislature is responsible for making laws but it also determines the budget of the executive branch (executive function) and it can impeach a president and remove him/her from office (judicial function). The judiciary is responsible for interpreting laws or adjudicating laws but it can examine the actions of the executive branch (executive function) and laws of the legislature (a legislative function). The system has built-in safeguards to prevent one arm of government from becoming too powerful or tyrannical without oversight. It is based on trust and the use of good judgment.

The manifestoes promise Sierra Leoneans good representative government, but they are unclear about how much oversight and remedy to bad governance are desirable. The SLPP states: “Rights, whatever their descr1ption, are hollow until they are stoutly protected by the judicial system. That system, given the degree of independence and impartiality and effectiveness it enjoys, can itself contribute greatly to increasing or decreasing public confidence in the Government and the State.” The party also supports decentralization and devolution by empowering local institutions just as the other political parties.

The APC complains that “executive interference, coupled with the pursuit of political party interests have clearly undercut the constitutional role of the legislature. In addition to this, general conditions of service for members of Parliament remain unattractive. This situation will be thoroughly examined by an APC government, and proper and adequate policies will be put in place to make Parliamentary work attractive and productive. There has been an unwillingness on the part of the central government to devolve power, functions and resources to the local units.” To obtain “the true mark of democracy,” the APC cites the supremacy of the rule of law and the separation of the offices of the Minister of Justice and that of the Attorney-General.

The PMDC stipulates that “the rule of law is a sine qua non for any democratic society. It is the cornerstone for good governance leading to a stable society. PMDC is committed to upholding the rule of law and guarantees a free, open and just society. A PMDC government will: a) Ensue (sic) the independence of the judiciary as opposed to what obtains now and had long been. b) Reform the judicial and justice system to make them more efficient, effective and attractive.”

What seems to be apparent in the manifestoes of the political parties, and rightly so, is the vigorous promotion of the idea that an independent judiciary and devolution are crucial indicators of representative government. It seems to me that voters should be prepared to request more information about the checks to arbitrary authority and the removal of political leaders from office during their tenure when they abuse their authority or commit “high crimes.” Punitive measures for the abuse of power and/or “high crimes” while leaders are in office must not be perceived of as an ancillary component of representative government if the almighty fundamental liberties are to be guaranteed. It should be interesting to know what the political parties intend to do (in real terms) about such crimes and abuse of authority. It just might not be enough to talk about zero tolerance for corruption or referral to under-utilized political institutions.

Economic Growth and Development

The political parties have frantically raced to out-compete one another in their promises for economic growth in five years. Virtually every sector of the national economy has been targeted for improvement. It is curious to know why modest promises are insufficient to capture political power. Why over-commit or over-invest? Intuitively, the thinking seems to be that a political party which promises the most would have a realistic chance of being elected if the electorate fails to see the hidden challenges of meeting ambitious goals.

Voters must consider the practical limits or the merits of the commitment to economic growth in five years. By promising too much, three salient questions cannot be overlooked: (i) How can these plans be attained in five years? (ii) If fiscal restraint or discipline should be given high priority, what is the source of funding for the essential programs to get the country back on track? (iii) What is the plan for foreign exchange stability, if foreign investors are to be enticed to Sierra Leone (i.e. without having pecuniary rewards in alternative forms, how can the currency be made more attractive to foreign investors)? What might not have anything to do with over-commitment is a plan for the labor force to be internationally competitive for integration into the global economy. What are the plans to prepare Sierra Leoneans to capture a substantial share of the outsourcing market of the global economy if the domestic agricultural, financial, and business sectors cannot readily and favorably respond to the state of unemployment?

The Commitments to Economic Growth and Development

In addition to the social spending that might be required, there is hardly any sector of the Sierra Leonean economy for which targeted spending is clear. It is incomprehensible how the leakages of smuggling, tax evasion, and public capital flight will make-up for the short-fall of government outlay. It is somewhat consoling to note that privatization, which is strongly supported by the political parties could minimize government spending, but it will require more than privatization to satisfy the required deficit financing. The manifestoes do not make clear just how much spending is required to resuscitate the ailing economy, although it is clear that the mining, agricultural, and financial sectors, in addition to the physical infrastructure of the country, will require mammoth financing or remain in a steady state or state of disrepair.

The National Revenue Authority (NRA), which is now part of the bureaucracy for the purposes of revenue collection, may very well be instrumental in improving the revenue collecting capabilities of any government in the country, but it does not indicate the extent to which it is capable of financing the agenda of any of the political parties. How much money is required to overhaul the educational system, health, housing, forestry, mining, communication and electricity? What assurances are there that electricity will be available for private consumption, businesses, or foreign investors?

The inflationary situation in the country has to be addressed much more deeply. The SLPP promises to reduce inflation in the next five years by instituting major monetary instruments that will include open market operations and statutory reserve requirements. The PMDC and APC are equally aware of the fiscal and monetary challenges, but with less precise strategies, voters might want to understand the positions of all the political parties on precise issues like seigniorage and what can be done about it to reduce the level of inflation. How can the central Bank’s independence be restored? What role will seigniorage play in financing government deficit? How can seigniorage be avoided?

As far as sovereign debt is concerned, the incumbent party seems to have an advantage and its manifesto gives exhaustive analysis of debt negotiations culminating in decision point. Unlike its challengers, it has been in the favorable position to negotiate debt reduction with international organizations. Challengers must therefore show debt-reduction competence or serious commitment to sovereign debt negotiations and reduction.

Should voters be vigilant and responsible? The country is in a situation for which due diligence and civic responsibility cannot be trivialized or sacrificed to irrational sentiments. Voters must be willing and eager to ask the decisive questions that will put the country on the path of sustainable economic development. Convincing and rational responses with the highest likelihood of implementation must inform probative rather than belligerent voters if the country should have any realistic prospect of hope.

Meaningful political and economic transitions are no longer dependent on rhetoric or sentiments, but substantive programs in an age when most nations of the world are beginning to realize that it is important to make progress and uplift the lot of their citizenry. Fortunately, unlike the 1960s and 1970s when military regimes were well disposed to seize political power with virtual impunity, the international community is now less disposed to countenance rogue regimes and war crimes. Sierra Leoneans must now seize the opportunity to elect the government they deserve to give them a better shot at life and prosperity. May the best political party win and may God save the country from undesirable leadership.

Subject: Concubines, Bastards and Airports
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 12:45:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
I have witnessed the recent spate of political protagonists diving into the gutter to scoop dirt about the presidential candidates. My response to all this is best expressed forme by Clark Gable in the movie, Gone With The Wind: "Frankly my dear, I don't give a damn". My stance is not because of high principle. I just believe that if we start taking the political discourse on that slippery slope of a man's extramarital activities, vis-a-vis girlfriends, concubines or out-of-wedlock kids, most people on this forum will turn out to be hypocrites. Besides we are not voting for the Pope. We are trying to elect someone who in spite of his human failings will aspire to noble ideals and altruism for the greater good. Berewa's concubines? Margai's bastards? Who cares? My vote for any of the big three will depend on their record and plans for the future. For example, which candidate will consider extending Hastings runways so that it can become an international airport and save every body the shuttle nightmare between Lungi and Freetown?

Subject: Re: Concubines, Bastards and Airports
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:54:32 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
I like that. Brilliant! I posed the question as to the validity of margai's statement on his website and other outlets about the number of his children. It was not intended to attack his personality but his credibility as a leader. The act itself can be understood but the omission of disclosure made me wonder - why is this man behaving like this - we are not fools - we know and telling us about will make us hold you in high esteem.

Subject: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:41:19 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
THE NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT OH; WE NA DE LANDLORD!
By Awareness Time
Jul 19, 2007, 18:39 Email this article
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You May Click Here To Read or Discuss Views About This Article

Track & Lyrics by Oba of Fourah Bay

INTRO

Go Lidom if you heart done warm

For 24 years back, oodat bin

take Salone lek Farm???

Two Ship Res; You want know ‘bout that

Ask Ernest Koroma ‘bout that

Na im na bin NASSIT Chairman

NASSIT Chairman na Parliament

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

The Notice Nor Go Right Oh

We Na De Landlord

The Notice Nor Go Right Oh

We Na De Landlord

From 2001, Gadhaffi send res for Salone

From 2001, Gadhaffi send res for Salone

Ernest Koroma know that

Na im na bin the Chairman

For the NASSIT Committee

Na dem bin sell the res

Ee dey make innocent

Because ee want power

Power wey noto you yone

24 Years, We don toe-line

You done kill we! Ee do so!

FIRST STANZA

If you don craise, Go leh den men you

You nor go gi notice to landlord

Oodat den dey use you

Get for abuse you oh

Rebel den pwell yah

De Pa don cam, ee make yah

Schoolpikin nor dey pay school

Woman sabi den yone right

NASSIT support old pa dem

Support Solo B leh we get betteh Salone

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

SECOND STANZA

2002 Elections, den nor talk

2004 Elections, den nor talk

You wey don sell res

Dey make lek you nor know

Na Politics!

Why 2007 from 2001?

Na now den wan talk

Because election don cam

Den frade Solo-B

Den begin talk... Boku Lie!

Talk Na Free!

CHORUS: The Notice Nor Go Right Oh...

Subject: Re: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: Continue for Suffer
To: All
Date Posted: 14:08:29 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
Support Solo B leh KABBAH ALAKI continue FOR PWELL BETTEH NAR Salone

CHORUS:

Berewa en Kabbah
We nor fool
Nar Oonu fool
We nor craise
We don gainse
Kabbah don don
Berewa go don
Nar di notice dis
We don tire wit dis
Salone Pipul Problem
We go kick dem

Subject: Re: APC & PMDC OFF THEIR TROLLY - NOTICE NOR GO RIGHT
From: PROPAGANDA
To: All
Date Posted: 14:37:58 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
E luk leke say kabba in bortu don sweet nar sylvia worworliwor in mot. Ejus dey pull sing way.

Subject: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Saidu Daphay Turay
To: All
Date Posted: 10:51:01 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-70-108-186-218.washdc.east.verizon.net at 70.108.186.218

Message:
Maada Bio's quest for power made him to betray Valentine Strasser by hurriedly handing power through quasi elections to kabbah. He journeyed to the United States to enjoy his goodies and booties looted from the coffers of Sierra Leone but the United States could'nt accomodate him just as Tom Nyumah got himself exposed that rendered his deportation. Now these two ill-fated cronies are now joining forces with the SLPP to terrorize the opposition parties just as Maada announced in 2006 that "If the APC wins, he will overthrow that government." Let Maada Bio be reminded that inasmuch he has right to allign with any political party of his choice, his threat of distabilizing Sierra Leone is closely monitored and will be held accountable for any problems facing the opposition parties. Violent is not bought but a will for the savage to exercise and a counter defence for the civilized to reciprocate. So Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah can exploit the the dying SLPP party by becoming body guards to Berewah but the peoples power will prevail against any planned subversive activities.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 11:37:40 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Saidu Turay, I am in sync with you in your distrust of Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah, those political mercenaries. Yes they are mercenaries in the sense that they offer their services to the highest bidder. This time the SLPP is offering the biggest renumeration, so Bio and Nyumah are SLPP thugs today. These guys are completely devoid of principles or scrupples and would have eagerly jumped at the opportunity to tot a gun or ride shot gun for APC or PMDC had the price been right. There is no conspiracy theory here at all. It's all about the unprincipled dash for the buck. Oh, about Captain (General? PLEASE!!) Bio's threat to stage a coup; he has a snowball's chance in hell. The present day military in Sierra Leone is more professional than the rag-tag outfit Bio and Nyumah led. The only time this military will lead a coup is if the Solo gang decides to mug our democracy by stealing the elections. And even then, they are going to hold Bio and Nyumah at arm's lenght.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:58:13 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
We would rather have BIO, than have Gbassay Kanu( RUFP) leader.
Bet you are planning another Rebel War...
This time, it will take few days not YRS.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 13:15:54 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Alieu, you said you would rather have Bio than Gbessay Kanu of the RUFP. I have never heard of an RUFP Gbessay Kanu and wouldn't care anyway. My position is that we would be better off without any of these despicable clowns. Anyway just as Solo B deserves to be booed for hiring that bumbling Napoleon Maada Bio as his chief thug, so too does Boy Ernest deserve to be smacked for even entertaining the thought of entering into an unholy alliance with those murderous acolytes of the RUF. Win, but please not by all means necessary. Solomon, Ernest and Charles, take note.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Joker Oker
To: All
Date Posted: 13:57:56 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
Manny, why do you take this Joker seriously?

Don't you know his lies are the product of his dull imagination? The clown is a tribalistic SLPP supporter that is used to mammy cuss and calling other people names.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 13:26:14 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Bo mi man change da you cyber-name dae. How ba?

As for Gbassay Kanu, he is the current leader of the RUF and son of former APC kingpin.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: Mammy Sweh
To: All
Date Posted: 11:35:51 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mammysweh@gmail.com
Entered From: ool-44c6d571.dyn.optonline.net at 68.198.213.113

Message:
Saidu Turay, I am in sync with you in your distrust of Maada Bio and Tom Nyumah, those political mercenaries. Yes they are mercenaries in the sense that they offer their services to the highest bidder. This time the SLPP is offering the biggest renumeration, so Bio and Nyumah are SLPP thugs today. These guys are completely devoid of principles or scrupples and would have eagerly jumped at the opportunity to tot a gun or ride shot gun for APC or PMDC had the price been right. There is no conspiracy theory here at all. It's all about the unprincipled dash for the buck. Oh, about Captain (General? PLEASE!!) Bio's threat to stage a coup; he has a snowball's chance in hell. The present day military in Sierra Leone is more professional than the rag-tag outfit Bio and Nyumah led. The only time this military will lead a coup is if the Solo gang decides to mug our democracy by stealing the elections. And even then, they are going to hold Bio and Nyumah at arm's lenght.

Subject: Re: Maada Bio Falls from Grace to Grass
From: NOISE
To: All
Date Posted: 11:13:20 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 207.108.136.242

Message:
It's a shame for those who were singing praises of heroism for Tom Nyuma when he was in the US fighting deportation. Do you remember what happened to SAJ Musa? Trust me it is going to happen to these murderers if they want to reignite another problem for that country. This time is the people's turn. So they have to watch out their actions.

Subject: ‘Ten years of forcing young girls into prostitution'
From: Med
To: All
Date Posted: 10:29:46 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 82.114.74.96

Message:

Yaya thanks, I am moved by such a statement, I urge that our leaders and their loyalists double efforts in addressing such disgraceful issue. This problem is primarily influenced by the war we have all suffered in our nation; yes even extraterrestrials know now that recovering from war is a gradual and often painstaking process which gyrates around good or bad governance, for example, you don’t need an outstanding degree to run your home, it takes a two fold process i. the process of decision-making and ii. the process by which decisions are implemented, in short defines governance. It’s either as a government, CEO, husband or wife fails in reaching a realistic decision or the implementation process goes amiss, the results actually determines or questions ones ability.
Africa has the nastiest history in the human race, our people have suffered much brutality and we continue to suffer the more in the hands of very few narrow mindedness people called politicians, which includes the reunion of slpp and former nprc teenage soldiers, soldiers that ravaged our nation with impunity [despite Berewa’s allegation of corruption claims on13 Sept 1996] are now taking the back seat whilst those that advised them rule us [Kabba and Berewa-National Policy Advisory Council] it’s a pity, this has actually helped my conclusion that we have no clue of governance, what a leader is or should be, even how our people accept the effects of bad governance as against its proper functioning, determines our level of understanding. Sierra Leoneans venerates our leaders, sad to say, it’s a colonial legacy, it ought not to be so in this 21 century, our people need to know the concept of leadership, pathetically even those deemed enlightened prove ignorance on this subject when ever they express themselves in this forum. I have often said that leaders should fear the people, not the opposite; if a nation suffers, it’s a nation’s choice, because history has taught us that ordinary sober minded people [nations] have crumbled kingdoms, governments that did not serve their national interests.
The Arabs we beg for money today, helping us install electricity or street lights mostly were mere hunters or nomads at the time most African nations gained what you call independence today, despite the fact that they are engulfed in crises they are ahead of us.
Now, our women [sisters] and children were reported by TRC to have suffered the most during the barbaric senseless decade war and have continued to suffer, we need to put aside politics and address these simple issues like food security……to our leaders, think and implement, please

Subject: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Toegondoe Sagbah
To: All
Date Posted: 01:33:52 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: mendemoi@yahoo.com
Entered From: pool-72-82-207-36.cmdnnj.east.verizon.net at 72.82.207.36

Message:
Wanakabs, you want to go personal on Charles with your previous question and not on the issues? Then here is a question for you to answer. HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE AND HOW DID HE RELLY TREAT THE OLD LADY WHEN SHE WAS ALIVE?(May God Bless Her soul)? I think that you would rather deal with the issues instead of private lives...PLENTY OF SKELETONS IN THE CLOSET, MAY BE YOU DON'T KNOW

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Salia Koroma
To: All
Date Posted: 09:12:56 07/20/07 ()
Email Address: salia@hotmail.com
Entered From: c-24-127-53-17.hsd1.va.comcast.net at 24.127.53.17

Message:
Just rumour mongering: that is what you are known for here and on other forums.That Margai is unfaithful is common knowledge, not a skeleton. Only you know the skeleton about Mr. Berewa.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: WAA
To: All
Date Posted: 09:50:30 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
You are the person fooling himself.

Berewa is NOTORIOUS for having concubines, many of them half his age! They usually called him "uncle" around his late wife, to try and fool the poor woman. One of the notorious "money-nar han back nar gron" ladies of ill repute in Atlanta is in fact one of Berewa's many concubines

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:14:19 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Atleast he is not known for having an affair with his neice like Toe's leader.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: PMDC
To: All
Date Posted: 11:37:23 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
YOU DON'T KNOW THE REAL DIRTY OLD MAN CALLED BEREWA.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Alieu Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 11:39:30 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
what/who i know is the DIRTY Bastard called Margai.
Laydom with you neice...

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:09:22 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Alie, do not go down their road - we should avoid using such words. The bulk who left the SLPP and joined the PMDC are known for such tactics - profane obscenities is part of their vocabulary. Hooliganism and notoriety is all the orders of their day. Thank God they are no longer a part of us; their tribalistic character is known throughout - they are the characters that gave the SLPP a Southerner/Easterner look. Thank God they have gone!

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: XCheck Your Facts
To: All
Date Posted: 13:54:47 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
"The bulk who left the SLPP and joined the PMDC are known for such tactics - profane obscenities is part of their vocabulary. Hooliganism and notoriety is all the orders of their day."

Not true, lying SLPP bato man.Is SLPP Alieu Sesay, man of many fake names, who has just now used obcenities not SLPP? Why is it that you SLPPers always like to push your dirty laundry under the foot mat (no pun intended, SLPPers).

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: PMDC
To: All
Date Posted: 11:43:06 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
berewa laydom wit his niece while his wife was in the same house, is what i hear. SO, WHAT DOESC HE WANT TO TALK?

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: men pekin
To: All
Date Posted: 13:42:09 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 67.63.2.157

Message:
Wae me aunty say for go men me, every night wae e comot Pa dae tell me for pull wait year nar im aede.
Den we move to " touch am". E kin tell me for touch am, en den e gee me 10000 leone.
Nar dat we lef pan tae ar get belleh for am.

De peikin dae with me mama nar BO #2.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: FINDA ATL
To: All
Date Posted: 12:07:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: adsl-074-228-219-218.sip.asm.bellsouth.net at 74.228.219.218

Message:
Leave me out of this,because as far as I know,Uncle Berewa helped me with my SCHOOL FEES in America,so if he decided to have me as one of his CONCUBINES that's find with me,eventhough I knew what he was doing to AUNTY NEE was wrong,but yeah I needed to finish school in Georgia.I was at the HILTON AIRPORT HOTEL with him last year when he came to Atlanta,and his children were mad at US,but I do not give a damm about them,and they know it,and especially that spoiled rotten daughter of his ANNIE LANSANA.I have been to Sierra Leone several times since the death of Aunty NEE,and now I am free to stay at his house.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: news
To: All
Date Posted: 04:59:43 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: 125-64-ftth.onsneteindhoven.nl at 88.159.64.125

Message:
Chez is drifting into a sea of lies and darkness. Himself has more than nine children. He said it not me.
Tell me, your action to have such a large number of children shows that you are promiscuous and you lack a sense of self control.
Go back and look at yourself before you talk about others.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:08:27 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Are you refuting my observations? Am i the candidate here? Am I the one being tested here for credibility and not promiscuity? Answer my questions! I am not ashamed of my children. I have five biological and I support a lot through my etrepreneurial vetures.

I am not the one being tested here. i have not given a false statement to conceal a vital prerequisite on the question of my credibility.

I tell no lies - those who know me, will tell you that I do not engage in gossip or namecalling. it is an observation that i want to confirm. It emanated from a debate on charles' honesty and credibility. If you have anything berewa said that is not true - tell us and some of us will question him.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: ANSWER
To: All
Date Posted: 09:55:34 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
"Are you refuting my observations? Am i the candidate here? Am I the one being tested here for credibility and not promiscuity? Answer my questions!"

The answer to your first and last question is yes! The answer to your remaining question is no. That is not so relevant as the answer to the first and last questions.

Your major problem is that you lack credibility. It is a fault you share with your candidate, Berewa. Both of you are doomed to failure in your unpatriotic quest to fool the poor suffering people of Salone.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 12:18:35 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
I can see we are not understanding each other. is the statement made by margai in his profile about the number of his children an omission or the truth? that is my question. My credibility is not been tested here - it is that of margai. he made a statement to the world and i am merely trying to bring out his error or lack of truth.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: UNCLE FINDA
To: All
Date Posted: 13:51:05 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-mtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 64.12.116.204

Message:
You may not understand yuourzelf, but me, I undersand you very very well. You want to use dirty politics. Too bad you don't know that your candidate Dirty Old Man Solomon FINDA of ATlanta Uncle BEREWA s a very dirty old man.

I repeat, Berewa is a very dirty OLD man.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 05:49:46 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
There are many forms of marraige you know. There are even traditional forms.....

The passing unto the hereafter of Rabbi Josef Dunner was followed by this obituary in the Guardian
“He is survived by his wife, nine of his 10 children, and 250 grand and great-grandchildren, all following the traditions in which he lived his life.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,,2117048,00.html
Count your own blessings and without envy, avarice, covetousness, jealousy or spite, you may count his blessings too.
“The Vicar of Wakefield” begins “I was ever of opinion that the honest man who married and brought up a large family, did more service than he who continued single and only talked of population.”

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 06:09:12 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
True mon patron! My bone of contention: ommission/oversight or misplaced info if become known should be courageously disclosed. I am asking the PMDC is the info or your website for the public to consume true?

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:53:17 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
You are missing my point. my question may have been directed in a personal phase but it is the credibility of your candidate's statement on your website that puzzles me. he says "Marital Status: Married (Mrs. Vivat Margai with two daughters)". This statement makes me question a credibillity issue here. Why is he withholding information that would have dismiss the notion that Charles lacks credibility; that charles is covertly dishonest - disclosure to the full is what I am asking. About Berewa's concubines! that is irrelevant as everyman who lacks a bit of discipline can indulge in such, it is also a matter of the degree to which the individual is ready to go. have concubines and spread your powerful genes? Or you just fulfill likes animalistic needs man can hardly let go? I do not think i am personal here? If you have anything on Berewa, please say it the people need to know. I am supporting Berewa but the interest of my country comes first. i think, for now, he is the only suitable choice we have. I would not be personal - I love facts - noone will kill or send me to gaol for that. Tell us the truth and we will understand you guys.

yes the closets are full of dirty linen. now is the time that the character can have a bearing on the policies you can make in the future. A womaniser may be an immoral character and lacks self-discipline but to deny that which you've sown is an abomination of the higest order.

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 02:38:59 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Of course you guys have never heard of "Grandpa's style!" - Muslims are limited to four, and Christians to one. You'll have to check the song " School Days" from Demba Conta's Album " The United States of Africa " for Grandpa's style.....

Whilst you Chez Winakabs may be beating your chest with self -Righteousness when talking about our local heroes, what do you have to say, not only about Kabbah and Albert's annointed, but about

Subject: Re: Chez Wanakabs Eurpoe: HOW MANY CONCUBINES DID BEREWA HAVE?
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 04:59:15 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Mon patron, i am not criticising the act here but the denial of an act that one has done and everybody knows it. It dents one's credibility. Few men can raise their hands up and call themselves saint. But when in the public domain or wanting to be in the public domain, one should have the bold courage to disclose what others may view as a necessary thing. Do not conceal that which is so important in making assessment of your standing in life - your integrity.

Solomon lived it and enjoyed it. he did not deny his offspring. Ethiopia is proud today to have solomon as their descendant. Speak out and people will respect and understand your past. The urge can do a lot of wonders.

Subject: Cocorioko! Why so late with the debate?
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:19:03 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:

The reporting of the debate will take a day and then this will be discussed during the four days before the elections on Cocorioko and a few other forums with mostly Diaspora participants, some card toting, but mostly non-voters.........

And then do these Diaspora discussions in cyberspace ever impact on the discussions and home grown opinions?

To what extent will the debate impact on voter behaviour, especially on the floating (if there are any such people in Sierra Leone.......

The Royal African Society
http://www.royalafricansociety.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=141

Tackling the issues that caused the war:
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/493/

That Libyan Rice business:
http://www.peepsierraleone.com/news/templates/article.asp?articleid=38&zoneid=8

To help prevent the hijacking of the elections:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/africa/story/2007/03/070220_sierraleone_elections.shtml

Since the debate has been postponed to the day before Mr. Berewa’s birthday party, it’s possible that we can still send in questions for the SLPP’s Berewa (known to some of his detractors as a somnambulist) the Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma (the youngest and most youthful of the three) and the Hon. Charles St. Francis Margai (who would also like to be given a chance to perform some miracles) and to debate…….

Subject: Re: Cocorioko! Why so late with the debate? (2)
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 21:30:58 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
V-P Berewa is probably now undergoing intensive debate coaching , going over the issues , again and again and knowing that some of these APC debaters can be rough, able trifoot you ehn den bazz you pan tap di bargain, and one sure good thing about Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma, is that he is a very calm human being....

A vice-presidential debate could also take place before the big boys’ battle it out.

Subject: A REFLECTION - SEE WHERE OUR DETERIORATION BEGAN
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 20:17:31 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
COUNTRY REPORT ON TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE - BY MARIAMA JALLOH

Sierra Leone is one of the oldest Countries in the West Coast of Africa. It has a population of about 4 million people and it shares common boarders with Liberia on the Eastern side and with Guinea on both the Eastern and Northern sides of the country. Sierra Leone has 14 indigenous ethnic tribes and it is divided in to four provinces – the Eastern Province, Southern Province, Northern Province and the Western Area.

Sierra Leone has natural resources like Diamonds, Gold, Iron Ore and Bauxite which were the main source of export before the war. About half of the population are engaged in small scale farming like rearing livestock (this is common in the Northern Province), planting of rice, ground nut, cocoa, coffee and kola nuts. Most of these crops planted are for domestic use. But crops like Cocoa and Coffee, before the war, were exported to other countries.

At this moment Sierra Leone does not export any crops and is highly dependent on importation of goods from other countries.

Sierra Leone, among other countries, was colonized by the British and finally got independence on the 27th April,1961 and later became a republican state under the then Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai. Sierra Leone at present has a democratically elected government headed by President Ahmed Tejan Kabba. We have the three main organs of Government which are independent i.e. The Legislature, The Executive and The Judiciary.

TRADE UNION HISTORY IN SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is among the countries on the continent with the oldest trade unions. It is also among the countries, which recorded the earliest strikes on the continent. In 1874, a strike occurred in Freetown harbor and in the years that followed before the formation of trade unions as of today, were years of bitter and violent protest by the workers against the poor working conditions and inhuman treatment in the hands of the employers who enjoyed the full backing of the colonial government.

THE PERIOD 1928 – 1938
Many of the strikes and protests took place during this period. These days any strike action and protests were considered illegal and subversive. But, as a result of these unrest’s which were not only prevalent in Sierra Leone but also in other countries, led to the issuing of a directive by the colonial secretary of the home government to the colonial administrators in 1930 requiring them to enact labor legislation on minimum conditions of employment and trade union organization.

Attempts to form trade unions in Sierra Leone started with workers grouping themselves into departmental and shop organizations. The first such organizations formed at work places were in the Railways Department, Marampa Mines, Pepel and the Sierra Leone Coaling Company (MABELLA).

The organizations were formed purposely to enable the workers to put across their demands to the employers, but due to the fact that the organizations were not recognized by the employers andin the absence of labor laws providing a machinery for negotiations, the organizations were more often used to organize strikes than engaging in negotiations with employers. This situation of unrest lingered on until 1938, when the late I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson returned home from abroad with a wealth of experience he gained during his travels around the world. He preached to people the following ideas:

- how the workers could request for their rights from the employers and
- How the citizens could request for their civil rights.

At a general meeting convened at the King George Farm at Savage Street in Freetown immediately after the MABELLA Strike, he educated thousands of workers who attended the meeting on how to organize themselves into strong trade unions which fight for their rights and be recognized by the government. He in fact introduced the method of organizing trade unions and political parties in Sierra Leone.

THE RAILWAYS’ AND THE “MABELLA” STRIKES
The two strikes occurred before the enactment of the Sierra Leone Labor Laws in 1939. The Railways strike took place in 1926. The strike was as a result of workers’ demands for better wages and better working conditions from the Railways authority, which seemed to have fallen on “Deaf Ears”.

The strike, which began on February 1926, lasted for two months, during which period the workers suffered humiliation, and harassment in the hands of troops who shot at them as they demonstrated and arrested the strike leaders. The Governor of Sierra Leone described the strike as a revolt against the government by its own servants.

The 1938 strike by the workers of Sierra Leone Coaling Company, MABELLA as it was best known, lasted for two weeks. The strike was caused by the same reasons as the Railways strike. But this time, the government intervened by working out a compromise between the raging workers and the management, resulting in the work being resumed after slight changes were made in the working conditions.

Although the work resumed within two weeks, the stranded foreign ships waiting to be loaded with coal incurred huge losses.

The enactment of the Sierra Leone Labor Laws embodying trade union ordinance in 1939, marked a new era of industrial relation in Sierra Leone. The trade unions were registered in large numbers following the enactment of the laws. The first trade union to be registered was the Artisans & Allied Workers’ Union led by the late Brother Marcus Grant as its General Secretary. Brother Grant later figured prominently not only in trade unions, but also in politics. Together with late President Dr. Siaka Stevens, who started his trade union career, as General Secretary of Marampa Mines Union later became the General Secretary-General of the United Mine Workers Union and first Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Council of Labor (SLCL) at its inception?

Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act Sierra Leone Government

Dr. Siaka Stevens never lost touch with Trade Union Movement even after his resignation from trade union leadership to become a full-time politician. Both Brother Siaka Stevens and Marcus C. Grant were pioneers and heroes of the Sierra Leone Labor Movement. Other trade unions formed that time included the Railways Union, Carpenters’ Union. Some of the unions were very small and weak. The government on the other hand was busy with the establishment of the labor department. But due to lack of qualified personnel, it took a long time before the government could properly start the department.

THE FIRST TRADE UNION LABOUR CENTRE
Efforts by Dupinee a Sierra Leonean and Edgar Parry, a British Trade Unionist who later became the first labor commissioner culminated in the establishment by 1946 of streamlined trade union organization on industrial basis. The Sierra Leone Council of Labor, a trade union co-ordinating body was formed in the same year with Brother Siaka Stevens as its first General Secretary.

The Creoles of Freetown provided almost the entire labor force for the government owned enterprises with which the early trade unions were connected such as the railways, the mines and docks. Not until much later were trade unions formed in most private sectors.

Because of this homogeneity of labor force without marked tribal difference trade union organization accelerated much faster. Of all the British colonies, Sierra Leone enjoyed the enviable position of having the highest reputation in the field of industrial relations and boasted of negotiating machinery, which conformed to that of the United Kingdom.

In 1949 Sierra Leone Labor Congress participated in the formation of the ICFTU the first representatives being the late Siaka Stevens and the late Marcus Grant.

Prior to the 1955 strike, industrial relations in Sierra Leone were presented as something of a model with close cooperation between unions, the labor departments and employers, the existence of wages councils, joint industrial councils and National joint Consultative Committee which acted as a central advisory body on labor legislation and labor policy.

The 1955 Strike
The strike of 1955 by the members of the two unions, the Artisans and Allied Workers’ Union and the Transport and General Workers’ Union was caused by a deadlock at the joint industrial Council over pay demand and a subsequent disagreement at a special investigation committee appointed by the government to look into the dispute and make recommendations.

The strike was described as historical and unique because of the following reasons:
- It was the first to be organized by a registered trade union
- It was the first to occur after exhausting the parties negotiating machinery
- It was the first to affect the essential services in the whole of Freetown as the workers staged sympathy strikes at places like Railway, Electricity, Health, Public works and Water Works.

The situation became so tense with the government threatening to arrest trade union leaders if they did not call off the strike. The threat sent the leaders into hiding for fear of arrest.

As the strike continued to make life difficult for the Freetown residents the Governor was compelled to summon trade union leaders to a meeting at his Fort Thornton residence Now State House to discuss the strike issue. Since the trade union leaders had feared arrest, none of them turned up except Brother Marcus Grant who availed himself for the meeting which ended with a promise by the government to look into the workers grievances should they resume work. Brother Grant was left with no choice but to communicate the government’s decision to the workers. He called a meeting at the Victoria Park. After his address to the workers on the government’s decision, the workers decided to resume work.

After a month, the governor who was also Commander-in-Chief and Vice Admiral of Sierra Leone announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry headed by the late Justice R.B. Marke. Surprisingly enough the terms of reference did not include the workers’ grievances. The aim of the government was to find someone to blame for the strike.

MERGERS AND SPLITS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
The Sierra Leone Council of Labor formed in 1946 remained the only central trade body until 1962 when as a result of a rift; a rival organization was formed known as the Sierra Leone Labor Congress. The two organizations merged in 1964 under the name Sierra Leone Federation of Labor. But the merger was short-lived. A group broke away from the Federation in the same year to form yet again the Sierra Leone Council of Labor. In 1966, unity was restored again and the tow organizations formed yet another Sierra Leone Labor Congress. In 1971, there was another split. Differences in opinion and policy arose between those who broke away to form Sierra Leone Labor Congress. This division caused many harms to the workers during the period 1971-1976.

On the 22nd July 1976, the Sierra Leone Labor Congress and the Sierra Leone Council of Labor merged again to form the present Sierra Leone Labor Congress.

The late President, Siaka Stevens, whose association with labour movement in Sierra Leone never ceased, was a guest of honor at the inaugural ceremony of the Congress held at the Parliament Building on 16th September, 1976 to which he delivered an inaugural speech.

In his speech, among other things, he congratulated all those who were involved in negotiations for the long hoped for but long deferred unity. He noted with appreciation that one of the aims of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress was to reduce the number of trade unions in the country to a meaningful proportion, since the country was small and would be better off with fewer but strong and viable trade unions than with many weak ones. He re-assured the trade unions of the Government’s continued assistance to the movement to improve the lot for the workers. He noted that the government and trade unions have a common goal of putting all their energies together for the development of the country. He concluded by wishing the trade unions every success in their endeavors and hoped that they would not fail the workers.

The 1981 National Strike

The economic difficulties of the 1980’s which resulted in serious inflation and deteriorating economy prompted the Sierra Leone Labor Congress in 1981 under the leadership of late J.B. Kabbia, as Secretary-General, to make strong appeals to the Sierra Leone Government to take drastic measures in order to arrest the situation which the trade unions saw a running out of control.

The Sierra Leone Labor Congress in its two letters addressed to the Head of State, the last one dated 14th August, 1981, contained far reaching suggestions by the Congress on measures the government should take which ranged from the reduction of the price of rice, the Sierra Leone staple food, to the overall reorganization and institution of action on prices, unemployment, housing, hospitals and drug provisions, roads, delay in paying salaries and gratuities, transportation costs, reduction and control of government expenditures, income tax, foreign exchange control, farm produce prices, import licenses, investment loan system and the land tenure system.

The government did not respond to the first letter but took action on the second letter by appointing an eighteen-man committee, nine from government and nine from trade unions under the chairmanship of the late Vice President Hon. C.A. Kamara-Taylor.

The Committee held two successful meetings but the third meeting broke down as representatives of the trade unions led by Brother I. Langley walked out protesting against the failure by the government to implement issues agreed upon during the first meeting which included the reduction of the price of rice. The trade union representatives reported back to the Congress Executive Council, which decided to issue a strike notice effective from 1st September 1981. The government on the other hand suggested the appointment of a Commission of inquiry comprising representatives of government, Employers Federation and the trade unions.

The Congress Executive Council did not respond to the offer as was expected by the government. As a result of this, the President went on the air on 31st August 1981 on a broadcast to the nation. In the broadcast, after recounting the events, which had taken place up to that time, he declared a State of Emergency throughout the country with effect from 1st September1 1981 in the interest of public order and safety. In spite of this, the strike took place as planned and in some cases lasted up to 11 days. During the strike, over two hundred trade unionists including leaders of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress were arrested and detained at the Pademba Road Prison, but were later released after the strike had been called off.

The following events occurred after the strike

1. The government appointed a Commission of inquiry headed by Mr Justice M.O. Taju-Den on 15th October 1981.

The Commission’s terms of reference were as follows:

i. to enquire into the status, administration and activities of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress from 1976
ii. To Enquirer into all aspects of industrial relations in Sierra Leone and to make recommendations for any improvements which it may consider necessary.

2. The Commission of inquiry dissolved the entire Congress Executive Council on 10th March, 1982, replaced it with a caretaker committee, ordered the suspension of late J.B. Kabia from the office of the Secretary General of the Congress and further recommended that he be banned from participating in trade union activities for the next three years form 10th March, 1982
3. The Commission of inquiry ended its sitting on the 11th February 1982 and adjourned ‘sine die’ to compile its report.
4. The report, which made far-reaching recommendations on the labor laws on the structure of the Sierra Leone Labor Congress was later published, and most of its recommendations accepted by the government.
5. The Delegates’ Conference of the Congress took place on 2nd October 1982, bringing an end of the Caretaker Committee.
6. The Delegates’ Conference under the new constitution elected the Congress Executive Council Members with Bro. I. Langley as President. The new Executive subsequently appointed Bro. K. Yilla as the Secretary-General.
7. Immediately after the Congress elections, the late President Dr. Siaka Stevens offered to the Congress one parliamentary seat to which he appointed Bro. I. Langley on the recommendation of the Congress Executive Council.

SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME

Sierra Leone has at present no policy on this scheme. The Sierra Leone Labour Congress has since 1993 requested government to give this matter urgent attention as most workers are not benefiting from whatever paid to them on retiring from their employment. Similarly, there are no provisions in any of the trade group collective agreement for old age coverage with respect to medical and regular monthly income as pension as against those employed in the public service.

In 1996, the government delegation to the ILO Annual Meeting made a representation to the Director General of ILO for Technical Service. This took a little bit of time and in 1999, another arm of the Ministry of Labour was created to the present name – Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations.

Presently, the ILO has given its consent to provide all the technical service required in establishing this social security scheme. Parliament has also endorsed the decision. A parliamentary committee has been set up with the participation of the Labour Congress (representing the workers), Employers Federation (representing the Employers) and the Government. A tripartite committee is been headed by Hon. Alex Koroma.

Subject: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: shamsu Deen-Cole
To: All
Date Posted: 17:34:44 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: shamsu2000@hotmail.com
Entered From: ool-4355b29b.dyn.optonline.net at 67.85.178.155

Message:
Disaster inside the APC CAMP

It seems as if the Prayers of Governor Clarkson is alive and well. The All People Congress (APC) who was riding high a few weeks ago, with lots of false information about rice, lies and propaganda regarding who our running mate will be, are so desperate that they have gone back to their old ways of abuse, intimidation and hooliganism.

Let’s see what has turned the tide against them.

Item One: When we the SLPP, made the announcement that Hon. Alhaji Momodu Koroma, has been chosen by Vice President Solomon Berewa as his running mate, APC came out lambasting our selection. They had a lot to say about Momodu Koroma, but all their comments was nothing but indignation and bitterness against us for nominating a qualify respectable Northerner. They are angry because they cannot find a running mate of similar attribute and certification as Momodu Koroma. No respectable Southerner or Easterner wanted to be associated with the APC. So who so ever they got from the East is inconsequential. In another words, he is Mr. Nobody.

We the members of the SLPP, and our able, gallant leader examined our long list of qualify dynamic candidates from all over Sierra Leone. They are all long time members of our Party, people with political Correctness, Educational Qualities, and above all Social CLASS. Our Leader saw in Hon. Momodu Koroma a vision of a future leader. Not because of his Financial Contribution to the Campaign, but someone who will be ready to take over the duties as a leader of our Nation, in case of any eventuality. Momodu Koroma has been in Government for over ten years, as Minister of Presidential Affairs, to Minister of External Affairs.

In any Government, the External Affairs Ministry or Foreign Secretary or Secretary of State (as it is called in the USA), is not only one of the leading Cabinet officer, but the spokesperson for the Nation to the World. It is him who solicits support from the International Community...

Remember when President Kabba appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary, our Nation was in shambles due to the senseless barbaric acts of thugs. The international Community looked at us in disbelief. Asking how can any one belonging to the human race be so barbaric, as to mutilate the limp of innocent Women and Children including a 2 years old baby. It was Hon. Momodu Koroma that came to the rescue of our Nation. He made our case to the world at every International forum and today we as a people are proud to show our Faces to the world as Sierra Leoneans. That is what Hon. Momodu Koroma has accomplished for our Nation. He has done more than any other person in that Office with the exception of Dr. John Karifa Smart (who took us to independence).

Now let see who the APC vice Presidential Candidate is. Mr. Sam SUMANA.(As they say in the USA “SAM WHO”.) Who is he and what is he to you?. With all due respect to my opposition leader, Sierra Leone deserve better.. The people of Sierra Leone want to know who in the hell is this man. What contribution has he made to our Nations, Where was he during the Rebel War, when we Sierra Leoneans in the USA, organized several demonstrations against the War. We demonstrated, in Washington DC at the White House, and in New York City at the United Nations. Where was Mr. Sam Sumana?. What is his credential as far as political governance, knowledge of how Government should function, political readiness and so on.? He may have a University Degree, I respect that, but that is not enough. What is his employment back ground that may tell us of his experience in life?

A member of the APC chapter in New Jersey told me that he was chosen because they wanted a person with Geography equilibrium and Mr. Sumana is from the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. I do accept that premise, but is he the best man from the East? This man is not known in the East. He is a loner. Even when he was in Minnesota in the USA, he was not known by many Sierra Leoneans. He is not a good mixer.

I am not Bragging, but I am confident that I SHAMSU DEEN-COLE, I am well known in the Sierra Leone community in the USA and in Sierra Leone than Mr. Sumana., Looking for a running mate from another Region is always a good Idea, but you can’t just settle for anyone, just because he came from the region of your needs.. If APC cannot come up with any well known citizen from the east or the South, then APC is dying a slow death.

Item Two: The next Problem for APC disintegration is that they sold their Symbols to the highest bidder during the primary.. What a shame. This is a slap in the Face for the people who had been pushing the Banner of APC all those years.

My fellow Sierra Leoneans, APC is telling our people, that if any member of their party is poor regardless of what your contribution has been with the APC, if you can’t pay for the Symbol, you are OUT. This is not democracy, this is not Justice. Now people in Sierra Leone are saying that APC gave symbol only to people from England and America. As one APC member in Freetown told me” We go show dem say nar we day nar Salone”. The people are MAD.

We the SLPP, gave the people power to chose who they want as their Candidate. Our leaders did not get involve. It is the people that decide who they want, and that democracy..

Item Three: APC for what ever reason, decided to unite with RUF (THE REBEL PARTY OF FODAY SACCOR). What a disaster. This is Political Suicide. Are they so desperate, that they will sleep in the same bed with the devil?

People in Sierra Leone are saying that “Now we know who the Rebels were” I know we have peace, and that we forgave them, but we must not forget. Remember as we say in Salone “ Leppet nor day change in spot”. See what happen last week during the so-called APC Rally. Their behavior did not go well with the people of Freetown the ruffians in their midst, show their true color. They attacked people in their Cars, Stole Watches Hand Bags from Women, Mobile Phones, Using Abusive and Threaten Language against our party and our Leaders.( As they say, “ if you lay down with Dogs, you will get up with Fleas”….

A week before last, the SLPP supporters came out in good Numbers to Rally in Support of our DREAM TEAM. “SOLO-B & MOMODU –K”

The crowd was unbelievable. They were peaceful, joyful, respectful and nice to look at. They sang respectable Songs peaceful Banner, drummer and it was a carnival atmosphere. People dance till midnight with no problem. This is what Politics is all about. We are all Sierra Leoneans, and we all hoping for a better future for our mother land. We can belong to and support different political Party, but we must have respect for each other.

Item Four: To my greatest surprise, Hon. Ernest Koroma, Leader of the APC, said some days ago that if his party is victorious on the Coming August 11 Election, “he will bring Sierra Leone back to the Days of Sheka Stevens”.. The days of Sheika Stevens and THUGS. Please God Help us. Mr Koroma during one visit to the USA some time ago SAID THAT this APC is a new APC PARTY. Well My People, please think very well about what Sheka Stevens brought to Sierra Leone. INTA ALIA, ONE PARTY.STATE, VIOLENCE, ELECTION KIDNAPPINGS, UNOPPOSE, BEATINGS, BLACK OUT, REBELS, AND THE LIST GOES ON AND ON. .

As I said some time ago, and I must say it again, If Sierra Leone is to become a better Nation, a Nation with brighter future, a Nation of hope, we the people must change our attitude. I am calling on the Leadership of all political Parties, to please educate your supporters. Let us act as civilize people. Stop threaten people, Stop the Abuse, let’s live together, love each other, and at the end May the best man win.

. WE WANT A PEACEFUL FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. I HAVE NO DOUBT, THAT UNDER THE SLPP, YOU WILL HAVE FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. REMEMBER THAT IT IS ONLY UNDER SLPP, THAT SIERRA LEONEANS HAD EVER GIVEN THE CHOICE OF ELECTING. ALL THE YEARS OF APC RULE, WE NEVER HAD ELECTION, WE ALWAYS HAD SELECTION. “UNOPPOSE, DEM PICK AM”... SO IF EVEN YOU ARE NOT A SUPPORTER OF THE SLPP, THINK OF YOUR NATIONS FUTURE, AND VOTE SLPP.

GOD BLESS SIERRA LEONE

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 01:37:40 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You may perform the miracle of making a mountain out of a molehill but don’t cry disaster, where there is none. Distorting and exaggerating wild claims against members of the APC, does not strengthen your case for the SLPP when such exaggerations rob you of credibility.

Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma has shown resilience in that long tussle and tug of war, over the APC leadership – and so you know, he is a strong man; he has tenacity and is focused on his purpose.

Is there a tribal department in your brain, in which Sierra Leone is so neatly divided between North and South, East and West compartments?

“No respectable Southerner or Easterner wanted to be associated with the APC”

What about respectable Western Area and respectable Northern roots people?

I don’t think that you have to dis-qualify the APC choice of running mate – in order to sanctify Mr. Momodou Koroma – who admittedly has a different background and valuable experience to recommend him as potential leader of Sierra Leone.

Sometimes you want us to believe that which is glaringly untrue. It is not true that the APC is an incarnation of Pa Shaki or Josef Stalin or the gentle Joseph Momoh - as if you would define the Democratic and Republican parties by Carter and Reagan…..

When you post-Albert Margai SLPP guys start yapping it sounds like you think that the Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma, has it in the APC Manifesto that if he wins so overwhelmingly – to the extent that the SLPP does not win even a single parliamentary seat Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma has declared an emergency plan that since that would be a de facto one party state he would appoint some APC back benchers to form and opposition ( for the sake of multi-partyism) or that it is Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma’s avowed aim to usher in a new era of a one-party state whatever the circumstances - when he has never stated – and even the most anti-APC tribalist knows that would never state or dream of doing such a think.

The only question that I have about Mr. Sam Sumana is this: Since the office of the Vice-president (at least under the present government is responsible for “Control of the movement of people in Diamond protected areas” – If Mr. Sumana is in that competitive business branch of Diamonds, will his becoming Vice-president not lead to a conflict of interest between State business and his own Diamond business. Would it not give him undue advantage – and even encourage patronage, to have him responsible about that his area of interest?

The Office of Vice-President (where Mr. Solomon Berewa acquire some considerable experience these past few years.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 01:55:17 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
I forgot to add the areas that have been the reponsibility of

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 02:00:58 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Very sorry - please forgive - again

I forgot to add the areas that have been the reponsibility of V-P Berewa.

Subject: interesting reading!
From: Dr C. CURTIS-THOMAS
To: All
Date Posted: 18:57:24 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 198.24.31.125

Message:
INTERESTING READING!

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 18:39:19 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
SLPP Deen-Cole:
The voters of Sierra Leone are going to decide on August 11, 2007. Their decision will be based on how they feel about the Kabbah-SLPP Regime performance during the last 10 years. If you and your peers of the SLPP do not understand that you will continue to beat a dead horse. the Shaki-Momoh APC REGIME. The voters are not being asked to evaluate "deadmen" daedeabudi". You and the rest of SLPP are stupid but the average Sierra Leoaneans are not stupid. They are not going to bring deadmen back
to evaluate and cast vote on their performance. They are going to judge based oh how the SLPP DEBUL has performed over the lasst 10 years.
It is not the APC Stewardship under review and verdict/judgement on August 11, 2007. It is the SLPP PERFORMANCE FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS UP FOR EVALUATION. Do you understand?
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:29:53 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
No swearing on cyber streets when???

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:24:01 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
No swearing on cyber streets when you ought to know better.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: SHAMSU DEEN-COLE
To: All
Date Posted: 19:56:00 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: shamsu2000@hotmail.com
Entered From: ool-4355b29b.dyn.optonline.net at 67.85.178.155

Message:
Mr Yaya, with all due respect, I do not think that if someone is loyal to a party, it is because they are stupid. you see this is exactly what I am talking about. In all my statements about the APC, I did not use any insaulting or abusive words. Now you are calling me Stupid. But you know what they say?, "Abuse is the weapon of the VULGAR". Thank you Sir, but I rather be a stupid supporter with love, respect and dignity, than a Chicken with no head. If the Americans,voted for Bush, Clinton,TWICE Because they believe in them,the British voted Toni Blair three times, I think I have the right to support and vote for my choice.

I am intelligent enough to look at the history of the APC party, to know what they did to my motherland IN THEIR 24 YEARS OF POWER. Invoking the Names of your past Leaders, is not beating a dead Horse. It is your Party leader who said that he will "take us back to the days of Shiaka Stevens". I have the right and intellect to use that statement as my premise to make my case. And for you to have the audacity to call me stupid, is pathetic. I will keep my cool. I pray not to ever become abusive to any one . I love my homeland and only cool head and common sense will take us to the promise land....LONG LIVE SIERRA LEONE

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 20:49:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
SLPP Deen-Cole,
If you argue like a slow learner I have no choice but to use a descr1ptive term appropriate to your conduct. You and the other SLPP Mules and donkeys are not getting the point. Now is the focus of the people. now is the pain of the people. Not history!!! Now!!!!!
Ten years of degradation; ten years of mismanagement. Ten years of forcing young girls into prostitution. So that they can feed their parents1 Ten years of filth in our streets! Ten years deeper begging the world for crumps! Ten years of just coasting in an ocean of stupidity. You are not giong to buy bonga when you sea een haede don rot. Berewa and Kabbah dey stink so why pipul go vote for slpp? bu nafulman dem nomoh go do dat.
Go ahead and get angry: You are stupid!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: wow
To: All
Date Posted: 13:11:59 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
na di fors tem dis ar see yayah vex, but yu tork tru bra. yayah na man. now guys, let's talk about the PRESENT, you hear, mista Winkwink of europe? where is my popcorn?

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: babybob
To: All
Date Posted: 21:18:32 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: pool-71-172-31-34.nwrknj.fios.verizon.net at 71.172.31.34

Message:
Where were you when we had thirty years of corruption, destruction of the moral fabric of sierra leone ,kleptocracy and perpetration of violence against our people.

You may be surprise because more people are going to buy the rotten bonga than you think, When they think of the pain and misery from the previous rotten APC bonga that was thrust upon them.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: M. Alieu Iscandari Esq
To: All
Date Posted: 04:41:22 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
Where were you when we had thirty years of corruption, destruction of the moral fabric of sierra leone ,kleptocracy and perpetration of violence against our people.

chill out brother the past ten years under the slpp has been nothing but that which you so vehemently oppose, if ONLY you could be honest about it.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 23:24:31 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
Brah,
I know what I did and I did not hide. I am now dealing with the future and a new vision.
Yaya Fanusie-APC

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:05:30 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Yayah, the past creates the present. Our stupidity today was because of the 24 years of neglect. To give us a turnaround in ten years that which suffered 24 years of neglect is incomprehensible. Aside these difficulties faced, our government continues to try. Contnuity of our programmes is all we ask! Things will change under the abled leadership of Berewa. I will come back to you on this after 15 August 2007 - a time I will have access to the internet.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Kanforie Sorie Koroma
To: All
Date Posted: 19:00:57 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
Very brilliant response to this trash posted by somebody with the IQ of a roach. Who in his right senses will vote thieves back to power so that they will continue to steal our shiploads of rice and sell them to Ghana ? The Aramu Alhaji Tejan Kabbah will stand trial for that rice when APC comes to power.

Subject: AND GUESS HOW OLD IS YAYA FAMUSIE?{60yrs}
From: okdok
To: All
Date Posted: 20:46:14 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: okdok@yahoo.com
Entered From: wnpgmb11dc1-38-247.dynamic.mts.net at 209.202.38.247

Message:
Yaya is always tough at using bad,abusive languages in political matters of our country.Does he really think he is any better or educated?He is a book mumu

Subject: Re: AND GUESS HOW OLD IS YAYA FAMUSIE?{60yrs}
From: Yaya Fanusie
To: All
Date Posted: 23:29:39 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: Saigobe@lanset.com
Entered From: pool-71-179-7-225.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net at 71.179.7.225

Message:
Thannk You very much.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Pa Sorie
To: All
Date Posted: 20:36:55 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: dejabz2@yahoo.co.uk
Entered From: cpe-24-168-3-117.si.res.rr.com at 24.168.3.117

Message:
Do you guys ever write or participate in a discussion without using vulgar language? Is this the new APC? For God sake present to rebutal to a well-written piece. It seems as if each time your party's record is examined,you resort to statements buffeted with allegations, that cannot be corroborated. This "rice selling issue" have you guys investigated it? if my knowledged serves me right your leader is best placed to know what to it, the govt is saying that it was sold for NASSIT, and your leader was Chairman on the parliamentary committe responsible for NASSIT. Let hear from him, not one of set-piece speeches. But policy -oriented ones.

Subject: Re: Disaster inside the APC Camp
From: Bambay Lans Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 02:18:11 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-71-197-104-25.hsd1.ca.comcast.net at 71.197.104.25

Message:
It seems as if the Prayers of Governor Clarkson is alive and well. The All People Congress (APC) who was riding high a few weeks ago, with lots of false information about rice, lies and propaganda regarding who our running mate will be, are so desperate that they have gone back to their old ways of abuse, intimidation and hooliganism.
Greetings my brothers and sisters. Mr. shamsu Deen-Cole, let me take this opportunity to thank you for your observation. I hope your intentions are in the best interest of Sierra Leone.
Sir, permit me to respond to your thoughts to probably give you one of the last opportunities to change your mind for supporting the current S.L.P.P. leadership, if you actually bore the interest of Sierra Leone at heart.
Let me further remind you that popularity in the Sierra Leone community does not matter much nor does it seem to matter even when it involves the globe, space and beyond. Probably, it could have mattered had we a proper representation by people who dearly love Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, Sir, we are at a threshold where, our nation, in a not too distant future, our people, who have endured a lot, who have underwent a brutal civil war due to the selfishness of a few people, amidst all forms of cruelty such as selling their basic sustenance, might be given the opportunity to decide who will rule them and bring the long desired peace, progress and stability as we enjoyed during the Siaka Stevens era.
When I read your caption, I was aroused with the hope that a revealing message about many dubious issues such as that of the rice, the fraud at the party presidential candidate election, the filth in the country, the lack of electricity in the country though parts were donated by South African companies and other countries, the oil deal with Iran that we are hearing less of, the beating and killing of Journalists, the imprisonment of Journalist in a bid to intimidate and other issues that are more important to Sierra Leonean lives at home and abroad; issues you mentioned in your opening statement we thought have been revealed to shame all of us who have been awaiting truthful words or acknowledgement of the sale or locat1on of the missing item because our people really need it. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Instead, you came to shower praises on a member of the cabinet that has yet to tell us about the rice issue and the above mentioned issues. You heaped praises on one who, it is apparent, has operated in the inner circles of the very people who boldly wrote about these donations on their web site and have now categorically denied the statement. Do we see ethical deficiency here. Well it is a leadership of deficiencies.
Remember, that even after President Kabba had appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary, our Nation was in shambles due to the senseless barbaric acts of thugs and still is. Remember, that even after President Kabba had appointed Hon. Momodu Koroma as Foreign Secretary the international Community looked at us in disbelief and they still look at us in gross disbelief. Remember, that the International Community do have assessment capabilities and would consider the whole and not parts and parcel of a situation in analyzing it. Did you read the Canadian report on our war? Did you read the U.S. Congress’ report on our war? I hope you did. Did you read the Truth and Reconciliation reports or testimonies of the war? Well all these documents are in the hands of the International Community. Apparently, you would not know and would think that most of the things your government says about them will never reach them. When was it when President Kabba came crying that the pledges made by countries are not enough but then went to Sierra Leone, him and Berewa knocking because they were not beating their chest that everything in Sierra Leone was there doing. What happened to appreciation? That is ingratitude.
Yes they have been ungrateful. Hon. Hinga Norman, woops, may bad! Is dead. Did the government have a say in the decision making of Sierra Leone? How come they did not advocate for the man to be sent abroad to seek medical attention. Did they try but were denied? There was the intention to kill him. Ingratitude.
All the years you have spent abroad, I am opined that when you mention the International Community that you were not only referring to governments not the populace. If your statistics is inclusive of the populace as well, I can categorically tell you that the disappointment of the populace still stands because Mr. Momodu Koroma’s efforts might have reached governments and Heads of states but there is no way his efforts have reached the homes of three million people in America alone. This is one of the reasons we need people at State House and in Parliament who can sell Sierra Leone to the populace of the International Community not only heads of States and governments but the people of the various countries as well. Representatives who come abroad to beg and attend to dinners and dace and return to Sierra Leone claiming he has reached the International Community have been the very people that have prolonged the sufferings of Sierra Leone. They are the very people who have not been able to encourage meaningful trade to Sierra Leone because they cannot reach entrepreneurs due to their lack of knowledge of these systems and have been hoodwinked by diplomatic courtesies of Heads of States and government some of whom are not even impressed by their services to the people in diplomatic terms. Nonetheless, it is only protocol that they attend to them. This is why they have met with these people. I guarantee you that any person sent by the Sierra Leone Mission will be greeted with the same courtesy. So I personally would not buy whatever you claim he did for Sierra Leone because it is toying with protocol.
Sir, your diplomats and Foreign Ministers have done very little in unifying the Sierra Leonean Community by building the confidence of Sierra Leoneans in these communities let alone the born citizens of these countries. Sir, you do not know the population of Sierra Leoneans that reside in America alone do you? Your diplomat does not know either does he? Does representing Sierra Leone mean a portion or the whole? That is how different you are from democracies. Indicative of the fact that you throw your compatriots like sheep in the field to fend for themselves without knowing about them. But you are popular.
You have made a serious misinformation Sir, which I would like to correct. Please allow me to give you a brief lecture on the History of Sierra Leone. “Sir Milton's Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) led the country to independence and the first general election under universal adult franchise in May 1962. Upon Sir Milton Margai's death in 1964, his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, succeeded him as Prime Minister. Sir Albert attempted to establish a one-party political system but met fierce resistance from the opposition All People's Congress (APC). He ultimately abandoned the idea.”
Please pay special attention to the following because the S.L.P.P. has been famous of taking credibility for everything and giving no credibility to ardent Sierra Leoneans who make contributions no matter how small. The attainment of independence was a collective effort and not done by a single person as you have claimed.
“Dr. John Karefa-Smart entered politics in 1957. He was a foundation member of the Sierra Leone Organisation Society, which later became the S.L.P.P. He was active in the constitutional committees that eventually led to Sierra Leone's independence in 1961.” (Sierra Leone Web.)
Contested elections and military rule In closely contested elections in March 1967, the APC won a plurality of the parliamentary seats. Accordingly, the Governor General (representing the British Monarch) Henry Josiah Lightfoot Boston declared Siaka Stevens -- APC leader and Mayor of Freetown -- as the new Prime Minister. Within a few hours, Stevens and Margai were placed under house arrest by Brigadier David Lansana, the Commander of the Sierra Leone Military Forces (SLMF), on grounds that the determination of office should await the election of the tribal representatives to the house. A group of senior military officers overrode this action by seizing control of the government on March 23, arresting Brigadier Lansana, and suspending the constitution. The group constituted itself as the National Reformation Council (NRC) with Brigadier Andrew Juxon-Smith as its chairman. The NRC in turn was overthrown in April 1968 by a "sergeants' revolt," the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement. NRC members were imprisoned, and other army and police officers deposed. Stevens at last assumed the office of Prime Minister under the restored constitution.”
As you can see above, the S.L.P.P. in fact, innitiated the idea of a one party after the death of one of our great leaders, Sir Milton Margai. After the death of Sir Milton Margai, S.L.P.P. started going downhill. In fact there was an in-finght within the party even during the Albert Margai era, for the sake of power, the same way Hon. Berewa disrespected ethics by buldozing his way fraudulently into being appointed as the leader of the party. If he could fraud his own party, which in fact, almost broke the party into five parts, how much more if he is given power?
I have discussed with educated people. Onething I would hope is that such education can be utilized to benefit Sierra Leone. So far, the S.L.P.P has not produced.
In that light therefore, I admonish you to put concept into perspective and know that the readers here are ashamed for our S.L.P.P. government than any government on this palnet.
Look for an alternative so that your image, if not already tarnished, will not be tarnished alongside your Honorable. I have nothing against him personally, I know for fact that he is not the suitable representative for Sierra Leone though “he is popular in the Sierra Leone community.” We need one that is sincere with his people not one who is popular and unethical.
We need some one that can take integrity to a higher level that the International Community, both governments and the governed can feel comfortable to listen to out of trust.
I hope this has helped you to change your mind.

Subject: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:42:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-132-229-121.range81-132.btcentralplus.com at 81.132.229.121

Message:
I have been having a debate about honesty and integrity. How many children has margai got? A question for our PMDC brothers and sisters.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: muscuda
To: All
Date Posted: 17:56:25 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: cache-ntc-ad04.proxy.aol.com at 207.200.116.198

Message:
why is that important

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:05:42 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Credibility - we have to come clean and tell the people we want to lead who we are and what we are capable of doing. If the PMDC is not prepared to answer my question, Iwill be left with no option but to find the answer elsewhere. As humans, we can never be 100% perfect. What is important is owning up.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 00:27:42 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Mr. Somebod ( Johnny Leigh may not agree entirely, about

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:02:08 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
"Marital Status: Married (Mrs. Vivat Margai with two daughters)"

Is the above true? it was on his prolife on the link your directed me to.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 19:13:08 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
As the Rev & Pastor Kanu will be the first to admit, "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God"
( Romans 3:23 )

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:30:56 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Confess and thy immoral deeds will be pardoned! man is fallible and therefore can be pardoned. My boss, we all the prospective candidates are facing a credibility test and therefore have to come clean. As leaders we cannot continue to hide our dirty linen. An opportunity was given for all the constestants to tell the people who they are? If sane people detect false claims or omissions, one has to be gravely concern as to the standing of the individual.

I have five children, three with my estranged wife and two other form estwhile relationships. I have made it my life and cannot shy away from such truth. it is now part of me to the day I depart from this world. Itis not something I imagined as a child but fate decided otherwise and I am so proud of them. I have the boldness to tell the world about them - denying them this claim of fatherhood tantamounts to crass injustice and gross irresponsibility.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:46:21 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You are so utterly boring

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs
To: All
Date Posted: 21:09:55 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
True, to you eyes and ears. At least I have the exciting YOU!

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 19:43:02 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Can our leaders ever emulate these people in whose system we attempt to model our systems.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 20:50:45 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Chez winakabs most self-righteous paragon of virtue, it's you again?

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:26:29 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
Off to bed - bon nuit mon patron

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 22:50:54 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Chez, send me your e-mail address. There's a long letter, alreadyy wrtitten ( when you lost your mum) that I'd like to post to you.

I would not like to post it on the net.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 05:13:03 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host86-129-209-9.range86-129.btcentralplus.com at 86.129.209.9

Message:
Mon patron - i am human and if i do the wrong things, I'll have to suffer the consequencies. Anyway thanks. This is my email ad:

winakabs@rock.com

if it is something worth sharing I will be happy to do so. i did not loose my mother - it was my grandmother. may her soul continue to blossom in peace.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Chez Winakabs Europe
To: All
Date Posted: 21:11:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: host81-155-115-164.range81-155.btcentralplus.com at 81.155.115.164

Message:
I think we all need some sleep.

Subject: Re: HOW MANY CHILDREN HAS CHARLES MARGAI GOT
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 22:52:14 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
You decide

Subject: So you see, Cocorioko has no business with APC
From: COCORIOKO FANATIC
To: All
Date Posted: 14:52:19 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 208.115.226.234

Message:
In the APC website , related links are posted.

Related Link
Sierraleonelive

Awarenes Times

Allafrica.com

who's who

Cocorioko is not included.

There are only two explanations :
1. Either the people who made the website do not know or are ungrateful about cocorioko's services to the party or

2. Cocorioko really has no business with APC.

Shame how APC can begin to be ungrateful to those helping them.

But I am glad. I want cocorioko to remain independent.

Subject: LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE
From: RES NOR RES
To: All
Date Posted: 14:51:37 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: jaybez@hotmail.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE

S.L.P.P. DUMP SIERRA LEONE

TOPIC: HIGHLIGHTS ON LIBYA’S PRESIDENT SPEECH ABOUT
DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE DURING HIS VISIT.

ü 125 Million US Dollars and Cars to be distributed among Imams in Sierra Leone.

ü 100 Million US Dollars Cheque to Sierra Leone

ü Two ships loaded with Rice for Sierra Leone

ü Forty Tractors for Sierra Leone

ü Two Air Taxi Planes

ü Fifty-two Buses

ü Two 20ft Containers of meat for Sierra Leone

ü Twelve mini-hydro machines for the 12 Districts

ü Two Generators for the City

ü Two ferries for Sierra Leone

Subject: Re: LIST OF GADAFFI DONATIONS TO SIERRA LEONE
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 04:32:41 07/20/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
How come after two Libyan shipments of our staple food rice, and after all the honours and recognition accorded Dr. Monty Jones, we still have

Subject: Sign: Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma
From: Bambay Lans Kamara
To: All
Date Posted: 14:18:18 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: sccinstr194109.scc.losrios.edu at 165.196.194.109

Message:
"I believe in a fair global partnership and in sharing good practices with friends."

Sign: Hon. Ernest Bai Koroma

Subject: Barmoi Junction-
From: Amara Sesay
To: All
Date Posted: 13:25:05 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: amara@yahoo.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
The Barmoi Junction Luma commonly referred to as the “Beckley Luma” is to benefit from a UNDP program aimed at stimulating economic growth in Sierra Leone.

I are thankful for the vision of Mr. Olu Beckley who established this trading market in 1996. Today Barmoi Junction, a small village near Rokupr, can boast of the largest international market in Sierra Leone. What Mr. Beckley started 10 years ago is now paying dividends to thousands of people in our part of the country. It is a great source of revenue for our local government and I am proud to have worked with him.

Subject: ALPHA KANU ON THE APC RULE
From: POLITICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:17:48 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
"In those good years of the APC rule, Sierra Leone’s economic and social infrastructure were so far ahead of our sub-regional neighbours that a popular way of bidding farewell to family by our brothers leaving Guinea to come to Sierra Leone was “Mi yehi England” and the Senegalese used to say “Man gi dem Angleterre” meaning ‘I am going to England.’"

ALPHA KANU APC SPOKESMAN DURING THE LAUNCHING OF THE PARTY'S MANIFESTO

Subject: Judiciary to ensure free and fair elections
From: UNDP
To: All
Date Posted: 13:16:11 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Judiciary to ensure free and fair elections
- Thursday 19 July 2007.

Friday, 13 July 2007 saw the creation of two courts of law in Freetown, both dedicated to resolving electoral issues. The Electoral Courts have been established to safeguard the democratic structure of the judiciary and will fulfill an essential role in the achievement of accountable, transparent, free and fair elections. This is contained in a release sent to us today by the UNDP in Sierra Leone.

The envisaged court structure has two elements; the Electoral Offences Court and the Election Petition Rules Court. Both are divisions of the High Court and will address issues relating to the upcoming Parliamentary Elections.

The Electoral Offences Court will hear criminal matters with reference to offences listed in the Electoral Laws Act. All acts carried out in relation to the Parliamentary Elections, from the registration process through to the final announcement of results, will be subject to scrutiny by the courts. Those convicted of an electoral offence will face a fine or imprisonment.

The Election Petitions Courts will handle civil matters linked to the results of the election. Often referred to as ‘courts of disputed results’, these courts will provide redress to those who believe that the outcome of a given poll resulted from wrong doing. In such a case the court will investigate the poll and can remove elected candidates, if it is found that the seat was achieved through improper means.

The courts will operate side by side, with judges hearing both criminal and civil submissions. They will sit in total for six months and will be based in Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Freetown.

The creation of the Electoral Courts by the Chief Justice has taken place with collaboration from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Electoral Assistance Team and with the financial support from the international community through the Elections Basket Fund. The UN Executive Representative of Secretary General, Victor Angelo welcomes the creation of the Electoral Courts, stating that they are ‘a first in the history of the state, and a significant development in the rule of law and contribution towards the creation of a stable democracy in Sierra Leone.’

Photo: Chief Justice Ade Renner-Thomas of Sierra Leone.

Subject: Update on Kailahun Incident
From: POLITICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:15:26 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Update on Kailahun Incident
PATRIOTIC VANGUARD

- Thursday 19 July 2007.
By Jonathan Leigh.

President Tejan Kabbah made a brief stopover in Kailahun, east of Sierra Leone on Monday, which was the scene of political violence twenty four hours earlier, on his way to the border town of Guekedou in Guinea to attend a meeting of the Mano River Union states involving Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Ivory Coast.

Kabbah visited the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker and the SLPP office respectively which were allegedly vandalised by PMDC supporters and called on the police to prosecute those culpable for the incident despite the fact that no arrest were made by the police.

Rivalry between two brothers supporting opposing camps in the upcoming elections, sparked off ugly scenes of violence. Chiefdom Speaker Bongay Ngobeh is a staunch SLPP supporter while his brother is a parliamentary aspirant for the PMDC.

Talking to us on his mobile phone from Kailahun, Superintendent Kerefa Keita, the Police Local Unit Commander in Kailahun stated categorically that he was not aware of any shooting during the incident as alleged by the PMDC Publicity Secretary Mohamed Bangura neither from the police or any other person or group of persons.

According to Keita, Kailahun was peaceful and quiet before the arrival of Charles Margai. The same atmosphere prevailed on the first day of his visit last Saturday where he addressed his supporters, went to Buedu on a similar assignment, returned to Kailahun the same day and spent some time at his party’s office before retiring to the GTZ Guest House which was booked for him.

Keita says his information was that the midnight incident of last Sunday was sparked off when supporters of the PMDC started chanting provocative songs against the SLPP.

The situation became tense and stones were thrown at the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker Bongay Ngobeh by PMDC supporters. In retaliation, the PMDC office nearby was also attacked during the exchange of missiles. Two vehicles; one packed in the compound of the Speaker and the other parked infront of the PMDC office were damaged.

According to Keita, he was out of Kailahum at the time on patrol at a village called Borbu but had to cut short his trip and return to put the situation under control. He immediately cordoned off the area of the incident.

Later, he received a phone call from the SLPP District Chairman Prof. Sahr Ngevao informing him that thugs allegedly hired by the PMDC were advancing to the SLPP office on Mano Sawalu Road. Ngevao himself told us by telephone on Monday that the office was pelted with stones and vandalized.

Supt. Keita also narrated certain remarks made by Charles Margai himself against the police in particular, which he did not respond to. He said he also prevented SLPP supporters from blocking the route while Charles Margai and his entourage were leaving the town.

Subject: Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa
From: POLIYICO
To: All
Date Posted: 13:13:33 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
I’m the hope & future of Salone – Solo B

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa

The leader of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) yesterday told thousands of supporters at the Regent Village Community Centre that he was the hope and future of Sierra Leone. Vice President Berewa, who went on a short campaign tour in that constituency, said he would be the best choice to lead Sierra Leone for the next five years as he had enough experience to lead the people to the right direction.
The SLPP noted that 15 years ago if he was the Vice President he would not be campaigning because he would have won the election very easily under the APC one party rule.

Mr Berewa said he was moved by the crowd that welcomed him and promised to fight poverty unto its end.
He said President Kabbah promised to bring peace and that he succeeded, so he too was now telling the entire country that poverty would be his main concern.
He went on to state that last week Tuesday his party launched its manifesto and that during its launch the atmosphere was so peaceful that shops were opened and mobile phones not stolen.

“But when the All People’s Congress (APC) came out the following day, the city became a no-go area as peaceful citizens lost so many valuables,” the Vice President claimed.

Vice President Berewa appealed to all not to let the APC take power again “if we want to sustain the God given peace”.

Mr Berewa than received an ex-APC supporter, Solomon Coker, who said he left the APC because “SLPP is the only way forward”.
The SLPP leader then promised the constituency that when he would have become President, he would do more for them as the Mountain District had always supported the SLPP.

Rev. Jenner Buck, the SLPP chairman of Mountain District, thanked Vice President Berewa and all those who made the programme successful.
Mr Berewa was accompanied by HE Ali Bangura, Alhaji Cole, Kanja Sesay, Alieu Badara Mansaray, Sam Pratt, et al.

Councillor Edward Caesar, who chaired the occasion, praised the SLPP for all what it had done.
He also appealed to all to continue to support the SLPP by voting for Solomon Berewa and the parliamentary candidate Patrick Cole.

Subject: Re: Mountain District welcomes Solomon Berewa
From: Sengbe
To: All
Date Posted: 15:04:12 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: red_dog.niehs.nih.gov at 157.98.76.127

Message:
"...He [Mr. Berewa] went on to state that last week Tuesday his party launched its manifesto and that during its launch the atmosphere was so peaceful that shops were opened and mobile phones not stolen.

“But when the All People’s Congress (APC) came out the following day, the city became a no-go area as peaceful citizens lost so many valuables,” the Vice President claimed..."

Do you all now understand why I refer to them as the AKARTA PEOPLES' CONGRESS?

I rest my case.

Subject: World Bank Releases Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996 - 2
From: WORLD BANK
To: All
Date Posted: 13:11:28 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
Thursday, July 19, 2007 :: infoZine Staff

World Bank Releases Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996 - 2006

The report, Governance Matters, 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2006, launched by the World Bank Institute and the World Bank Development Economics Vice-presidency, shows that a number of countries - including in Africa - are making progress in improving governance and fighting corruption. This is encouraging given that good governance and corruption control are fundamental for long-term growth and reducing poverty.

Washington, D.C. - infoZine - "The hopeful news is that a considerable number of countries, including in Africa, are showing that it is possible to make significant governance progress in a relatively short period of time. Such improvements in governance are critical for aid effectiveness and for sustained long-run growth." says Daniel Kaufmann, co-author of the report and Director of Global Programs at the World Bank Institute "Bribery around the world is estimated at about US $1 trillion dollars, and the burden of corruption falls disproportionately on the bottom billion people living in extreme poverty,"

The report, authored by the World Bank's Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, builds on research on the importance of governance and its impact on development over the past decade. Good governance matters for other human development outcomes such as infant mortality, illiteracy, and inequality, as well. Good governance has also been found to significantly enhance the effectiveness of development assistance in general, and of World Bank funded projects in particular.

Measuring countries' governance performance, and their improvements over time, is thus a key item on the governance agenda. But it is also a complex challenge, as governance has many dimensions, each with inherent measurement challenges. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project shows how this challenge can be met.

"The Governance Indicators put to rest the tired assertion that these issues cannot be robustly measured and the lessons drawn cannot be put to subsequent positive use by governments, the development community, civil society and the media," says John Githongo, former Permanent Secretary for Governance & Ethics in Kenya's Office of the President.

This year's report represents a decade-long effort by the researchers to build and update the most comprehensive cross-country set of governance indicators currently available to the public. The aggregate indicators as well as data from the underlying sources are available at a newly-redesigned website at www.govindicators.org. The indicators cover 212 countries and territories, drawing on 33 different data sources to capture the views of tens of thousands of survey respondents worldwide, as well as thousands of experts in the private, NGO, and public sectors.

"Until the mid-nineties, I did not think that governance could be measured. The Worldwide Governance Indicators have shown me otherwise" says Shlomo Yitzhaki, Director of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Professor of Economics at the Hebrew University. "It constitutes the state of the art on how to build periodic governance indicators which can be a crucial tool for policy analysts and decision-makers benchmarking their countries. Uniquely, it publicly discloses the aggregated and disaggregated data, as well as the estimated margins of error for each country. It definitely sets a standard for transparency in data."

The report shows that:

Some African countries are making significant strides on the path to good governance. Over the period from 1998 to 2006, Kenya, Niger, Sierra Leone have shown marked recent improvements in Voice and Accountability, while Algeria and Liberia have strengthened their Rule of Law. Countries like Algeria, Angola Libya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have made improvements in Political Stability and Tanzania has recorded gains on Control of Corruption. The report also shows however that other African countries still face enormous governance and development challenges.

Emerging economies are matching rich countries on key dimensions of governance. Over a dozen developing countries such as Slovenia, Chile, Botswana, Estonia, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Costa Rica score higher on key dimensions of governance than industrialized countries such as Greece or Italy.

Improving governance helps fight poverty and improves standards of living. 10 years of research show that improved standards of living are largely the result of improved governance, and not the other way around. When governance is improved by one standard deviation, infant mortality declines by two-thirds and incomes rise about three-fold in the long run. Such an improvement is within reach as it is just a fraction of the difference between the worst and best performers. For example, in the dimension of Rule of Law, one standard deviation is all that separates the extremely low rating of Somalia from Cote D'Ivoire, or Cote D'Ivoire from El Salvador, or El Salvador from Italy or Botswana, and Botswana from the United Kingdom.

Where there is commitment to reform, improvements in governance can take place relatively quickly. While not the norm, a number of countries have made significant progress even in the very brief five-year period since 2002, as for example in Ukraine, Kenya, and Liberia in Voice and Accountability; and Angola and Algeria in Political Stability.

On average the quality of governance around the world has not improved much over the past decade, despite individual country improvements. For the countries that have done well, there have been a similar number that have experienced deteriorations in a number of governance dimensions, including Zimbabwe, Cote D'Ivoire, Belarus and Venezuela. And in many other countries no significant change in either direction is yet apparent.

This is the sixth update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, reflecting work over the past decade to develop evidence-based measures that help development stakeholders track the quality of institutions, support capacity building, improve governance, and address corruption.
The WGI measure the following six components of good governance:

Voice and Accountability - measuring the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence - measuring perceptions of the likelihoood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism

Government Effectiveness - measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies

Regulatory Quality - measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development

Rule of Law - measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence

Control of Corruption - measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests

"Measuring governance poses unique challenges. Governance is complex and has many different aspects, and so no single indicator can fully capture a country's governance performance" says Aart Kraay, Lead Economist in the World Bank's Development Research Group, and co-author of the report. "It is therefore important to draw on the wide variety of data sources on governance currently available. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a way of collecting and summarizing this wealth of information, based on the experiences and insights of stakeholders worldwide

Subject: WORLD BANK UNVEILS BEST PERFORMERS IN AFRICA
From: AFP
To: All
Date Posted: 13:04:59 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
WORLD BANK UNVEILS BEST PERFORMERS IN AFRICA

AFP

The World Bank has marked Sierra Leone as one of the few African countries that are making significant strides on the path of governance. This disclosure was made in a World Bank report ‘Governance Matters 2007, World Wide Indicators 1996-2006’ and was launched on July 10 by the World Bank Institute and the World Bank Development Economics Vice–President in Washington. According to the report, Sierra Leone has made an impressive performance indicating that good governance and corruption control are fundamental for long –term growth and reducing poverty.

The report which was authored by the World Bank’s Daniel Kaufmann Director of Global Programmes at the World Bank Institute, Aart Kraay Lead Economist in the World Bank’s Development Research Group Massimo Mastruzzi, member of the Global Governance Team World Bank Institute, builds on research on the importance of governance and its impact on development over the past decade. The report judged whether countries had free media, political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption. The helpful news is that good governance matters for other human development outcomes such as infant mortality, illiteracy and inequality as well.

Daniel Kaufmann maintained that such improvements in governance made by Sierra Leone are critical for aid effectiveness and for sustained long-term growth. Good governance has also been found to significantly enhance the effectiveness of development assistance in general, and of World Bank funded projects in particular.

Worthy of significance is that the measuring of countries’ performance and their improvements over time is a key item on the governance agenda. This year’s report represents decade-long efforts by researchers to build and update the most comprehensive cross-country set of governance indicators. The indicators cover 212 countries and territories drawing on 33 different data sources to capture the views of tens of thousands of survey respondents worldwide, as well as thousands of experts in the private, Non- governmental Organisations (NGO) and public sectors. The report shows that Sierra Leone, Kenya and Niger have shown marked improvements in Voice and Accountability, while Algeria and Liberia have strengthened their Rule of Law.

Angola, Libya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have made significant improvements in Political Stability, while Tanzania has recorded gains on Control of Corruption. The report shows however that other African countries still face enormous governance and development challenges. The report also noted that improving governance helps fight poverty and improves standards of living. Ten years of research shows that improved standards of living are largely the result of improved governance and not the other way round. When governance is improving by one standard deviation, infant mortality declines by two –thirds and incomes rise about three fold in the long run.

In the case of Sierra Leone, such an improvement is within reach as the country is back on track after a devastating civil war. This is the sixth update of the world wide governance indicator, reflecting work over the past decade to develop evidence –based measure that helps development stakeholders track the quality of institutions, support capacity building, improve good governance and address corruption. s

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), measure the six components of good governance: Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Control, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.

Legitimate and effective political Authority in managing society’s affairs is crucial to eliminating poverty and lifting the standards of the citizens in a country the report concluded.

Subject: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: DR. MICHEL SHO -SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 12:58:35 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: global.life.edu at 72.16.214.206

Message:
Man by nature is a political being, whether he directly or indirectly takes part in the process; nature has created him to be a political animal.

That notwithstanding, his interaction with his fellow political beings should be done with caution to avoid misrepresentation and misinterpretation. It is for that reason history plays a significant role in the development of any nation and mankind.

Qouting stevens - If you do not want to get involve, politics will involve you.

It is high time we as citizens of our beloved Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our beloved motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST.

Picking cotton is Picking cotton, it doesn't matter what title you hold and i am the first to admit that i am still picking cotton. we need to now work for country.

Your able servant in Training

Dr. Michel sho-Sawyer

Subject: Re: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: Dr. CHARLES CURTIS-THOMAS
To: All
Date Posted: 13:27:34 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: 208-58-72-25.c3-0.fch-ubr2.lnh-fch.md.cable.rcn.com at 208.58.72.25

Message:
"It is high time we as citizens of our beloved Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our beloved motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST". (Dr. Sho-Sawyer)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I applaud your comment. I am however perplex. You have written a few "articles" on the forum, but none of them has ever suggested anything that remotely resembles "holding our candidates accountable" or, for that matter, not "practicing syncophancy", or that is tantamount to "provinding your skills" (if any) "to your beloved motherland.

Please help me (and others) understand your position in the aforementioned subject. (Dr. C. CURTIS-THOMAS)

Subject: Re: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: Dr. MICHEL SHO - SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 17:41:12 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: cache-dtc-ad10.proxy.aol.com at 205.188.116.204

Message:
Dr. Thomas,

You are quite correct. I stayed away discussing politics but still endeavor once in a while to discuss nation interest.

I mostly stayed in peeperdom, acquiring information and knowledge for i am a young man.

Yesterday i finally finish reading Walter Rodney " How europe underdevelop Africa" and it dawns on me, what are we really doing to change from the past or is history reapeating itself here ( Salone 1967 much more to say about that but will leave it alone). The question which needs to be address is why our people still not fighting for national interest and from reading many article on this forum, most defend or critize instead of us talking about ways as citizen to hold whoever takes office accountable.

We are discussing their personalities, Instead of us requestinmg of them to discuss policies and issues, we are spending much time defending them. Shaka Stevens was defended by many and many suffered, when do we learn as people.

I am not saying we can't belong to a party, what i am asking is we hold who ever the candidates is accountable and not make him feel like hi is God, He has to recognize that he is there to serve the nation and not the nation to serve him.

If we start holding them accountable, they will hopefully stop signing away all our resources to the west and start rebuilding a proud nation. Our leaders need to know the people will not allow or tolerate inefficient governemnt anymore.

Practising syncophancy only allow them to take advantage of the illiterate popuplation.

I hope this help but maybe we can talk more on the phone.

Subject: NOT INTERESTED IN SIERRA LEONE POLITICS
From: DR. MICHEL SHO -SAWYER
To: All
Date Posted: 12:57:07 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: michel_sawyer@yahoo.com
Entered From: global.life.edu at 72.16.214.206

Message:
Man by nature is a political being, whether he directly or indirectly takes part in the process; nature has created him to be a political animal.

That notwithstanding, his interaction with his fellow political beings should be done with caution to avoid misrepresentation and misinterpretation. It is for that reason history plays a significant role in the development of any nation and mankind.

Qouting stevens - If you do not want to get involve, politics will involve you.

It is high time we as citizens of our belove Sierra Leone get involve in the process, hold our leaders accountable and work on redeveloping Sierra Leone by providing our skills to our belove motherland instead of always looking for the dollar. STOP PRACTICING SYNCOPHANCY AND HOLD YOUR CANDIDATES ACCOUNTABLE. NATION INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL INTEREST.

Picking cotton is Picking cotton, it doesn't matter what title you hold and i am the first to admit that i am still picking cotton. we need to now work for country.

Your able servant in Training

Dr. Michel sho-Sawyer

Subject: Eddie Nyallay of NEC is a stunch SLPP member
From: Special Cut
To: All
Date Posted: 12:56:17 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: gw1.dc.gov at 164.82.146.3

Message:
Eddie Nyallay a former ISU thug sponsored by Sheki's APC to study gorilla warfare in Cuba. After studies he defected to the US and lived in the Wahington area. Hard times forced him to relocate to Sierra Leone.Nyallay is a DIEHARD SLPP member that happens to be one of the top bras in the National Electorial Comission. No wonder Solo B is so confident about victory. Take note, opposition and keep a close watch on this Electorial commissioner Eastern province. Watch him pose with NEC officials at the Awoko website

Subject: COUP PLOT IN LIBERIA
From: COUP
To: All
Date Posted: 12:55:43 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: at 129.49.7.126

Message:
BBC NEWS

Arrests over Liberia 'coup plot'

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took power last year after winning elections
A former Liberian army commander has been arrested for "subversive activities" - the first such arrests since landmark elections in 2005.
Gen Charles Julu headed the presidential guard under former leader Samuel Doe and led a 1994 coup attempt.

"There is hard evidence that this man was trying to plan a coup," Information Minister Laurence Bropleh told the BBC.

President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took power in 2006 after a 14-year war.

The BBC's Jonathan Paye-Layleh in the capital, Monrovia, says people are shocked at the possibility of renewed unrest in the country.

The United Nations has some 15,000 peacekeepers in Liberia - the second largest deployment in the world.

Mr Bropleh said there was video proof of the coup pot, which the authorities in neighbouring Ivory Coast had helped investigate.

Fighters from the two countries have been involved in conflicts on both sides of the border in recent years.

"The Liberian public should remain calm. There is no immediate threat to the state," he told Reuters news agency.

Student groups from Doe's Krahn ethnic group have condemned the arrests and called for the release of Gen Julu and the other former officer also arrested.

Subject: DENNIS BRIGHT MUST RESIGN
From: bobobele
To: All
Date Posted: 12:45:52 07/19/07 ()
Email Address: bobobele@aol.com
Entered From: at 206.113.148.2

Message:
FOOTBALL STAKEHOLDERS SUPPORT NAHIM KHADI AS PRESIDENT

According to Western Area Football stakeholders at yesterday’s meeting, they fully support the Nahim Khadi executive because they were constitutionally elected by the football stakeholders three years ago in Makeni and their term has not yet expired.
The Western Area Football Stakeholders also blamed the Ministry of Youths and Sports for taking such action without the notification of the football stakeholders who have the constitutional right to suspend or remove the executive of SLFA.
They called on the attention of the Ministry of Youths and Sports to reverse their decision with immediate effect and that they are organizing the executive of Nahim Khadi to run the activities of football until May 2008 when their term of office shall expire and call for the congress to elect the new executive that would run football.
The Northern Region football stakeholders had also tendered signatory supporting Nahim Khadi as their president until May 2008.
They also condemned Dr. Dennis Bright decision to suspend the Nahim Khadi executive which is constitutionally elected by football stakeholders in Makeni town.
The Northern Region football stakeholder’s letter states that they were in full support of the Nahim Khadi executive and call for immediate reversal of the decision taken by the Minister of Sports to suspend an executive that has worked hard for the promotion and development of football within their tenure in office.
The Eastern Region football stakeholders have also submitted their letter of protest against the unilateral suspension of the SLFA executive by the Minister of Youths and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright. They also condemned the decision of the Ministry of Youths and Sports and urged the Minister, Dr. Dennis Bright, to reverse his decision with immediate effect.

Meanwhile, senior government officials have made their position very clear that the government has no business interfering into the decision taken by the Minister of Youths and Sports, Dr. Dennis Bright, to suspend the SLFA executive which was constitutionally elected by the football stakeholders of the nation.
Senior government officials yesterday confirmed to the New Citizen that the decision of Minister of Youth and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright, to suspend SLFA is unprofessional and did not have the blessing of the government.
The New Citizen was also informed that the government was fully aware of the rules and regulations of FIFA, governing football activities and that the government should not interfere with the regulations of FIFA, the football governing body, so that Sierra Leone would not be in the list of suspended countries through government interference.
Senior government officials yesterday have taken great exception to the Minister of Youths and Sports Dr. Dennis Bright’s decision to suspend a constitutionally elected executive and also assured the New Citizen sports that the matter would be amicable resolved within the shortest possible time to allow the Nahim Khadi executive to complete its term in office according the constitution of SLFA.

Subject: Re: DENNIS BRIGHT MUST RESIGN
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 19:00:46 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
Na POWER (misuse of) exceeding the responsibility of his portfolio, if you don't watch it, he'll soon be appointing himself as referee and handing out APC-red cards.

But should he resign because of this non-violent action?
Methinks all things considered, he is a sportsman after all, so a stern warning (not to interfere and no interventions.........

Worst case scenario was in post apartheid South Africa.
The referee awarded the yellow card and the guy should him a finger, and that caused the red card, whereupon the finger man refused to leave the match - at which point (not even faintly reminiscent of ex-captain Foya) the referee took out his revolver from its holster and shot him dead..... and that was the last card.....

So you see by comparison, DR. Bright is only guilty of zealous enthusiasm, which many football fans are liable to be swept away by that kind of enthusiasm which makes you forget who you are......

Next thing you know is you want to sack the president...or order him to resign, when, mamouton, a stern warning could do……

Subject: 2 documents: " Building a capable state." Parts 1 & 2
From: Cornelius Hamelberg
To: All
Date Posted: 12:35:30 07/19/07 ()
Email Address:
Entered From: c-2b8472d5.01-32-73746f42.cust.bredbandsbolaget.se at 213.114.132.43

Message:
It's a long one. Could have been posted in smaller sections. Anyway, it's talking to us and you may pause, as you wish......

There is a tendency, not only among the opposition, but also among men of those even in the Diaspora, many of those generally disgruntled with life & its slings and arrows of outrageous fortune who tend to want to blame it all on the SLPP.

This document entitled ”Building the Capable State in Africa” – makes some of what was hitherto unclear to become clearer.

The”Note” also features the “daunting “ package of tasks that are waiting for to challenge the seriousness of whoever takes over the State House on 11th August, come rain or shine.

These documents could be widely circulated.

With each and every party clamouring for attention and promising to deliver, like no other, it’s understandable that the APC thinks that they have a monopoly on ability to move Sierra Leone fast forward. The SLPP has a similar belief and St. Francis of the PMDC, also wants to work a miracle – if you will only give him a chance – to do so.

When judging the success or otherwise of the SLPP, we tend to forget that it’s the” simultaneous tasks of nation-building, state building, political development, and economic and social development and structural transformation.”

“ BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA”

SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGFVII) ON
“BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA”

OUAGADOUGOU-BURKINA FASO- 24-26 OCTOBER 2007

BACKGROUND AND PROCESS NOTE FOR THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

BACKGROUND

Since the 1960s African countries have been faced with the daunting and simultaneous tasks of nation-building, state building, political development, and economic and social development and structural transformation. A number of factors have been identified to explain Africa’s poor performance of Africa in maintaining peace, security and internal stability, promoting economic growth, and eradicating poverty. Among the major reasons identified are weak institutional and human capacities.
UNDP defines capacity as the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. Capacity Development (CD) is thereby the process through which the abilities to do so are obtained, strengthened, adapted and maintained over time . The ability of the state to manage rests on the capacity of its institutions and people as well as the prevalence of an enabling environment. Without capable institutions governments will not be able to develop and implement programmes to manage and deliver services. Weak capacity compromises the ability of the government to deliver services and to undertake its public sector management and regulatory functions. Inefficient government institutions hamper entrepreneurship and economic growth. It undermines civil society development.

Capacity and governance are linked. Sustainable growth and poverty reduction require national capacity to diagnose development problems and to formulate and implement appropriate solutions.

Why should Africa engage in capacity development dialogue?

a. Africa is the object and subject of Capacity Development
Over the last three decades, Africa and its partners have invested monumental effort and resources to develop capacity. Yet the continent continues to be capacity challenged. Effective capacity to formulate policies and implement and oversee them is lacking. Africa’s private sector is weak, its productive capacity too inadequate to take advantage of globalization. Public services are inadequate and in some cases deteriorating. Why is it the case? Why have the past policies targeting capacity development in Africa not produced the desired result despite the monumental effort and resources expended?

b. Africa’s voice is unheard
While Africa has been and still is the subject and object of Capacity development support by its development partners, it remains marginally involved in the dialogue and has made little input into the capacity agenda. Africa therefore needs to contribute to the definition of capacity in a manner that anchors the concept and its application in the continent’s realities and priorities, addressing its critical linkages to policy formation and implementation, individuals and institutions and how these interact to impact on the ability of continent to meet its peace, governance and development challenges.

These issues require consideration and AGFVII will provide the framework for reflection and agenda setting for building the capable state in Africa.

This Process Note is intended to provide broad guidelines for organizing the national consultations, the content and structures of the national reports, institutional arrangements, partnerships and financing. These are indicative and aimed at structuring and standardizing discussion and reporting on the national consultations. Countries are however free to adjust the organizational part of the suggested guidelines in this process note to suit local circumstances.

THE AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGF)

The AGF was launched in 1997 by UNDP and UNECA within the framework of the United Nations Special Initiative for Africa (UNSIA) The primary goal of the AGF is to bring together African leaders, representatives of the private sector, civil society organizations and other stakeholders in Africa, and officials from Africa’s development partners to exchange views and experience on major challenges and opportunities in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Since its launching AGF has held six sessions ending with the sixth session convened in Kigali-Rwanda in 2006 under the theme “Implementing the African Peer Review Mechanism: Challenges and Opportunities”

At the conclusion of the Kigali Forum and in recognition of the centrality of capacity in ensuring good governance and the delivery of services, it was agreed that AGFV11 should focus on the issues of capacity and capacity building for development and convene under the theme “Building the Capable State”.

THE SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM-AGFVII

The specific objectives of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum will be to:-

1. Deliberate on the meaning and definition of a capable state appropriate to the African context and its linkages to peace, security, good governance, and development.
2. Take stock of the experiences and lessons learnt from the efforts at meeting the capacity challenges in Africa including internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state
3. Brainstorm on the prevailing capacity development challenges and opportunities for building the capable state in Africa and their implications to Africa and its development partners.
4. Identify the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context, how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
5. Discuss how Africa can effectively respond in putting in place an African owned and led strategies for building the capable state and the nature of partnerships that will be required.

PREPARATION OF THE FORUM

The AGFVII preparatory processes will involve the holding of national consultations on country experiences in capacity development, preparation of national reports, and convening of the Forum itself. To facilitate these activities, an Issues Paper, a Process Note and six thematic technical papers will be commissioned for use as background for the national consultations and elaboration of the national reports that will inform the deliberations at the Forum.

1. The issues paper will provide the theoretical framework for the discussions within the national consultations that will be convened in the twenty seven countries leading to national reports on experiences and challenges of building institutions and strengthening state capacity for good governance and development.

2. Six technical thematic papers will be commissioned. These will be used as technical input into the national consultations and the deliberations at the Forum itself. The papers are on the following themes:-
a. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa
b. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance
c. State legitimacy and leadership
d. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance
e. The role of non-state actors
f. Globalization and state capacity

4. Twenty seven countries have been earmarked for participation in AGFVII. These countries were selected on the basis of linguistic and geographic balance, best practice and post-conflict experience. They are Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali and Togo from West Africa; Comoros, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Mauritius, Sudan and Uganda from East Africa; South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe from Southern Africa; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Cameroon and Gabon from Central Africa; Algeria and Tunisia from North Africa; and Central Africa and Chad from Central Africa invited as observers.

Five representatives including a media representative from each of the twenty-seven countries will be facilitated to attend.

5. In addition, a Heads of State segment will be facilitated- bringing six to seven African Heads of State or Government together with the participants of the Forum to deliberate on the capacity challenges. All branches of government, the private sector, civil society organizations, the African and international media, and Africa’s development partners will be invited to participate in the Forum

6. A Media Symposium will be organized as an integral part of AGF VII to deliberate on the role of media in the building of the capable state in Africa and on the effective ways of covering the state.
7. Mechanisms will be put in place to follow-up on the outcome and recommendations of AGF VII within national and regional programming.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES

1. OBJECTIVE OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

The national consultations are expected to do the following:-

a. Discuss the definition and characteristics of a capable state appropriate to the African context
b. Explore the linkages among peace, security, good governance, development, poverty reduction and a capable state
c. Deliberate on the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context
d. Examine how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
e. Identify internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state in Africa
f. Identify lessons learnt, best cases and worst cases in building and sustaining the capable state
g. Explore emerging challenges and opportunities in building the capable state and
Resource requirements for building and sustaining such a state
h. Prepare a report on national experience on building the capable state for submission to the Forum.
i. Determine composition of delegation to the Seventh Africa Governance Forum

2. ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

Each country is expected to organize broad based consultations bringing together all the key stakeholders in the country. In preparing for the workshops, the countries are expected to:-

a. Designate an appropriate focal point for organizing the national consultation and coordinating pre and post consultation processes leading to participation in the Forum
b. Draw up the terms of reference and designate experts to prepare any additional discussion papers that may be needed to supplement the Issues and Technical papers.
c. Select a facilitator(s) experienced in group animation and participatory group methodologies. The facilitator should also have strong writing skills to transform information obtained through consultative workshops into the national report
d. The consultations should be organized around interactive workshops that will permit free and spirited debate on the issues related to capacity development. Capacity development ministries and/or institutions should lead and animate the discussions on the basis of national experience.
e. Break out and dedicated sessions should be facilitated to consider the six focus areas of capacity development and on which thematic technical papers have been prepared-namely: - a. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa, b. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance, c. State legitimacy and leadership, d. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance, e. The role of non-state actor, and f. Globalization and state capacity.
f. The discussions, conclusions and recommendations of the workshops on the various aspects of capacity development should be captured in a Country Report that will be agreed on by the stakeholders as representing the national experiences. The report will be submitted to AGFVII.

Countries are free to use the Issues and the Technical Papers as they see fit- provided that they ensure focused and organized discussion capturing of national experiences in capacity development in a cogent report based on the format provided.

3. PARTICIPATION

Given the theme of the AGF VII, it is essential that the consultation include representatives of all key stakeholders including:-

a. National ministries of public service, capacity development ministries and institutions,
b. Parliamentarians, labor and employment organizations
c. Local government representatives
d. Civil society, think tanks, research and training institutions working on capacity development issues;
e. NGOs, women and youth
f. The private sector
g. Media

For logistical reasons, the national consultation workshops will have to be restricted to a manageable number of participants determined through local consultations. Notwithstanding the need to ensure manageability of the national process, it will be essential to ensure that all key stakeholders take part.

4. DURATION AND HOSTING

The national consultations should be held for at least three days between 15th June and 30th August 2007 at a place accessible and conducive to the participation by all stakeholders including those from outside the country capitals in particular the regional local government representatives.

5. REPORT CONTENTS AND FORMATS

The reports shall be prepared on the basis of the national consultations. They are expected to be concise and reflect the critical issues discussed and the general consensus arrived at on the challenges of capacity development in Africa and possible solutions. . While it is expected that consultants may have to be retained to do provide technical input, it is strongly suggested not to ask them to prepare national reports in lieu of holding national consultations. The reports should not exceed 30 pages including the executive summary with the following format-

a. Executive summary
b. A statement on the purpose of the national consultations
c. A descr1ption of the national consultations including process, agenda, participation etc
d. A survey of the national experiences/strategies in capacity development and challenges faced
e. A summary of a sustainable national agenda for building a capable state
f. Conclusions and recommendations for AGFVII

6. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The process will be jointly coordinated by UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa in close collaboration with the Steering Committee for AGFVII. The Steering Committee bringing together key partners will be set up to provide overall guidance to the preparatory work for the Forum. Similar committees or Task Forces may also to be established at the national level to coordinate and lead the process with the participation of the UNDP country offices and AGF VII focal points.

The UNDP and National Capacity development focal points will consult on the membership of these national coordinating committees.

7. ROLE OF COUNTRY OFFICES

UNDP country offices will play facilitative roles in coordination and provide financial support to the in-country preparatory processes and for the attendance to the Forum by stakeholders. The RR/RC will assist in organizing the UN country teams around providing technical support to the national consultations particularly in the preparation of national reports and participation at the Forum. UNDP country offices may also assist the national capacity development focal points with the preparation of the national reports on the format provided. National consultants may also be retained to assist with writing the reports.

8. TIMELINES

Pre-Forum: In-country processes

a. Designation of the National focal point for AGFVII: 15th June 2007
b. Holding of three days national consultations on experiences in capacity development.-the results of which would be captured in a report from each participating country summarizing the country consultation process, experiences and challenges related to capacity development-Between 15th June and 30th August 2007
c. Preparation and submission of national reports to RBA- 30th August 2007

Convening of AGFVII-24-26 October 2007

a. Convening of the Stakeholders’ Forum
b. Media symposium
c. The Heads of State Segment
“

SEVENTH AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGF VII)

Theme
“Building the Capable State in Africa”

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
24-26 October 2007

Concept Note
&
Technical Papers

REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

New York- June 2007

Contents

ACRONYMS 4
PREFACE 5
PART 1: CONCEPT PAPER
1. REINFORCING CAPACITY TOWARDS BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA 8
1.1 INTRODUCTION 8
1.2 CHALLENGES CONFRONTING AFRICA 10
1.3 RATIONALE REGARDING CALLS FOR THE CAPABLE STATE 16
1.4 INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE CAPABLE STATE 17
1.5 AGENDA FOR AGF VII 22
PART TWO: TECHNICAL PAPERS
PART 2 24
TECHNICAL PAPERS 24
2. STATE LEGITIMACY AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 25
2.1 INTRODUCTION 25
2.2. STATE, STATE CAPACITY, STATE LEGITIMACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION IN AFRICA 26
2.3. LEADERSHIP, STATE CAPACITY, LEGITIMACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 30
2.4. BUILDING STATE CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP UNDER THE AU, NEPAD AND THE APRM 36
2.5. CONCLUSION 38
REFERENCES 39
3. STRENGTHENING STATE PERFORMANCE THROUGH DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE 43
3.1 INTRODUCTION 43
3.2 DECENTRALIZATION DEFINED 43
3.3 CHALLENGES FOR DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 44
3.4 UNDERSTANDING STATE PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPMENT 45
3.5 SUMMARIZING THE AFRICAN CHALLENGE 49
3.6 STRATEGIES AND PROCESSES FOR EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE 49
3.7 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY AT LOCAL LEVELS 51
REFERENCES 52
4. GLOBALIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA 53
4.1 THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF GLOBALIZATION 53
4.2 . PROBLEMATIZING STATE CAPACITY 55
4.3 GLOBALIZATION, STATE CAPACITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN AFRICA 58
4.4 . ADDRESSING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CAUSED BY GLOBALIZATION 59
4.5 . GLOBALIZATION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CRISIS 60
4.6 . CONSTRAINING LIMITS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY FOR STATE CAPACITY 61
4.7 GLOBALIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD? 62
4.8 POLICY AGENDA FOR OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS TO STRENGTHENING STATE CAPACITY IN AFRICA 64
4.9 CONCLUSIONS 66
REFERENCES 66
5. THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS 68
5.1 INTRODUCTION 68
5.2 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 68
5.3 OUTREACH LIMITED, FUNDING DOUBTFUL, LEGITIMACY CONTESTED 75
5.4 CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD 78
6. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 81
6.1 INTRODUCTION 81
6.2 AFRICA’S POVERTY CHALLENGE 81
6.3 AFRICA’S GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE 82
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 90
7. ENHANCING INSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN CAPACITY FOR IMPROVED PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE 91
7.1 INTRODUCTION 91
7.2 CONCEPTUAL AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 91
7.3 NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF CAPACITY CHALLENGES 92
7.4 EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CAPACITY CHALLENGES 95
7.5 THE WAY FORWARD: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 98
7.6 CONCLUSIONS: PRIORITIZING CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORT 106
REFERENCES 107
8. ROLE OF WOMEN IN BUILDING THE CAPABLE STATE IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 109
8.1 INTRODUCTION 109
8.2 INTRODUCTION OF GENDER INTO THE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE IN AFRICA 109
8.3 HOW WOMEN GROUPS ARE ORGANISED 112
8.4 FUNDING FOR WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS 114
8.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS AND THE STATE 114
8.6 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE 116
8.7 OPPORTUNITIES 118
8.8 CHALLENGES 118
8.9 THE WAY FORWARD 119
8.10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 120
REFERENCES 122

Acronyms

ACHPR African Charter for Human and People’s Rights
AGF African Governance Forum
ALPN African Leadership and Progress Network
APRM Africa Peer Review Mechanism
AU African Union
CBO Community Based Organization
CD Capacity Development
NSA Non-State Actor
DAC Development Assistance Committee [of OECD]
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS Economic Commission of West African States
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FUPRO Federation des Unions des Producteurs du Benin
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GLPF Great Lakes Policy Forum
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IFIs International Financial Institutions
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme
LIFE Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OANET l’Organisations des Acteurs Non-Etatiques du Tchad
OAU Organization of African Union
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NSA Non State Actor
ROPARWA Reseau des Organisations Paysanne du Rwanda
SACI Southern Africa Capacity Initiative
SAP Structural Adjustments Programmes
TA Technical Assistance
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSIA United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WHO World Health Organization

Preface

The African Governance Forum (AGF) was launched in 1997 by UNDP and UNECA within the framework of the United Nations Special Initiative for Africa (UNSIA.) While UNSIA has since folded, AGF has continued as a flagship governance programme bringing together African leaders, cooperating partners, representatives of civil society and the private sector to discuss a thematic subject that is considered to be important and timely in the advancement of good governance on the African continent. Four specific objectives underlay the AGF-namely:-
a. Strengthen development cooperation and partnerships among African governments, civil society organizations and Africa’s development partners for improved governance
b. Increase awareness and facilitate the exchange of information, experiences and best practices among African governments, the private sector, civil society organizations, development partners and other stakeholders on good governance
c. Encourage the development of concrete programs of action to promote good governance related issues and facilitate the mobilization of resources for these programs at the national level
d. Create an environment that is supportive of resource mobilization for follow-up governance related activities in Africa.

Since its launch, six AGF sessions have so far been held. The first one was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1997 and focused on a multiplicity of issues that included constitutional reforms, the media, capacity building, and decentralization. The second AGF, held in Accra, Ghana, focused specifically on ‘Accountability and Transparency while the third was held in Bamako, Mali, and addressed Good Governance and Conflict Management. The fourth AGF was held in Kampala, Uganda, and looked at the Contribution of the Parliamentary Process in Strengthening Good Governance in Africa. The fifth one was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on the theme: Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa. The sixth one (AGF-VI) was held in Kigali, Rwanda in 2006 and focused on “Implementing the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Challenges and Opportunities”.

The Sixth Africa Governance Forum in Kigali underscored the centrality of state capacity in strengthening good governance and delivering of development generally. To that effect, the Forum decided to devote the Seventh Africa Governance Forum to the consideration of the critical issue of capacity development and how the capacities of the state in Africa can be enhanced with a view to enabling them deliver services effectively. It is against this background that the seventh AGF will be held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 24-26 October 2007 under the theme of Building the Capable State in Africa.

The specific objectives of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum will be to:-
6. Deliberate on the meaning and definition of a capable state appropriate to the African context and its linkages to peace, security, good governance, and development.
7. Take stock of the experiences and lessons learnt from the efforts at meeting the capacity challenges in Africa including internal and external factors that have facilitated and/or hindered building the capable state
8. Brainstorm on the prevailing capacity development challenges and opportunities for building the capable state in Africa and their implications to Africa and its development partners.
9. Identify the nature and types of capacity required in a variety of state and non-state actors in the African context, how to ensure ownership of the process of building capable states by all relevant stakeholders
10. Discuss how Africa can effectively respond in putting in place an African owned and led strategies for building the capable state and the nature of partnerships that will be required.

The AGFVII preparatory processes will involve the holding of national consultations on country experiences in capacity development, preparation of national reports, and convening of the Forum itself. To facilitate these activities, an Issues Paper and seven thematic technical papers have been commissioned for use as background for the national consultations and elaboration of the national reports that will inform the deliberations at the Forum.

The issues paper provides the theoretical framework for the discussions within the national consultations that will be convened in the twenty seven countries leading to national reports on experiences and challenges of building institutions and strengthening state capacity for good governance and development.

The seven technical thematic papers developed by independent African experts are intended to provide technical input into the national consultations discussions and the deliberations at the Forum itself. The papers are on the following themes:-
g. Redefining the role of the state and development challenges in Africa
h. Developing institutional and human capacity for public sector performance
i. State legitimacy and leadership
j. Strengthening state performance through decentralized governance
k. The role of non-state actors
l. Globalization and state capacity
m. Role of Women in Building the Capable State in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

This Document presents the Issues and Technical Papers developed around the theme of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum on Building the Capable State in Africa. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors.
On behalf of the Steering Committee of the Seventh Africa Governance Forum, UNDP- Regional Bureau for Africa would like to thank the authors of the various papers for sharing their insight into the challenge of capacity development at all levels and how that impacts on Building the Capable State in Africa and Professor Oliver Saasa for editing the original English versions of the papers.

Gilbert Fousson Houngbo
United Nations Assistant Secretary General and UNDP Regional Director for Africa

Part 1
Concept Paper

Concept Paper
1. Reinforcing Capacity towards building the Capable State in Africa
Ahmed Mohiddin

1.1 Introduction
In the pursuit of nation building and economic development, the first generation of African leaders considered centralization of political power and authority, the control of the material resources and the mobilization of human resources as the most critical factors. Nation building entailed the forging of diverse ethnic, cultural, racial, religious and traditional groups into one meaningful nation. This entailed top-bottom authoritarian socio-economic policies that did not necessarily reflect the wishes of the people, nor did they sufficiently empower them to effectively participate in the economic activities.

In the process of mobilizing the people, the one-party governance systems and authoritarian regimes that characterize many African political systems undermined and destroyed the growth and development of independently organized political groups and other critics in the civil society. The regimes attempted to co-opt existing fledgling civil society organizations, marginalized those not cooperating and destroyed those that appeared to be hostile or opposed to the regimes. Consequently, institutional capacity building was neglected, not considered a priority, and the residual but weak institutional capacity bequeathed by the colonial rulers was severely undermined. In some instances, the legislatures were allowed to decay, with their capacities to check and balance the executive virtually destroyed. There were no means by which the people could effectively air their grievances, articulate particular interests or, in general, call their governments to account.

The emergence of the military dictatorship in many African countries had extremely damaging impact on the capacity of the governance institutions. In their excessive preoccupation with security and control, they restricted the political process, marginalised civil society organizations, and suspended existing constitutions that were the basic foundations of good governance and democracy. They banned political parties, undermined the judiciary, threatened the media, frustrated private sector initiatives and often created an atmosphere of fear, suspicions and distrust amongst the citizenry. There were no checks and balances. Government accountability to the governed was virtually non-existent. There were, thus, neither institutional capacities nor concerns for capacity building.

In the circumstances of the euphoria of independence, coupled with the rising expectations, not much thought was given to the precise ingredients - the building blocks - that would constitute the capacity to maintain and sustain the political order and the economic institutions needed to produce goods and services. Beyond the general expansion of education and training, supplemented by foreign aid and expertise in improving technical capacities in selected ministries, very little was done or thought given to the issue of the appropriate capabilities for the fulfillment of the post-colonial development objectives. The inherited institutions were assumed, mutatis mutandis, to be adequate for the promotion of the development objectives. Issues of the appropriate capacity to sustain the post-Independence political order and the management of the economic institutions were raised in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. The World Bank noted in 1988:

Many countries in the region are severely handicapped in their development efforts by poor institutional performance at all levels—the limited capacity of government ministries to determine appropriate policies and allocate resources, the poor management of public sector enterprises, the fragility of the cooperative movement, or the undeveloped potential of the private sector. Many African countries also face chronic shortages of qualified local personnel, and still depend on foreign personnel, even to maintain existing levels of performance. Thus the need for strengthening the indigenous capacity of African institutions is urgent and broad-based programs for institutional development must be seen as central to any strategy for African development.

A lot has taken place in Africa in the course of the last two decades, opening up the political space and empowering people to participate in the development and democratization processes of their countries. Much also has since been written, debated and actions taken on the issue of capacity building in Africa. From the initial preoccupations with the lack of capital, administrative abilities and foreign technical assistance to wider concerns about governing and its consequences, and sophisticated appreciation of the role of the non-state actors, to the different types of capacity in the formulation of appropriate policies and their implementation, management of resources and the promotion of sustainable human development.

Capacity has now been acknowledged as the major ‘missing link’ in the development and democratization efforts in Africa. At the conclusion of AGF VI in Kigali in May 2006, it was agreed that AGFVII should focus on the issue of ‘Building the Capable State.’ This Concept Paper forms the overall platform from which the issues for AGF VII are to be discussed. As an Issues Paper, this piece aims to provide a conceptual basis for the more pointed discussions in Part Two if this document on Technical papers. Experience so far gained suggests that the capacity of the institutions of governance to deliver services efficiently, effectively, equitably and predictably needs to be addressed by African countries. Moreover, as countries must respond effectively and timely to the new global challenges and opportunities, African governance systems need to acquire appropriate capabilities. Africa, thus, needs a capable state appropriate to its conditions and experiences.

Africa is a vast continent with many and diverse human and material resources. It has great potentials for economic growth and human development. But it also has tremendous economic, social and political problems, as well as global challenges and opportunities. Some of these problems are deeply rooted in history. Some are the consequences of the colonial situation, the anti-colonial struggles and the exigencies of the Cold War. Others are the results of inappropriate policies as African governments were grappling with the development and democratization issues. While yet others are the consequences of the structural adjustments imposed by the international development community, and the continuous unavoidable processes of globalization. But changes also bring forth new challenges, opportunities and possibilities for those with the capabilities to respond to them positively. Whatever the root-causes of these problems and challenges, they all have to be responded to effectively with the appropriate policies, strategies and capabilities.

One of the positive responses is the New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD). Similarly, many African countries have voluntarily acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). APRM is essentially a mechanism to promote the political, social and economic objectives of NEPAD, and ensuring that the participating countries observe the principles and practices supportive of the objectives. The over-aching objectives of NEPAD are the promotion of sustainable human development; the eradication of poverty; continental economic and political integration; and the enhancement of global competitiveness.

This Concept Paper is divided into six sections. A brief review of the major domestic and global challenges confronting Africa is made in section 2. Section 3 dwells on the rationale regarding calls for the Capable State. Section 4, in turn, sets the intellectual framework for understanding the concept of the capable State. Lastly, Section 5 presents possible issues to be considered in the Agenda for AGF VII.

1.2 Challenges Confronting Africa
Africa is currently confronted with two sets of challenges. One is domestic, and the other is global. The domestic challenges include promotion of sustainable human development, including meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); promotion of peace, security and stability without which the achievement of sustainable development would be impossible; combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic and malaria; sustaining popular electoral participatory democracy; ensuring a thriving private sector; and, at the regional and continental levels, promotion of economic and political integration.

1.2.1 Capacity Challenges
Capacity has been identified as the ‘missing link’ in the African development and democratization processes. The issues of capacity and capacity building are very critical in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Good governance is a major factor in the creation of an environment of peace, stability and security, in which people may pursue various productive and creative activities, creating wealth and employment, and thus promoting human development and the alleviation of poverty.

Capacity building is a perpetual and complex process, entailing policies, strategies and their implementation; human, financial and material resources, as well as good leadership. It is an issue of empowerment, providing people with the capabilities and expanding their range of choices and opportunities for consultations and partnerships, as well as that of the availability and utilization of resources. It is not simply an issue of the availability of, for example, doctors, engineers, economists, or teachers, but those who have the appropriate specialisation and experience needed for the specific functions, and the creation of the appropriate working conditions. Capacity building thus requires an environment that would, in general:
a) Ensure the continuous supply of the appropriate capacity ingredients: human, material and financial resources
b) Create an environment of peace, security and stability so that people could engage in various creative and productive activities, creating wealth and employment, and thus the conditions for continuous supply of the ingredients for capacity building
c) Facilitate the efficient utilization of the human and material resources, and promote efforts to continuously up-grade information and knowledge, skills, techniques and best practices
d) Consolidate trust and generate social capital to promote co-operation and partnerships amongst the various groups of people in society, amongst and between the CSOs and CBOs, and with the government, the press, media and the private sector
e) Facilitate the observance of accountability and transparency in the public decision making processes, and enable people to call to account those in governance positions
f) Encourage people and their organizations to identify and discuss diminishing institutional capacities or such serious deficiencies in all the structures and levels of governance in their countries, design or suggest the appropriate capacity for the efficient and effective performance of those institutions.
g) Promote the unhindered circulation of ideas and opinions, information and knowledge, and the exchange of experience, insight and best practice.
In the light of the above, capacity building is a continuous process requiring continuous supply of the appropriate legal, institutional, human and material resources. The objective of capacity building is to ensure that institutions are efficient and effective in the performance of their respective functions. Capacity building has to respond to changes, needs and aspirations of the people, as well as adapting to, and adopting, scientific and technological changes, new ideas, organizational and managerial principles, experiences and relevant ‘best practices’ from within Africa or elsewhere.
Much broader and sophisticated concepts of capacity have emerged. Capacity now includes the wider issue of governance, its principles, institutions and supportive components in the civil society and the private sector. This has entailed major shifts from top-down authoritative rule to constitutionalism and the rule of law; democracy and social justice; accountability and transparency; inclusiveness and empowerment so that the people have the capabilities to effectively participate in public affairs; as well as being aware of the situation in which they live and work, of the available range of choices and opportunities, and to identify problems and suggest solutions. In short, a major paradigm shift has taken place, from the ‘brutality’ of big government to the ‘sensitivity’ of good governance.

Understanding the possible or potential causes of capacity deficiency is an important first step towards capacity building. Capacity problems may arise because of any of the following:
a) Lost capacity due to destruction caused by civil wars or severe political problems (bad governance) forcing professional and skilled people to flee to other countries, creating very serious brain drains.
b) Inadequate material and financial resources. The required quantity of trained and skilled personnel might be available but not matched with the required material and financial resources.
c) Inefficient utilization of existing capacity due, in part, to the following:
o People concerned are not fully applying themselves to the tasks at hand because of inappropriate or inadequate incentive such as poor remuneration or working conditions.
o Corruption, i.e., the miss-use and appropriation of material and financial resources for personal gains.
o lack of accountability and transparency in the system of governance.
o Lack of integrity, vision, commitment, and political will to get things done.

The crucial practical question for African countries confronted with the competing domestic needs and demands is: capacity for what? If, for example, one is concerned with the development of a country, then capacity needed might be that which would enable the achievement of the stated development objectives of the country. This will entail the capabilities for formulating sound and appropriate policies and strategies, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; mobilizing and managing human and material resources; mobilizing and managing funds to pay for the policies and their implementation; availability and accessibility of information and knowledge relevant to the tasks; management and utilization of social capital, trust, organizational inter-linkages and various kinds of partnerships, cooperation and consultations within the civil and private sectors. Thus, the capabilities to achieve the development objectives would be assumed to exist if:
a) institutions and organizations with the supportive personnel to perform the stated functions are in place;
b) personnel with the requisite skills to perform the specified functions are available;
c) there are leaders who are conversant with the needs and aspirations of the people, competent and honest, with integrity, vision and are committed to the fulfillment of the objectives; leaders who are able to mobilize and inspire people, defining the future while effectively responding to the present needs and demands of the people
d) the institutions and organizations have the adequate financial and material resources to perform the activities;
e) there are numerous independent professional and trade associations, civil society and community based organizations engaged in providing services for their members;
f) people working for the institutions and organizations work according to the best methods and techniques (best practice), following productivity-related principles, and governance-related principles.

It is important to make the distinction between capacity as a generic ability to get things done, and capacity for as specific ability to get certain things done. With reference to an institution, the notion capacity for would signify the specific capabilities that would enable the specified institution to perform the specified objectives efficiently and effectively. Capacity of an institution is, thus, essentially the product of the dynamic interactions of the performance of the people running and managing the specific institution, with the laws, rules and regulations, norms and traditions pertaining to the institution. The performance of the people will be determined by three factors: the availability of the supportive institutional infrastructures, equipment and adequate financial resources; their technical skills and professional competence to achieve the objectives of the institution; and their commitment and integrity in observing the rules and regulations, norms and conventions of the institution. Institutional capacity building, thus, entails acquiring the appropriate capacity ingredients for the specific institution; and this would depend on the nature and objectives of the institution.

The global challenges include the building of the appropriate capabilities to respond positively to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. In the past, Africans have tended to be reactive or even passive in the face of rapid global changes and, consequently, they became victims rather than beneficiary of globalization. Africans now need to be better integrated into the global economy. The response to the domestic and global challenges requires collective effort. For development to be meaningful and sustainable, it must be initiated and undertaken by the people themselves. Only when the people effectively participate in the development processes can development truly be of their choice. But the people must be sufficiently empowered, provided with the relevant information and knowledge to enable them effectively and meaningfully participate in the development processes. This is a critical challenge for capacity enhancement.

To respond positively to the capacity enhancement challenges, an enabling environment of peace, security and stability is required. Good governance plays a major role in the creation of this enabling environment. Governance is about power and its utilization. Governance enables people to utilize collective power to manage their affairs in the most efficient and effective manners, and in accordance with their needs and aspirations, cultures and traditions (see Chapter 3). To be effective in achieving people’s aspirations, governance processes need to be organized and institutionalised, so that power is utilised within the three arms of government, namely the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The involvement of other governance structures/systems in the civil society and the private sectors is equally essential (see Chapter 5 on the role of non-state actors)

In order to fully understand the importance of institutional capacity, it is useful to identify the operational and inter-dependent structures of governance, namely, political governance, administrative governance, economic governance, corporate governance, civic governance, systemic governance, and global governance. They could be defined as follows:
• Political governance is concerned with the participation of the people in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and livelihood. These relate to the issues of democracy, representation, power sharing and the relationship between the institutions of governance, such as the legislature or local council, the executive and the judiciary, political parties and civil society organizations.
• Administrative governance deals with the implementation of the decisions, the establishment of the institutional framework for the efficient and effective implementation of public policies and the supply of the public services.
• Economic governance relates to the decision-making processes related to the efficient allocat1on of economic resources in order to promote growth, the creation of wealth, employment, equity and sustainable development.
• Civic governance refers the working of the civil society, the relationship between and among the various voluntary and non-profit civil society organizations such as NGOs, CBOs, and cultural, ethnic and religious organizations.
• Systemic governance is responsible for the convergence of all the domains and processes of governance that brings together government [central and local], private sector and civil society in an efficient, effective and meaningful framework.

Some of these domains constitute the critical components of the NEPAD’s Basic Declarations on: Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-Economic Development. Some of these components are subject to the peer review processes under the APRM.

Governance entails a series of decision-making and their implementation. It is the quality of these decisions and the manner by which they are implemented that determines the effectiveness of governance. The quality of decisions and the effectiveness of their implementation will depend on a variety of factors, ranging from the constitutional/legal and ethical, the human and material resources, the working environment, leadership, commitment, political will, as well as the pattern of decision-making and its management.

In spite of the major governance and constitutional reforms undertaken by many governments in the course of the last two decades, capacity deficiencies continues to be one of the major governance issues in Africa. The African Governance Report [AGR], published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] in 2005, revealed various magnitudes of capacity deficiencies across all the governance systems in Africa, ranging from the state institutions to the non-state agencies in the civil society and private sectors. These capacity deficits have adversely affected the effectiveness of the governance systems and will continue to do so unless they are adequately addressed. In general, the current systems of governance in Africa lack the capacity to efficiently and effectively sustain the various domains and levels of governance –economic, political, administrative, and systemic—to perform their respective functions efficiently and effectively (see Chapter 7 on institutional and human resource capacity enhancement). Corporate governance, political governance and economic governance are still weak albeit incrementally improving in those few countries that have embarked upon serious comprehensive reforms. For various reasons, institutional checks and balances are very weak. Presently, there are no effective mechanisms to prevent governments - and in particular the executive branches - from being dominant, monopolizing power and abusing their discretionary authorities. They are also deficient in responding to the needs and aspirations of the people, and to the challenges, possibilities and opportunities of globalization or what the 21st Century might offer. (see Chapter 2 on State legitimacy and leadership in Africa). Legislatures in Africa are also generally unable to perform efficiently and effectively their constitutional obligations. In general, African legislators are inadequately educated, or appropriately informed on major issues affecting their constituencies, lack the relevant knowledge, information, sophistication, freedom and independence that would enable them to perform their functions efficiently and effectively, monitoring of the executive

The efficiency and effectiveness of the executive is, likewise, hampered by weak institutional capacity, due largely to inadequate supportive professional and technical personnel, material and financial resources, a clear understanding and acknowledgment of its role. In particular, the executive lacks the capacity for informed policy formulation.
Although the independence of the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed under the principles of the separation of powers, its institutional capacities to perform its basic functions of ensuring constitutionalism and the observance of the rule of law and due process of law in the governance systems are severely hampered in the average African country. This is largely due to executive interference, inadequate supply of judges and magistrates, lack of technical equipment and professional administrative support.

At another level, many political parties in Africa do not have the capabilities to effectively articulate and promote their political principles and visions of their preferred society or defend the interests and rights of their supporters. They lack the organizational capabilities, partly due to lack of professional and dedicated personnel, funding and leadership; and partly because of government’s tendencies of marginalization, exclusion and harassments. In some African countries, the political space for the opposition is still problematic. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are weak because of lack of organizational capabilities, funding, skilled personnel in advocacy and promotion of their interests and objectives. Many of these organizations receive substantial external funding, thus rather supply-driven and dependent; and not demand-driven and independent. Partly due to this external dependency and partly because African governments have not fully appreciated the role and importance of CSOs in the governance systems, many governments have been reluctant in accepting them as partners in the promotion of good governance, or as credible sources of inputs in the policy formulation processes.

1.2.2 Good Governance Challenges
As with democracy, there are universally recognized principles and institutions of good governance, but there is no universally acceptable/applicable model of good governance. There is, as well, clearly no African model of good governance. Both democracy and good governance are ‘works in progress.’ What might constitute good governance in Rwanda, given its post-genocide context, may not necessarily be the same in another African country that has not had such experiences. Or the governance priorities entailed in the accommodation of racial minorities or rectifying racial imbalances in a post-Apartheid South Africa; or the disproportionate ethnic economic or political power as is the case in some African countries. Similarly, what constitutes a governance priority in one African country, say the modernization of chieftaincy in Ghana, might not be necessarily the same in the other African countries.
Moreover, in this age of rapid changes and globalization, the continuous impact of foreign cultures and development paradigms impacting on Africa, it is important that Africa has its own perspectives based on its own knowledge and information, experience and insights on these issues. Changes are inevitable. However, in the realms of ideas and the best practices of getting things done - whether in the governance of people or the production and distribution of goods and services - there have always, historically, emerged powerful and influential ideas and practices that were often taken, mutatis mutandis, as universally applicable. These ideas and practices were usually referred to as conventional wisdom, or paradigms. How these ideas and practices - conventional wisdoms and paradigms - are created is not easy to explain. But how they gain currency and influence is less difficult to understand. Usually these ideas and best practices emanate from the most industrially advanced and politically powerful countries and find their way to, or get imposed on, the less economically advanced and politically weak countries.

Powerful multilateral institutions and major players in global governance like the IMF, the Organization OECD, because of their intellectual influences as creators of concepts and strategies of development, and their financial powers as providers of funds for research and development, set the objectives and conditions under which development takes place in the poor countries. In their attempts to grapple with the problems of development in the poor countries, the international development community has gone through a series of “buzz words” or “fashionable fads” since the late 1950s: from growth with or without trickle-down effects, through basic needs and integrated rural development to sustainable growth with equity and participation, liberalization and the markets; to, now, good governance as conceived by them.

At the outset of independence the state and the national structures of governance inherited by the first-generation of African leaders were modeled on those of the colonial powers. Apart from participating in the series of constitutional conferences that led to independence, which was essentially a transfer of power from colonial rulers to African nationalists, African scholars or intellectuals were not consulted in the major decisions involving the philosophical foundations of the state or the theories of government and economic organization they were about to inherit. The nationalists were focused on capturing the colonial state, and the colonial authorities were keen to ensure that their interests would be protected. The interests of the metropolitan countries thus permeated the constitutional conferences, and the constitutions, which were eventually structured, reflected the western historical experiences and theories of government. There was very little in them of any relevance to the historical, anthropological or sociological realities of Africa.
Whether these constitutions and institution were utilized according to the appropriate principles, conventions and practice or not is not the issue. What is important for the purpose at hand (i.e. better understanding of capacity and capacity building, and the crafting of an African capable state) is not that they were non-African structures of governance, or did not originate from the African practical experience of governance. Rather, to objectively examine the experiences in utilizing and managing these institutions, and in light of the domestic and global challenges confronting African countries, discuss what needs done to ensure that states in Africa have the appropriate capabilities to respond efficiently and effectively to these challenges.
1.2.3 Information and Knowledge Challenges
In this rapidly changing world in which information and knowledge are critical factors in responding to the domestic needs and demands, as well as the competitive global markets, decisions must be well informed and efficiently executed. Given the complexity of these decisions and the speed at which the necessary information and knowledge needed for the decisions must be organized and processed and decisions executed, it is important that those in charge of decision-making are appropriately educated, trained and experienced. This entails a process of continuous learning, training and adapting; and of being “in the loop” of the incessant flow of data, information and knowledge; in essence, a life-long education and training. It may also entail reforms of the governance institutions, making them more efficient and effective in response to the changing domestic needs and demands.

1.2.4 Media Freedom Challenge
Although the freedom of the press and media in Africa has much improved in the course of the last two decades, there is still the lack of capacity, particularly in investigative journalism. Funding, availability of personnel with the appropriate skills and experience, and government’s reluctance to provide access to information and data are the main reasons. Moreover, African governments are hostile to press reportage-exposing abuses of power or corruption, even when these allegations are based on governments’ own records. Transparency is still a major issue in the governance systems in Africa, thus rendering press reportage of public accountability failures very difficult and at times risky.

1.2.5 Research Capacity Challenge
Research facilities lodged in government ministries or departments are not as efficient or effective as they should be as they are constrained by the unavailability of the appropriate capacity ingredients and bureaucratic procedures. They also suffer from political interference, as research objectives are often politically motivated or their results are suppressed if they are politically embarrassing to the political masters. Independent think tanks and policy research centres are a recent phenomenon, initially promoted and largely funded by donors and the international development community. As they were part of the first phase of the democratisation movement in Africa, they often appeared to be critical of the prevailing political status quo and behaviour of the leaders. They were thus perceived by the incumbent political leaders to be hostile, and not as benign critics or potential partners and collaborators in the development and democratization processes. Hence, their effectiveness—capacity---is muted. The potential of the Universities as sources of capacity building facilities have been greatly weakened by lack of financial and material resources.

1.2.6 Implications of Capacity Challenges
Firstly, high levels of poverty in Africa are the more visible ramification of capacity limitations. On the one hand, poverty has been the consequence of lack of capacity to create wealth and employment, to deliver the needed social and other necessary services. On the other hand, persistent poverty tends to inflict disease and sickness, thus further deteriorating the already depreciated human resources; and more so as educated, trained and experienced people migrate to other parts of the country, or leave for other countries. Moreover, globalization coupled with liberalization have enabled Africans with marketable skills to migrate where those skills are in demand and well remunerated. This brain drain must be stopped; and those who are now settled in the developed countries - the Diaspora - are well educated and trained, endowed with the kinds of skills and experience that Africa needs in the 21st Century information and knowledge age. These people need to be persuaded to return home. For such persuasions to succeed, an enabling environment of peace, security and stability, democracy and good governance must be created (see more of this in Chapter 7).

Secondly, capacity challenges have also compromised the ability of African governments to effectively address the social and health challenges that are brought about by HIV/AIDS and malaria. These two diseases are the greatest killers in Africa. HIV/AIDS devastates the young, able-bodied, educated and productive adults, who are Africa’s major assets in the struggles for development and meeting the MDGs challenges. Malaria, in turn, kills the very young who are the sources of capacity building blocks, future citizens, leaders, creators of wealth, employment and generation of income. Appropriate capacity is, thus, urgently needed to eliminate and prevent the recurrence of these killer diseases.

Thirdly, the education sector in Africa has been severely undermined by both neglect and the series of structural adjustment programmes. Although the proliferation of private educational institutions from primary schools to universities has enhanced the opportunities for many to access education, it has also strained the existing capacity and somewhat lowered the standards. There is an urgent need to review education policies and existing capacity in the light of the domestic needs and demands and the exigencies of responding to the global challenges and opportunities, in which education and information are critical factors.

Fourthly, poor economic management and bad governance have created monumental unemployment and poverty in many African countries. They have created internal displaced people, economic migrants, refugees, rapid and unwieldy urbanization, anxieties, fears and a sense of insecurity amongst those who are rich; and hardship, anger, frustration and hostility amongst the poor and unemployed. Violent conflicts have been the main obstacle to economic growth, socio-economic transformation and the reduction of poverty. And the major victims of violent conflicts in Africa are the children. They are the most vulnerable segment of the population. Today’s children are the building blocks of the future societies. If today they receive proper education and development, protection and identity, health and survival, love and care, they will be peace loving and law abiding citizens, with strong work ethics, compassionate, responsible, responsive and accountable in their actions. They will be potential contributors to economic growth, development and the reduction of poverty.
Fifthly, although many African governments undertook reforms to improve the working of the private sector, capacity frailties have continued to compromise the emergence of a vibrant private sector in the average African country. The AGR cited several reasons, including lack of an appropriate predictable regulatory enforcement mechanism that is transparent and accountable; weak mechanism for consultation or partnership between government and private sector; limited and weak capacity within the informal sector for entrepreneurial development; persistent dominance of foreign-owned private sector; indigenous private sector under-funded, unable to compete with foreign corporations; weak corporate governance; and inadequate understanding of the role of the private sector in the promotion of human development.

1.3 Rationale regarding Calls for the Capable State
In the light of the challenges catalogued above, one of the biggest challenges facing the state in Africa in the 21st Century is the building of the appropriate capabilities to respond positively to the domestic needs and demands of the people, as well as the unavoidable global changes and challenges impacting on African economies and societies. In the past, Africans have tended to be re-active or even passive to global changes and, consequently, they became victims rather than potential beneficiary of the changes. Africans now need to be proactive, acquiring the essential knowledge and information, building the appropriate capabilities, identifying the possibilities and opportunities and responding to them effectively. In the course of the last two decades, the African State was demonized and vilified, primarily because it was perceived to be over-extended, inefficient, dictatorial and authoritarian. At the economic level, it was unable to deliver the needed essential good and services, including law and order, peace and security. Politically, it was regarded as dictatorial, authoritarian, unaccountable and irresponsive to the needs and wishes of the people. It was criticized by the scholarly and ideological neo-Marxist as well as the neo-Liberals and neo-Conservatives for its failure to deliver as expected by these critics. And it was also criticized by ordinary African citizens (the ‘wananchi’) for its failure to fulfill their expectations of independence. It has been variably referred to as: ‘parasitical state,’ ‘predatory state,’ ‘crony state,’ ‘kleptocratic state,’ ‘vampire state,’ ‘bourgeois state,’ ‘neo-colonial state,’ etc.

Africans were caught in the larger neo-liberal ideological hegemonic debates of the markets versus the state. Africans were mainly onlookers as they were not involved in the major debates on whether the market should be dominated or directed by the state; or the state should dominate the market. African perspectives were not acknowledged and addressed in the formulation of these policy measures in response to the globalization and market forces. In light of the experience and consequences of externally imposed paradigms on African societies and economies, who is entitled to design the appropriate balance between the state and the market in the contemporary African context? In a democracy, informed debates should be encouraged involving all stakeholders, including the government as the major institution in the State. There is also the imperative of taking into account the African perspectives in light of the more than four decades of experience in governance and managing the inherited institutions.
In the course of the last two decades there has been tremendous transformation in the governance systems of the African countries. The Continent witnessed the appearance of a new generation of young citizenry - most of who were born after the independence of their respective countries. They have been demanding effective participation in the decision-making processes. They have continued to insist on institutional and electoral reforms and new constitutions to reflect the prevailing African realities. They also demand for new leaders who were accountable, transparent, and competent, with integrity, honesty and commitment.

1.4 Intellectual Framework for Understanding the Concept of the Capable State
Governance is one f the important ingredients in the establishment of the Capable State. Governance is about power: how it is utilized, on behalf of whose interests or for what purpose; and about decision-makers, how they make those decisions and implement them, and how they can be made accountable for the decisions they have made and implemented. However, to be efficient and effective, governance has to be institutionalized into appropriate institutions. How the institutions of governance interact with one another, and with the people and organizations in the civil society and the private sector determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the system of governance (see Chapter 6 on the Role of the State and Africa’s Development Challenges).

The state is essentially a cluster of inter-related socio-economic and political institutions in society. It has the monopoly of collective and coercive power and commands attention from the civil society. The state is the main supplier of the basic and essential public goods and services, ranging from the maintenance of law and order, creating and maintaining the enabling environment of peace, security and stability, so that people could pursue creative and productive activities of their own choices, to the health and education services for all citizens. However, the role or functions of the State and its capacity to perform those functions vary over time. Functions or role of the State are subject to changing philosophical considerations and socio-economic circumstances. And with each change, there is the need to review the appropriate capacities needed to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the state.

Modern African states have their origins in the colonial period. They were initially created by the colonial rulers to serve their own imperial and colonial interests. Although some policies were promulgated in order to promote “political order and good government” and measures taken to encourage selected economic growth in the colonies, nation building was not the primary objectives of colonial rulers. The main functions of the colonial state were to ensure that ‘political order and good government,’ as conceived by the colonial authorities, prevailed in the colonies. When African nationalists achieved freedom and independence from the colonial rulers, the state they inherited was basically a colonial creation. Although based on new Constitutions, crafted largely by the colonial authorities, the functions of the post-colonial African states were basically not dissimilar to those of the colonial period. They, too, were intended to promote ‘political order and good government,’ this time as conceived by the post-colonial rulers and their supportive elites.

The transformation of the post-colonial state came basically from two main sources: the policies and actions of first-generation African political and military leaders, and the structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund (Breton Woods Institutions). In their determination to create their own conceptions of the political order and good government, nation building and economic development, the post-colonial African political and military leaders expanded the scope of the state both economically and politically. The exigencies of post-colonial nation building and economic development incrementally involved the state in various economic activities, producing goods and services, as well as controlling and regulating the economy. It became the main supplier of not only public goods and services, but other consumer goods as well. To ensure that the ‘political order and good government’ was maintained, the political and military leaders expanded the constitutional and political powers of the state. Either via the one-party political regimes or the military juntas, the state became authoritarian and dictatorial. Thus, both economically and politically, the state was very powerful but virtually unaccountable to the people. Because it was over-extended, its capacity to perform its various functions efficiently and effectively was invariably inadequate; it did not have the requisite capabilities to perform the functions. The state was extensive and expansive in society, yet ineffective in the delivery of the public goods and services.

In the 1980s and 1990s, SAPs initiated by the Breton Woods institutions, influenced by the neo-liberal thinking (Washington Consensus) on the role of the state and the markets, and supported by the international development and donor communities, drastically undermined the capacities of the state and many other public institutions throughout the continent. These included those in health, education, civil service and various parastatal organizations. Minimal government proposed and insisted by the international development institutions implied retrenchment of civil servants and diminution of the capacities of the public institutions to perform their functions efficiently and effectively. While the liberalization of the economy provided some potential for empowering the citizens to participate in the economy, this was done at the expense of the states’ institutional capacities to produce and deliver the essential public goods and services.

The cumulative impact of the first-generation of African political and military leaders, in expanding the scope of the state economically and politically without at the same time endowing it with the appropriate capacities, also drastically undermined the capacities of the other socio-economic institutions of governance to perform their functions efficiently and effectively. They, thus, all failed to deliver the needed public goods and services, as well as the consumer goods for the ordinary citizens. Although SAPs restricted the scope of the African state, retrenching its administrative infrastructure and, thus, creating unemployed armies of former civil servants, they also created a new socio-political phenomenon: the emergence of the huge number of civil servants - and the other people who serviced the retrenched public service - seeking employment for livelihood. Some of these people engaged themselves in various activities in the private or informal sectors, producing goods and services some of which used to be produced by the state. They thus either competed with the state or supplemented its services. And those who were more entrepreneurial and enterprising founded various types of NGOs, CSOs and CBOs purporting to serve the interests of their respective stakeholders or communities. Donors funded some of them while others consisted mainly of a few active individuals. But all of them claimed to promote the interests of their stakeholders, empowering them or protecting them from the abuse of powers by the state; or promoting democracy and good governance.

The civil societies are very active in Africa. There has been a proliferation of NGOs and CBOs, and other kinds of social and professional associations that it is now possible for people to establish various types of partnerships amongst themselves for the promotion of their mutual interests. The state has in many ways been overtaken by events. It has lost the monopoly of being the only provider of the essential services. In the realms of public security, education and health, private entrepreneurs are incrementally marginalizing the state. These changes have exerted a lot of pressures on the state, widening the gap between its capability and demands placed on it, on the one hand, and brutally exposing its inefficiency and irrelevancy at times, on the other.
The state of affairs above raised questions regarding State legitimacy and the associated trust in government. In light of the endemic economic and social hardships, tremendous political upheavals, including violent conflicts; the demands for better life, peace and security today, and the prospects of a much better more secure and peaceful life in the future; and given the continuous unavoidable global changes and challenges that are impacting on Africa, there are serious governance concerns in many African countries. There is, on the one hand, a mismatch between the domestic socio-economic changes and the demands of the people and the challenges brought about by globalization and its impacts on societies and economies in Africa and, on the other hand, the capabilities of the state to efficiently and to effectively respond to the domestic changes and demands, as well as the challenges, opportunities and possibilities in the global market places of goods and services, ideas and new methods of doing things.

Unable to deliver the public goods and services, the legitimacy of the state has been gradually eroded. Moreover, given the prevailing pressures of democratization and the insistence on accountability, the pressing needs and demands of the people for public goods and services, as well as the exigencies of global challenges and opportunities, trust in government---its capacity to respond effectively to these needs and challenges---has also become a major issue in many African countries.
What does all this imply? In governance systems, the state could be taken as the agent and the people. In this context, legitimacy entails the acceptance by the principals - the people - of the role or functions undertaken by the state. It would also entail the responsibilities of the state to provide the public goods and services needed and/or required by the people. In a democracy, there is an implicit ‘social contract’ between the state and the people-between those who are in charge of the state and performing its functions/roles, and those who are recipients of the services or are subject to the laws, rules and regulations made by those in authority. The foundations of this social ‘contract’ could be a Constitution.
The bottom line, however, is the capability and sustainability of the system of governance itself, whether democratic or otherwise, to deliver. In a democracy, the people have a voice, and they may call to account those in authority. There are also elections during which the people could change those in government or remove the entire government itself. And in between elections, there are the CSOs, the press and other organizations that call to account those in power and authority. In a non-democratic system of governance, where people have no voice and elections are either non-existent or liable to manipulation, people may resort to agitation and violence. In either case, if the state persists in its lack of capacity or willingness to deliver on its commitments and/or promises, people will gradually lose confidence in it, and ultimately its legitimacy will be eroded.

In any system of governance, it is the government that is responsible for the delivery of the public goods and services; or for the creation of the enabling environment in which such goods and services could be produced and delivered. But in the final analysis, government is a collection of people - elected politicians and appointed civil servants - working within the institutions of governance guided by the constitutional provisions, norms, traditions, and the political culture of the society in which they live and operate. It is the respective capacities of the relevant institutions and the people managing them that are critical for the delivery of the public goods and services, and upon whom the trust of government rests.
The Quest for the Capable State has emerged as an importance consideration in Africa. There is now an African consensus on these issues: NEPAD with regard to the human development challenges; and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to ensure the promotion of democracy and good governance. The quest for the capable state ought to be considered in the light of Africa’s experiences in governance and the need to acquire the appropriate capabilities to respond efficiently, effectively and timely to the domestic needs and demands as wells the global challenges and opportunities Africans are bound to encounter in the 21st Century. More importantly, due to the complexity of the modern world, the African state needs the capabilities for operating effectively in such an environment.

Moreover, state has been de-mystified, rendered more meaningful to the people, and big government transformed into good governance. People’s attitude towards the state has radically changed. They want a state that is technically capable of solving their problems. They want governments they can trust, that are transparent and accountable and ‘citizens friendly.’ Moreover, they are demanding to participate in the processes that would re-create or re-invent a state that is capable of solving the domestic socioeconomic and political demands, preventing and solving violent ethnic conflicts, promoting sustainable human development, and of responding to the competitive global markets. In the light of this ‘renaissance,’ what is now needed is the crafting of a Capable State that has the appropriate capacities for responding effectively and timely to developmental challenges. Clearly, in the crafting of the Capable State, the traditional African governance institutions need to be taken into consideration as they are still an integral part of the modern African state. Moreover, African countries are at different levels of development, engaged in various types of governance reforms in support of good governance and, thus, acquiring a wide range of knowledge, skills and experience towards the creation of the Capable State.

What then are the main characteristics of the Capable State? The basic issue is not a choice between ‘minimal’ state, ‘interventionist’ state, a ‘developmental’ state or a ‘welfare’ state. The issue is: what kind of state will enable Africans to efficiently and effectively respond to the domestic needs and demands, and global challenges in the 21st Century? What are the characteristics of such a state? Obviously, such a state must have the following capabilities:
a) To create, promote and sustain an enable environment of peace, security and stability- in which people could engage themselves in creative and productive activities of their own, producing goods and services, thus, contributing to the promotion of human development, responding to the global challenges and opportunities and, in the process, generate employment and tax revenue supportive of public goods and services.
b) To promote and sustain constitutionalism, the rule of law and due processes of law; accountability and transparency; ensuring better understanding of citizenship entitlements and obligations.
c) To create and maintain an appropriate and continuously flexible balance between the efficiency of the market forces, and the availability and delivery of the public goods and services; an appropriate balance within the African context between the needs of the creative and productive entrepreneurs and enterprising individuals, and those of the ordinary people/citizens for public goods and services.
d) To create the enabling environment and the appropriate policies, regulatory mechanisms and processes for the promotion of the private sector; ensuring good corporate governance; avoiding cronyism, and preventing corruption.
e) To empower the people. In a democracy, it is the people who decide the form and composition of government. It is also the people who ultimately acquiesce to bad governance or insist on good governance. But in order for them to do the latter or resist the former, people need to be empowered with the appropriate knowledge, information and other means of asserting their right to accountability and transparency of government and its agencies. In this context, there are four types of empowerment. One is related to knowledge and information. Not only do the people need to be informed about what the government is doing, but also what it is constitutionally mandated to do or forbidden to do. This requires good programmes of civic education, starting from schools, so that people are sufficiently empowered to behave as responsible citizens, checking government activities when the need arises, encouraging and supporting it when it deserves. Two, entails the creation of an environment in which people could freely exchange views, ideas, opinions, experiences, anxiety, fears, aspirations and visions.. Three, the people also ought to be empowered economically, to be reasonably self reliant and self-sufficient so that they do not have to depend on the generosity or manipulation of the government. Four, provide a reasonable level of welfare for all citizens, ensuring life and basic livelihood, the preservation of basic human dignity, and protection against electoral corruption.
f) To strengthen, expand and promote the public policy community (PPC). The PPC consists of people who either because of professional commitments, sense of civic responsibilities, or academic and intellectual interests regularly take part in the political processes and are usually consulted by policy makers, or whose views and opinions are respected and taken into account by the governments. The PPC is very weak, virtually non-existence in many African countries.
g) To manage diversities. Diversities are the enduring realities in Africa. The first-generation African political and military leaders detested the societal diversities and feared their impact on nation building. The struggles for diversities could be interpreted as those of political democracy - people asserting their identity, and recognition of their cultural rights and traditions.
h) To mobilize human and material resources. Effective responses to the domestic and global challenges would necessarily require the mobilization of human and material resources. Africa’s greatest assets are the people. They need to be liberated, mobilized and empowered: to be allowed to exercise their individual freedoms; provided with the opportunities to be educated, to learn new skills, acquire the necessary information and knowledge; and to engage themselves in creative activities of their choice in pursuit of their interests.
i) To promote and consolidate gender validation (see Chapter 8 on the role of women in building the capable state in Africa). In most African countries, women constitute the majority of the population. Good governance demands that all people must be involved in the democratic and development processes. Women play very critical roles in the development processes but are invariably excluded from the major decision-making processes.
j) To create an environment that will facilitate and promote the co-operation between the different generations of leaders and facilitate the recruitment and succession of leadership. Africa demands new leaders and style of leadership that is competent, honest, visionary and committed, that can steer Africa from the vicious circles of endemic problems. Indeed, a leadership that is in tune with the changing world, competent and committed to respond to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation. Clearly, that leadership is likely to emerge from the generation of young Africans. The major challenges are: one, how to synthesize the ideas, experience and wisdom of the past generation of leaders with the expertise and global perspectives of the young aspiring leaders; and, two, how to create and sustain the synergetic impulses of the two generations of leaders (for more details on how to handle this aspect, see Chapter 7).
k) To promote and sustain an open society. In the past governments and large business organizations kept a very tight lid on the information and knowledge for different reasons and information and knowledge was shared among the selected few. In this age of information and knowledge-based governance systems, organizations must have well-informed and knowledgeable work force. And for governments to be effective in the delivery of services, they have to share information and knowledge with the citizens. This is perhaps one of the greatest challenges likely to be encountered in the crafting of the Capable State. African States are used to control, hide or manipulate information and knowledge. They habitually keep their citizens in the dark.
l) To promote trust, understanding and the imperatives of national consensus amongst the political parties. This could be achieved through the nurturing of civil society that encourages them to refine and clarify their real differences, to reinforce their commonalities, to focus on the national issues, and thus minimizing the potentials for any frictions or fights between them selves. Foster dialogue between the party in power and those in opposition or the critics of the Government. This will minimize misunderstanding, expand the arena of trust and thus enhance consensus on national issues.
m) Promote democracy and good governance. Democracy will empower the people to organize themselves, articulate their views, grievances, needs and aspirations, and enable them to promote and protect their interests. The long-term sustainability of democracy and good governance will require vigilance and continuous participation of the people in public affairs. This requires continuous capacity building for all the institutions of governance, and other organizations and agencies in the civil society and the private sector (see Chapter 5 on the role of Non-State Actors).
n) Promote good politics and good government. The long rule by single parties and military juntas in Africa have confused the role of politics and misinterpreted the responsibilities of government in civilized societies. Single party dictators resorted to intrigues, regimentation, manipulations and coercion in support of what came to be known as the politics of nation building and economic development. The military dictators dissolved political parties, banned politics and banished politicians in the name of cleansing society of bad politics and corrupt politicians. They all used governments to achieve their objectives. Consequently politics and government have acquired bad names and mystics of their own.
o) Leaders and leadership that are competent and committed, aware of the current problems and able to identify future changes and challenges, and are continuously prepared to respond to such changes and challenges.

A capable state will always be prepared to continuously reassess itself and change itself (in its missions, in its institutional arrangements and structures, in its human and leadership capacity, in its partners and even in its ideological convictions) in order to suit emerging challenges. In fact, ability to change and adopt is likely to be the most important aspect of the Capable State. One of the problems with some states in Africa is that instead of changing (i.e. being masters of their changes), they have been changed by external agents. A capable state is expected to command and enjoy popular legitimacy in its monopoly and exercise of coercive powers. It would be unwise to entrust the crafting of the Capable State solely to a small group of people however politically important, experienced or learned they might be. The people must be involved. But how and when, and by what means or processes? This is an issue for AGFVII.

1.5 Agenda for AGF VII
The revolutions in participatory democracy, promotion of human rights and good governance, and the consequent emergence of the democratic regimes that have taken place in Africa in the last two decades have, on the one hand, accomplished a momentous task, namely, the destruction of dictatorial and military regimes and, on the other, have created serious governance implications and capacity building challenges for African countries. In the light of these achievements, a number of issues/interventions should be addressed. Firstly, continuous capacity building for the electoral commissions is important so that these important institutions are able to conduct elections efficiently, effectively and fairly. Secondly, there is need to ensure that the press and media have the appropriate capacities to perform their respective functions of informing and educating the people. Thirdly, civil society organizations should be allowed to have sufficient freedom and requisite capacities to empower the people. Fourthly, in a democracy, the legislature is one of the important governance institutions. However, for it to be able to perform its functions effectively it should have the appropriate capacity. Fifthly, to maintain the rule of law and to ensure compliance with the constitution, the judiciary must also be endowed with the appropriate institutional capacities.
Clearly, the role of the capable state is to ensure that all the institutions of governance as well as the other non-state organizations in the governance system are endowed with the appropriate capacities.

In the light of the above, the following is the suggested tentative Agenda for AGF VII:
a) Re-visit the scope of the state in Africa, not reducing it or expanding it but determining what the state should or should not engage, in the light of the roles of other actors in the private and civil society sectors.
b) Review and exchange views on capacity and capacity building issues in Africa: strategies, experience and lessons learnt.
c) Promote a better understanding of good governance and good politics, the conditions conducive to good governance and good politics, and the avoidance of bad governance and bad politics.
d) The nature and role of the state in the African context, its scope and strength and, given the dominant role of the private sector in the development processes, the need for the appropriate balance between the state and the market; and the processes by which such a balance can be crafted: by whom, how, when or how often.
e) Identify the characteristics of a capable state appropriate to the African context, and the manner or processes by which they can be identified, acknowledged and crafted into the capable State.
f) Review public sector reforms, including the civil service and the parastatals: strategies, successes and failures; lessons learnt.
g) Explore the mechanism and processes for strengthening good governance and deepening democracy.
h) Explore the frontiers of governance and democratization from the African perspectives and experiences, taking into account the role and status of traditional governance institutions.
i) Review the leadership issue and succession in Africa in light of the need to attract and retain young generation of Africans (within Africa and from the Diaspora) to be actively involved in issues related to the development of the continent, thus, reducing the brain drain and relieving drained brains.
j) Empower civil society organizations to engage effectively and meaningfully in the development and democratization processes, thus, providing support for the capable State.
k) Develop capacity for deepening regional and continental political integration
l) Review the role of the informal sector in the generation of wealth, employment, self-reliance; and the popularization of the private sector as the engine of growth and development.
m) Determine the role of local governance and local government as a critical component of the capable State.
n) Review the experience of gender validation, strategies used, success and failures, lessons learnt, and what needs done in the light of the quest for the capable State.

Part 2
Technical Papers

2. State Legitimacy and Leadership Development in Africa
André Mbata B. Mangu

2.1 Introduction
Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, one of the icons of the Pan-Africanist movement, Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan and black country to gain its independence in 1957. Subsequently, Ghana became one of the founding members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and later of the African Union (AU) that superseded the OAU. Ghana was also one of the first countries to participate in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the very first to be reviewed under the African Peer-Review Mechanism (APRM). For all African people across the continent and in the Diaspora, the celebration of the 50th anniversary of independence of Ghana was a historic occasion to reflect on the long road Africa has gone since colonialism, on the current state of affairs and the role that the state and political leaders are expected to play in order to achieve African renaissance.

During the anti-colonial and even the anti-apartheid struggles, African people were requested by their leaders to put independence and (political) freedom first while (economic) development would follow. On independence, the state, which was once used against them, was to serve as the main instrument to improve the life conditions of the people without which independence and freedom could be meaningless.

Unfortunately, African people did not take long to find out that they had been granted a paper, formal or flag independence only, with the tendency of their leaders to adopt a leadership style reminding of the one of the erstwhile colonial masters. Little attention was paid to social and economic rights yet critical for any genuine development project. A formal independence that could see African leaders just taking over from foreign colonial masters without improving their life conditions was not, however, the kind of independence that African people had fought for. Unsurprisingly, a number of the newly independent states were confronted with new struggles backed by the disenchanted masses of African people in what Nzongola-Ntalaja aptly referred to as “Second Independence Movement” .

Some fifty years after the “independence sun” started shining on the continent, despite the efforts that have been made thus far, Africans have not entered the promised kingdom of development. In some countries, the life conditions have been made even worse than under colonisation. The state and its new leaders have been held accountable for the “failure” of the “first independence” and the development project. From both inside and outside Africa, the blame lies with the state and African leaders whose fantastic rhetoric did not match up the deeds and popular expectations. They promised too much and yet achieved very little.

Despite the great amount of criticism levelled against African states and their leaders, “state disappearance” is no longer part of the wildest dreams of the most radical Marxists and communists. The state seems to be here to stay while new leaders are emerging in Africa without necessarily learning from the mistakes of their predecessors. The major hypothesis of this paper is that African states need to be reconstructed to reinforce their capacity. On the other hand, another generation of leaders should be encouraged.

State capacity is also based on the legitimacy of its political leaders. Such legitimacy requires that the state be founded on the principles of constitutionalism and democracy. Political leaders should themselves be legitimate in the sense that they should be elected during free and fair elections organised by an independent institution representative of all the parties and not subject to the government of the day. Legitimate leaders are likely to better serve the cause of development in Africa. On the other hand, there is a relationship between state capacity and democratic governance as a system of rule that maximises popular consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the expressed interests and needs of the public. The African experience of the fifty years of independence has demonstrated that state capacity could not be reinforced through a benevolent dictator or an authoritarian developmental state.

However, the reinforcement of state capacity and leadership legitimacy required for African states to embark irreversibly on the road to sustainable peace and economic development gives rise to a number of questions that still need to be addressed by policy makers, development agencies, and African researchers:
a) How do we understand “state”, “state capacity”, “state legitimacy” and what can be done to build capable and developmental states in Africa?
b) How can the economic, political and administrative structures of the state inherited from colonialism be transformed so that the state can reinforce its capacity to serve the interests of all African people, including the masses, and not only those of the leaders?
c) What is “political leadership” and why is it so important and how can a culture of developmental leadership be established and consolidated in order to reinforce state capacity to deliver sustainable peace and development?
d) Why is a democratic state more likely to promote development in Africa and how can a legitimate leadership better contribute to the reinforcement of state capacity than an authoritarian one?
e) What is “leadership legitimacy” and why is it so critical for the reinforcement of state capacity and for the success of the developmental project?
f) What measures are needed to make the electoral process more open, less expensive, and relatively free from major irregularities in order to enhance the credibility and the legitimacy of the regime and its leaders?
g) What does explain the reluctance of incumbent leaders to relinquish power in Africa and how can they be encouraged to leave office and to permit a process of political succession that is likely to enhance the legitimacy of new leaders and reinforce state capacity?
h) What role has been played by the international community, some of its powers and agencies, in the building of capable and democratic states? What role can they play in the process of “state reconstruction” and in encouraging the leaders not to manipulate the Constitution and to abide by its provisions relating to the terms of office?
i) Is there any life after the presidency in Africa? What is the practice emerging from individual AU member states and from the AU itself to encourage African leaders to abide by the Constitution?
j) What are the mechanisms in place to promote constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law, and to reinforce state capacity and how can these mechanisms be assessed?

Arguably, the low average level of state legitimacy and leadership has contributed to weak average performance in terms of development objectives in Africa. Accordingly, the state and leadership should be legitimate to increase their development performance. Against this background, this paper purports to contribute to the reinforcement of state capacity and to the emergence and the consolidation of a legitimate leadership in Africa.

2.2. State, State Capacity, State Legitimacy and the Development Question in Africa
State, leadership and legitimacy are contentious concepts that need to be examined in order to understand their meaning and the relationship between them and development in Africa.

2.2.1 State
The commonly agreed upon definition of a state was provided by the Montevideo Convention of 1933. This Convention defined the state as a person of international law possessing a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The state is a much broader concept than the government, as it also includes territory, territory and sovereignty. It is very often confused with the government in the mainstream social scientist political discourse. References to “state capacity” and “state legitimacy” connote this persistent confusion between the state and the government. The government being state’s representative, its actions – or its failure to act – are generally attributed to the state itself.

2.2.2 State Capacity
When Englebert argues that “[t]here should be little doubt left that Africa’s development crisis is one of capacity” and undertakes to explain “Africa’s capacity crisis,” the capacity of African states is understood to mean their ability “to provide the most basic services expected…, the very services – the security of people and prosperity – whose provision justifies their existence.” State capacity would also include the ability to devise and implement policies for economic development, to create stable environment for investors, to guarantee property rights, and to provide an efficient bureaucracy and a climate free of corruption. State capacity in Africa refers to the ability of the state to protect and promote all the rights of its people, including civil and political rights, social, economic and cultural rights, individual and collective or people’ rights. It is worth stressing the development is one of the rights enshrined in the African Charter for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). State capacity is, therefore, close to the concept of “political efficacy.”

In Africa, as elsewhere, a capable state is not a minimal state, indifferent to the sufferings and injustices, or insensitive to economic and social crises. When necessity requires and market mechanisms and social conditions do not guarantee the minimum without which men are actually demeaned, excluded and unable to enjoy their basic fundamental rights, the state should have the capacity to intervene. Not only are many African governments unable to provide these basic rights, but many are actively engaged in criminal activities of their own.

“Politics of the belly,” “patrimonial politics,” “corrupted” or “predatory rule,” “criminalisation of the state,” and massive human rights violations are evidence of the capacity of many African governments to act and deliver the “wrong goods”. African governments have also demonstrated their tremendous capacity through the rulership of many which appeared to be an exercise in “how to ruin a country.” If the power of leaders can be exercised to control, dominate, and to subjugate, it can surely be exercised to uplift, improve and develop. It is this state capacity that really matters, as it favours the developmental project.

2.2.3 State and Development in Africa
The state - reduced to government - and political leadership were singled out as the primary factor responsible for non-development or under-development in Africa in the mainstream discourse developed by Western leaders and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Yet, strong states were for long supported by democratic leaders in the West, by the major IFIs and other development agencies. Under the structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) devised to promote development on the continent, the developmental state was then said to be an authoritarian state or a “dictatorship of development.” Until the early 1990s, for instance, “Mobutu or the chaos” was still the underling principle of the American policy regarding former Zaire. On the other hand, as he toured West Africa when people were revolting against their authoritarian leaders and demanding respect for human rights, including political pluralism, the former French president Jacques Chirac declared that Africa was not fit for plural democracy. The discourse started changing in the 1990s, as African struggles for democracy intensified across the continent and the IFIs had come to the conclusion that their SAPs and “dictatorships of development” had failed. Then came their discourse on governance, which did not necessarily mean “democratic governance,” as they were more interested in business than in democracy.

The empirical and political scientist theories of state collapse or failure inspired by the American school of political science that managed to hijack the discourse on the state in Africa proved wrong. So did the sister theory of state-society struggle that alleged that citizens were disengaging from the state and the African state running without citizens.

The strong state that was once praised became the major problem of development in Africa. There was a trust shift from the state civil society. However, decades after it was proclaimed dead and buried, the state is always there even in countries where it was declared collapsed. Some state collapse theoreticians even found to their cost that African “failed”, “collapsed”, “shadow states” or “quasi-states” survived or persisted. On the other hand, the state that used to be a “problem” was progressively considered a “solution” to the problem of development in Africa . Accordingly, calls were made to “bring the state back in.” The state was blamed for its lack of legitimacy although there was no agreement on the content of this yet another contested concept or how the state could be legitimate to reinforce its developmental capacity. In order to achieve development, a “developmental state” is required, which needs to be governed by legitimate and accountable leaders responsive to the interests and needs of the people.

2.2.4 State Legitimacy
State legitimacy is used here to refer to the legitimacy of the government as it would hardly apply to other components of statehood, namely territory, population and independence. There does not seem to be a consensual definition of legitimacy. Englebert, for instance, held that “a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions.” A non-legitimate state is a non-indigenous or allochthonous one. In Englebert’s view, new African states lack legitimacy because they are not the indigenous creations of local history. Yet, endogeneity does not define legitimacy. According to Englebert, non-legitimate states are non-European and non-North American states. Englebert’s conception of legitimacy is, therefore, arbitrary and Eurocentric. Kalevi Holsti distinguished between vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy is an estimate of the strength of the relationship “between society and political institutions.” It is a crucial dimension of overall state legitimacy. On the other hand, horizontal legitimacy relates to the agreement within society on what constitutes the polity – the politically defined community that underlies the state. Englebert endorsed this distinction of vertical and horizontal legitimacy. However, it does not correspond to his concept of legitimacy that is centred on the endogeneity of the state in Africa. It is rather close to our understanding of legitimacy.

As far as we are concerned, legitimacy entails the acceptance by the people of institutions that seem to correspond to, and promote the values of, the society. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of governmental leadership by those who are governed. A government whose acceptance or legitimacy is contested is likely to resort to authoritarianism, intimidation, or manipulation, and to exercise power rather than to seek authority. The consequence is frustration, anger, and even aggression on the part of those permanently locked out of available social opportunities. According to Conteh-Morgan, a party or a government can be considered legitimate only if there is widespread acceptance that it is widely representative, or is dedicated to realising a set of overriding common goals that adequately benefit the entire populace. Englebert’s contention that a legitimate government need not be just, democratic, inclusive, popular or otherwise accountable to its citizens, but only indigenous, is controversial since there is a close relationship between state legitimacy and state capacity or developmental capacity.

One may distinguish between international or foreign and national or domestic legitimacy of African governments. The former relates to compliance or promotion of values and interests of the international community or those of some foreign states while the latter refers to the acceptance of the government by its own people. African governments used to be more interested in international and foreign legitimacy than in domestic legitimacy, as their life and survival mainly depended on the first. The interests - political, economic and even cultural (foreign languages established as official state languages to the detriment of national languages) - of their foreign masters or patrons prevailed over those of their own people. This was just the opposite to the morality in the so-called legitimate states of Europe and North-America where national interests come first and the government is mainly to care for national legitimacy that justifies its election and power. Arguably, increasing state capacity in Africa would require governments to be preoccupied first with national legitimacy and interests and not the opposite. It is perhaps here that the South African political motto of Batho pele (people first) should become the first principle of governance. State or leadership illegitimacy breeds state or leadership incapacity.

2.3. Leadership, State Capacity, Legitimacy and Development in Africa
A great deal has been written on leadership. Much of the literature on leadership has been produced in the United States where there has been a remarkable increase in interest in the subject since the mid-1970s. Probably terrified by the brutal nature of political leadership in most African countries, African social scientists, in general, and political scientists in particular, have shied away from the debate on leadership on their continent. In Africa as elsewhere, Blondel argues that one reason why political leadership has not been analysed is the fear which it has provoked and still provokes among generations of thinkers. As Hobbes would have put it, political leadership is a Leviathan, a frightening beat, which it is perhaps more urgent to tame or to charm than to dissect.

Of all forms of leadership, however, political leadership, in particular in a nation-state, occupies a special position because it is vastly more visible and, ostensibly at least more important. Many questions about political leadership refer to its meaning and its importance or role in society.

2.3.1 Political Leadership and Leaders
According to Blondel, leadership is as old as mankind. It is everywhere, and inescapable. Wherever there is a group, there is always a form of leadership .

2.3.1.1 Political Leadership
Leadership in general and political leadership in particular is an abstraction, a concept whose meaning is socially constructed. Some scholars define leadership as a process of human interaction in which some individuals exert, or attempt to exert, a determining influence upon others or a process by which one individual consistently exerts more impact than others on the nature and direction of group activity. According to Blondel, political leadership is a phenomenon of power; a power because it entails the ability of the one or few who are at the top to make others do a number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not do or at least might not have done. In Edinger’s view, “leadership is a position within a society which is defined by the ability of the incumbent to guide and structure the collective behaviour patterns of some or all of its members. It is at all times relational, interpersonal, and is based upon inequality of influence between the leader as the influencing agent and the followers as the objects of his efforts to cue their behaviour so that it will conform to his personal objectives.” Hah and Bartol also define political leadership as “the mobilisation and direction, by a person or persons using essentially non-coercive means, of other persons within a society to act in patterned and coherent ways that cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocat1on of values within that society.”

Blondel argues that leadership does not just refer to any power, but to influential power exercised on the society and that affects ostensibly the destiny of mankind. According to Cartwright, leadership is better defined as government by persuasion rather than force. The essence of leadership is the ability to persuade others to comply voluntarily with one’s wishes. Leadership involves voluntary compliance by those over whom it is exercised. It is the ability to obtain non-coerced, voluntary compliance which enables followers to obtain goals which they share with the leader. This is more related to leadership legitimacy than leadership itself. Hence, Blondel makes a distinction between leaders and office-bearers or rulers. Unfortunately, in many African countries, leadership has been and still remains power by force used against the people, as it was under colonialism, rather than power by persuasion or by conviction of the people themselves.

Political leadership in post-colonial Africa has been generally authoritarian, non-legitimate or based on an erroneous conception of legitimacy as the acceptance by the international community. It is also interesting to see how some African national leaders have been struggling to extend their leadership on the sub-regional and regional levels. As far as leadership style is concerned, Elgie distinguished between charismatic leadership, heroic leadership, revolutionary leadership, innovative leadership, transforming leadership, transactional leadership, personal leadership, individual leadership, collective leadership, consensual leadership, reactive leadership, and managerial leadership. An individual may have to exercise a combination of different types of and forms of political leadership at any one time.

2.3.1.2 Political Leaders
Political leaders are the most talked about elements of political life. Unlike leadership, which is an abstraction, leaders are individuals and real human beings, with their emotions, cognitions, predispositions, ambitions, styles of actions, characters, strengths, weaknesses, and personalities that make each leader unique. Although there are many political leaders at all levels of power, the most important are heads of state and government. However, political leadership at the regional or local level should not be neglected. The concept of political leaders is closely related to that of political elite, which was defined by Nadel as “an aggregate of people with distinct characteristics: a position of high status; some degree of corporate group character as well as exclusiveness; awareness of their pre-eminent position as the consequence of some attribute which they share by right; recognition of their general superiority by the society at large…”

Elgie identified three main historical approaches, theories or schools of leadership. The “Great Man” theory of history or school of political leadership has been associated with Thomas Carlyle who argued that leaders were morally good and great men or heroes, able to change the course of history as agents of social and political change. The cultural determinist school of history was, however, associated with Herbert Spencer. It denied that individuals – “Great Men” included – had any significant impact on the course of events, which was rather determined by the impersonal interplay of social and cultural forces over which individuals had little control. The leadership environment in which they operated shaped their actions, leaving them with little or no opportunity to make a personal impact on historical events. More attractive is the interactionist approach, endorsed by Elgie, and which holds that political leadership is the product of the interaction between leaders and the leadership environment with which they are faced. It acknowledges that political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the environment in which they operate and have the potential to leave their mark upon the system, but only if and to the degree that the environment (political, social, economic, and cultural) permits it. Political leadership and leaders are, therefore, important for social change and development despite their actions being subject to the environment, either national or international.

2.3.2 Importance of Political Leadership
The importance of political leadership is generally recognised. As one saying goes, “a fish rots from the head down”. The Book of Proverbs (29: 11) also rules that “Where there is no vision, the people perish.” Yet, such vision has to come from leaders. Since leadership appears to be a formidable power that can affect mankind, whose conditions deserve amelioration, it is clearly valuable, indeed imperative, to see how this power can help to bring about a better life for all in our societies. According to Blondel, “political leadership appears to be one of the clearest ways in which men and women can be induced to work jointly for the improvement of their lot; leadership seems able, by virtue of what it is, both to bring citizens together in a concerted effort and to do so over time by gradual achievements aimed at a common goal.”

As demonstrated by many scholars, leadership is also critical for the establishment of democracy and for democratic consolidation. In Huntington’s view, “democracy will spread in the world to the extent that those who exercise power in the world and individual countries want it to spread.” Clapham and Wiseman observe, “democratic consolidation is most likely to take place when a new leadership emerges, seeking to organise politics in a different way from those adopted by discredited parties and leaders in the past, but within the context of non-violent opposition and the acceptance of basic institutions.”

According to Wiseman, “key decisions taken by leaders at key points in the process have a great impact in enhancing or weakening the prospects of democracy.” Reflecting on democracy in India, Krishna held that “the genuine commitment to a liberal democratic policy by the first generations of leaders, especially the first Prime Minister Jawaharial Nehru …must be regarded as the key factors in the emergence and persistence of democracy in India.” As James Manor stressed, “Nehru might …have sought a radical centralization of power in his own hands, at the expenses of the party and of formal institutions. He might have employed populist slogans and programs as a substitute …for such institutions. Plenty of other leaders in Africa and Asia did so and they and their countries often paid a heavy price for it. He chose not to and as a consequence the liberal representative odder took root and acquired enough substance to endure into the 1970s and 1980s.”

As Wiseman further put it, “the characteristics of individual leaders are extremely relevant in determining the political outcomes and this holds true in relation to democratization as it does to any other political developments…The evidence from the relatively limited number of examples of cases where democracy has survived for long periods suggest that the question of political leadership was extremely important. The role of Seretse Khama (Botswana), Dawda Jawara (The Gambia), and Sir Woogsagun Rangoolam (Mauritius) in sustaining democratic political systems during periods when democracy was on the wane in Africa was of a crucial importance.”

In the light of the above,, political leadership does matter. Cartwright has demonstrated how, in Nyerere’s Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, for instance, a leader’s influence could have considerable effect to what happens to a state. This position has been strengthened in the study on Leadership Change and Former presidents in African politics.

2.3.3 Leadership Legitimacy and Elections
Elections are closely related to democracy. They are also instrumental for leadership legitimacy.

Elections and democracy have become virtually synonymous in Western political thought and analysis. Yet more recently, as Claude Ake noted, in the hurry to globalise democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War, democracy was reduced to the crude simplicity of multiparty elections to the benefit of some of the world’s most notorious autocrats who were able to parade democratic credentials without reforming their repressive systems . This was well captured by Liniger-Goumaz in his démocrature. As Bratton and Posner stressed, “formal procedures do not create a democracy because, as in Latin America – we should add Africa – experience has shown elections can coexist with systematic abuses of human rights and disenfranchisement of large segments of the population.”

Karl Terry rightly warned against two fallacies, the “fallacy of electoralism” and the “anti-electoral fallacy.” The first would result in the confusion between democracy and elections while the latter holds that elections do not really matter for democracy. The post-colonial experience reveals that several elections have been held and continue to be organised on the continent without Africa becoming a paradise for democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, elections are the defining institution of modern democracy. However, they are not synonymous. Some conditions are required for elections to be free and fair and promote democracy. First, elections must be universal. The entire population or its largest segments of adult citizens should be allowed to participate in the elections. Their exclusion from the electoral process is a mark of authoritarianism and cannot result in the elections contributing to democracy.

Second, the elections should be competitive, open to all political parties and people should be allowed to elect the candidates of their choice. Elections where people would be “voting without choosing,” to use Ake’s metaphor, could only result into what Mkandawire called “choiceless democracies,” which is a contradiction in terms. Candidates and their parties should be able to campaign freely. Third, the organisation of the elections should be left in the hands of an independent and autonomous body in the form of an independent electoral commission. This body should be representative of all or the major political forces to ensure the credibility of the process starting from the registration of voters to the proclamation of the results. Such a body should not be dependent on the government of the day. The electoral commission should also be made accountable and open to all political forces contesting elections. Key during the electoral process is the role of the media. Public media should be open to all candidates and parties on the same footing instead of being transformed into an electoral machinery for the incumbent government or the ruling party particularly addicted to power and capable of doing anything, including intimidation and corruption, to get elected or re-elected.

Elections should also be monitored by candidates’ witnesses and observers, national or international. Unfortunately, monitors could also be corrupt. The same goes for the observers with their usual “national anthem”: “elections have been globally free and fair and satisfactory, except for some minor shortcomings that cannot impact of the general result of the process”. In a very few cases have the observers from the AU, SADC, European Union and other international institutions declared that elections were rigged and invalid. Togo seems to be one of these unfortunate cases.

Democratic elections should be organised based on the law accepted or enacted by peoples’ representatives in Parliament, and not a presidential decree. The law should provide for rights, but also for duties and sanctions in cases of intimidation and corruption that is the main cancer of the elections in Africa. An independent and impartial judiciary should be empowered by the electoral law and the Constitution to pronounce on the electoral process in the final instance. Without such judiciary, elections can hardly be trusted as free and fair.

Under the conditions above, the electoral process is likely to be more open and relatively free from major irregularities. Problems generally arise after the elections. They relate to the acceptance of the results by the candidates, especially by the opposition candidates or parties, as the incumbents are generally expected to win. Another major problem is that elections are costly. In countries which are confronted with serious problems in terms of infrastructures, with no reliable roads or railways and where some regions are hardly accessible, the success of the electoral process requires funding, systems and materials (airplanes, computers, communication infrastructure) that many African countries cannot afford. Instead of relying on external donors, for elections to be legitimate, Africans should finance their own elections. One way to make the process less expensive would be the sharing of information and materials (kits, computers, boots…) as Africans in their respective countries go to polls almost every year. In this regard, South Africa should be commended for providing assistance to Ghana, Burundi, and DRC. The latter has also been approached recently to provide assistance to Togo.

2.3.4 Legitimate Leadership, Term Limits, and Life after the Presidency
In many African countries, the Constitution provides that the President can be re-elected only once. Few African leaders have complied so far. There are many reasons why incumbent leaders tend to cling to power. One of them relates to the logics of patrimonialism and to their fear of the unknown after the presidency. Many leaders fear prosecution and would better do everything to die in power. As a result, many have managed to establish a de facto presidency for life or some “presidential monarchies” with sons and relatives groomed to take over from them. As the constitutional limit on the term of office approached, a number of leaders embarked on a political campaign to get the Constitution amended and obtain a “come back call” from their parties. While some like Bongo (Gabon), Musevini (Uganda), and Nujoma (Namibia) succeeded, others such as Chiluba (Zambia) and Muluzi (Malawi) had to concede defeat and leave the office under tremendous pressure from the opposition, civil society and even some quarters of the ruling party.

President Nyerere was among the first African leaders to reflect on the term limits of the presidency. In September 1980, when he was nominated by his party Chama Cha Mapinduzi to stand for president at the next election for what he insisted would be the last time, he said the time had come for Tanzanians to institutionalise a method of changing the president, and to impose limits on his term in office. In November 1985, he handed over power to Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who had been popularly elected to the presidency. President Nyerere set up a precedent, which has been respected by all his successors who did not attempt to manipulate the Constitution.

The question that needs to be addressed, and which requires further research, is why incumbent African leaders tend to cling to power and how they can be encouraged to leave office and to permit a process of political succession that is likely to enhance the legitimacy of new leaders and reinforce state capacity. Life after presidency may mean insecurity, as those who were persecuted under their regimes might be tempted to take revenge. Life after presidency may also mean isolation and misery, as they would no longer enjoy the material and financial prosperity that came with power. This last fear is hardly understandable given the amount of wealth accumulated during the presidency. Dispelling this fear should be central to any endeavour to get African leaders abide by the Constitution and leave power at the expiry of their office term.

Despite the fate suffered by the Habré (Chad), Chiluba (Zambia), and Taylor (Liberia) who have been less fortunate than the Mengistu (Ethiopia) among the former presidents who are still alive, incumbent leaders should be convinced that there is life and even a better life after the presidency, as demonstrated by the case of leaders such as Khama, Masire (Botswana), Moi (Kenya), Nujoma (Namibia), Kaunda (Zambia), Muluzi (Malawi) , Chissano (Mozambique), Mandela, and De Klerk (South Africa), Rawlings (Ghana), Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Mkapa (Tanzania), Diouf (Senegal), Kerekou and Soglo (Benin), Konare (Mali), and even for the army of Nigerian ex-presidents (Yakubu Gowon, Shehu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Ernest Shonekan, and Abdusalami Abubakar. Many of these leaders have been actively involved in conflict resolution, mediation, and in the observation of elections. Some have set up centres for good governance to help incumbents learn from their past mistakes. Besides, they have created a forum that may be used to encourage incumbents who are reluctant to abide by the Constitution once their term has expired. Some of them have been used by their successors or recommended to AU, the UN and other international institutions to serve as mediators, facilitators, or special envoys.

Personal initiatives such as the one by the Sudanese multi-millionaire Mo Ibrahim should be commended as an original initiative by an African to stimulate good governance, respect for constitutionalism, democracy, human rights and compliance with the constitutional limits on the presidency. Former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan was appointed chairman of the board of the 5-million US dollar Mo Ibrahim Prize. The first laureate of this prize, who will be announced by the end of 2007, will receive 1.3 million US dollars, which is relatively bigger than the Nobel Prize. Each year he/she will receive 200.000 US dollars to finance any development project in his/her country. After ten years he/she will be entitled to a retirement pension of equal amount (200.000 US dollars) until his death. The importance and value of this Prize should not be neglected as no African country can currently provide such a pension for retired leaders.

Apart from such initiatives, legal mechanisms should be envisaged to encourage good governance and respect for the constitutional limits on the presidential term of office. These may include immunity from prosecution, retirement pension, housing, medical care, annual air tickets for former presidents and immediate family members, and small secretariat. President Kabila has tried to do so for his four former vice-presidents during the transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, this could not have been dealt with secretly through a presidential decree as a personal affair but rather by an Act of Parliament. Fortunately, the DRC Constitution provides that all former elected Congolese presidents are ex officio members of the Senate (for life).

A State Council may also be established, as in the Nigerian case. The State Council consists of all former leaders. It is presided over by the incumbent president. Its mission is to advise him/her and his/her government on some national issues submitted to the Council and to assist in addressing them. On the regional level, a Council of Elders may also be institutionalised under the AU. It would comprise all former African leaders (Heads of state and governments as well as former OAU General Secretaries/AU Chairpersons of the Commission) to assist the Chairman of the AU and the Commission and advise them on issues of democracy and good governance now taken seriously under the AU Constitutive Act, the NEPAD-base instrument and the APRM document.

2.4. Building State Capacity and Developmental Leadership under the AU, NEPAD and the APRM
Complementing national constitutions, the AU, NEPAD and APRM instruments contain a number of objectives, principles and standards aimed at promoting democracy and good political governance that are critical for the reinforcing of state capacity and for the emergence and consolidation of a developmental leadership needed to achieve an African renaissance. For the time being, these objectives, principles and standards constitute the minimum package and may be used as benchmarks for assessing the commitments of African leaders to building state capacity and for consolidating leaders’ legitimacy on the continent.

2.4.1 The AU Constitutive Act
The AU Constitutive Act [Article 3 (g), (h), (k), and (n)] provides that the objectives of the AU are inter alia to:
a) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
b) promote respect for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
c) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
d) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The AU is also expected to operate according to the following principles:
a) the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
b) promotion of gender equality;
c) respect for democratic principles , human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
d) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;
e) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;
f) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

Since all African countries with the exception of Morocco are AU member states and are bound by its Constitutive Act, the above objectives and principles may help build a capable state and reinforce legitimate leadership.

2.4.2 The NEPAD and APRM Instruments
NEPAD was launched in July 2002 as an African initiative to “eradicate poverty and to place African countries, individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and African development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing.” Its twin objectives are, therefore, the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance. The APRM was inaugurated as NEPAD’s lynchpin. It was established as a mechanism to implement NEPAD. It was provided for in the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and annexed to this Declaration. The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance is the main instrument on which the work of the APRM is based. If taken seriously, the DDPECG should contribute to the reinforcing of state capacity and leadership legitimacy in Africa. In this Declaration, African heads of state and government of the AU undertook to work with renewed determination to enforce:
a) the rule of law;
b) the equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual;
c) individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the Constitution;
d) equality of opportunity for all;
e) the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
f) adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments.

They are also committed to just, honest, transparent, accountable and participatory government in public life and undertook to combat and eradicate corruption. They held that in the light of Africa’s recent history, respect for human rights had to be accorded an importance and urgency of its own. Moreover, they accepted as a binding obligation to ensure that women have every opportunity to contribute on terms of full equality to political and socio-economic development. In support of democracy and the democratic process, African leaders undertook to:
a) ensure that their national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountable governance;
b) promote political participation, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment;
c) enforce strict adherence to the position of the African Union on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of our continental organisation aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, peace and security;
d) strengthen and, where necessary, establish an appropriate electoral administration and oversight bodies and provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are free, fair and credible.

African leaders also committed to good governance. They agreed to adopt clear codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the national, sub-regional and continental levels; to promote accountable, efficient and effective civil service; to ensure the effective functioning of Parliaments and other accountability institutions in their countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies, and to ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption. Finally, they agreed to promote and respect human rights as entrenched in their national constitutions as well as in regional and international human rights instruments that they ratified.

The DDPECG spells out the institutions and processes adopted to guide peer reviews, based on mutually agreed codes and standards of democracy, political, economic and corporate governance. Compliance with the mutually agreed codes and standards aimed at promoting democracy and good governance and human rights would send a strong message that African leaders are committed to building a capable state and reinforcing the legitimacy of the leaders that is critical to Africa’s development.

2.5. Conclusion
In our societies, leadership has come to be concerned principally with the improvement of social and economic conditions. Blondel holds that “the most important aspect appears to be a daily concern or the improvement of society, where long-term developments are balanced with the recognition of current problems, and where technical and economic progress is associated with a major interest in the well-being of citizens.” Modern political leaders do not choose to be concerned with the continuous improvement of their societies: they have to take this concern on board or they may not stay in office. The population often demands that their lot be improved and, even if they do not, the leaders themselves believe and are repeatedly told by others that it is their duty to achieve social and economic progress. If leaders are to be essentially concerned with the “cure” of social and economic ills, and if this role entails the continuous guidance and direction of the population, it is simply not possible to dismiss leaders as either unimportant or dangerous, as many of the classical political theorists did, or as playing a crucial but exceptional part, as Weber’s model of authority suggested. On the contrary, leadership has to be viewed as continuously playing a positive part in developing society. Efforts have, therefore, to be made to ensure that leaders do fulfil this positive role. This entails, in the first instance, a precise determination of the personal quality and institutional support that are most appropriate.

This paper dealt with state capacity and leadership legitimacy in Africa. The challenge of building or reinforcing state capacity for effective delivery of the development process is one of the major challenges confronting African people and leaders. The present paper has argued that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the incapacity of the post-colonial state and its legitimacy is not based on the fact of the state being foreign to Africans as an imported product inherited from colonisation. In Africa, as elsewhere, the state cannot be said to be totally indigenous. It emerged as a force imposed by the colonisers and maintained by the most powerful members of the society. Its capacity mainly depends on its “domestication” by the people.

A capable state and a truly developmental state has to be a constitutional and democratic state where constitutionalism and the rule of law prevail. Development is more promoted by legitimate leaders, those elected by the people during free, credible and fair elections organised by an independent and impartial body also subject to an independent and impartial judiciary. Elected leaders are accountable to the people.

Building a capable state in Africa therefore means reconstructing the state on the foundations of constitutionalism and democracy to ensure that it is governed by elected and accountable leaders committed to delivering on the promises made and whose political survival depends on their legitimacy. Such leaders should be encouraged to embark on good governance and to leave office after the expiry of their terms. Such leaders are likely to comply with the Constitution when the latter provides for secure life, materially, financially and legally, after the presidency. The Constitutive Act of the AU, the NEPAD instruments, especially the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance on which the APRM is based set objectives and principles that constitute a step forward in building state capacity and promoting a responsible, legitimate and developmental leadership on the continent. The fact that African leaders may voluntarily agree to subject their governance and leadership to peer-review constitutes an unprecedented development on the continent.

Notwithstanding the above, adopting the different codes and standards under the AU Constitutive Act, NEPAD and APRM instruments would not be enough on a continent characterised by the paradox of constitutions without constitutionalism and elections that contributed more to consolidating authoritarianism instead of democracy. States should comply with the principles of constitutionalism and democracy in international instruments they ratified and which are binding, and those entrenched in their own Constitutions and other pieces of legislation. Similarly, the much talked about African Renaissance cannot be achieved with a great number of incapable states characterised by illegitimate or undemocratic leadership. Contrary to what was said of “East Asian tigers” which delivered under “benevolent” authoritarianism, the African experience with “dictatorships of development” under de jure or de facto one-party or military rule once supported by some Western governments and international financial institutions teaches that constitutionalism and democracy is the only way to build developmental states and leadership legitimacy that is critical for Africa’s development. Developmental leadership required for state capacity has to be a legitimate one. To consolidate, such political leadership requires a favourable environment at the national level and also at the international one. A new approach is expected from African regional and sub-regional institutions and from the rest of the international community.

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3. Strengthening State Performance through Decentralized Governance
Kadmiel Wekwete

3.1 Introduction
The African State faces major challenges in its quest for consolidation, modernization and capacity to address the needs of its citizens. Historically, a product of the various colonial traditions, the African State has evolved through the turbulent post colonial period and is beginning to show some signs of stability as the democratic processes are taking root, and the political and administrative systems begin to function in a regular fashion. While the Africa Governance Report 2005 still mirrors major capacity deficiencies across all the governance systems (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone), the recent Africa Peer Mechanisms Reviews offer some hope as the respective African Governments are showing a willingness to address the challenges that they face objectively and in highly transparent ways.

The African State has a strong centralized tradition given its historic control function under the colonial systems. State power and its apparatus were designed as potent weapons to control native populations and, therefore, perfected repressive mechanisms, allowing little room for participation in decision making politically, administratively and economically. The inheritance of the post colonial state was, therefore, that of highly centralized bureaucracy guarding the interests of the elite and performing the functions in a highly top down manner. This created the inevitable tensions resulting in major political and civil crises as the State grappled from being an exclusive to an inclusive one.

Whilst clearly the democratization of the State and its institutions has been the number one challenge, decentralization of its powers and function has always been the other important side of the coin. Once the system begins to democratize, it also seeks to empower its citizens, to reach out to the marginalized groups and seeks the participation of the different levels and spheres of government. The political rationale for decentralization has always been crafted in terms of better governance and democratization, greater efficiency and accountability and greater ability to engage and protect the rights and values of citizens.

3.2 Decentralization Defined
Decentralization is defined broadly as the transfer of public authority, resources and personnel from national level to sub-national spheres and jurisdictions, and has three key components – political, administrative and fiscal. Ndegwa (2002) in a stocktaking survey in Africa attempted to measure the extent of decentralization in Africa. The political decentralization index was computed from the mean of the following: number of elected sub national tiers, the score for the existence of direct elections for local governments and the score for turnout and fairness of elections; the administrative decentralization index consisted of the score for the clarity of roles for national and local governments provided by the laws, score indicative of where the actual responsibility for service delivery resided and the score where the responsibility for (hiring and firing) civil servants resided; and the fiscal decentralization index was based on the score given for the fiscal transfers from central government to localities and the proportion of public expenditure controlled by the localities.

Of the 30 countries analyzed, 50% scored high to moderate, whilst the other 50% had low levels of political decentralization. The top 5 included South Africa, Uganda, Namibia, Kenya, Ghana and the bottom 5 were Burundi, Benin, Congo DRC, Niger and Chad. In many cases political decentralization was a manifestation of democratic reform that has been characteristic of the continent since the 1990s, and has continued to improve beyond 2000.In terms of administrative decentralization, Uganda and South Africa were the two top performers, with 10 moderate performers, and the rest with very poor and rudimentary systems. Public sector reform programmes have propelled Administrative decentralization and have even occurred without political decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is generally poor across the continent and in 19 of the 30 countries analyzed, local governments control less than 5% of the national public expenditure (for most developed countries it is well above 10%). Only South Africa with constitutionally mandated local governments approached 5%. In general, the situation is even more dismal because of the very limited local revenues generated at local levels, creating a situation of total dependency on the centre.

Whilst it is useful to review decentralization using the composite indices across countries, it is also important to recognize the legislative traditions, which underpin the nature and structure of local governments. Overwhelmingly the State in Africa is unitary, which is highly centralizing, and has colonial traditions reinforcing that. Whilst the Anglophone tradition caters for more devolved local government systems, (indirect rule tradition) it highly restricted what the local authorities could do and made them very dependent on the State and limited to the functions stipulated in the laws and regulations. The Francophone tradition is more centralized and local authorities are under the state “tutelle.” Central government has direct control on many aspects of everyday life and has direct control on local government staff. Decentralization in the postcolonial State has, therefore, had to grapple with these traditions linked to the overall manifestations of state power at local levels.

3.3 Challenges for Decentralized Governance in Africa
It is important to recognize that decentralized governance manifest itself in many forms and structures in Africa. Each of the countries has its own manifestation of sub national governance and the distribution of functions and authority vary significantly. Of the 47 countries in Africa, only 4 have Federal constitutions (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Comoros). South Africa has a unique semi federal system whose constitution mandates devolved powers to the regions and to local governments. In the rest of Africa, the types of sub-national governments are created through local legislation which creates regional, provincial, urban and district local government laws. In most cases, there are two parallel systems in existence, namely, the deconcentrated administrative systems linked to sector ministries and the local authorities, which are locally elected bodies with specifically defined functions. In most countries, the most visible distinctions are between urban and rural local authorities and in some cases regional authorities. The common denominator for local governments is the fact of having democratically elected bodies and being backed by law to perform specific functions.

The first challenge for decentralized local governance is linked to the political and administrative manifestations of these sub-national governments. They are poorly defined, resources not clear and not back their functions, and they are too politicized and lack a critical mass to perform their functions. Until recently when there have been systematic efforts to have decentralization policies and laws, there was a tendency to have duplication of functions and little technical capacities at the local levels to make decentralization a reality. The parceling of the sub-national units of local governments also tends to be highly politicized and incumbent governments and presidents use their prerogative to create districts and provinces to suit their political needs. These local governments end up being too small to function and given the relatively low population densities in some parts of Africa, lacking the critical mass in terms of population served.

The second challenge is the ability to provide and deliver services. This is a major challenge and an important part of the State performance scorecard. There is weak capacity to deliver services, inefficient institutions and lack of crucial linkages to national policy formation and implementation. This is a major challenge in terms of addressing poverty and trying to reach the millennium development goals. Typical services that are provided by local authorities include: water supply and sewerage; transport systems and services; physical planning and building; preventive and primary health care, pre school and primary schools; local legal and regulatory systems and social welfare. All these services require technical capacities on the part of local governments and financial resources –human and fiscal resources must accompany the transfer of responsibilities to local governments. As highlighted in the ULCG final declaration (May 2004)
“One of the cornerstones of decentralization is the implementation of transfer of financial resources between different spheres of government. Local authorities need these resources to carry out their mandate, to develop services but also to ensure capable human resources to serve their citizens…”
The third challenge is fiscal capacity, which is critical in assuring the necessary resources for service delivery and the function of local authorities. This is a major challenge because far too often there are no funds delivered and there is no revenue generating power and authority ceded on sub-national governments. There are five major forms of fiscal decentralization: self financing or cost recovery of public services through user charges; co financing through which users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions; expansion of local revenue through property or sales tax or indirect charges; intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from the taxes collected at the centre to local government for general or specific uses. In most African countries the capacity by the central governments to provide transfers has been hampered by the lack of systems and lack of political commitment to promote local development. The bulk of African citizens have until very recently been rural and the capacities to generate local revenues have been limited. Hence the only real transfers have happened when donors have participated in projects and programmes.

3.4 Understanding State Performance in Development
3.4.1 Overview
Mkandawire 1998 states: “The African state is today the most demonized social institution in Africa, vilified for its weaknesses, its over extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of the markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity and its absence…” The list of names and characterizations is endless.

In defining the developmental state Mkandawire 1998 highlights two components: the ideological and the structural. In terms of ideology, the developmental state is essentially one that conceives its mission as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization. The state structure side of the definition emphasizes the capacity to implement economic and social policies effectively, and such capacity is determined by institutional, technical, administrative and political dimension.

Decentralization within the context of democratic developmental states must reflect these ideological and structural dimensions. Most typically, local governments and other sub national authorities are seen as carrying the State mission and mandate – they are part of the overall project to achieve economic and social development. Therefore, state performance in terms of achieving national targets (poverty reduction, MDGs) has to be filtered through the lenses of the decentralized spheres of government. The key question is what power local governments have to influence overall state performance –what is it that they are accountable for? What resources and capacities do they have to achieve the objectives? How much is decentralization viewed as part of achieving the state objectives?

In order to understand the significance of decentralized governance through local Governments and other sub-national institutions, we have to understand their mandates and the functions and resources attributed to them. These vary from country to country and are not easily aggregated. This paper will therefore briefly review some of the specific country cases and draw some general conclusions from the practices. Decentralized governance is reflected and embedded in the sub national spheres of government, which the State legitimizes through legislation and the constitution.

3.4.2 South Africa
Before 1993, South Africa operated under apartheid, which was the basis of the National constitution, and the basis for the functioning of the Republic. Apartheid was about segregation of races at all levels of society, and South Africa had detailed legislation on all facets of segregation. The end of Apartheid heralded a new beginning, which resulted in South Africa adopting a democratic constitution and reorganizing the political and administrative system. The State completely overhauled itself and undertook to address the deep wounds and challenges left by apartheid. This re engineering is ongoing, and there are major challenges that include very high degrees of inequality, major deficits in services and infrastructure among the disadvantaged groups, high unemployment and high levels of crime in the major cities.

With an estimated population of 44 million, the Republic of South Africa is a unitary state subdivided into 9 provinces. The 9 provinces contain three categories of local governments –metropolitan councils, district councils and local councils. Each of the provinces has its own legislature with Provincial Premiers. The provinces have power over agriculture, education, environment, health services, housing, local government, public transport, regional planning, roads, economic development and traditional authorities, most of which powers are also reflected in the local government powers. Provincial and local governments are at the forefront of development and the State has reinforced them through powers given to the different spheres of government and significant inter governmental transfers. The post Apartheid State has used decentralized governance as a vehicle for change and a way of engaging citizens at the local levels to consolidate democracy and promote participatory development.

Local government is enshrined in the constitution in Chapter 7 of the 1996 constitution of the Republic and further supported by the provisions for Cooperative Government and local government financial matters. Other significant legislation include the Municipal Finance Management Act 2003 and the Intergovernmental framework 2005. Thus, the Local government organizational structure is well established and has been a subject of extensive deliberation at national levels. Local Government Finances continue to undergo substantial financial changes and the number of local authorities has been restructured from 843 to 284.
In comparison with other African countries, South African local governments have significant capacity to generate local revenue through utility fees, property rates, fees and charges, and through intergovernmental transfers. The local government expenditures are made for the following: Electricity 26%, Finance and administration 25%, Water 20%; Public Safety 6%, road transport 5%, waste management 4%, Housing and Health 4%, and other 10%. These expenditures exclude education, which is the responsibility of the central and provincial governments.

Whilst local government revenues are inadequate to address the significant levels of urban and rural poverty, they are a significant input into the local and national economies and critical for state performance in development. South Africa is predominantly an urban society and so the metropolitan councils are an important and significant feature of the economic landscape. (Contribution to GDP 7.5%)

3.4.3 Tanzania
Tanzania is a unitary state, with Zanzibar having autonomy for non-union matters. It is administratively divided into 26 regions, which are further divided into districts and further into divisions and has a population estimated at 36 million. There are 22 urban councils and 92 rural councils on the mainland and 10,075 registered village councils. Local government was abolished in the 1970s and re-established with functional councils in 1984. More recently, Tanzania shifted towards a multiparty democracy model and adopted a liberalised stance towards the development of the economy, resulting in a major interest by the international development partners to support the development agenda. Consequently, the economy has significantly been opened to private capital and has registered significant economic growth. Since 1997, there has been major public sector reform, including a Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) covering political, financial and administrative decentralization, reflecting the new ideology and perspective of the State.

The Constitution of the United Republic 1997 provides for local government through legislation. The objective of local government is to enhance the democratic process and to facilitate development. The main local government legislation includes the Local Government Finance Act 1982; Urban Authorities Act 1983; Regional Administration Act 1997 and the Local Government Laws (miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1999. Tanzania has embarked on a comprehensive local government reform that seeks to promote democratic and accountable local governments with a strong financial base and capacities to deliver services. There has also been significant effort to reform and rationalize the role and function of central government ministries and parastatal organizations.

Up to 75 % of local authority budgets are derived from transfers from the central government, while the balance comes from local revenue sources that include fees (taxi registration, bus stands, forestry products); licenses (road and liquor); property taxes and rents. Government transfers and donor basket funds are the most significant income sources for local authorities. The bulk of these resources are conditional grant transfers, which are linked to sector ministries responsible for education, health, water, roads and extensions services, which are also the key services provided, by local governments. Other smaller transfers are in the form of unconditional grants and equalization grants.

Whilst the local governments have a clear mandate for service provision in both rural and urban areas, their roles are undermined by the dependence on the centre, which makes them very weak when it comes to planning and implementation. They have limited discretion when the funding is all conditional and earmarked. Urban local authorities which are able to generate their own revenues have stronger leverage in terms of service provision and have responsibilities met through their own generated revenues. However the ongoing reforms in Tanzania are redefining centre-local relationships and giving local governments a central role in maintenance of law, order and good governance, promoting local economic and social development and ensuring effective delivery of service. The Local Government Reform Programme (1998) has emphasized the need to promote effective linkages and coordination between civil service reform, sector reforms and local government reforms.

3.4.4 Malawi
Local Government in Malawi was established during the colonial period under the centralized British District Commissioner system. This system depended on the control of traditional chiefs who were allowed to retain their traditional functions provided they remained loyal. They provided the services that were required by the colonial state such as forced labor, contract labor for plantations and mines, and labor for the towns and cities. The postcolonial order initially adopted the colonial inheritance and re engineered to meet the goals of one party system of government, operating in a highly authoritarian way. This operated from 1964 to 1994 when the one party state was abolished and a new multi party state constitution was adopted.

Malawi is a unitary state with an estimated population of 12 million. It is predominantly an agricultural economy divided into three administrative regions and with 27 districts forming the basis of local government. There are 12 urban authorities, which include 3 city assemblies, 8 town assemblies and one municipal assembly. Since the adoption of a multi party democratic system, major strides have been made to democratize the political system and to decentralize the function of local governments. Decentralization has been a priority since 1994 seeking to create democratic local institutions, strengthen the levels of participation in the process of development and service delivery, and promoting local economic development

Local Government is enshrined in the 1995 constitution and its role and function has been fully articulated in the 1998 Local Government Act, which provides a framework for decentralized governance, establishing assemblies and defining their functions. Urban local authorities are well established in Malawi offering a wide range of local services and catering for some 14% of the total population. The 27 rural districts are the core of the local government system in Malawi and have been given a wide range of responsibilities in the legislation, reflecting the national policy and plan priorities. They however have a limited resource base and are heavily dependent on central government and donor transfers. The local Governance and Development Management Programme supported by UNDP and UNCDF since 1994 has been the cornerstone of the support to the Malawi Government decentralization programme. This resulted in the adoption of the national decentralization strategy and policy 1998, local government act 1998, local government finance commission.

The post-1994 State used the local government system to reduce the excesses of centralization and to reach out to the rural communities through more participatory ways and giving them a voice in local politics and development. Rural local government is still weak but it has expanded the political space and enabled the State to reach out more effectively than through the centralized ministries. The Sectors have also decentralized in response to the National decentralization policy and there is evidence of increased donor support to rural development. Poverty reduction is still the number one priority in Malawi, which calls for more public sector expenditure on infrastructure and service delivery, local economic development and to meet the huge millennium development goals deficits.

3.4.5 Uganda
Uganda is a unitary state in East Africa with a population of 26 million. Uganda has had a very turbulent political history resulting in major civil and political conflicts. After achieving political independence in 1962, Uganda inherited a British colonial system, which had been the model for the British “indirect rule” policy and had a potentially vibrant agricultural economy. Post colonial governments sought to mould this inheritance to suit their new goals and this created a source of major conflict resulting in a military coup and subsequently a sustained guerrilla war which brought the National Resistance Movement to power in 1987.The struggles characterizing the establishment of a stable post colonial State and system centered around a lack of consensus on the nature and structure of the government system, highly politicized ethnic/regional differences, centralization of power and lack of accountability. (11)

The National Resistance Movement under the leadership of President Museveni was committed in 1987 to transform the function of government and to make it more decentralized and representative. Based on the experience of Resistance Councils that they had established during the guerrilla campaign, NRM argued for the formalization of the Resistance Councils into the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute 1987. This was passed in 1993 as the Local Governments Statute. The Government of Uganda launched a decentralization policy in 1992, which has continued to be refined to the current Decentralization Policy Strategy Framework 2005. The objectives of the decentralization policy include the transfer of real power to local governments (human and financial resources); promoting a feeling of ownership of programmes and projects executed by local governments; improving financial accountability and responsibility for payment of taxes and provision of services; improving local authorities’ capacity to plan, finance and manage the delivery of services. These objectives are clearly articulated in the Local Government Act 1997. (12)

The key pillars to the Uganda local Government system are the District and City Councils, which delegate authority to the lower tiers. Below the District Councils are sub counties, which serve as electoral constituencies and form the basis of the representative structure of the District Councils. There are 55 District Councils with 903 sub counties, and below that are smaller parish and village councils. There are 14 urban jurisdictions (1 city and 13 municipal), which fall within district structures but enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in terms of their function and management. Whilst the politics of these sub national political jurisdictions continues to be dominated by the dictates of the centre and is problematic (politically and administratively), there is evidence in the last 15 years that decentralization has become enmeshed with the country’s overarching poverty reduction strategy and has become a key feature of service delivery. The local authorities share of execution of total government expenditure per sector, excluding the share directly financed by earmarked donor projects, rose from 30% in 1997/8 to about 37% in 2004/5, with the sub national governments picking the responsibility for 75 % of the resources assigned to education, 62% to health and 57% for water services. (IMF Working paper 2006). The government of Uganda allowed local authorities to handle a significant share of capital projects most of it through the conditional grant system.

The main sources of revenue to the local government system in Uganda are: intergovernmental grants (conditional, unconditional and equalization) –79%; Local taxes –9%; market dues, licenses –10%; property taxes other user fees and charges - 2%; Donors are a critical part of the Uganda development equation at central and local levels accounting significantly to the support to all the development sectors of the economy. The bulk of local government expenditures go to education, health, water and agriculture support –these are the national government priorities in the PEAP and PRS. Indeed the biggest challenge that the Uganda local governments face is that pertaining to the revenue framework where they exhibit a very high dependence on the centre, which reinforces a deconcentrated rather than a devolved system. There are serious limitations with own revenue instruments (common to African local governments), which are limited, suboptimal and subject to serious political manipulation. There are also capacity constraints as they relate to public financial management, including budgeting and planning financial management, including budgeting and planning, weak expenditure controls, accountability and governance.

3.5 Summarizing the African challenge
The survey of the four countries is by no means exhaustive –it just presents a snapshot, which needs to be enlarged to cover the 43 sub Sahara countries. Several key messages emerge from these brief surveys. Firstly, many of the African governments which have embarked on democratic reforms in the last 2 decades have also embraced decentralized governance as part of the package. They have used various forms of decentralization to consolidate the position of the State in promoting participatory democracy and development. Local governments have been seen as an important vehicle for establishing the voice of citizens through locally elected bodies. Secondly, local governments have suffered in most countries from flaws in capacity and institutional design, and therefore have been unable to deliver services effectively. They do not have the systems that enable them to plan and effectively engage in the public expenditure management framework. The main outcomes in the service delivery arena have been fragile and achievement on local development (MDG’s; PRS) weak. Thirdly, weakness in the revenue framework is one of the most glaring deficiencies for most local governments in Africa. Without donor, support transfers from the centre are generally negligible, and only manage to cover the recurrent costs. This dependence (70% and above) makes local governments function largely in a deconcentrated rather than devolved manner. They process what they are given and have little room to maneuver in terms of own planning and prioritization. The own revenue stream is very weak (except in urban jurisdictions). There are structural characteristics (volatility of their collection bases, lack of adequate information on property and economic activities and poor administrative structures) that undermine their function.

However the major overriding issue continues to be the overall capacity of the State to function and coordinate the other spheres of government at sub national levels. Most African States continue to function in a sectoral and not a territorial manner. The sectors of the economy organize the public expenditure management framework. The sectors (agriculture, health, education) are managed from the centre and de-concentrate through field office structures. This does not take into account the territorial dimension, which is the basis for organization of local governments. The bulk of public resources that are authorized by national legislatures are directed towards the sectors and the relationship with local governments is only usually significant in terms of implementation. Only South Africa has a clear constitutional provision that guarantees resource allocat1on to provinces and local governments, whilst in other countries the fiscal framework is usually overridden by sectoral concerns. The argument should not however be understood as an either/or for local governments and sectors, but that there should be clarity on who does what and give them the resources they need to carry out the function. The two models of managing the economy are complimentary and have to be designed to ensure maximum complimentarily. This calls for a strong centre, which is able to provide strong and effective oversight.

3.6 Strategies and processes for effective decentralized governance
A recent survey undertaken by the informal working group on local governance and decentralization (November 2006) revealed that there were 500 projects with significant elements of support to decentralization and local governance, and whose average project budget was 4-6 million Euros. The majorities of the projects have been occurring in selected geographical areas and do not seem to be integrated with systematic reforms for the public sector, and have spread their support to civic society, communities and local governance. This is far from the ideal where decentralization is considered as an integral part of poverty reduction strategies and thus expected to be part of sector support programmes in education, health, agriculture and water. However, in some countries, it was found that donors are overcoming these problems and supporting in an integrated way decentralization and local governance (Uganda, Tanzania, and Malawi)

UNDP supports programmes in 95 countries in programmes encompassing decentralization, local governance and urban/rural development. UNCDF, which works jointly with UNDP and is focused on the LDCs, has a portfolio supporting local development programmes, which sought to pilot and promote decentralization and local development in up to 20 African countries in 2006. Local Development programmes support local governments in terms of local planning, fiscal management, improvement of local access to services and capacity development. The pilot work has in many countries been precursors for larger policy impact and replication programmes by governments and the other bilateral and multilateral partners.

The most important innovations in the Local development Programmes have been in the following areas: (UNCDF: 2004):
a) Financing innovations: this includes designing fund allocat1on modalities; creating local discretion and limits; providing capital budget support; establishing performance based funding; targeting funding on specific priorities; and supporting improvement in local revenue collection. All these measures are critical to the fiscal decentralization agenda.
b) Planning and budgeting: effectively linking planning and budgeting,; introducing inclusive and cost effective planning; and strengthening the various aspects of technical planning.
c) Implementation and production: encouraging and introducing procurement procedures and practices; developing procurement and production modalities; strengthening supervision, monitoring and oversight; training and upgrading the skills of contractors; and establishing effective operations and maintenance.
d) Capacity building: including formal training and learning by doing.
e) Accountability and transparency: including communication strategies for downward and upward accountabilities, and instituting strong M&E systems

Significant debate has been generated among development partners and governments on the best way forward in support to Decentralization and Decentralized Governance. In a discussion paper prepared for the International Conference on Local Development (June 2004), three alternative approaches to local development were put forward: decentralized sectoral; local government; and direct community approaches. The three share common objectives- increasing local access to public infrastructure; public services and economic opportunities; increasing the empowerment of local actors; and enhancing sustainability of local development processes. However when it comes to the ground they promote different institutional arrangements which can indeed have different long-term outcomes.

Decentralized sectoral approaches tend to be sector focused promoting deconcentration within the framework of a given sector (health, education). There is a danger of serious overlooking of local governments and conflicts in terms of priorities, thus weakening the local planning and empowerment process. The sector wide approaches, which have been promoted, have been positive in supporting the technical and financial needs of the sector but tend to leave out building the necessary capacity of local institutions, which, in the long term, are critical for local ownership and sustainability. Indeed, the emphasis on operational management severely limits strategic response to local conditions and priorities. There is also a tendency for the centre to believe they have the answers to the problems and to have a top down approach.

Local government approaches focus on the transfer of responsibilities by the State to lower jurisdiction and promote the development of local capacities to plan, priorities and implement development. The quality of local governments and their capacities is a very crucial factor for success and in many cases accounts for the failures. There is therefore a need for a holistic picture of decentralization, which has to be supported by the constitutions and legislatures in order to avoid excessive politicization of decision making, poor coordination and vulnerability to “demand overload” when citizen expectations and the devolved responsibilities exceed local government capacities.

Direct community approaches include a range of social funds that are channeled directly to communities, which utilize a project structure outside government to implement the programmes. Direct Community Funds are very effective in terms of reaching the target groups and in achieving delivery targets. In the end it is a combination of the three approaches and making them compliment each other, which is the secret to long-term sustainability. This is being recognized in the new programmes where the design of the local development funds is very much being linked to government ownership and integrated within the government norms and regulations. There is also a greater recognition that promoting decentralized governance is about strengthening the capacities of the State and therefore its central involvement is the most important factor for success. The Decentralization and Local Governance Study (2004) highlighted the following key issues for Donors and the different approaches for capacity building:
a) need for long term donor commitment as the reform of local government systems is a time and resource-consuming exercise.
b) Central Government condition is a precondition for effective support. Donors cannot push governments to reform and that capacity building is an integral part of any needed support.
c) Improvements of coordination between donors and partner governments are a prerequisite for success.
d) It is essential to scale up piloted interventions in district/municipalities /and cities into national programmes in order to build on the lessons learnt.
e) There is a need to build on, and emphasize the poverty dimension of decentralization programmes.
f) There is need for more focus on building local government own revenues in order to create sustainability.
g) There is a need to build capacities of civil society and grassroots organizations in order to strengthen local voice.

3.7 Capacity Development necessary to achieve public service delivery at Local levels
There is no golden formula for capacity development for decentralized governance in Africa or indeed elsewhere in the world. It is, however, clear that there is a need to package support to enable the process to proceed with clear goals and targets. Decentralization is a process of reform, which requires careful re-engineering of existing systems, building the necessary alliances and ensuring full political support. Most countries moving towards decentralized systems therefore develop policy strategy frameworks that guide the process in the short, medium and long term, and integrate the objectives of decentralization with the broader national policies. This includes the Poverty Eradication Plans, Millennium Development Goals Plan and a variety of Sector wide plans.

How do we build capacity to strengthen political decentralization? Emphasis in most plans is to build the capacity of citizens through civic groups, community groups and through local government participatory mechanisms. The objective is to deepen the democratic process at the local levels and ensure that citizens are engaged in the local decision-making, the planning process and the implementation of the development process. Support has also been provided to the voting process and providing the necessary voter education at national and local levels. The challenge in most cases is that local people are not made fully aware of the real decisions taking place and tend to be involved in small marginal activities. There is, therefore, need for investment in the education process to overcome the rampant adult illiteracy, which would unlock potential for participation in the political and development process. Training of elected councilors is another very important input in the capacity development at local level. The key outcomes should be: a) Local political leaders are fully cognizant of their roles and responsibilities and acting in the best interests of their citizens; b) Central and local government leaders establish clear partnership for local development; and c) Local civic organizations, community based groups, religious groups and traditional groups are effectively interacting in partnership to achieve local development.

How do we build capacity for administrative decentralization? The first challenge is to define the functions clearly and know the capacities needed to make the functions a reality. What do we need to make a local authority function? What sort of personnel should be in place? What kind of resources are needed to fund the functions and the capacities needed at the local level? In many countries, the central government itself is very weak and unable to provide the necessary guidance to local governments.

How do we build the capacity for fiscal decentralization? This is another very essential dimension for local decentralized governance to take place. Most decentralization policy frameworks capture the fiscal transfers from central government that are necessary for the decentralized delivery of infrastructure and services. These include unconditional grants, conditional grants and equalization grants. There has also been elaboration of the formulas that are needed to ensure that localities utilize their allocat1ons effectively and efficiently. In most countries, the institution of local government finance commission has been put in place to intermediate between central and local governments. However, as highlighted in many countries, the local revenue framework is extremely weak resulting in a large and unhealthy dependence of sub national governments on the centre, revealing hierarchical monitoring and top down planning. There is an urgent need to develop and expand the necessary instruments for “own revenue” for both urban and rural authorities, which requires improving the administrative arrangements and collecting capacities for local taxes and charges. There should also be non-interference and manipulation by the central government, which undermines the locally elected authorities’ capacity to generate local revenues.

References
Commonwealth local Government Forum website: www.clgf .uk UNCDF website: www.uncdf.org United Cities and Local Governments website: www.uclg.org
De Valk P and Wekwete K.H, Decentralization for participatory planning?, Gower Aldershot 1991.
Mawhood. P., Local Government for Development: The experience of Tropical Africa, John Wiley, Chichester, 1983
Mkandawire.T, Thinking about Developmental States in Africa Conference paper, United Nations University,, October 1998.
Ndegwa S. N., Decentralization in Africa: a stocktaking survey, World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series No 40, November 2002.
James S. Wunch and Dele Olowu, The Failure of the centralized State: Institutions and self-governance in Africa, ICS Press 1995, San Francisco, California
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Survey on support to Local Governance and decentralization: For the Informal Working group on local Governance and Decentralization, OECD 2006
Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice, The World Bank 2007
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Delivering the Goods –Building Local Government Capacity to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, UNCDF 2006
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa, Proceedings from the Cape Town Symposium 2002
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Local Government Initiative: Pro poor infrastructure and service delivery in Africa, UNCDF 2004
United Nations Development Programme, Report on Role in Decentralization and local development, UNDP Evaluation 2000 (in conjunction with German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

United Nations Development Programme, Decentralized Governance for Development: a combined practice note on decentralization, Local Governance, Urban and Rural Development, UNDP, March 2004
World Bank, Linking Community Empowerment, Decentralized Governance and Public Service provision through a Local Development Framework, World Bank, International Conference paper June 2004 (Human Development, Social Development and Public Sector management Networks)

4. Globalization and State Capacity in Africa
L. Adele JINADU

4.1 The Problematic Nature of Globalization
4.1.1 Definitional Challenges
How do we conceptualize and problematize the relationship between globalization and state capacity in Africa? What problems and challenges does globalization pose for state capacity in Africa? Posing the question in this way is intended to link the character and direction of the African state, and the interplay of economic, political and socio-cultural processes within it, to the impact of globalization. In Africa, exogenous material, political, and socio-cultural forces have historically offered challenges, opportunities and constraints to state capacity on the continent. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that globalization is unproblematic for state capacity in Africa. A starting point, therefore, is to problematize globalization as a central determining factor in building state capacity on the continent.

But what is globalization? And which, or whose globalization is the reference to? This question becomes important, since globalization is an example of what Gallie [1955] has described as “essentially contested concepts.” The “contested” nature of globalization is evident in current debate about its meaning and nature. The debate has pitted “hyperglobalist,” “skeptical,” and “transformationalist” accounts of globalization against one another. [Held & McGrew, 2001:324]. However, a common defining element in these different accounts, models and versions is its use to refer to a complex set of historical and material processes, which has resulted in, or is the catalyst for “a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power…[It] can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness.” [Held & McGrew, 2001:234]. Or, as another definition has put it, “Globalization…[has] to do with the growing influence that economic, social and cultural processes at the international level have on those same processes at the national or regional level.” [United Nations/CEPAL/ECLAC, 2000:25]

4.1.2 Globalization as Ideology
If globalization reflects economic, cultural and political exchanges and diffusions from one part of the world to the other, it requires typologizing or differentiating, historicizing or contextualizing. Additionally, and more importantly, and in view of its diffusionist and hegemonizing logic, it is important to focus on its underlying ideological or normative anchor or driving force, what Leys [1996:43] has characterized as “the global theory of development.” Globalization, in other words, has its own ideology, if only because “every system of power tends to develop its own ideology, and ideology guides and rationalizes the governmental policies that impose and sustain the system of power.” [Lowi: 2000:17] But the ideological superstructure of globalization has varied from mercantilist, protectionist, and Keynesian to the now regnant neo-liberal ones, with their combination of differing emphasis on two functional prerequisites of capitalist development: free enterprise or “possessive individualism,” and social control by the state.

The basic ideological contention is, therefore, not about the exclusion of social or state control but how to conceptualize and determine the extent and limit of that control, how much of it should be concentrated at the centre and its institutions, and how much should be devolved from central to local control. But as I have argued elsewhere [Jinadu, 2000:71], the ideological basis for the contemporary phase of globalization is neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on economic and political liberalization and its consequential rejection of social democracy and Keynesian state interventionism. Indeed neo-liberalism is a theory of world capitalist development.

4.1.3 The problematic nature of globalization for Africa
In spite of the talk about the “end of history” [Fukuyama, 1992], the realignment engendered by this new globalization, as in the hegemonic emergence of the United States, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the new, enlarged European Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the commandist economies of its satellites in Eastern Europe, and the projected reforms of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions, has highlighted and problematized the contradictions of this new process of globalization, whose undercurrents are much more structurally fundamental, reflecting the contradiction between capital and labour, than efforts to characterize them as arising from the clash of civilizations and cultures would suggest. [Huntington, 1996]

Therefore, to understand why it is a problem for state capacity in Africa, it is important to conceptualize the model globalization used here as referring specifically to a complex set of interconnected multi-linear, multifaceted and dialectical and still unfolding historical processes. The processes are propelled by the transnationalization of finance capital, in search of new markets, and the logic of capital accumulation. Typically, the processes are characterized by structural differentiation and unequal functional integration or interdependence and exchange between metropolitan and dependent or satellite nations, peoples and markets. They are mediated and facilitated on a world scale by technological advances, world trade regimes, and by hegemonizing and universalizing or homogenizing cultural and intellectual institutions, even as they generate their contraries or competing responses.

More recently, this homogenizing globalization has resulted in the emergence of the internationalized state and of a “ layer of transnational institutional authority above” the state, both of which facilitate the creation of transnational market interests, the movement of transnational capital, and the emergence of networks of national and transnational state actors [MacLean, et. al., 2001]. It has, however, necessitated, as a strategic policy response to the inherent logic of this globalization, new modes of political and economic governance structures and processes, which are not only derogating from traditional concepts of sovereignty but also are impelling new definitions of the state and of citizenship, while also creating new and competing political and cultural identities. This development has had profound implications for the character of the state in Africa, as indeed elsewhere in the world, and has further complicated the question of state capacity in Africa.

The trajectories of this model of globalization as a historical and structural process of capitalist and imperialist domination on a world scale, and of the global diffusion or replication of its economic substructures and cultural and political superstructures, have been well outlined and analyzed by others and need not be repeated here. [Aina, 1996; Ake, 1996; Amin, 1976, 1992; Griffin & Khan, 1992; Hoogvelt, 1997; Leys, 1996; McBride and Wiseman, 2000; Nabudere, 2000; Robertson, 1992; Rodney, 1972; Rugumamu, 2001; Scott, 1992; UNDP, 1996; Wallerstein, 1974]

However, the point to emphasize here, in order to locate the problem of state capacity in Africa within the context of this mainstream version of globalization as a historical and structural-materialist, diffusionist process from the West to other parts of the world, is that in its engagement with Africa, it has historically been characterized by uneven market and cultural exchanges between unequal partners, the underdevelopment of Africa’s human capital and the fragility of its economic and political institutions. But globalization has not only led to the marginalization of Africa but also denied it the possibility and prospects of auto-centered development, by regarding it [Africa] as a “follower society,” in the image of hegemonizing and globalizing West.

This is why, regarding its impact on state capacity in Africa, it is important to go beyond Eurocentric or “west-centered” perspectives on globalization, in their emphasis on “time-space compression,” “shrinking world,” “integrated markets,” “global interdependence” to problematize globalization in terms of “the inequality, unevenness and injustice embodied in the New World Order…and the social, economic, political and gender implications and consequences of the global restructuring of capital through SAPs.” [Aina, 1996:20-21]

So defined and problematized, globalization needs to be analyzed in terms of the opportunities and challenges it has posed for the state formation process in Africa, and particularly for the prospects and possibilities for the development of auto-centered or indigenously based state capacity on the continent.

4.2 . Problematizing State Capacity
4.2.1 Defining state capacity in Africa
But what does state capacity mean in the context of the African state? The answer to this question is partly to be found in the attributes, or the powers and functions normally associated with the modern state. Such attributes, no doubt shifting and variable over time, include sovereignty; the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force to ensure law and order, to enforce contract, and to deter external aggression; the pursuit of the public welfare, through public political institutional processes and public policies; and physical, natural, social, cultural, and human resource endowment and development.

State capacity is also a function of the complementary, indeed reinforcing and consolidating role of subsidiary associations and groups in mediating the relationship between the state and its institutions on the one hand, and the civil society, on the other hand, and in conferring legitimacy on the state. This is another form of human resource endowment or capacity. State capacity, therefore, is a function of the strength or deficit of these attributes, and of the extent to which a political culture of public spiritedness prevails within both the political leadership, the citizenry generally.

State capacity is also a function of the distance between the state and these subsidiary associations and groups. In other words, state capacity depends on the extent to which citizens take their civic responsibility seriously and will defend their own sovereign rights; believe they own the state and belong to it; and have confidence in its ability, through legal and political processes, to manage or contain conflict impartially.

4.2.2 State capacity, democratization and inclusiveness
This perspective towards state capacity, which neither narrowly restricts it to, nor defines it exclusively in terms of, human and physical resource capacity-building or capacity-enhancement, nor limits it to econometric or statistical computations of gross domestic product or national income data, though it includes and requires both, assumes a democratic, open, participatory, and socially inclusive political system, based on what might be described as a social contract between the state and its citizens. While it also assumes that there is a strong connection between state capacity and the direction and substantive content of public policy, it views state capacity as a function of both a combination of democratic political and legal culture, and of the evolution and durability of democratic public political and socio-economic and cultural institutions. What the perspective also underlines is the need to shift focus to, and to specify the determining material and socio- political conditions or environments for state capacity, and how to restructure or change them to enhance state capacity. This is what Amartya Sen [1999:38] meant when he hypothesized that the “instrumental freedoms [political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security] tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, but they also serve to complement each other…strengthening their joint importance.” This is why he [Sen, 1999:298] concluded that, “Development is indeed a momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities.”

Although there is ebb and flow of state capacity, which is to say that it is always, and necessarily developing, waning and waxing, depending on historical or conjunctural forces, much also depends, in the long run, on the character of the state and its ability to sustain and continually renew, regenerate or re-invent itself. Much also depends, in this regard, on the answer to the question, “to whom does the state belong?” For to pose this question is to raise the critical issue of access to the state, and to project participation and social inclusiveness as important conditions for expanding and consolidating state capacity on a sustainable basis in Africa as elsewhere.

4.2.3 Pan-African Dimensions of State Capacity
There is another dimension, a Pan-African one to the problem of state capacity. This is the compelling need for collective action at the African continental and Diaspora levels by African countries to deepen, consolidate and move the integration process in Africa forward, so that common problems of state capacity facing them can be more collectively handled. Historically, globalization has divided and balkanized them, carving out political, economic and cultural spheres of influence, and weakening their ability to act collectively to defend their common interests. Collective action by them will require new governance structures to strengthen African regional economic communities, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, along lines that will, by democratizing decision-making and public political processes within their member-states, enhance state